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Chapter I 

DEFEAT AND REFORM: THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND 

THE ADOPTION OF THE FRENCH-AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF WAR 

Part I 

For some forty years prior to the Civil War, the United 

States Army prepared itself for the task of successfully 

waging a European-style war. The humiliating War of 1812 

provided the stimulus for a complete realignment of American 

military doctrine and practice along the lines of the 

prevailing French-Austrian school of post-Napoleonic war­

fare. Official American military policy in these years 

stressed the need for scientific, mathematically precise 

strategical and tactical theory, for a rededication to 

conservative political and social values and an emphasis 

upon traditional aristocratic warrior ethics. For these 

same forty or so years the Army was compelled by its 

political masters in Congress and in the executive branch to 

devote itself to the dirty and occasionally dishonorable 

task of Indian control and frontier security duty. Yet, the 

American Army of the European, French-Austrian school of 

war, remained virtually unaltered or affected by the pro­

tracted experience of frontier security duty. The pro­
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nounced gulf between these two quite different yet nonethe­

less connected spheres of the Antebellum American Army is 

the subject of this investigation. 

The War of 1812 exposed deep, crippling failures of 

ordnance, strategy and tactics, administration, logistics 

and, most appalling, leadership or as Secretary of War Lewis 

puts it: 

...not withstanding the lessons left by the 
revolution, we entered the War of 1812 in a state 
of extreme inefficiency with respect to all the 
administrative departments of the military
service. 4n utter waste of millions was the 
consequence. 
Civilian control of the Army, particularly the direct com­
mand of field operations by Secretary of War John Armstrong 
and the selection of senior officers personally by President 
James Madison, produced strident opposition from many 
younger military commanders. And the severe malperformance 
of the militia, particularly the galling failure of New York 
troops to support the invasion of Canada, further intensi­
fied the demands of regular officers for significant, com­
prehensive reform of the United States Army.2 
One of the few gains for the United States from its 

humbling experience in the War of 1812, was the emergence of 

a new generation of professional officers to replace the 

superannuated veterans of the Revolutionary War. In the 

forefront of new vibrant Army leadership were such 

influential officers as Edmund P. Gaines, Winfield Scott, 

Jacob Brown and Alexander Macomb. All were under forty 
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years of age; all had risen to prominence during the course 

of the War of 1812, not one having entered the service prior 

to 1808. Moreover, the Army was truly their home, in that 

they were largely rootless insofar as ties to civil society 

were concerned. While by no means uniform in their princi­

ples of military science, these officers, nevertheless, were 

in substantial agreement as to the need for a complete and 

exhaustive reorganization and redefinition of the Army's 

role in national defense. The administration of President 

Monroe and his extraordinarily effective Secretary of War, 

John C. Calhoun, provided both a forum for the articulation 

and implementation of new concepts of military science as 

well as invaluable political support in navigating war 

legislation through a hostile and unreceptive Congress.4 

The model upon which Army reform was to be based was 

that of post-Napoleonic, Bourbon France, then the center of 

military science. Certainly there was nothing in the brief 

history of American arms from which to develop an indigenous 

model of Army organization and doctrine. The pre-War of 

1812 Army had been a small, ill-defined and ill-funded, 

desultory and even dishonorable military force. The regular 

Army was created essentially as an afterthought to the 

demobilization of the Continental Army. Thus, on June 2, 

1784, Congress created a tiny eighty soldier force to guard 

the two United States arsenals.' From that date on, through 

the War of 1812, the American Army resembled an accordion, 
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as Congress enlarged and then just as suddenly decreased its 
strength as crises, real or imagined, came and went. In the 
1790s ,  for example, as war loomed with France and as Indian 
problems escalated along the Old Northwest Frontier, 
Congress feverishly expanded Army strength to over three 
thousand men, a nearly two hundred percent increase. Yet 
when the threat of war evaporated or when Indian problems 
faded, Congress promptly implemented severe reductions of 
the Army as in the 1802 Peace Act.6 
The pre-War of 1812 Army had labored thanklessly in the 
absence of any precise definition of its role in national 
war policy. It sometimes had been given responsibility for 
frontier security and on occasion it had been given a role 
in the defense against prospective foreign adversaries. But 
its exact mission remained at best a mystery, its reason for 
existence being confused and contorted by the recurrent 
shifts in Congressional interest toward the Army. Further­
more, little of note had been achieved by the early Army in 
its few consequential military actions. From General Arthur 
St. Clair's massacre in 1795 through the demeaning experi­
ence of the War of 1812, in which the United States had only 
succeeded in eking out a draw with Great Britain, the tra­
dition of the American Army was largely bereft of triumph.7 
The earlier American military model, that of the Royal Army, 
while in many respects still embedded in the matrix of the 
Army's organization and customs, was, in the years after 
5 

Napoleon, widely declared by progressive military thinkers 

to be obsolete and contrary to the latest advances in war­

fare.8 The Army had as well suffered previously from being 

a political football; in the 1 7 9 0 s  the Federalists dominated 
the officers corps only to be undermined in their influence 

by the passage of President Thomas Jefferson's 1802 Peace 

Act, designed in part to create new positions for 

Democratic-Republican officers.9 

For a small, fourth-rate military power, humiliated by 

recent defeat and the sacking of its capital, the choice of 

a model from which substantial reforms were to be derived 

was thus obvious. The United States Army adopted wholesale 

the methods of Bourbon France, the successor of Napoleon's 

Empire and the most successful and triumphant military power 

of the day. United States Army officers had even before 

1815 laid the foundation for a long and beneficial associa­

tion with the French school of war. During the Revolution­

ary War and afterwards, French military works had circulated 

widely among those Americans of a military bent; the early 

engineer corps was staffed almost exclusively with seconded 

or loaned French officers. The allure of French military 

prowess coupled with the dazzling color and elan of the 

Napoleonic armies, gripped the minds of officers on both 

sides of the Atlantic. General Winfield Scott was therefore 

dispatched, in 1815, by the War Department to visit the new 
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mecca of the art of war, to gather data on the reasons for 
the stunning French military achievements.10 
The prism through which the new trans-Atlantic military 
doctrine was viewed, however, was not that of either the 
French Revolutionary Republic or the Empire. Rather it was 
the conservative backlash of the Congress of Vienna and the 
revival of the monarchy in Bourbon France which acted as 
filters, blocking out the more revolutionary and unsettling 
aspects of Napoleonic Warfare. Only Prussia, due to a 
very different national reaction to Napoleon, developed a 
rival and quite dissimilar system of war fighting, one that 
would attract wide attention only after her crushing defeat 
of France in 1870. The United States, as with all other 
Western nations, studiously followed the lead of Bourbon 
France and Austria in revising and upgrading its system of 
war. l2 Thus as West Point professor Edward P. Mansfield put 
it so succinctly: "NAPOLEON of France may be regarded as 
strictly the Representative of modern [military] SCIENCE IN 
ACTION. William Duane, a major American writer on mili­
tary subjects in the first decade of the Nineteenth Century, 
concurred fully with this position when he wrote in 1811: 
"the armies of France have exhibited an activity and an 
energy unexampled and unknown to the armies o f  other 
nations. ii 1 4  
The linchpin of post-Napoleonic warfare was the concept 

of officer professionalism. Officership, in the Sixteenth 
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and Seventeenth Centuries, by and large, had been a 
commercial trade, combining proven field success with acute 
business acumen. Due to the lack of substantial permanent 
military forces and as an alternative to the ineffective 
feudal levy, commercial officership and the employment of 
mercenary free companies became prevalent. Generals, 
therefore, had to sell their services to a prospective 
customer and in turn, raise the men and equipment to execute 
their employer's wishes. The distinct disadvantage of such 
commercial officers was that their loyalty all too often 
went no further than the size of their employer's purse. 
The profound intellectual and political reaction to the 
unrestrained, tartarean violence of the proceeding Thirty 
Years War led, in the Eighteenth Century, to the emergence 
of centralized monarchial nation states. Concomitant with 
such political concentration of power was the imposition of 
a royal monopoly on the exercise of military power. 
Correspondingly, standing armies, as opposed to mere royal 
bodyguards, reappeared in Europe. Officership, in turn, 
became a function of social class. The aristocracy were 
literally dragooned into military service by the new 
absolute monarchs. Now these factious and fatuous aristo­
crats could safely exercise their militaristic tendencies 
only in the service of the state. Moreover, compulsory 
military service allowed the monarchy free access to the 
financial resources of these gentlemen and in turn bound 
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their fates with that of their lord. Such officers were 

very loyal, in terms of class identification. National 

origin, however, was of little import. Officers freely 

crossed borders in pursuit of military service and adven­

ture. There was as well the emergence of a true community 

of officership; these men shared a common ethos of aristo­
cratic social and warrior values and shared a common lang­
uage, French.1 5  
The gentleman officer was not a wholly satisfactory m 
model of military leadership. While extolling the warrior 
ethos of honor, elan and courage, there were at best, only 
limited requirements for technical expertise in the arts of 
war. Only the small number of artillery and engineer 
officers received any form of technical instruction. They 
thus constituted the intellectual, though not the social 
elite of Eighteenth Century armies, due to the highly 
specialized nature o f  their branch of military service. 
Most officers received only the most cursory formal 
instruction in the art of war. Prussia and Russia, for 
example, established military academies, run as crack 
infantry battalions, coupled with an apprenticeship in the 
ranks to weed out the incompetent and the unfit. Warfare, 
however, save for the complexities of siegecraft, was not a 
terribly demanding intellectual activity in these years. 
Basically, for most officers, all that was required of them 
was to be able to memorize the drill book, to be capable of 
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moving their men forwards and backwards and to execute the 
assorted evolutions of the line. The battlefield and not 
the classroom dominated military education. Furthermore, 
the first systematic works on tactics only began to appear 
in the late 1 7 2 0 s  and the first crude treatise on strategy 
in the 1 7 9 0 s .  What few works there were of a truly military 
nature (as opposed to autobiographies or philosophical 
inquiries into the nature and limits of war) were dominated 
by the mathematically-centered treatises of the artillerists 
and the engineers. While the need for improvement in the 
standards of officership gradually became apparent over the 
course of the Eighteenth Century, no clear idea merged as to 
what form the remedy should take.16 
The astonishing success of the French Revolutionary 

Armies compelled a rapid reconsideration of the principles 

of officership. As barefoot, badly armed and trained 

citizen soldiers led by former noncommissioned and junior 

officers of the Royal French Army swept aside the 

traditional forces of Austria, Prussia and Great Britain, 
the need for substantial change in the concept of military 
leadership became evident. l7  The French-Austrian 
redefinition of officership was both progressive and 
traditional in nature. On the one hand it was innovative in 
seeking to create a professional corps of officers, formally 
educated in the science of war. Professionalism is 
generally considered to be composed of five essential 
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components: First, a systematic body of specialized 

knowledge transmitted to members by a formal education 

process; Second, a commitment to use professional knowledge 

for the benefit of society; Third, a sense of belonging to a 

unique group, distinct from the rest of society; Fourth, 

professionalism is characterized by a high level of self-

government within the particular subculture, sanctioned by 

the larger society; Finally, a network of formal 

institutions and organizations concerned with the leadership 

a n d  e d u c a t i o n  o f  t h a t  p r o f e s s i o n .  I n  s o m e  

respects, therefore, a profession constitutes a kind of 

aristocracy of knowledge, membership being conferred upon 

those persons who have successfully applied themselves to 

the mastery of such specialized information and skills.18 

Such trends were in turn a major aspect of the Industrial 

Revolution's effect of compartmentalizing technical 

knowledge and precise skills into narrowly defined 

categories.19 

On the other hand, while modern in appearance, the 
French school of post-Napoleonic warfare was as well an 
affirmation of traditional aristocratic values. The leading 
problem of traditional officership, so painfully revealed by 
the French Revolution was the shocking degree of disloyalty 
of many lower-ranked officers, generally not of aristocratic 
birth. Thus, in addition to the incorporation of technical 
expertise, officership was redefined to insure complete 
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personal and political loyalty to the state. This goal was, 

therefore, a reaffirmation of the Eighteenth Century 

principles of isolating the military as completely as 

possible from the corruptions of civil society. Elan, honor 

and bravery, traditional warrior values, became 

institutionalized, via professionalism, as the moral basis 

of officership -- in other words, the military's equivalent 
to the conservative counter revolution of the Congress of 

Vienna. Furthermore, it was to a degree, an expression of 

the Romantic movement against the rationalism of the 

Enlightenment, albeit more of style than of substance.20 

Professionalism, to a degree, thus constituted a shield, 

guarding as well as isolating the officer corps from the 

politics and ideologies of civil society.21 This Janus-like 
quality of both modernity and traditional warrior values, 

was both the hallmark and the central weakness of French-

Austrian, post-Napoleonic military doctrine, including its 

theory of officership. Over time, these discordant elements 

would tear against each other, with traditional usually 

emerging victorious. Only Prussia evolved a very different, 

far more technocratic definition of officership in which 

aristocratic warrior values gave shape but not definition to 
the concept of military leadership.22  
Part I1 
The debate over American war policy in the immediate 
post-War of 1 8 1 2  years focused on the size of the regular 
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Army. The larger the force retained by Congress, the less 
the regular Army's reliance upon the militia as well as its 
greater expense. The strength of the Army from 1815 to 1817 
was approximately nineteen thousand. Such a force was far 
too large, politically and economically, for the nation to 
maintain in peacetime. In 1817, John C. Calhoun was made 
Secretary of War. During his brilliant administration, 
Calhoun, through internal reform and political haggling with 
Congress, hammered out the basic structural form of the 
United States Army until the administration of Theodore 
Roosevelt. 2 3  
An ardent proponent of a standing army, Calhoun 
believed that a military force of no less than ten thousand 
men was the key to the effective defense of the nation.24 
Such a force, due to the limitations of and the length of 
time involved in sail-propelled ocean transport, was deemed 
sufficiently large to counter any foreseeable threat from a 
major European power. acting in conjunction with the senior 
leadership of the Army, Calhoun developed for the first 
time, a definition of the military's mission in the defense 
of the country. First and last, the Army was to be prepared 
to meet a European threat to American independence. This 
doctrine became ingrained as formal Army policy for the 
remainder of the Nineteenth Century. "However remote our 
situation from the great powers of the world", propounded 
Calhoun, "and however peaceful our policy, we are, 
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notwithstanding, liable to be involved in a war; and to 

resist with success its calamities and dangers, a standing 

army in peace, in the present improved state of the military 
service, is an indispensable preparation. II 25 
The years 1818 to 1821, were not, however conducive to 

Congressional support for such a radical and expensive 

departure from traditional American military practice. The 

severe downturn in the economy after 1818 placed consider­

able pressure upon Congress to make significant reductions 

in federal spending. With no major foreign crisis in the 

offing, with an army clearly too large for the needs of 

frontier security duty, the House on May 11, 1820 continued 

its traditional animus toward standing armies, directed the 

Secretary of War to report a plan for the reduction of Army 

strength to some six thousand men. 26 

Although vigorously opposed by the full spectrum of 

senior Army leadership, Calhoun, effectively but grudgingly, 

set about his unpleasant task of reducing American military 

strength. In a rearguard action to preserve the embryonic 

concept of military professionalism, as well as to ensure 

the combat effectiveness of the diminished Army, Calhoun 

devised the concept of a modular or skeleton army: 

The great and leading object, then of a 
military establishment in peace, ought to be to 
create and perpetuate military skill and 
experience, so that, at all times, the country may
have at its command a body of officers, 
sufficiently numerous and well...instructed in 
every branch of duty, both of the line and of the 
staff; and the organization of the army ought to 
14 

be such as to enable the Government, at the 
commencement of hostilities, to obtain a regular
[force], adequate to the emergencies of the 
country, propvly organized and prepared for 

actual service. 

In short, the Army would be so organized as to allow 

for rapid expansion in time of war. To this end, 

supernumary or cadre officers were to be attached to each 

line battalion, who in wartime, would command an additional 

fourth company, fleshed out by militiamen. The result would 

be an efficient and relatively problem-free expansion of the 

regular Army in periods of national emergency. On January 

23, 1821 the House passed legislation providing for a force 

of six thousand men commanded by a single brigadier-general 

supported by a much reduced general staff. The result was 

to vitiate the effectiveness of Calhoun's skeleton army 

concept. The Senate, exhibiting far greater support for the 

modular army plan, passed legislation generally conforming 

to Calhoun's design: a six thousand man force organized for 

future expansion (although with fewer surplus officers than 

were requested by the Secretary of War), commanded by a 

major-general and two brigadier-generals and assisted by a 

somewhat smaller general staff. This legislative plan, 

while not expressly ratifying the idea of officer 

professionalism as such, nevertheless, gave considerable 

support to this definition of military leadership. In the 

end, the Senate version prevailed, setting the basic form of 

the Army for the rest of the century. 
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While t h e  n e w  Army system of organization 

was in fact too constricted to allow for efficient and ready 

expansion, it nonetheless represented a significant advance 

over the impermanent and wildly fluctuating pre-War of 1 8 1 2  
Army. 2 8  Yet the ultimate purpose of this reconstituted 
Army, the defense of the United States from foreign 

invasion, had ironically been effectively negated by the 

Louisiana Purchase in 1 8 0 3 ,  by the terms of the Treaty of 
Gent and by the political understandings reached by the 

leading European powers at the Congress of Vienna. The 

result of these three events, by 1 8 2 0 ,  in concert with the 
limitations of sail power, effectively provided for the 

political and military isolation from Europe so long 

cherished by many Americans. 2 9  Only the development of 
steam powered ships in the 1 8 3 0 s  and 1 8 4 0 s  significantly 
altered this physical isolation from European power. 3 0  
Consequently, many Americans held the view that "the United 
States, from [its] peculiar geographical situation, have 
undoubtedly less need of military establishments than any 
other government now existing. 'I3' The result was a small 
military service barely capable of meeting the unlikely 
threat of European aggression and saddled instead with the 
considerable burden of frontier security duty in the ever 
growing territories of the United States. 
16 

Part I11 

As in Europe, Americans interest din upgrading and 

systematizing the training of officers, were groping for 

some form of improved officer education. The need for some 

form of military education for American officers was 

realized as early as 1783 with General George Washington's 

response to a congressional committee's request for his 

views on National war policy. Washington, in his response, 

in part, argued for the creation of a national military 

academy. A variety o f  other plans were advanced from 
Alexander Hamilton's plan for a grand system of basic and 

advanced military instruction to Colonel Louisdale Toward's 

suggestion for a school for the preparatory training of 

officer candidates. 

Implementation of these schemes came to naught.32 In 

1874 Congress created the Corps of Artillerists and 

Engineers. The enabling legislation provided for eight 

cadets. Training, however, was of the instructional method, 
rather than through formal schooling.33 
The true origin of formal American military instruction 
began on March 16, 1802 when Congress established a school 

of engineering at West Point, New York. The primary 

motivation of the Jefferson administration of switching from 

its earlier opposition to military professionalism was its 

desire to end Federal domination of the officer corps.34 

The new military academy was established as a division of 
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the Corps of Engineers (separated in 1802 from the 

artillery); the superintendent being the Commandant of this 

corps. Access was limited solely to prospective engineer 

officers. No significant advance was made in the function 

of the Military Academy until 1806 when it was informally 

opened to cadets from other branches of the Army. Prior to 

this date, prospective officers for artillery or infantry 

service obtained military employment from the respective 

corps (the administrative body of each branch of the Army) 

which issued warrants to such candidates, subject to 

presidential ratification. On the whole, prior to 1817, 

West Point was a rather indifferent technical school 

designed solely to train engineer officers.35 

I n  1812 legislation was passed by Congress 

significantly altering the form and purpose of the Military 

Academy. Drawing directly from the French system of 

military education, in particular, the distinguished army 

engineering school, the L'Ecole Polytechnique, West Point 

was remade into a truly academic school of war. The Corps 

of Cadets was enlarged to two hundred and fifty officer 

candidates and entry requirements were imposed mandating 

basic competence in reading, writing and arithmetic, with 

final selection overseen by the Secretary of War. Of 

considerable importance was the creation of the first 

professorships; the subjects, initially being natural 

philosophy, French and mathematics, demonstrated both the 
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European and the engineering foundations of the curriculum. 
The new importance of West Point was forcefully demonstrated 
by making senior cadet class ranking the overriding factor 
as to which branches of service were open to the prospective 
officer. Thus the preponderance of the officer corps, save 
for those promoted from the ranks or appointed directly from 
civilian life, would now have completed a common, standard­
ized four year course of military instruction. The 
objective, in part, as in the numerous military academies 
opened in these years in Europe, was to create uniformity in 
the technical skills of war. More importantly, was the 
development of a new class identification among the members 
of the officer corps: a combination of traditional 
aristocratic values and the new concept of military 
professionalism. The impact of these reforms was delayed by 
the outbreak of hostilities in 1812 with Great Britain, 
which greatly disrupted the education of the country's 
future officers.36 
Chief Engineer, Colonel Joseph G. Swift, in 1816 issued 
a set of regulations which fleshed out the earlier 1812 
Congressional legislation and, in turn, fashioned the basic 
structure of West Point down to the present day. A Board of 
Visitors, patterned after the analogous Council de 
Perfectionment of the L'Ecole Polytechnique, and composed of 
five distinguished gentlemen (frequently including the 
Senate and House military committee chairmen) was created to 
1 9  
oversee the annual examinations and to advise on the 

operation of the school.37  Secondly, cadets were henceforth 
to be ranked on the basis of merit, as determined by 

academic performance. A comprehensive four year curriculum 

was established as well, with oral examinations held twice a 

year, in July and December. Moreover, the position of cadet 

was granted an official status in the Army's rank structure, 

subjecting the officer candidate to the service's code of 

military law. Finally, new and superior standards of 

Academy administration and organization were implemented, 

particularly the creation of a separate superintendent for 

the school. Organizationally, however, West Point remained 

wedded to the Corps of Engineers.3 8  The revised and far 
more comprehensive course of instruction at West Point was 
thus made the technical foundation o f  the new Army 
professionalism. 3 9  Military writer Henry Barnhard 
succinctly identified what the cadets were expected to have 
mastered: 
They ((the cadets)) were to learn the sterner 

arguments of the battlefield; to arrange squadrons

for the handy fight; to acquire the profound

knowledge of the science and materials of nature, 

which should fit them for the complicated art of 

war; to defend and attack cities; to bridge

rivers; to make roads; to provide armaments; to 

arrange munitions; to understand the topography of 

countries; and to foresee and provid all the 

resources necessary to national defense.$0 
Socially and politically, West Point, as "the nursery 

of officers," was designed to create a new class of military 
professionals, whose paramount loyalty would be to the 
20 
central governmental authority.41 Or as Henry Clay put it, 
in the clearest of terms: 
The individual receiving the advantages

offered by these Instructions would not look to 

any particular State, but would have his 

obligation to the fountain head, and to the 

support and strength ofq2the Union all his 

exertions would be directed. 

The Army could, as with its European counterparts, be 

available for the suppression of rebellion and the 

maintenance of internal order. An officer corps, isolated 

from civil society and whose loyalty flowed not to the 

states but to the federal government, was a crucial element 

in the Army's potential effectiveness in forcefully insuring 

domestic tranquility and order. This use of the Army was 

rarely mentioned by its supporters due to the widespread 

hostility to any standing army as a threat to liberty. Yet 

one officer did anonymously state this potentially necessary 

use of the military: 

Under a well organized and just government,

the military body is always a check upon a certain 

class of people, and particularly individuals,

who, existing in every co%?try, are ever ready to 

foment violence and alarm. 

A third key function of the revamped West Point was to 

serve as the transmitter, throughout the military 

establishment, of the new French-Austrian corpus of military 

science. The Military Academy thus, in part, existed: 

...to introduce into the armies of the United 
States all the modern improvements in the art of 
war and the high state of discipline which 
distinguishes the best armies of Europe, to 
disseminate throughout our country a knowledge of 
2 1  
Military Tactics and Engineering so as to 

furnishing the means of rendering our militia as 

well as regular army an efficient arm: of defense 

in time of war; and to provide officers properly

instructed and fully capable of suggrintending the 

construction of fortifications.... 

President James Monroe, pursuant to a scandal at the 
Academy, involving highly irregular procedures in the 
selection and passing out o f  cadets, culminating in 
Superintendent Captain Allen Partridge's court martial and 
acquittal, moved immediately to find a successor. Under 
Partridge, the Military Academy had been run as simply 
another Army post, not unlike the Eighteenth Century Berlin 
Academy for Prussian officers, with little effort to 
implement the new academic concept of military education. 
Major (later Colonel) Sylvanus Thayer was picked by Monroe 
to become the new head of the Academy. Few American 
officers were as thoroughly prepared for assuming the 
difficult task of installing the new system of professional 
military education and to rebuild the tarnished academic 
credibility o f  the Military Academy, as was Thayer. 
Educated in France, at the extremely prestigious L'Ecole 

Polytechnique, as well as West Point, Thayer was exceedingly 

well versed in post-Napoleonic military theory as well as in 

the most up-to-date pedagogical techniques. In the War of 

1812, moreover, Thayer had distinguished himself as an 

officer of ability and talent; in his capacity as 

Superintendent, as General Scott described in the most 

laudatory of terms, he "gave development and great 

22 

excellence to that institution--stamping upon it his own 

higher character. Under Thayer s enlightened guidance, 

the seminal features and the most enduring traditions of the 

Military Academy were created; it was "to his exertions, we 

owe, in great measure the success of the establishment 

.... The result of Thayer and the Academy's staff labors 
was, in part, the development of the first and most 

important school of engineering prior to the Civil War. 
More importantly, in terms of the needs of the United States 

Army, West Point was to emerge as one of the finest schools 

of military instruction ever created.4 7  For the United 
States Army, the new West Point, patterned after the leading 

European models, was intended to serve as the incubator for 

a new class of American professional officers, trained 

thoroughly in the most modern principles of scientific 

warfare while at the same time embodying the conservative 

ethos and warrior values of their aristocratic predecessors. 

In turn, the Military Academy would function as the catalyst 

for the transformation of the Army into a modern and truly 

effective and potent military service.48 

As with the rest of the dilapidated pre-War of 1812 
Army, the officer corps was a dispirited and indifferent 
lot. "The old officers, according to General Scott, "had, 
very generally, sunk into either sloth, ignorance or habits 
of intemperate drink. 1149 Officer warrants were a form of 
political patronage, awards being based on personal 
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contacts, party affiliation and state or regional 

identification. As with most other Eighteenth Century 

officers, American military commanders learned their trade 

on the job, their knowledge of the art of war being meager 

and as demonstrated by the Napoleonic Wars and the War of 

1812, all too often dangerously inadequate. Complicating 

matters further, was the absence of a uniform system of 

tactics, beyond Frederich von Steuben's drill book, and no 

formal body of regulations until 1812. Political jobs, such 

as postmaster, were frequently taken up by officers, leading 

of course to a lessening of their interest in purely 

military concerns. The rank politics in officer selection 
and promotion, the obvious lack of military success and 
several uproarious moral scandals badly tarnished the 
reputation of  the officer corps. No wonder that the new 
generation of military leaders, rapidly promoted due to the 
repeated failures of their predecessors, so impassionately 
endorsed the very callow principles of professionalism and 
the science of war. Scott expressed the anger and disgust 

of his contemporaries with their predecessors when he 

vehemently savaged their lack of martial prowess: 

Shall a coxcomb who merely wants a splendid

uniform to gratify his peacock vanity- be allowed 

unnecessarily to lose his men by hundreds, or by

thousands, to surrender them in mass, or to cause 

them to be beaten by inferior numbers;-

imbeciles escape ignominious punishment?st3all such 
In a very real sense, therefore, the American officer 

corps had suffered, as a result of the War of 1812, the same 
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sort of debacle, the failure of command and leadership, as 

had the nations of Europe in their wars with France.51 In 
Great Britain, by far the most traditional military power of 
the period, and the most backward in the eyes of the new 
professionals, her officer corps was similarly criticized 
for its lack of expertise in the science of  war. As 
Blanchard Jerrold put it: "an English officer's 

education is expressed by so many pounds sterling. Post-

Napoleonic military science was thus the curative of the 
trans-Atlantic military community followed more or less 
uniformly by virtually every Western nation with the pointed 
exception of Prussia. 5 3  Effective future military 
leadership would demand a mastery of this new body of 
information and maxims. American devotion to the new 
European science of war was held by officers and military 

writers, such as Jacob K. Neff, as critical to the 

modernization and reform of the Army: 

It should be asked why we obtain much of our 

information from European works, let it be 

remembered that we owe our tactics to Europe, and 

that it was against European tactics that our 

heroes had to exercise their powers. It was not 

so much the possession of superior tactics on the 

part of the Americans that crowned their efforts 

with victory
to practice.4 4  as the superior application of them 
Thus the redesign of West Point as a school of the arts 

of war was primarily intended to insure a solid American 

foundation for the continual adoption and transmission of 

the new French-Austrian school of military science. As 
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counseled by a very well informed Calhoun, "no truth is 

better supported by history than that under other 

circumstances being equal, victory will be on the side. . . 
who have the best instructed officers. The new concept 

of military leader thus clearly manifested the Janus-like 

quality of French post-Napoleonic military doctrine. the 
modern face of the French-Austrian school of war, in the 

field of military instruction, was represented by the 

adoption of a new, technical and very mathematical language 

and curriculum, drawn from the only available model, the 

treatises of the engineers and artillerists. In other 

words, as clarified by Colonel J.J. Graham of the British 

Army, mastery of the "science of war" was thus the "proper 
knowledge of the elements of war. For the first time, 
military experience and practice could be expressed, 
analyzed, transmitted and taught in a universal, 
nonjudgmental and wholly scientific manner. The intention 
was to give the student of the science of  war Ira great 
superiority over those who have neglected military science 
under the mistaken notion that untaught honor with 

patriotism is sufficient. 1157 Or as Scott put it, to give 
the West Point graduate, "a head upon his shoulders.i t  58 
On a purely practical level of military command, 

according to Isaac Maltby, "war, like many other things, is 

a science to be acquired, and perfected by diliqence, by 

perseverance, by time, and by practice. 'I5' Therefore, the 
2 6  

necessity of long, hard study and practice, contrary to the 
quaint notion of the gentlemen as inherently an officer by 
act of noble birth, was now held to be essential to the 
proper instruction of the would-be officer, since, as stated 
by E. Hoyt, an American military writer, "an officer cannot 
be the work of a day. 1160 
The second face of the French-Austrian theory of 
military education and its command and leadership doctrine, 
its traditional and more important side, was composed of 
classical aristocratic warrior values. True excellence of 
command thus meant, in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, that an officer possessed the uncommon ability to 
"excel in the coup d'oeil. II 61 Or rather, as clarified by 
the noted French military Engineer and West Point 
instructor, Simon Francis Gay de Verron, "the coup d'oeil is 
the fruit of genius, of the union and assemblage of the 
talents which discovers instantly the relations of things, 
and promptly applies to the particular case or occurrence of 
moment. The concept of the coup d'oeil was the heritage 
of an earlier age in warfare in which there were 
substantially no military staffs, virtually no organization 
above the regiment, only the most inchoate principles of 
troop and unit movement and almost no literature, of a 
systematic nature, on the art of war. Successful military 
command, focused intensely on the performance of the great 
captains of war as guides and models, was truly the province 
27  
of genius and its close ally, fortune. The new officer of 

the early Nineteenth Century, as defined by the great master 

of the French-Austrian school of war, Baron Henri de Jomini, 

was a mixture of the warrior tradition and the new science 

of war: 6 3  
The most essential qualities for a general
will always be as follows-: First, A high moral 
courage capable of great resolutions; Secondly, A 
physical couraqe which takes no account of danger.
His scientific or military requirements are 
secondary to the above mentioned characteristics, 
though if great they will be valuable auxiliaries. 
It is not necessary that he should be a man of 
vast erudition. His knowledge may be limited, but 
it should be thorough, and should be perfectly
grounded in the principles at the base of the art 
of war. Next in importance come the qualities of 
his personal character. A man who is gallant,
just, firm, upright, capable of esteeming merit in 
others instead of being jealous of it, and skilled 
in making this merit conduce t his own glory,
will always be a good general....e 4  
Thus truly, "the science of commanding armies is a gift 

of Heaven. It is genius that inspires great generals; hence 

their rarity. But to make a good officer, only requires 

instruction and experience. Technical expertise in the 

arts of war, while valuable, paled beside the sheer 

brilliance of a Frederick the Great or a Napoleon, the 

paragons of generalship. Fundamentally, therefore, to the 

officers of the first half of the Nineteenth Century, "the 

mode of war is an art and not a lame abstract science.ii 66 
The theory of war could not therefore "exclude human 

nature," rather "it has to admit valor, boldness, and even 

temerity. 'I6' The truly effective officer was thus conceived 
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as the blend of disparate elements, of the coup d'oeil and 
the science of war, since excellence of military leadership 
demanded "the most extensive acquirements and the most 
superior of mental and moral qualifications. 1 1 6 8  West Point 
could not of course have been expected to impart to its 
graduates the mystical qualities embodied in the coup 
d'oeil, although it did impart most effectively the 
patrician values and culture of the earlier aristocratic 
officer. Rather, West Point served to equip American 
officers with a basic competency in the new technocratic 
science of war and to identify the most promising 
candidates, under peacetime conditions, for future positions 
as senior military commanders. Officers were, after all, 
still defined as warriors, expected to heroically lead their 
forces into battle, and not as commanders or bureaucratic 
managers of complex military organizations. Thus West Point 
served the vital function of training and cultivating the 
new type of officer; one whose values and philosophy were 
those of their aristocratic predecessors but who was also 
equipped with a solid grounding in the technical science of 
war. 

Despite the near uniformity of opinion, on both sides 

of the Atlantic, as to the nature of both competent and 

remarkable military leadership, at least one noteworthy 

American officer, Brevet-Major-General Edmund P. Gaines, 

openly challenged the paramount emphasis on the coup d'oeil. 
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The effectiveness of an army depends on the 
character and qualifications of the captains of 
companies and commandants of regiments. with out 
these. . . the most renowned general could effect 
but little. . .against the veteran troops of 
civilized nations. Rut with companies and 
regiments ably commanded, much may [be] effected 
without [the] towering genius of a Frederich or a 
Napoleon the head of the brigade, division, or 
the army. 
The modern and democratic tenor of Gaine's observation 

(who, in most matters regarding the post-War of 1812 
American Army, was in full agreement with the rest of the 
young turks of the officer corps) clearly ran counter to 
both the arch political conservatism of the French-Austrian 
school of war and the bedrock of tradition which lay at the 
heart of the concept of military leadership. Most American 
(and European) officers would have instead sided with the 
concept of military genius as so strongly articulated by 
Colonel Patrick MacDougall of the British Army: 
Great generals are heaven born, but it would 
be a very foolish conclusion from this truth that 
they may therefore dispense with the study of 
their profession. On the other hand, the art of 
war can never bestow those mental and physical
q u a l i t i e s  t h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  f i f  w h i c h  i s  
indispensable in a military leader. 
While the West Point of the Antebellum era was first 

and foremost a school of military science, its curriculum 

was dominated by engineering courses. Military theory, as 

understood today, was taught in a rather limited and not 

particularly detailed manner. Captain Dennis Hart Mahan, 

for example, devoted a mere two weeks of his seminal two 

semester course on fortification principles to tactics and 
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strategy.71 In the two years prior to the Civil War, some 
seventy-one percent of class time, on the average, was 
devoted to the study of engineering, mathematics and natural 
philosophy. The remaining twenty-nine percent of the 
curriculum was reserved for all other subjects, including 
French, dance and military science. Tactical training and 
expertise in all forms of weaponry was largely a matter of 
drill, particularly during the summer field exercises. 
Moreover, the technical subjects such as engineering were 
each weighted 2.0 or 3.0 by the Academic Board as compared 
to only a rating of 1.0 or 1.5 for "military" subjects. 
Thus, in terms of the cadet's order of merit and final class 
standing, which was determinative of his choice of branch of 
service and his position on the promotion list, excellence 
in subjects such as engineering and natural philosophy was 
far more important than, say, artillery drill in launching a 
career as an officer.7 2  
By modern standards, Antebellum officer training would 

seem too theoretical in its content. Clearly, modern 

officers require a broader education, combining managerial 

with combat and leadership skills than that afforded by the 

West Point of the first half of the Nineteenth Century. 

However, it must be of course noted that an Antebellum 

American Army officer was being trained to fight not a 

Twentieth Century but rather what was essentially an 

Eighteenth Century war. The mathematical domination of both 
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the course of instruction at West Point and of military 
writing in general in this era is perhaps the most 
perplexing aspect of the science of war in the first half of 
the Nineteenth Century; reading Jomini and studying his 
numerous geometrical formulas, it appears that if followed 
to the last decimal, war could be fought automatically and 
with a constant degree of victory. Mathematics, and its 
practical application engineering, were clearly of 
inestimable value to the practitioners of the new science of 
war. The importance of mathematics was clearly stated by 
Hoyt: 
...g eometry is the science of measuring, or in 

other words it is the science that treats of and 

considers the properties of magnitude in general,

comprehending the doctrines and relations of 

whatever is susceptible of augmentation or 

diminution. 

art of war. 7 3  
It is esteemed by many writers as the 
Of what therefore were the calculations and formulas, in 
works of military theory representative o f ?  They were most 
assuredly not abstractions, without mooring to actual 
military experience and history. Rather, they represented 
the first attempt to translate military historical 
experience into a universal and technically precise 
language. Military history, as in the preceding Eighteenth 
century, remained vital to military education, as 
engineering professor Captain Mahan so clearly understood. 7 4  
No one can be said to have thoroughly
mastered his art, who has neglected to make 
himself conversant with its early history; 
nor indeed, can any.. . elementary notions 
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ever be formed of an art beyond those 

formulated by the more technical language

without some historical knowledge of its use 

and progress; for this alone can give to the 

mind those means of comparison, without which 

everything has to be painfully created 

anew... it is in military history that we are 

to loo55for the source of all military

science. 

Certainly, the new scientific course of officer 
instruction was criticized precisely because it appear5ed as 
a radical departure from the earlier, informal reliance on 
military history, in conjunction with battlefield 
experience, to train officers.7 6  Calhoun, most assuredly an 
ardent proponent of the Military Academy, questioned the 
emphasis on mathematics. And there was certainly more than 
an element of truth in the criticism of Inspector General 
John E. Wool's remark that great military success was "not 
achieved by. .. the measurement of angles".7 7  As understood 
by Thayer and many other formulators of the new science of 
war, however, the supreme advantage of a mathematically 
centered course of instruction over traditional military 
history, emphasizing heroic feats of arms, was its very 
pronounced quality of being systematic and completely 
logical. Thus, "history is the basis upon which the 
principles of the 'science of war' are found", as expanded 
by Mahan's successor as instructor of engineering at West 
Point, Brevet Colonel J.B. Wheeler, and such knowledge could 
only be "acquired by systematic and methodical study".7 8  
Therefore, since "facts must precede theory", "it is evident 
3 3  
then that an intimate connection exist between military 

history and the science of war".79 

The manifest and quite urgent need for a vastly 
improved system of both officer education and the writing 
and the writing and analysis of military problems had been 
clearly demonstrated by recent battle experience on both 
sides of the Atlantic. Military history, of the traditional 
variety, had clearly not been adequate in providing officers 
with basic technical skills of warfighting; while one could 
of course learn the secrets of winning great campaigns, 
heroic accounts of battles simply could not tell a captain 
how to best direct his company in battle or a second 
lieutenant how to build a temporary bridge. The new 
scientific officer was thus intended to be a considerable 
advancement over his immediate predecessor, the aristocratic 
officer, in his knowledge of and ability to employ technical 
military information and skills. A new critical and 
investigative frame of mind, one willing to a degree, to 
experiment, was thus necessary in order to bring about a 
significant upgrading of the basic standard of officership 
in both European and American armies. As McDougall 
explained, the aristocratic officer had been content simply 
to memorize the minutiae of the drill book and were "content 
to ignore the principles, or correct knowledge of which 
( (i.e., the science of war)1, could alone enable them to 
apply those acquirements with any useful results".*' The 
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new science of war was developed, however imperfectly, to 
supply an officer with a logical, coherent and apparently 
valid framework of problem analysis and solution. Its model 
was the works of the artillerists and engineers who had made 
siegecraft a precise, mathematically certain task. Thus, 
for the proponents of the new science of war, it was evident 
that aside from true but rare military genius (which no 
program of instruction could be of course devised to instill 
in officer cadets), what chance would a traditional officer 
have against the superior attainments of the scientifically 
trained professional.81 It should be remembered that West 
Point was supposed to turn out high quality second 
lieutenants and not brilliant major-generals. Military 
skills for most soldiers - artillery, infantry and cavalry, 
such as loading a cannon, executing a column left or 
delivering a charge were not in themselves terribly 
difficult. The advantage of the new scientifically trained 
officer was that, in a pinch, he could with reasonable 
effectiveness perform all these tasks and many others as 
well. It was this very flexibility of mind and broad base 
of knowledge that conferred significant advantage to the new 
professionals. 8 2  
Mathematics, as the new cornerstone of the military 

arts and science, was held by the new professionals to be a 

logical step in the gradual improvement of war fighting, 

since the end of the barbaric Thirty Years War, toward 
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ameliorating the passions and violence of war itself. It 

was a part of a logical progression from the development of 

international legal principles protecting captured soldiers 

and the imposition of restraints on wanton pillage and 

looting by an invading army. Thus, the very precision and 

coolness of mathematically centered military analysis would, 

it was hoped, work to constrain and eventually dissipate the 

primitive fears, emotions and animosities that drove men and 

nations to war. In a very real sense, therefore, the 

ultimate goal of the science of war was to provide for the 

very elimination of war itself, replaced, one assumed, by 

clean, faultless and bloodless logic as the new basis of 

peacefully resolving international conflict. Thus, the 

great strategist Baron de Jomini, defined military science 

as the pathway toward the purging of war from human history: 

Military science in our hands may then 

become the potent instrument of millennia1 

triumph, the indication of universal peace.

Military science prevents war, conducts it in 

triumph and under humane restraints, and will 

at last 35ke war impossible; hence we learn 

our duty. 

Engineering, in its immediate practical uses by armies 

and officers, rendered it of enormous value. One cardinal 

failing of Eighteenth Century armies was the common tendency 

of military services to grow soft and fat in peacetime. 

Paramount therefore to the ability of the new scientific 

armies maintaining their battle effectiveness lay in finding 

ways of exercising officers, soldiers and units and thereby 
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keeping them lean and trim despite the comfortable and 
devitalizing conditions of peacetime. As annunciated as 
early as 1800 by President John Adams, the peacetime Army 
must be so organized as to allow "military science, in its 
various branches... to be cultivated with particular 
cars. 11 8 4 Thus, in the intervals between hostilities, an 
army had to be kept effectively active s o  as to guard 
against the highly corrosive effects of prolonged exposure 
to the isolation of garrison duty. Such excessively 
defensive maintenance of regular troops was held to vitiate 
the ardor and elan of the men. A s  for the officers, the 
effect was defined as inculcating them the pleasant but 
illusionary comforts of garrison duty, rendering them lax in 
their study of the science of war. Finally, in terms of the 
army as an entity, the cumulative effect was to render it 
enfeebled for the sudden and unexpected rigors of war. The 
critical importance of keeping officers, men and armies 
alike, trim and lean - capable of being placed on a war 
footing on short notice - was crucial to the new 
professional military leaders. The inability of European 
armies (or for that matter, the American military service in 
1812) quickly to prepare to counter the French threat 
underscored the crucial importance of developing techniques 
of maintaining a high degree of combat readiness in 
peacetime. 
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There were, according to Jomini, two possible solutions 

to this problem. One was clearly military, in its 

traditional sense: to exercise regularly in great maneuvers 

and sham battles "which, though but faintly resembling those 

of actual war, still are of decided advantage in preparing 

for war." Secondly, in a manner expressing the emphasis of 

military science on engineering, an army could be gainfully 

employed "in labors useful for the defense of the 

country. This second solution bore the hallmark of 

Eighteenth Century limited war doctrine to minimize the 

burden of national expenditures for its military services 

and in turn, whenever impractical, channel such funds into 

enhancing the civil economy. Due to the pressing demands of 

frontier security on a small, illfunded military force such 

as the United States Army, the second technique of 

maintaining battle readiness was considerably more 

practical. Road and coastal fortress construction, while 

placing a considerable strain on limited military resources 

and fiscal outlays, particularly in regards to line units, 

was nevertheless invaluable as a training device. Large 

scale engineering projects after all utilized the same type 

of organizational skills as did complex field campaigns. In 

addition, such labors served to fulfill such tenets of 

professionalism as using specialized skills and knowledge 

for the benefit of society, which in turn worked to lessen 

the general hostility of the American people toward military 
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forces. An added direct military benefit was that 
engineering officers constituted the most promising and 
talented commanders in the Army. Their career growth was 
surely to be enhanced by tackling the innumerable 
difficulties of laying out and building a badly needed 
military road over several hundred miles of virgin country. 
Chasing Indians, as lowly and unmilitary task as could be 
imagined, was far better suited to the less cerebral types 
populating the infantry, As revealed by the failures of the 
War of 1812, there most certainly was a pressing demand for 
the construction of roads and other forms of interior lines 
of communication to correct the appalling lack of mobility 
of the Army. Casement fortresses were also required to 
shield the nation's coastlines against European invaders, 
Such projects were particularly valuable for those 
Congressmen in whose districts they were to be built, 
earning the Army political capital and currying favor with 
the influential.86 Finally, perhaps the simplest and most 
practical rationale for an extensive grounding in 
engineering by professional officers, was that offered by 
Hoyt: 
Next to an acquaintance with the field 
exercises and duties of the camp, no part of 
military science is of more importance than 
fortification: for without some knowledge of 
this, how will he ((i.e., the officer)) be 
capable of throwing up work for the defense 
of a post or detachggnt... when he has not 
with him an engineer? 
39 

Public acceptance of West Point, as the fulcrum of Army 

professionalism, was mixed. Clearly the contribution to the 

development of civil engineering was immense. Yet for 

perhaps a majority of Americans, particularly during the 

Jacksonian era of the 1830s and 1840s, a very negative image 

of the Military Academy came to the fore in national 

politics. In some quarters West Point was depicted as still 

another cesspool of decadent European, aristocratic 

corruption antithetical to the values of the American 

republic. This line of criticism, in its broadest terms, 

was forcibly stated by Senator Thomas Hart Benton of 

Missouri, who argued that West Point was guilty of affording 

"a monopoly for the gratuitous education of the sons and 

connections of the rich and influential. Furthermore, 
the system of exclusive presidential selection of cadet 
applicants was vigorously criticized by Benton for 
entrenching in West Point graduates a belief that they were 
"independent of the people" and more grievously, were 
"irresistibly led to acquire the habits and feelings which 
in all ages have rendered regular armies obnoxious to 
popular government. n 8 9  Critics frequently charged West 
Point with having unfairly and improperly usurped the right 
to supply the United States Army with officers, since 
according to proponents of this view, "in many circumstances 
better officers could be found among our militias." A 
related complaint was that officers drawn from civil society 
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were stigmatized by their lack of professionalism, with 

"every exertion... nade to crush him."90 Thus, for its 

adversaries, "the Academy sits like an incubus upon [(our)] 

militia and they cry loud for justice and equal rights.1191 

The Army to a degree, closed ranks against the weight 

of public and political criticism, which ironically served 

to strengthen military professionalism. The rough-and-

tumble quality of Jacksonian politics was most distasteful 

to the very patrician members of the scientific, gentleman 

officer corps. The very democratic quality of the anti-West 

Point attacks was, by and large, contrary to the social 

ethos of the new professional officer, as sharply stated by 

one newly minted cadet: 

Without it [ (i.e., West Point)] our army
would have become another political lazaretto, 
where a depraved executive could, and would, 
quarter its importune scavengers and palace
begging lazzaronie, until it would become and 
unendurable stench in the national nostrils. 
Already. .. patronage [(has)] so far debased our 
government, as to grieve all honest patriotism;
and were the army, navy and marine corps, to 
become like the custom houses and post-offices,

but parts of a huge machinery for political

pension and party warfare, better, far better, 

were it to at once disband them all, and leave 

hosti& emergencies to be encountered as they

could. 
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During the course o f  President Andrew Jackson's 
administration, the level of political opposition to the 
Military Academy grew to considerable proportions. Several 
state legislatures, including Ohio (18341, Tennessee (1833) 
and Connecticut (18421, passed resolutions calling for the 
termination of West Point. 9 3  In response, Congress, in 
1844, completely revised the Academy's selection policy. 
Selection o f  cadets was removed from the purview of 
presidential authority and instead, was invested in the 
Congress. Under the revamped system, each Senator was 
allotted six cadet slots, each Congressman two and the 
President, ten. Nevertheless, despite such a major 
redrafting o f  the cadet selection process, entrance 
standards were not pared down. Thus there remained in place 
reasonably difficult entrance requirements, which still had 
to be hurdled by an interested candidate. 
In the wake of the 1821 Congressional reduction of Army 

strength, Secretary of War Calhoun convened boards of 

officers to weed out the unfit, incompetent or poorly 

educated among the Army's commanders. From 1821 to 1832 

only West Point graduates were allowed to enter the officer 

corps, save for a handful raised from the ranks. 

Subsequently, after 1832, civilians were granted admission, 

provided they satisfactorily passed an examination. West 

Point, however, continued to provide the bulk of the Army's 

officers; by 1860 its graduates constituted 7.58 percent of 
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the officer corps, including physicians and clergymen (who 
had always been promoted directly from civil society). A 
second major result of the Calhoun reforms was to instill a 
high level of stability within the officer corps. Granted 
that the combination of low pay, harsh working conditions, 
the slowness of promotion (there was no mandatory retirement 
age) and lack O E  social status served to deter many from 
seeking or continuing with a military career. Nonetheless, 
compared to the pre-War 1812 situation, a considerable 
degree of constancy was imparted to the ranks of the officer 
corps as a consequence of Calhoun's reforms. For example, 
of the thirty-two men at or above the rank of full colonel 
in 1860, when the seniority system of promotion for line 
units was replaced by one of merit, ten had held filed 
commissions in the War of 1812. The overwhelming remainder, 
had entered the Army prior to 1830. 94 
West Point succeeded in its central task of producing 
highly trained, professional soldiers, "men of intelligence 
and culture, who. ..[possess] the most exalted conception of 
integrity and moral and personal responsibility," according 
to graduate Colonel Randolph B. Marcy. 95  Without question, 
the four years spent at West Point, were the single most 
important experience of an officer's career. Cadet ranking 
in the senior year was the key to a high slot on the very 
slow promotion list (it usually took some three years for a 
brevet second lieutenant to gain an actual commission).96 
4 3  
The more brilliant a cadet's performance, the greater the 
range of choice of selecting a branch of service.97  After 
graduation, it was largely left to each officer to keep up 
with the changes in the science of war. Efforts at 
establishing a higher level of military education for senior 
officers, such as the Artillery School at Fortress Monroe, 
Virginia, collapsed in the 1830s due to lack of funds and 
the relentless demands of frontier security duty. In this 
regard, the United States lagged, but not all that much, 
behind its mentor, Bourbon France. 
It should be noted that the cadets were after all, 

adolescent boys. For most, the freshmen year constituted 

their first protracted and independent stay away from home. 

Inpressionable and malleable, the cadets were refashioned by 

the stern discipline into officers and gentlemen in four 

short years, after which they were expected to be able to 

lead men into combat. Inexperience and impressionableness 

thus added further to the extraordinary degree of influence 

and prestige enjoyed by the French-Austrian school of war 
among members of the officer cops. Thus as regards West 
Point's cardinal objective of instilling the principles of 
military science, history and of course honor in its 
charges, it succeeded, according to the rules of the day, 
with considerable effectiveness.9 8  
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Part IV 

The organization of the Antebellum Army reflected the 

realignment of the military service upon the French model. 
Prior to 1812, Army administration had been highly 
decentralized, largely under civilian control, plagued by 
the corruption and inefficiency of private contractors, and 
poorly organized and operated. In 1812 Congress initiated 
major reforms in Army organization. Of major note was the 
establishment of  a military quartermaster corps. The 
outbreak of war, however, interrupted efforts at 
substantially revising Army administration until after the 
cessation of hostilities. The postwar reforms were given 
new urgency by the shocking lack of effectiveness of the 
earlier system. On April 14, 1818, legislation personally 
authorized by Calhoun was passed by Congress resulting in 
the centralization of Army administration under the auspices 
of the Secretary of War. 9 9  Specifically, a single 
quartermaster department was created as well as a commissary 
general of subsistence and a surgeon general. More 
significant than the establishment of any one office was the 
introduction of the bureau system of administration. Major 
executive department were created under the auspices of the 
War Department and, in turn, subdivided into subdepartments, 
each with its own chief and staff of clerks.loo The one 
critical failure of the reorganization scheme which, in 
1821, the ordinance bureau was combined with the artillery 
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as a single corps. This inefficient shotgun marriage was 

annulled by Congress in 1832.101 

The organizational scheme of the Army, hammered out in 
the years 1815 to 1821, established two broad, independent 
divisions of the military command and administrative 
structure. The General Staff was composed of the semi-
independent bureaus, such as the quartermaster corps, the 
corps of engineers, the adjutant general's office and the 
civilian-run paymaster's department in Philadelphia. Each 
bureau chief held the rank of colonel, with the exception of 
the Quartermaster General, who as a brigadier-general due to 
the great demands and prestige of his office. The bureau 
chiefs enjoyed considerable organizational autonomy, 
reporting directly to the Secretary of War. The national 
Headquarters was organized parallel with the General Staff. 
It consisted of the Commanding General and his small 
direction of Army field operations. By custom, the 
Commanding General was allowed the use of the two Inspector 
Generals and the Adjutant General. The former were 
responsible for inspections and insuring the military 
fitness of line units and bases. The latter functioned as 
the effective head of Army field operations, a kind of 
executive secretary insuring clarity of orders issued by the 
national Headquarters.1 0 2  
At the apex of the Army's chain of command, at least in 

theory, was the Commanding General. This office was 
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established by default under the terms of the 1821 
reorganization, which retained one of the two major-general 
positions. The immediate purpose of this office was to 
address the severe problem of lack of supreme intra-Army 
command authority. During the War of 1812, one major 
failing had been the marked absence of any one officer 
empowered to act as the senior representative of the Army, 
positioned in the chain-of-command between the field 
department commanders and the Secretary of War. The primary 
command problem was one of definition of authority. The 
exact powers and duties of the Commanding General were thus 
exceedingly vague and ill-defined. Gradually, both Congress 
and the drar'tsmen of the Army's Regulations invested this 
office with seemingly impressive administrative powers. 
Functionally, however the position of Commanding General 
remained largely declared; whatever official powers it may 
have possessed, its authority ultimately lay in the 
personality and charisma of the holder of that position. 
The first Commanding General, Jacob Brown, ran this office 

as if its authority was truly vacuous. Essentially, Brown, 

who was extremely deferential to his superiors was content 

to be no more than the senior military advisor to the 

Secretary of War. 

In 1828 Brown died, precipitating a bruising and quite 
unseemly tussle between the two brigadier-generals, Edmund 
P. Gaines and Winfield Scott, over the right of succession 
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to the office of Commanding General. In the end, both 
prospective candidates, by their vitriolic sparring and by 
refusal to obey orders, succeeded only in discrediting 
themselves. A compromise choice was found in Inspector 
General Colonel Alexander Macomb. The undercorous row over 
the position of Commanding General compelled Congress to 
undertake a re-examination of this office. Seeking to 
clarify the purpose and the purview of the Commanding 
General, Congress in 1828 formally defined it as the "medium 
of communication" between the government and the Army. This 
hardly constituted either a blanket or even a specific grant 
of administrative authority to this office. N o  real or 
substantive redefinition of the Commanding General's office 
emerged from Congress's further ponderings. Thus it 
rested once again on the holder of the office, with the 
assistance of increasingly more specific Army regulations, 
to determine his role in the structure of organization and 
command. While Macomb (and from 1841 to November 1861, 
Scott) pursued a far more pugnacious policy of asserting the 
authority of the Commanding General, no substantial gains of 
administrative power were in fact tallied by such efforts. 
At no time was real authority over the bureaus ever exerted 
for any appreciable period of time by the Commanding 
General. Moreover, field operations were frequently 
conducted by the department commanders, on their own 
authority or directly under the orders of the Secretary of 
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War. 104 Consequently, the Army lacked a centralized, over-
arching command structure to direct and coordinate all 

aspects of organization and administration. The lack of 

central executive authority in the Army later proved one of 

the key difficulties in the Union efforts to win the Civil 

War and remained unsolved until 1903 when a modern general 

staff was created. Yet this was a time when field 

commanders, according to the rules of the French-Austrian 

school of war, were expected to be brash and unflaggingly 

assertive in the direction and handling of military matters. 

Once in the presence of the enemy, the effective and 

honorable commander was expected never to "accept any plan 

ready-made, or any fixed instructions from your government 

on the manner of carrying on the war." according to Captain 

Auguste F. Lendy of the French general staff. In this 

regard, military command continued to resemble more closely 

the practices of Seventeenth Century mercenary free 

companies than the highly bureaucratic armies of today. All 

in all, therefore, the office of Commanding General remained 

quite weak. 

It has been argued and widely accepted that the 
organization of the Antebellum Army was principally derived 
from British military practice and was corresponding, highly 
decentralized.lo7 In fact, while deficient in such respects 
as the training of staff officers, the United States 
nonetheless substantially realigned its system of Army 
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administration directly on French practice and methods. The 
general staff, responsible for army administration, had 
historically evolved out of the quartermaster corps. 
The development of improved roads and significantly 
better techniques of topography, in the late Eighteenth 
Century led to a much greater level of army mobility. Thus, 
in order to locate camps and sources of provisions, the 
function of strategic reconnaissance and long range planning 
devolved out of necessity to the quartermaster corps. 
Slowly this fusion o f  administration, planning and 
intelligence gathering crystallized into what would begin to 
be recognizable as a true general staff by the conclusion of 
the Napoleonic Wars.108 
Of particular interest was the role of the field 

commander in French-Austrian tactical doctrine. The worship, 

as it were, of military genius and the coup d'eoil, was 

wholly representative of traditional aristocratic warrior 

values, not easily translated into an organizational chart. 

Consequently, as under Napoleon, staffs were defined as no 
more than tools to facilitate the will of the warrior 
commander. While transportation and communication expanded 
and military operations assumed continental proportions, the 
staff remained underdeveloped. Even the pronounced 
difficulties experienced by Napoleon in attempting to 
personally direct the massive warfighting operations of his 
vast Empire had no effect, save for the Prussians, on post 
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war military planners. The staff was thus confined 

principally to "supervise and coordinate the various 

branches, and thus relieve the commanding general of a 

multiplicity of details,I' as explained by General George B. 
McClellan. log "Without a well instructed and intelligent 
staff," counseled Colonel MacDougall, "the difference 

divisions, however admirable in organization and discipline 

as independent military units, would, when required to 

combine their action toward a common object, be found 

wanting in that unity of impulse which is indispensable to 

military success. llo Staff work remained no more than a 
coordinating process in this era. It did not, as is the 

rule today, plan and implement army operations. Only the 

Prussians developed the modern conception of the general 

staff, aimed specifically at correcting this key weakness in 

the Napoleonic warfighting system. The General Staff, was, 

by royal decree, in 1821, made a completely independent body 

from the civilian war ministry. The result was that the 

General Staff and its supreme chief-of-staff were 

responsible for all facets of Prussian army organization and 

leadership. American and French general staffs, in sharp 

contrast, merely tinkered with the Eighteenth Century model 

of military command and organization.111 

Structurally, French Nineteenth Century army 

organization was not dissimilar from contemporary American 

practice. Both were divided into administrative and command 

departments, with strong 

each. Thus, the General 
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institutional barriers between 

Staff was the equivalent of the 

intendance, the Etat Major, of the French Army, consisting 

of the quartermaster corps, the adjutant general's office 

and the other logistical and administrative bureaus. 

Similarly, the national Headquarters and the subordinate 

department responsible for field operations were patterned 

directly after the directory of the French army. In 

sharp contrast to the orderly state of military 

administration in France and the United States, the British 

army's system of organization was exceedingly diffused. The 

Royal Army's administration was a veritable crazy quilt of 

separate and independent civilian and military department 

encrusted with tradition and custom; the artillery 

regiments, reminiscent of medieval guilds, did not even own 

their cannon, which were in fact the property of a civil 

ordinance office. Regimental supply, quite unlike either 

American or French efforts at centralizing military 

logistics, was in the British army left to the individual 

units. During the latter Drimean War (1853-18561, many of 

the crippling supply problems of the Royal Army could be 

directly traced to this enormous gulf between field units 

and the disorganized civilian administration.113 

Though the office of Secretary of War was established 

by Congress on August 7, 1789, its precise role, relative to 

senior military leadership and the chain of command, was to 
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remain unclarif ied for over a century. The early 
experience of the War Department did little to enhance its 
reputation or authority. Only two truly efEective and 
influential men held the office of Secretary of War in the 
Antebellum years: Calhoun and Jefferson Davis. The primary 
managerial flaw as that the position was usually filled by 
short-term professional politicians. The high level of 
turnover at the top thus served to frustrate the development 
of comprehensive and original war policies. It worked as 
well to undercut the personal authority of most Secretaries 
of War, who simply could not match the administrative 
knowledge, expertise in bureaucratic infighting and 
longevity of the bureau chiefs, who essentially served in 
their offices for life. At a still higher level of 
command, lay the perpetual battle between the President and 
the Congress over which branch would exert primacy in the 
development of national war policy. In the Antebellum era, 
this political struggle would ascend to inconsequential 
matters as the personal weapons of the rank-and-file or even 
the style of uniforms issued. Generally, in periods of war 
or during the infrequent tenure of an aggressive and 
interested Secretary of War, domination over military 
affairs swung to the president's corner. Thus, under the 
less than effective prosecution of the War of 1812 by the 
Madison administration or in the case of  the far more 
successful (if no less combative) efforts of James Polk in 
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directing the military effort in the Nexican War, control 

over national defense policy was almost solely the province 

of the executive branch. Similarly, during both Calhoun and 

Davis's tenures as Secretary of War, the executive branch 

effectively controlled the outcome of most major policy 

resolutions. Generally, in the Antebellum period, however, 

military policy was essentially a Congressional prerogative. 

The legislative branch exerted dominance by its strangle 

hold over the budget and on occasion, by the direct passage 

of legislation encompassing specific policy decisions. One 

may wonder what influence, if any, senior military 

leadership exerted in this process. The answer is not much 

at all. The divided system of command, the ambiguous role 

of the Commanding General and the creed of military 

professionalism, which advocated that the officer corps 

stand aloof from the coarse and unseemly world of civil 

politics, combined to mitigate Army influence in the 

formation of war policy. In put was limited to unofficial 

personal correspondence with members of Congress. Lobbying 

by the Army was not a feature of Antebellum politics.117 

Underlining the problem of executive versus the 
legislature, was the larger and more problematical question 
of civil control over the military, Standing armies only 
began to reappear in Europe in the 1640s. They were one of 
the most telling badges of the newly emergent absolute 
monarchies. So to was the switch to the use of aristocratic 
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officers. No country satisfactorily resolved the thorny 

dilemma of civilian control over the permanent military 

establishment. The very nature and composition of a 

standing army resisted being bent to the will of elected 

civil authority. Its makeup was that of socially elite 

officers, isolated from and contemptuous of civil society 

and politics, and commanding the sweepings and dregs of that 

society. Furthermore, in the United States, while the 

larger society, during the course of the Jacksonian Age as a 

result of  industrialization, was experiencing an era of 
startling growth of personal and social mobility, the 

perspective of military professionalism was backward looking 
in its reaffirmation of traditional, aristocratic warrior 

values. Military service had been, for several hundred 

years, a matter of personal loyalty to a superior and not to 

some disembodied and impersonal entity such as the state. 

From the viewpoint of the officer corps, an equally 

troubling problem was the relationship of the militia 

forces, by relying largely on the standing army. The only 

traditional monarchial state to fashion a workable solution 

was Prussia. In 1858, by royal decree, the Prussian 

militia, or Lander, was placed under the direct authority of 

the General-stab, with regular officers placed in command 

and sergeants drawn from a pool of loyal veterans. For most 

other nations, the process of integrating the army into 

society would only be resolved early in our own century.118 
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American popular opposition to the idea of a standing 
army can be traced back to the Radical Whig ideology of late 
Seventeenth Century England. The new permanent Royal Army, 
authoritarian and aristocratic by nature, was viewed by some 
as a constant threat to parliamentary government.'I9 In the 
American colonies this issue came to the fore in the 1 7 6 0 s .  
Following the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, permanent 
British garrisons were established. Close association with 
the Redcoats provoked a revival of the earlier Radical Whig 
opposition toward standing armies, One key result of this 
reaction was a dramatic reassertion of the role of the 
militia as the primary source of colonial military power. 
To this end, the militias were overhauled and centralized 
under the authority of the local governing body, instead, as 
before, at the county level. In this movement lay the 
origin of the idea of a truly national American army, a 
concept which, however, would have a very long and quite 
painful gestation period.'*' In 1 7 7 6  Samuel Adams warned: 
A standing army, however necessary it may be 
at some times, is always dangerous to the 
Liberties of the People. Soldiers are apt to 
consider themselves as a Body distinct from the 
rest of the Citizens. They have their Arms always
in their hands, their Rules and their Discipline
is severe. They soon become attached to their 
officers and disposed to yield obedience to their 
commands. 5yjh a power should be watched with a 
jealous Eye, 
The fierce and passionate debate between proponents of 
the militia and the advocates of permanent military forces, 
had, at its heart, the fundamental question of the 
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legitimacy of the regular Army itself. What struck in the 

craws of many Americans was the fear that standing armies 

were an inherent threat to civil liberties and freedoms. In 

other words, whether to choose between Lundy Lane, General 

Scott and the professional army of General Jackson, New 

Orleans and the state militias, as per the still fresh 

experience of The War of 1812. Fundamentally, both sides 
either for tactical reasons or out of conviction, would 

have concurred with the views of Brevet Major General 

Gaines, who in 1828 wrote: 

That the militia forms the basis of the 

defense and productive power of the republic, the 

history of our independence and fortune, success 
and triumphant wars, with one of the strongest 
powers of EuropT22ffers the most inefragable

((sic.)) evidence. 

Basically, the opponents of the standing army concurred 

fully with Adams' earlier comments; Benjamin Butler 

forcefully stated, in no uncertain terms, that such bodies 

are "injurious to the habits and morals of the people, and 

dangerous to public liberty." Moreover, the Army was 
"productive of needless waste and expenditure. T o  
insure against the use of the Army as an instrument of 
tyrannical power by some would be Napoleon skulking within 
the ranks of the professional officer corps, it was thus 
necessary, according to militia officer, Captain M. W. 
Berriman, "to maintain a regular army not larger than the 
immediate needs of the frontier." To the proponents of the 
militia, the citizen soldiers of the several states were 
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thus the true bulwark of national defense. "It is in this 
grant element of the volunteer soldier, the alacrity with 

which our young citizen chivalry leaps to arms... with eager 

and clamorous offers of service.... This indication of a 

warlike and inestible spirit that we find our real 
protection from old world jealousies and hatreds. 11 1 2 4  
The defenders of the standing army number more than the 

members of the regular Army officer corps, although never a 

majority of the body politic. For example, the Attorney 

General of Massachusetts, William H. Sumner, in 1823, while 

accepting the correctness of the proposition that the 

regular military establishment was the historic enemy of 

liberty, nonetheless found a very real need for a standing 

army. "The militia intended for defense only; standing 

armies for aggression, as well for defense. Thus 
effective national defense mandated both elements, acting in 
harmony and close cooperations.126 Far less temporizing in 
his enthusiasm for the regulars was Western traveler 
Eastwick Evans, who excoriated the proponents of the militia 
for being simplistic in their opposition to a large standing 

army: 
In this particular, we seem to have been 

unduly influenced by our too general idea or a 

standing army; - an idea which at the ceremony of 
a hearing, every suggestion of reason. We are not 
children, and it is high time to put aside 
bugbears. Our prejudices against the standing
armies are natural, and in some respects, 

salutary, but in fleyvg from the water, let us 

not run into the fire. 
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Naturally, of course, it was the regular army officer 

corps who were the most ardent defenders of a large standing 

army, Their arguments were premised on the ineffectiveness 

of the militia, again revealing the Janus-like quality of 

the new officer professionalism. According to one side of 

the argument, the standing army was an effective means of 

sparing the nation the expense, fiscally, socially and 

politically, of the burdens and terrors of war; as expressed 

by Captain Philip Cooke: 

What amount o f  treasury has been expended the 
guardians of the Treasury can best answer, those 
conversant with militia claims, can best estimate: 
- to what purpose with what gains to the nation, 
military men might answer if they pleased, but all 
conversant with figures can demonstrate that the 
militia operations ((in)) 1832 ((e-g., the Black 
Hawk War)) cost a sum that would support the 
regiment of dragoons for ten years, to say nothing
of an immense loss arising from a ~5ge4ralneglect
of business, particularly farming. 
A second line of professional officer criticism, as 

annunciated by General Scott, was reflective of the new 

technocratic expertise in the science of war. As a fighting 

force, the militia graded out very badly, due to its lack of 

discipline and for an almost complete ignorance of the 

science and art of war. Such criticism was characteristic of 

the intense post-Napoleonic conservative reaction against 

the excesses of the French Revolution in particular and 

democratic government in general: 

Discipline is the sole ((sic.)) of an army,

and that, without the habit of obedience, a mass 

assemblage of men in battle can never be more than 

a panic stricken mob. The fields of Princeton, 
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Spanish River, Camden.. . during the war of the 
Revolution not to speak of latter disasters, amply
sustain the declaration of Washington, that such 
undisciplined forces are nothing more than a 
destructive, expensive, and disorderly mob. When 
danger is a little removed from ((i.e., the 
militia)), the well affected, instead of flying to 
arms to defend themselves, are busily employed in 
removing their families and their effects while 
disaffected are concocting measures to make their 
submission and spread terror and dismay all 

around, to induce others to follow their example. 

Short enlistments and mistaken dependence 

upon our militia, have been the origin of all our 

misfortunes, and the great accumulation of our 

debt. The militia comes in, you cannot tell how; 

go you cannot tell when; and act, you cannot tell 
where; consume your provisions, exhaus 
stores, and leave you at a critical moment.h Y o u r  

Thus, the Army defined the militia as simply 

"respectable mobs, useful, if at all, as auxiliaries for the 

regular troops.I3O Or more colorfully, according to Cooke, 
as a "swarming hive, catching horses, electioneering, 

drawing in auctions... electing officers, mustering in, 

issuing orders, disobeying orders, galloping about, 'cursing 
and discussin'... everything but actual hard fighting.11131  
The Army's position was strengthened by the militia's 

gradual disintegration as a military organization over the 

course of the Antebellum period. The militia, to a limited 

degree, was federalized under the terms of this legislation, 

all citizens between eighteen and forty-five years obligated 

to perform annual militia duty with their state forces. 

Ideally, the forces of the U.S. Navy, Army and Militia, 

"should be s o  organized and arranged, as to cooperate 
harmoniously and effectually, in all times of emergency, for 
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the promotion of  the public security.1'" In operation, 
however, the militia act was exceedingly decentralized in 
its effect: state armed forces remained largely 
independent, with little federal input as to such elementary 
matters as uniforms, weaponry or tactics. Initially, all 
equipment and arms were to be supplied by the militia-men 
themselves. The clear lack of enthusiasm for such a burden 
by the citizen soldiers led to state provision of military 
stores, followed, from 1808 on, by limited amounts of arms 
and accouterments by the federal government. As the sense 
of national insecurity from a European threat diminished 
following the War o f  1 8 1 2 ,  the popularity of the militia 
correspondingly decreased. 
An alternative to militia service, developed by the 
states themselves, in particular Massachusetts, from the 
1 8 2 0 s  on, was the establishment of volunteer companies. 
Such units satisfied the letter of the militia act, while at 
the same time, allowing the members of a volunteer company 
to create their own style of military service. Such 
companies, marked by gaudy uniforms, were a great hit on the 
two annual militia days, as would-be heroes tried not to 
embarrass themselves unduly by their pronounced lack of 
expertise in the manual of  arms or the issuing of  the 
simplest commands (frequently from printed cards). From a 
practical military perspective, both varieties of state 
troops were almost completely unfit to take the field as 
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combat troops. Moreover, the lack of integration with the 

regular Army further weakened the overall effectiveness of 

the national defense system or, as stated by Colonel 

Jonathan Winters, "without uniformity every military system 

must be a rope of sand. Still another problem arose 

from the terms of service of militiamen in comparison to the 

volunteers. Militia units could only be led by their own 

officers, did not have to serve beyond their state 

boundaries and were not subject to the provisions of the 

Army Regulations. Volunteer companies, in contrast, were 

obligated, in periods of hostilities, to submit to either 

state or federal officers and could be employed in military 

operations beyond their state borders. The unpleasant 

possibility of being mustered into federal service was of 

little consequence compared to the decided social and 

political advantages one could reap as a member of one of 

the more elegant volunteer companies. While repeated calls 

bemoaned the deterioration of the militia and the numerous 

plans were trotted out to remedy this problem, no actual 

reform was in fact undertaken. There was lack of interest, 

save for a brief flurry of activity in the early 1840s, for 

an effective overhaul of the militia and virtually no real 

enthusiasm for the development of a truly centralized 

military reserve. Thus, as opposition to the standing army 

hardened, the only countervailing force to the regulars, the 

militia, was wasting away due to neglect.134 
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The development of military professionalism was by no 
means a complete success. Certainly, the vigorous and 
frequently virulent politicking of even senior officers in 
the public domain, for position within the Army was not 
conducive to the achievement of political isolation of the 
military as required by the tenets of professionalism. In 
the 1 8 2 0 s  and 1 8 3 0 s  professionalism by-and-large was 
practiced by Army officers in their official capacity as 
soldiers but not in their own private sphere. Slowly, 
nonetheless, as more West Pointers entered the officer 
corps, professionalism grew substantially in dominating, 
however imperfectly, the perceptions and beliefs of the 
Army's leaders. Moreover, a strong, administratively 
centralized Army emerged, which unlike its pre-War of 1 8 1 2  
predecessor, was fully capable of warding off the attacks of 
its many critics and riding out fluctuations in popular 
opinion toward the professional military establishment. The 
Army which emerged in the years 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 2 1  would not alter 
its essential mission, its professionalism or its doctrine 
until late in the Civil War. It remained until then, a 
modern, progressive military service, the embodiment of the 
French-Austrian school of war. 
-- 
CHAPTER I1 

THE FRENCH-AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF WAR: 

STRATEGY, TACTICS AND CAVALRY WARFARE 
Part I 

Two great war-fighting systems emerged from the wake of 
the Napoleonic Wars. For the preponderance of the Nine­
teenth Century, military science in Europe and the United 
States was dominated by the tenets of the French-Austrian 
school of War-1 Within its ranks could be numbered such 
luminaries of the new science of strategy as Archduke 
Charles of Austria, Colonel Henry Halleck of the United 
States and Colonel Patrick MacDougall of Great Britain. Its 
grandmaster was Baron Antoine Henri de Jornini of Switzerland 
and France, whose clear, precise and traditionally-grounded 
writings served as the foundation of the nascent concepts of 
military professionalism, science and education on both 
sides of the Atlantic Ocean.2 The other school of strategy 
was that of Prussia, and was led by General Karl von 
Clausewitz, whose writings would only begin to have influ­
ence on the trans-Atlantic military community after France's 
crushing defeat in 1870. In the Antebellum era, Clausewitz 
was known to some American officers (his seminal treatise, 
On War, is listed in Halleck's bibliography to Elements of 
Military Art and Science for example), but generally was not 
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influential since the Prussian's writings constituted such a 

radical departure from the orthodox military tradition.3 

The French-Austrian school of strategy constituted the 
conservative military reaction to the excesses of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. It embodied the conserv­
ative reaction against the legacy of the French Revolution 
as manifested by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Fundament­
ally, as the keystone of the French-Austrian school of war, 
Jomini and his followers concluded that the Napoleonic Wars 
were an historical fluke, a brief retreat into the ideo­
logically-motivated style of the earlier Thirty Years War. 
They advocated that the Eighteenth Century limited-war 
tradition should be restored so that wars would once again 
be limited in purpose and scope. Essentially, the French-
Austrian school failed to come to grips with the militant 
nationalism, the development of citizen armies, the impor­
tance of ideology and the increasing importance of economics 
and technology in determining the outcome of armed hostili­
ties. These innovative aspects of the French Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars were not comprehensible to traditional­
ists like Jomini, who expected the profession of arms to 
resume its function as an increasingly scientific and yet 
deeply heroic and aristocratic discipline. 
As a second fundamental conclusion, future wars would 
not assume the colossal scale of the Napoleonic Wars. Army 
size would shrink to the proper size of fifty to two hundred 
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thousand men. Such small armies would accommodate fully the 

needs of professional military services with only limited 

requirements for reserve forces, Such numbers reflected the 

optimum size of a military force which could be commanded 

and directed with orthodox principles of command and 
leadership doctrine, A warrior commander could, with 
traditional line-of-sight techniques and without the 
necessity (or nuisance) of a large staff and more complex, 
sub-army formations such as divisions OK corps, direct no 
more than fifty or so thousand men. Essentially, the 
warfighting system of the Antebellum American Army was that 
of the French-Austrian school. In turn, the French-Austrian 
school, in the main, was a slightly updated version of 
Eighteenth Century limited war. The goal of limited warfare 
was to minimize, to the greatest possible extent, the cost 
to society of war by insulating it from its worst and most 
destructive effects. This same goal motivated the profes­
sional soldiers of the post-Napoleonic era, in their quest 
for a cleaner, more scientific warfare. 4 
Strategically, warfare was, from the Seventeenth 

Century on, essentially a �unction of siegecraft until the 

French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. None of the 

uncertainties or hazards of pitched battle in unfamiliar 

enemy country were present in a well executed siege. The 

geometrically precise techniques of siegecraEt were certain 

and highly effective, Armies on the move, on the other 
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hand ,  were s u b j e c t  t o  an i r o n  l a w  of d e c l i n i n g  e f f e c t i v e ­
ness ,  as wear and tear  i n c r e a s e d ,  as t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  of t h e  
p a r a d e  g r o u n d  f l a g g e d  a n d  as  d e s e r t i o n  i n c r e a s e d .  While 
s i e g e c r a f t  c o u l d ,  i f  b u n g l e d ,  r e s u l t  i n  a n  army penned  
between a f o r t r e s s  and an a d v e r s a r y ' s  f i e l d  f o r c e s ,  it w a s  
f a r  less r i s k y  t h a n  open b a t t l e .  
S t i l l  a n o t h e r  b r i c k  i n  t h e  founda t ion  of l i m i t e d  w a r  
l a y  i n  t h e  tact ical  movement of armies. Due t o  t h e  pronoun­
c e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  of E i g h t e e n t h  Century d r i l l  systems,  one 
army could  no t  maneuver w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  d i s p a t c h  o r  c e l e r i t y  
t o  f o r c e  a second i n t o  b a t t l e  o r  even s u r p r i s e  it. P u r s u i t  
of a r e t r e a t i n g  f o e  w a s  no t  f e a s i b l e ,  save i n  t h e  ex t remely  
rare case of a r o u t .  The danger w a s  t h a t  t h e  pu r su ing  army 
w o u l d  b e  drawn o u t  and  e x t e n d e d  o v e r  many mi l e s ,  t h u s  
p rov id ing  a ve ry  tempting t a r g e t  t o  t h e  enemy.5 
Army m o b i l i t y  w a s  f u r t h e r  imper i l ed  by t h e  p a u c i t y  of 
good roads  and nav igab le  r i v e r s ,  a problem which only  began 
t o  be so lved  by t h e  close of t h e  Nine teenth  Century.  Maps 
w e r e  i n  s h o r t  s u p p l y  a n d  o f  e x c e e d i n g  p o o r  q u a l i t y .  
P r i n c i p l e s  a n d  t echn iques  of army d i r e c t i o n  were t h o s e  of 
l i n e - o f - s i g h t  command; t h e  w a r r i o r  commander w a s ,  due t o  t h e  
p r i m i t i v e  q u a l i t y  of s i g n a l  communications and t h e  absence 
of s t a f f s ,  p e r s o n a l l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  lead h i s  men i n t o  combat. 
Arms t e c h n o l o g y  p l a c e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h e  n a t u r e  of w a r .  
The f l i n t l o c k  musket and bayonet combinat ion,  mandated t h e  
u s e  of h i g h l y  t r a i n e d  and d i s c i p l i n e d  s o l d i e r s ;  t h e  c l o s e  
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o r d e r  n a t u r e  of  b a t t l e  i n  t h e s e  y e a r s ,  compelled by t h e  
l i m i t e d  r a n g e  of  t h e  muske t ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  f r i g h t f u l l y  
h i g h  a v e r a g e  c a s u a l t y  r a t e  of  be tween  t h i r t y  a n d  f o r t y  
p e r c e n t  p e r  b a t t l e .  The n e e d  f o r  h i g h l y - d i s c i p l i n e d ,  
v e t e r a n  (most men were i n  t h e i r  m i d - t h i r t i e s )  s o l d i e r s  l e d  
commanders t o  p l a c e  a premium on e x p e r i e n c e  over youth,  
p r o f i c i e n c y  o v e r  a g i l i t y  and s t r e n g t h  and d i s c i p l i n e  over  
i n n o v a t i o n .  6 T h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  of a l l  of t h e s e  v a r i e d  
f a c t o r s ,  i n  con junc t ion  wi th  t h e  l i m i t e d  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  
of a g r a r i a n ,  p r e - i n d u s t r i a l  s tates and t h e  s c a r c i t y  of a l l  
k i n d s  of m i l i t a r y  r e s o u r c e s ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  a s t r o n g  i n c l i n a ­
t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  f r e e  expend i tu re  of manpower i n  b a t t l e . 7  
T h e  F r e n c h - A u s t r i a n  s c h o o l  o f  war, however, d i d  n o t  
simply r e v i v e  E igh teen th  Century war fa re  i n  t o t a l .  I n s t e a d ,  
t h e y  f o r c i b l y  g r a f t e d  upon t h i s  earl ier m i l i t a r y  d o c t r i n e  
N a p o l e o n ' s  e m p h a s i s  o n  t h e  o f f e n s i v e .  T h e  d e f e n s i v e  
c h a r a c t e r  of l i m i t e d  w a r  w a s  t h u s  augmented, i f  on ly  i n  
spirit, by a new emphasis on the offensive; o r  as forcibly 
stated by Jomini:  
B a t t l e  o n c e  r e s o l v e d  upon, be t h e  f i r s t  t o  
a t tack;  i f  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  i s  t o  be avoided i n  t h e  
g e n e r a l  conduct of w a r ,  it i s  e n t i r e l y  unreason­
a b l e  i n  a c t i o n .  I t  i s  a known f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
o f f e n s e ,  besides i t s  tac t ica l  advantages ,  e x c i t e s  
t h e  a r d o r  and  c o u r a g e  of t h e  men. Thus ,  when 
c o m p e l l e d  t o  f i g h t ,  a l w a y s  a d v a n c e  towards t h e  
enemy, u n l e s s  you are under t h e  cover  of impreg­
n a b l e  entrenchments ,  and even t h e n  always manage 
some o u t l e t s  t h a t  w i l l  a l l ow you t o  debouch from 
them. 8 
6 8  

The fundamental maxim of grand tactics, according to 
American military writer Jacob R. NPff, was "to attack the 
most vulnerable point of the enemy, which conquered, would 
be the most decisive in terminating the war.9 At the same 
time however, the goal of war remained firmly within the 

limited war tradition--competitive states resorting to the 

use of armed force, when other methods had failed, to 

redress grievances against their neighbors or for limited 

strategical gain such as acquiring, a valuable port or a 

desirable treaty concession.10 

The French-Austrian school of strategy therefore fused 

the defensively centered concept of limited war with 

Napoleon's penchant, for offensive warfare.ll The real 

failure of the French-Austrian school of war, in a strictly 

military sense, was in not understanding how the radical 

changes in tactics brought about by the French Revolutionary 

Wars and later exploited by Napoleon with such outstanding 

success, had in fact washed away much of the bedrock of 
limited war theory.12 This failure of comprehension 
foreshadows the later problem, beginning in the 1840s, of 
how radical technological change, including armament, could 
as well change the practice and nature of warfighting.l3 
Contradiction was the hallmark of the French-Austrian 

school. What thus issued from this marriage of opposites 

was a system of war in which the attack was everything and 

in which the frontal assault was hailed as the true test of 
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an army's martial prowess. At the same time, however, this 

body of military science, with equal emphasis, counseled the 

studious avoidance of pitched battle. Combat was to be 

accepted only when one possessed a decisively superior 

tactical advantage. Furthermore, while championing the 

spirit of the offense, what would in time be called the elan 

vitale, war, in accordance with the tenets of Jominian 

strategy, was waged for limited political objectives and 

goals, in the classic Eighteenth Century manner.14 

The competitive strategical system was that of Prussia 

and General Clausewitz. The Prussian school serves to 
highlight the deficiencies of their competitor's system. 
Inexplicably, it was one of Europe's most traditional and 
autocratic states that pioneered a wholly different school 
of warfighting. A s  the heirs to the grand legacy oE 
Frederick the Great, the shattering defeat at Jena in 1806 
by the upstart French armies was world shattering in its 
impact on the Prussian high command. It was almost incom­
prehensible to the senior Prussian army commanders how the 
ragtag, undisciplined citizen soldiers of France commanded 
by an ex-corporal could so totally whip the once preeminent 
military power of Europe.15 The basic premise of the 
revamped Prussian warfighting machine was completely 
contrary to the French-Austrian brand of military science. 
Wars were defined as being struggles between not only 
warring nations, but warring peoples as well. Consequently, 
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huge conscript armies would be required, dependent upon the 

availability of well trained, ready reserves; the regular 

army would therefore not bear the brunt oE the war alone but 

instead would serve as the leader of a collective national 

effort. Fundamentally, the Prussian concept of war was 

militantly aggressive; the quaint gentlemanly notion of 

limited war being shunted aside. In addition, the concept 

of soldier as robot, as in Frederick's day was forever 

replaced by a new and radically di�ferent emphasis on 

teamwork. Prussia, became the prototype of the modern 

nation in arms, with the army on a permanent footing.l6 

United States Army warfighting doctrine was completely 

Jominian in the Antebellum era. Tactical theory, whether 

artillery, infantry and later, cavalry, were wholely based 

on standard French manuals, translated into English. 

Winfield Scott's 1818 and 1836 infantry manuals represented 

no more than formal ratification of the 1816 and 1833 French 

works. 18 

Part I1 

The classical tradition of mounted warfare constituted 

a very traditional and aristocratic body of military 

doctrine, increasingly out-of-place in the post-Napoleonic 

era of scientific warfare.19 The cavalry was traditionally 

regarded as morally superior to a11 other branches of army 

service on the ground that it was blessed with inherently 

7 1  

g r e a t e r  endowments of a r i s t o c r a t i c  v i r t u e ,  honor and e l a n  
t h a n  t h e  more p l e b i a n  i n f a n t r y  o r  t e c h n o c r a t i c  a r t i l l e r y .  
The h a l l m a r k s  of t h e  mounted s e r v i c e  were i t s  z e a l ,  i t s  
n o b i l i t y ,  i t s  r i c h e r  sense  of honor and i t s  s u p e r i o r  s t y l e  
and audac i ty .  
The g o l d e n  o r  c l a s s i c a l  a g e  of  European c a v a l r y  r a n  
from t h e  1640s t o  1815.  I n  t h e  mid-Seventeenth Century,  
G u s t a v a s  Adolphus of  Sweden a l m o s t  s ing lehanded ly  r e s u r ­
r e c t e d  t h e  u s e  of  c a v a l r y  as a n  e f f e c t i v e  t o o l  of  w a r .  
P r i o r  t o  t h e  c lass ical  age ,  c a v a l r y  had been i n  a s t a t e  of 
severe d e c l i n e .  Its u t i l i t y  as an e f f e c t i v e  t n i l i t a r y  weapon 
had w i t h e r e d  d u e  t o  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  v a s t l y  improved 
missile weapons and t h e  r e v i v a l  of t h e  phalanx. Gustavas,  
through t h e  development of combined arms d o c t r i n e ,  developed 
a means of r e d r e s s i n g  t h e  ba lance  of war fa re  so as t o  a l l o w  
f o r  a renewed, if more c i rcumspect ,  r o l e  f o r  mounted t r o o p s .  
S n a l l  l i g h t - w e i g h t  cannon ( f a l c o n e t s )  were in t roduced  i n  
combination with detachments of musketeers  t o  provide direct 
f i r e  suppor t  f o r  t h e  Swedish c a v a l r y .  Whi le  t h i s  t echn ique ,  
due  t o  improvements  i n  a r t i l l e r y ,  of mixing i n f a n t r y  and 
c a v a l r y  i n  t h e  same tact ical  format ion ,  below t h a t  of t h e  
d i v i s i o n  w a s  declared taboo by later c a v a l r y  t h e o r i s t s ,  it 
was n o n e t h e l e s s ,  a s i g n i f i c a n t  b r e a k - t h r o u g h  i n  mounted 
war fa re  i n  i t s  day. The key t o  Swedish c a v a l r y  s u c c e s s  l a y  
i n  t h i s  e f f e c t i v e  use  of missile f i r e  i n  d i s r u p t i n g  opposing 
i n f a n t r y  fo rma t ions  p r i o r  t o  launching  t h e  h o r s e  s o l d i e r s  on 
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their headlong, and hopefully, decisive charge. The net 

effect was a dramatic revival of cavalry effectiveness.20 

Insofar as the specifics of mounted warfare were 

concerned, Gustavas made a crucial advance, perhaps the 

single most significant one prior to the Civil War, in 
cavalry organization by reworking his horse soldiers into a 
disciplined and controlled fighting force. In order to 
maximize their shock potential, Swedish cavalry was re­
organized into formal military units, expressly designed to 
engage the enemy as a tightly disciplined and controlled 
military force and not as a mob on horseback. To this end, 
cavalry was, for the first time, deployed in a linear 
formation of three ranks, replacing the traditional, densely 
clustered cavalcade assemblage. Tactically, cavalry 
deployment would, over the next two-hundred-and-fifty years, 
be largely a matter of gradually reducing mounted formations 
to double and single rank formations. In regards to 
armament, Gustavas authored a revival of the a r m e  blanche, 
or in this case, the saber, as the quintessential calvary-
man's weapon, a position that the sword would retain into 

the 1930s.21 

The next great era of cavalry development was initiated 

by Frederick the Great of Prussia. Inheriting one of 

Europe's worst mounted services, noted for fat troopers on 

slow plow horses, Frederick transformed his cavalry into the 

most effective horse units ever created in the classical 
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t r a d i t i o n .  The key improvement l a y  i n  t h e  u s e  of a r t i l l e r y .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  F r e d e r i c k  c r e a t e d  t h e  f i r s t  t r u e  h o r s e  
a r t i l l e r y .  Consequently,  t h e  P r u s s i a n  mounted s e r v i c e  w a s  
provided wi th  i t s  own o r g a n i c  f i r e  suppor t .  Horse a r t i l l e r y  
c o n s i s t e d  of small, h i g h l y  mobile cannon drawn by teams of 
f l e e t  h o r s e s  b e s t r i d e  w h i c h  rode  t h e  gunners  r a t h e r  t h a n  
b e i n g  t r a n s p o r t e d  i n  a s e p a r a t e  wagon. Thus hard-moving 
mounted u n i t s ,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e ,  were a s s u r e d  of having 
ready a r t i l l e r y  suppor t  capable  of marching t h e i r  own h igh  
r a t e  o f  movement .  T h i s  s y s t e m  r e p r e s e n t e d  a f u r t h e r  
enhancement  of  t h e  c r u c i a l  p r i n c i p l e  of  combined arms; 
t a c t i c a l l y ,  t h e  ho r se  a r t i l l e r y  se rved  t o  p u l v e r i z e  opposing 
i n f a n t r y  fo rma t ions  s o  as t o  f a c i l i t a t e  an  e f f e c t i v e  c a v a l r y  
a t t a c k .  22 
F r e d e r i c k ' s  c a v a l r y  a t t a i n e d  a l e v e l  of t r a i n i n g  and 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  n e v e r  a c h i e v e d  b e f o r e  o r  s i n c e  by classical  
European  mounted u n i t s .  Due t o  t h e  e f f o r t s  of t h e  f i r s t  
m i l i t a r y  v e t e r i n a r y  s e r v i c e  a n d  t h e  f i r s t  army b reed ing  
f a r m s ,  t h e  P r u s s i a n  c a v a l r y  w a s  p r o v i d e d  w i t h  e x c e l l e n t  
h o r s e s .  T a c t i c a l l y ,  t h i s  a d v a n t a g e  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  a n  
a b i l i t y  of P r u s s i a n  ho r se  u n i t s  t o  charge  e x c l u s i v e l y  a t  t h e  
g a l l o p ,  over  unprecedented d i s t a n c e s  of up t o  e ight-hundred 
y a r d s .  Such breakneck speed al lowed t h e  P r u s s i a n  mounted 
t r o o p s  t o  r e a c h  o p p o s i n g  i n f a n t r y  and a r t i l l e r y  be fo re  a 
second v o l l e y  could be d i scha rged  a g a i n s t  %hem. The t r e n d  
toward p l a c i n g  pr imary emphasis on t h e  arme blanche  as t h e  
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cavalry's weapon, was continued by Frederick; pistols and 

carbines were therefore relegated to such secondary tasks as 
reconnaissance and guard duty. To enhance the cavalry's 
shock effect, Frederick popularized the trend toward 
outfitting the largest percentage of his troopers as heavy 
cavalry or cuirassiers, so named due to their distinctive 
breastplates. It was in this period that the tendency 
toward specialization of cavalry into light, heavy and 
dragoon units jelled. Tactically, the cavalry, under 
Frederick, continued to place a key emphasis on the charge; 
all other duties being demoted to a distinctly secondary 
role.23 As the Prussian warrior king himself put it, laying 
down at once both the fundamental principle of cavalry 
warfare as well as its most salient and essential myth: 

"with the cavalry attack it is not the size of the horse but 

the impetuosity of the charge that turns the scales".... 24 

The third and last great cavalry innovator was Napoleon 

of France. The pxe-Revolutionary French cavalry was an 

exceedingly ineffective branch of service even though its 

schools of mounted warfare were without peer in Eighteenth 
Century Europe. The actual worth of French cavalry in 
combat, however, was negligible, due to exceedingly poor 
horseflesh, deficient organization and mediocre officers. 
The key changes introduced in the French cavalry by Napoleon 
lay mainly in organization ( f o r  the first time mounted units 
were concentrated into brigade and even divisional size for-
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mations), unit specialization and the strategic application 
of mounted troopers in intelligence gathering. At no time 
during the assorted Napoleonic Wars did French mounted units 
enjoy the benefits of prime quality mounts or even an ade­
quate supply of horses of any kind. Correspondingly, 
charges had to be made exclusively at the trot rather than 
the gallop and the employment of cavalry in battle was held 
to a minimum, so as to keep as many animals fit as possible. 
Tactically, Napoleon authored no new model of mounted 

warfare. Rather, as in other tactical aspects of war, 

Napoleon was content to borrow wholesale from the earlier 

French Revolutionary generals. Napoleon simply concentrated 

much more of everything--cavalry, artillery and infantry--

in his battles, relying on his personal brilliance at 

tactical and strategical management.25 

The overriding factor in determining the way that 
cavalry was utilized in battle was the type of armament it 
carried. The cardinal weakness of mounted troops, was in 
fact, its extremely ineffectual armament. Granted that all 
weapons were exceedingly limited in range and lethality 
(some infantry commanders, for example, considered the 
musket little better than a fire stick, useful f o r  making a 
disquieting noise and slightly more s o ,  as a convenient 
place to attach a bayonet), cavalry armament was even less 
effective. Three distinctive types of weapons were employed 
by mounted troops: firearms (pistols and carbines), lances 
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and swords. I n  de te rmining  weapon e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  writers of 
t h i s  p e r i o d  fused  t e c h n i c a l  performance wi th  p e r c e p t i o n s  of 
how such a dev ice  s tood  i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  such a r i s t o c r a t i c  
v a l u e s  a s  a n  e l a n  a n d  h o n o r .  U n i v e r s a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  
d i s t i n c t l y  i n f e r i o r  t o  t h e  l a n c e  of saber, f i r e a r m s  were 
l a r g e l y  c o n f i n e d  t o  s e c o n d a r y  t a s k s  such as s c o u t i n g  and 
p i c k e t  d u t y  a n d  t h u s  o c c u p i e d  t h e  l o w e s t  r u n g  i n  t h e  
h i e ra rchy .  26 B a s i c a l l y ,  " t h e  p i s t o l  can on ly  be cons ide red  
as a weapon of necess i ty , ' '  accord ing  t o  Count von Bismark of 
t h e  P r u s s i a n  c a v a l r y ,  f o r  " i ts  f i r e  i s  u n c e r t a i n ,  s h o r t ,  and 
se ldom e f f i c a c i o u s  .It27 As f o r  t h e  smoothbore c a r b i n e  or 
musketoon, it w a s  "an impor tan t  weapon f o r  t h e  a t t a c k  of t h e  
s k i r m i s h e r s  i n  extended l i n e , "  bu t  o the rwise  n o t  a u s e f u l  
c a v a l r y  weapon.28  Only t h e  l o w l y ,  j a c k - o f - a l l - t r a d e s  
dragoons were cus tomar i ly  equipped wi th  t h e  c a r b i n e  and i n  
t u r n  expec ted  t o  f i g h t ,  i n  a f a s h i o n ,  wh i l e  dismounted. The 
t r u e  cavalryman, however, had l i t t l e ,  i f  any, a f f e c t i o n  f o r  
t h i s  weapon and would have f u l l y  concurred w i t h  Jomini w h e n  
he wrote  : 
I do no t  know what t h e  c a r b i n e  i s  good f o r ;  
s i n c e  a body armed wi th  it must h a l t  i f  t h e y  wish 
t o  f i r e  w i t h  any accuracy ,  and t h e y  are t h e n  i n  a 
f a v o r a b l e  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  enemy t o  a t t a c k .  
T h e r e  are f e w  marksmen who can w i t h  any accuracy  
f i r e  a musket  w h i l e  on h o r s e b a c k  and  i n  r a p i d
motion. 29 
T h i s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  f i rearms  w a s  r o o t e d  i n  c a v a l r y  
h i s t o r y  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e .  G u s t a v u s ' s  r e v i v a l  of t h e  arme 
b l a n c h e  w a s  d o n e  p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  p ronounced  
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inaccuracy and lack of range of the firearms of his day. 
The horse pistol was a true monster of a weapon. Virtually 
a miniature cannon, it weighted up to six pounds (about the 
same as a modern infantry rifle), had a hellish kick to it 
when it indeed actually discharged and its effective range 
was less than fifteen yards. The butt of the horse pistol 
was therefore usually bulbous in shape and heavily weighted 
so that it could easily be wielded as a club for the purpose 
of bashing an adversary's skull. Otherwise, one literally 

had to have the barrel touching one's opponent in order to 

insure registering a kill when discharging this gun. 

Furthermore, attempting to fire a pistol accurately while 

sitting astride a moving horse at the trot, let alone at the 

gallop, while simultaneously attempting to stay in formation 

bordered on the impossible. Trying the same stunt with a 

musketoon simply lay beyond the province of most mortals. 

As for the effective range of the smoothbore carbine it was 

at best no more than seventy-five yards. Since both species 
of firearms were flintlocks, with an exposed primer for the 

ignition powder for the primary charge inside the weapon, 

connected by a touchhole, they could never be employed in 

adverse weather. Still another shortcoming was the ever 

present danger that a poorly loaded gun, or  one with an 
inferior grade of powder could easily blow up.30 This lack 

of firepower of traditionally armed cavalry produced, out of 

experience, the following maxim of war, as stated by 
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Lieutenant -Colonel  George T. Denison of t h e  Canadian Army, 
t h a t  c a v a l r y  "has no f i r e ,  and t h e r e f o r e  i s  n o t  s u i t a b l e  f o r  
defense ,  and can only resist an a t t a c k  by making an a n t i c i ­
p a t o r y  o n s e t  . G u s t a v u s ' s  t e c h n i q u e  of  i n t e r s p e r s i n g  
m u s k e t e e r s  among h i s  mounted s q u a d r o n s  o r  F r e d e r i c k ' s  
deve lopmen t  of  h o r s e  a r t i l l e r y  were no more t h a n  p a r t i a l  
s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h i s  p r e s s i n g  l a c k  of  f i r e p o w e r  o r  mounted 
u n i t s .  Thus,  ho r se  s o l d i e r s  were compelled t o  r e l y  l a r g e l y  
on edged weapons, b e s t  s u i t e d  f o r  use  i n  t h e  charge .  
An a l t e r n a t i v e ,  and far more noble ,  c a v a l r y  weapon w a s  
t h e  h i g h l y  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  l a n c e ,  which reappeared  i n  Western 
E u r o p e  i n  t h e  m i d d l e  o f  t h e  E i g h t e e n t h  C e n t u r y .  I t s  
immediate o r i g i n  l a y  w i t h  t h e  Asiatic, semi-nomadic t r ibes­
men of t h e  P o l i s h  and Russian s t eppes .  Made of hardwood, 
p r e f e r a b l y  oak o r  a sh ,  it f e a t u r e d  a sharpened metal t i p  and 
f r e q u e n t l y  as w e l l ,  metal s h e a t h i n g  f o r  t h e  forward t h i r d  of 
i t s  l e n g t h  so as t o  prevent  it from be ing  hacked o f f  by a 
s w o r d .  S u c h  weapons w e r e  i n v a r i a b l y  a d o r n e d  w i t h  t h e  
c o l o r f u l  r eg imen ta l  pennant.  P r e c i s e l y  due t o  t h e  l a n c e ' s  
s u p e r i o r  l e n g t h  and i t s  supposedly g r e a t e r  f e a r - g e n e r a t i o n  
c a p a c i t y  t h a n  t h e  s a b e r ,  more t h a n  a few c a v a l r y  commanders 
p r e f e r r e d  t o  send t h e i r  l a n c e r s  i n  f i r s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  enemy 
l i n e ,  fo l lowed by t h e  heavy cava l ry .  T h i s  g r e a t e r  psycho­
l o g i c a l  terror of t h e  l a n c e  w a s  a r e s u l t  of t h e  "apprehen­
s i o n  of  b e i n g  run  through ( ( w h i c h ) )  has  a powerful e f f e c t  
upon a man."32 But on ly  a few z e a l o t s ,  a t  any g iven  t i m e ,  
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ever  b e l i e v e d  one could a c t u a l l y  f i g h t  a c a v a l r y  melee w i t h  
l a n c e s  a g a i n s t  s a b e r s  a n d  have  t h e  fo rmer  p r e v a i l .  The 
l a n c e  w a s  s imply t o o  clumsy and t o o  unwieldy f o r  c l o s e - i n ,  
mounted horse- to-horse f i g h t i n g .  3 3  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  "a l a n c e  i s  u s e l e s s  i n  a melee", accord­
i n g  t o  c a v a l r y  e x p e r t  C a p t a i n  L.E.  Nolan  of t h e  B r i t i s h  
Army, " t h e  moment t h e  l a n c e r  p u l l s  up and impuls ive  power is  
s topped ,  t h e  i n s t a n t  t h e  power of t h e  weapon i s  gone.34 The 
l a n c e  w a s  a whol ly  o f f e n s i v e  weapon accord ing  t o  Bismark, 
"only a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  a t t a c k  and t h e  charge.  1'35 A major 
d i s a d v a n t a g e  of  t h e  lance w a s  t h a t  it t o o k  f a r  more t i m e  
t h a n  t h e  customary two y e a r s  of b a s i c  c a v a l r y  i n s t r u c t i o n  t o  
t r a i n  a t r o o p e r  i n  i t s  u s e .  " T h i s  i s  a most  e f f i c i e n t  
weapon when u s e d  by a t h o r o u g h l y  t r a i n e d  man," cau t ioned  
Bismark ,  " b u t  i n  t h e  hands of new levies it is p e r f e c t l y  
wor th less . "36  The lance enjoyed f i t s  and s p u r t s  of e n t h u s i ­
asm by r a t h e r  f i c k l e  c a v a l r y  leaders. I n  g e n e r a l ,  it w a s  
not terribly effective; its limitations virtually out­ 

weighed, i n  p r a c t i c a l  terms, i t s  a l l e g e d  f r i g h t f u l n e s s .  Y e t  
it possessed  a s t r o n g  v i s c e r a l  appea l  t o  t h e  a r i s t o c r a t i c ­
a l l y  minded p r o f e s s i o n a l  c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r  which t r anscended  
such mundane i s s u e s  as t ac t i ca l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  .37 
T h e  p r e m i e r  c a v a l r y  weapon w a s  o f  c o u r s e  t h e  arrne 
b l a n c h e :  The  saber o r  sword.  I n  o r d e r  t o  master t h i s  
d e c e p t i v e l y  s i m p l e  weapon, some n i n e  months of i n t e n s i v e  
p r a c t i c e  w a s  devoted t o  l e a r n i n g  t h e  innumerable i n t r i c a c i e s  
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of t h e  s a b e r  d a n c e  or d r i l l .  To t h e  popular  mind, fancy  
uniforms, mighty s t e e d s  and t h e  f l a s h i n g  g l i n t  of c o l d  steel  
c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  images  of  what  c a v a l r y  s h o u l d  b e .  To 
ex t remely  c o n s e r v a t i v e  c a v a l r y  commanders of t h e  E igh teen th  
a n d  N i n e t e e n t h  C e n t u r i e s ,  t h e  saber was wi thou t  pee r ;  t h e  
p i s t o l  and  t h e  c a r b i n e  second-ra te  i n t e r l o p e r s  of l i m i t e d  
u t i l i t y .  Such p e r s p e c t i v e ,  which a t  times bordered  on t h e  
m y s t i c a l ,  d i d  i n  f a c t  make p e r f e c t l y  good s e n s e  i n  an era of 
e x c e p t i o n a l l y  s h o r t  r a n g e  m u s k e t s  a n d  h i g h l y  e x p o s e d ,  
t i g h t l y  packed  i n f a n t r y  f o r m a t i o n s ;  a n  a g e  i n  which t h e  
c a v a l r y  s t i l l  had a f a i r  chance of succeeding  i n  i t s  r o l e  as 
shock. 38 
Even i n  t h e  Eighteenth  Century,  t h e  s a b e r  w a s  h e l d  t o  
be more u s e f u l  f o r  t h e  i n f l i c t i o n  of p sycho log ica l  r a t h e r  
t h a n  p h y s i c a l  i n j u r y ,  bu t  t h e  d r o i t  and e f f o r t l e s s  motion of 
t h e  swordsman on horseback i s  f a r  more t h e  s t u f f  of legend 
t h a n  of  h i s t o r i c a l  r e a l i t y .  Such f e a t s  w e r e  p e r f e c t l y  
p o s s i b l e  i f  one I s  t a r g e t  were meekly s t a n d i n g  still, one I s  
mount n o t  unduly a c t i v e  and o n e ' s  weapon indeed had an  edge 
on it. Such combination of f o r t u i t o u s  c i r cums tances  w a s  a11 
but  unheard of i n  t h e  customary melee o r  i n  c a v a l r y  v e r s u s  
i n f a n t r y  engagements . The hor se  provided a v e r y  u n s t a b l e  
p l a t fo rm;  t h e  t r o o p e r  i n  b a t t l e  w a s  i n  a c o n s t a n t  s ta te  of 
mot ion  a s  were h i s  mount and  h i s  a d v e r s a r i e s .  A goodly 
p o r t i o n  of  t h e  saber d a n c e  w a s  d i r e c t e d  t o  t r a i n i n g  t h e  
would-be t r o o p e r  how t o  f i g h t  i n  t h e  environment of s e v e r a l  
a 1  
different but interrelated planes of space with geometric­

ally precise patterns of sword play in the course of the 

very jumbled and exceedingly disorienting cavalry melee. 

Rarely did a trooper have more than a few opportunities for 

a head-on clear shot. Rather, the norm were glancing blows 

which rarely proved fatal or even disabling. The tradi­

tional heavy cavalry garb afforded ample protection against 

the saber, further diminishing its effectiveness. Moreover, 

it was virtually impossible to maintain a truly sharp edge 

on a saber while in the field. And it was deemed a breach 

of the rules of war to employ a grinder to give a sharp edge 

to a sword. 

Despite the clear ineffectiveness of the saber, cavalry 
men remained, in effect, spiritually wedded to the arme 
blanche. Even the later introduction of revolvers and 
breechloading, magazine carbines failed to shake most 
cavalry leaders in their faith in the deadliness of cold 
steel .  The mys t i ca l  devot ion t o  t h e  saber long a f t e r  Samuel 
Colt had manufactured his first cap and ball revolver had 
little if anything to do with a carefully reasoned and 
rationally based evaluation of the comparative merits and 
demerits of each category of cavalry weapons and the 
corresponding tactics that would best exploit their particu­
lar characteristics. Rather, from the mid-Seventeenth 
Century o n ,  the cavalry branch of service came to be 
dominated by a very aristocratic brand of officer, self-
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c l o i s t e r e d  as it were from t h e  d i s a g r e e a b l e  changes i n  t h e  
t e c h n o l o g y  o f  w a r ,  beginning w i t h  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of t h e  
f l i n t l o c k  musket  and  r u n n i n g  through t h e  more deadly  by-
p r o d u c t s  of  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  Revolut ion.  Th i s  overwhelming 
commitment t o  t r a d i t i o n  r e g a r d l e s s  of m i l i t a r y  and s o c i a l  
change  w a s  t h e  h a l l m a r k  of  t h e  b l u e b l o o d e d  European and 
American c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r  .39 
T h e  t y p e s  of c a v a l r y  armament d e s c r i b e d  above, engen­
dered t h e  deve lopmen t  of s p e c i a l i z e d  mounted f o r m a t i o n s  
t a i l o r e d  so as t o  enhance e i ther  a p a r t i c u l a r  weapon o r  a 
s p e c i f i c  t ac t ica l  role. What were i n  e f f e c t  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  
of t o d a y ' s  main b a t t l e  t a n k  were t h e  armored c u i r a s s i e r s  o r  
heavy c a v a l r y .  Out of n e c e s s i t y ,  a s  w e l l  as t o  enhance 
t h e i r  s h o c k  e f f e c t ,  t h e  c u i r a s s i e r s  rode  t h e  l a r g e s t  and 
h e a v i e s t  h o r s e s .  I n  t h e  y e a r s  immediately preceding  t h e  
C i v i l  War, c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e b a t e  raged among c a v a l r y  e x p e r t s  
as t o  t h e  merits and u t i l i t y  of t h e  c u i r a s s i e r s .  The c rux  of 
t h i s  i s s u e  w a s  w h e t h e r  t h e  a d v a n c e s  i n  weaponry  i n  t h e  
1850s, i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  Minnie b u l l e t  r i f l e ,  would so s h i f t  
t h e  b a l a n c e  of  t a c t i c s  i n  f a v o r  of  t h e  i n f a n t r y  as  t o  
l i q u i d a t e  t h e  shock  f u n c t i o n  of heavy c a v a l r y  a l t o g e t h e r .  
T h i s  c o n t r o v e r s y  was t h e  l e a d i n g  i s s u e  w i t h  cavalrymen on 
b o t h  s ides  of  t h e  A t l a n t i c  as t o  t h e  f u t u r e  c h a r a c t e r  of 
t h e i r  branch of s e r v i c e .  The m i n o r i t y  view w a s  propounded 
by,  i n  t h e  main ,  l i g h t  c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r s  such as Capta in  
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Nolan, who rather caustically dismissed the worth of heavy 
cavalry when he wrote: 

Composed of large men in defensive armor, 

mounted on heavy, powerful horses are held in hand 

for a decisive charge on the day of battle, and 

their horses are s o  deficient in speed and 
endurance, being so overweighted that they require
light horse to follow up the enemy they had 
beaten. 4 0  
The scantiness of actual battlefield experience as to 

the deadliness of the weapons served to undercut the 

credibility of the position of the light cavalrymen. 

Moreover, the considerable hold of tradition on cavalry 

doctrine further hindered any effort at modernizing mounted 

warfare. J. Roemer, of the Dutch cavalry, and a passionate 

proponent of the cuirassiers as the elite of the mounted 

service, rejected the minority's position as unsound: 

..substituting fervid inclination for cool 
judgment, they have concluded that henceforth 
there is need but for that one kind of cavalry,

and the one in whose welfare they are particularly 

interested.41 

The dragoons were p r o p e r  members of t h e  c a v a l r y  
fraternity, albeit of distinctly lower military status. 

While trained to fight as skirmishers when dismounted, the 

signifying characteristic of the dragoon was that he could, 

in a pinch, deliver a charge, in lieu of heavy cavalry. In 

addition, the dragoons could be gainfully employed for 

reconnoitering and camp security duties. Historically, 

dragoons, named f o r  their early hand armament or dragons, 
first appeared in the English and French armies in the 
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F i f t e e n t h  C e n t u r y  a s  mounted i n f a n t r y .  Such u n i t s  were 
o r i g i n a l l y  c r e a t e d  t o  provide  a more v e r s a t i l e  and cheaper  
form o f  h o r s e  s o l d i e r  t h a n  t h e  mounted k n i g h t .  By t h e  
N i n e t e e n t h  Century,  however, t h e  dragoons had been l a r g e l y  
s h o r n  of  t h e i r  t a i n t e d  i n f a n t r y  t ra i ts .  Correspondingly ,  
t h e i r  p r o w e s s  a t  d i s m o u n t e d  combat d e c l i n e d  a s  mounted 
d u t i e s  t o o k  i n c r e a s i n g  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  t h e  r o l e  of t h e  
dragoons .4 2  
The dragoons were t h e r e f o r e  no t  mounted i n f a n t r y  i n  t h e  
c l a s s i c a l  E u r o p e a n  d e f i n i t i o n .  T e c h n i c a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
mounted r i f l e s  o r  i n f a n t r y  (depending on t h e  k ind  of small 
arms c a r r i e d )  were h a s t i l y  formed o u t f i t s  c u s t o m a r i l y  
c r e a t e d  d u e  t o  a p r e s s i n g  l o c a l  s h o r t a g e  of f u l l - f l e d g e d  
c a v a l r y  u n i t s .  Mounted i n f a n t r y ,  as unders tood  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
h a l f  o f  t h e  N i n e t e e n t h  C e n t u r y ,  were e s s e n t i a l l y  ground 
p o u n d e r s  i n e l e g a n t l y  p e r c h e d  on  w h a t e v e r  h o r s e f l e s h  w a s  
r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e .  Under no c i rcumstances  were j e r r y r i g g e d  
o u t f i t s  i n t e n d e d  t o  mount a r e a l ,  saber waving cavalry 
charge.  Ra the r ,  as po in ted  o u t  by Colonel J. Lucius Davis,  
"MOUNTED R I F L E S  d i f f e r s  f rom all o t h e r  c a v a l r y  i n  arms, 
manoeuver and  i n  h a b i t u a l l y  d i s m o u n t i n g  f o r  t h e  combat, 
t h e i r  h o r s e s  c h i e f l y  t h e  means of r a p i d  locomotion. t t43 Such 
f o r m a t i o n s  were r a r e l y ,  i f  e v e r ,  equipped wi th  t h e  proper  
r e g a l i a  and accouterments  of "real" cava l ry .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  
mounted in fan t ryman ' s  equipage w a s  s t a n d a r d  i s s u e  for f o o t  
s o l d i e r s  p l u s  h a r n e s s ,  s a d d l e  and perhaps a s h o r t  sword. 
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Spurs ,  t h e  earmark of a t r u e  ho r se  s o l d i e r ,  were seldom i f  
ever  bestowed upon t h e  lowly mounted infantryman.  Mounted 
i n f a n t r y  proved e s p e c i a l l y  u s e f u l  i n  European c o l o n i e s  where 
imported ho r ses  d i d  no t  f a r e  as w e l l  due t o  local  d i s e a s e s  
a n d  b e c a u s e  t h e  i n d i g e n o u s  horsemen were o n l y  r a r e l y  
organized  a long  l i n e s  approximate t o  classical  t h e o r y .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  w a s  t h e  l i g h t  c a v a l r y .  I n  terms of t h e  
peerage of t h e  European mounted s e r v i c e s ,  t h e s e  s p o r t i v e  and 
spunky l a d s  were, i n  e f f e c t ,  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  of t h e  tradi­
t i o n a l l y  g o o d - h e a r t e d  b u t  n a u g h t y  younger  s o n s  of t h e  
a r i s t o c r a c y .  Awash  i n  sp l endor ,  over loaded  wi th  c o l o r  and 
marked by  a s u r f e i t  o f  c h e e k  and  t e m e r i t y ,  these d a r i n g  
d e s c e n d a n t s  of t h e  c a v a l i e r  t r a d i t i o n  were g e n e r a l l y  n o t  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  e f f e c t i v e  i n  t h e i r  d e s i g n a t e d  r o l e  of harass­
ment and  r e c o n n a i s s a n c e .  T h i s  w a s  due  t o  t h e  r e c u r r i n g  
h a b i t  of such u n i t s ,  i n  peacet ime,  of bu lk ing  up, i n  terms 
of h o r s e  s i z e ,  i n t o  t h e  r a n g e  of t h e  heavy c a v a l r y ;  t h e  
B r i t i s h  A r m y  w a s  c lear ly  t h e  w o r s t  o f fenders  i n  t h i s  regard. 
T h e  v e r y  embodiment of  a r i s t o c r a t i c  f r i v o l i t y ,  t h e  l i g h t  
c a v a l r y  w e r e  marked ly  d i f f e r e n t  i n  s p i r i t  and appearance 
t h a n  t h e  somber, s t o u t  oaks of t h e  heavy c a v a l r y ,  which w e r e  
t h e  p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n ,  as  it w e r e ,  o f  r e s p e c t a b i l i t y  a n d  
o r d e r .  T h e  p o p u l a r i t y  of l i g h t  c a v a l r y  was s u b j e c t  t o  
r e c u r r i n g  s h i f t s  o f  e n t h u s i a s m  on t h e  p a r t  O E  m i l i t a r y  
leaders due t h e  waning of combat expe r i ence  fo l lowing  a war 
and t h e  g r a d u a l  r e a s s e r t i o n  of t r a d i t i o n  as dominated i n  
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p e a c e t i m e  c a v a l r y  p lanning .  B a t t l e f i e l d  expe r i ence  tended  
c l e a r l y  t o  show t h e  i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of heavy c a v a l r y  and i n  
t u r n ,  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  most  p r o f  i t a b l e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of 
mounted u n i t s  would l i e  i n  s c o u t i n g ,  which w a s  of c o u r s e  t h e  
s u i t  of t h e  l i g h t  c a v a l r y .  Doct r ine ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  over­
w h e l m i n g l y  r e s t e d  on t h e  s i d e  of  t r a d i t i o n  and  of  t h e  
c u i r a s s i e r s  and t h u s  t rumpeted t h e  c r u c i a l  r o l e  of c a v a l r y  
as be ing  t h e  f o r c e f u l  and e x p e r t  d e l i v e r y  of t h e  charge .  
L i g h t  c a v a l r y  u n i t s ,  however ,  p o s s e s s e d  o t h e r  t h a n  
s t r i c t l y  m i l i t a r y  v i r t u e s .  For o n e ,  t h e y  were s o c i a l l y  
a t t r a c t i v e  t o  t h e  u p p e r  c l a s s ,  what  w i t h  t h e i r  l a r g e l y  
p a t r i c i a n  o f f i c e r s  (it took  c o n s i d e r a b l e  sums t o  ma in ta in  a 
s t a b l e  of f i n e  ho r ses ,  a r e t i n u e  of s e r v a n t s ,  a couple  of 
c l o s e t s  of e x q u i s i t e  uniforms and t o  bear t h e  heavy burden 
of mon th ly  mess f e e s )  a n d  t h e i r  l u s h  f i n e r y  and s p l e n d i d  
pageant ry .  N o  b e t t e r  exponents  could t h u s  be found of t h e  
romantic  s t y l e  of m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of t h e  
N i n e t e e n t h  C e n t u r y .  The l i g h t  cavalry a l s o  afforded an 
e x c e l l e n t  p l a c e  t o  p i g e o n h o l e  d i m w i t t e d  s o n s  of d i s t i n ­
g u i s h e d  o f f i c e r s  and t h e  less menta l ly  a g i l e  youth of t h e  
a r i s t o c r a c y .  
The h u s s a r s  and c h a s s e u r s ,  t h e  s p e c i e s  of l i g h t  c a v a l r y  
most f r e q u e n t l y  encountered  i n  European armies, and func­
t i o n a l l y  i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e  i n  n a t u r e ,  were in t ended  t o  perform 
t h e  more venturesome d u t i e s  of c a v a l r y .  Thus t h e i r  f o r t e  
w a s  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of b a t t l e f i e l d  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  e s c o r t  and 
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p a t r o l  d u t y  a n d  t o  a lesser degree ,  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  of t h e  
s h i f t ,  d a u n t l e s s  r a i d s  on t h e  enemy's f l a n k s  and rear. I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  l i g h t  c a v a l r y  w a s  a l s o  most r e g u l a r l y  a s s i g n e d  
t h e  g r i n d i n g  and h i g h l y  unp leasan t  t a s k  of p rov id ing  l o c a l  
army s e c u r i t y  as p i c k e t s  and v e d e t t e s .  The romanticism of 
t h e  l i g h t  c a v a l r y  was w e l l  d e s c r i b e d  by Mahan, h i m s e l f  
supposedly a ve ry  p r a c t i c a l  eng inee r :  
T h e  d a s h i n g  b o l d  h u s s a r ,  t h e  e p i t o m e  of  
m i l i t a r y  i m p u d e n c e  a n d  r e c k l e s s n e s s . . . s h o u l d  
p r e s e n t  t h e s e  q u a l i t i e s  i n  a subl imated  form on 
t h e  f i e l d .  Regard less  of f a t i g u e  and danger ,  h i s  
i m a g i n a t i o n  s h o u l d  n e v e r  p r e s e n t  t o  i t s e l f  a n  
o b s t a c l e  as insurmountable .  
Furthermore,  t h e  l i g h t  cavalryman should  always a t t a c k  
h i s  f o e ,  " w i t h  a f a l c o n ' s  speed and g l ance  upon h i s  q u a r r y ,  
h o w e v e r  it may s e e k  t o  e l u d e  h i s  b l o w ,  s u c h  b e  t h e  
hussar ."44 
C a v a l r y  w a s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  d e f i n e d  as an  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  
o f f e n s i v e  t o o l  of w a r ,  i n  t h a t  it "is always weak on t h e  
d e f e n s i v e .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Major  W i l l i a m  
Gelhorn, ''a body of c a v a l r y  which w a i t s  t o  r e c e i v e  a cha rge  
o f  c a v a l r y ,  o r  i s  e x p o s e d  t o  a Eorce  of i n f a n t r y ,  o r  
a r t i l l e r y ,  m u s t  ei ther retire, o r  be destroyed."46 S ince  
t h e  "paramount purpose of c a v a l r y  is t o  attack," it w a s  a 
f u n d a m e n t a l  maxim of c a v a l r y  t a c t i c a l  d o c t r i n e ,  as here 
s t a t ed  by  Roemer, t o  "a lways  husband t h e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  
ho r ses  and never expend more of it t h a n  i s  n e c e s s a r y  for t h e  
o b j e c t  aimed a t . " 4 7  The  charge  of ho r se  w a s  n o t  d i ss imi la r  
t o  t h e  one s h o t  musket: once a round w a s  d i scha rged  o r  a 
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c a v a l r y  a t t a c k  launched,  i n  o rde r  r a p i d l y  t o  reengage t h e  
enemy, a f r e s h  l i n e  had  t o  be  b r o u g h t  up o r  new mounted 
u n i t s  unleashed a t  t h e  enemy. The thunde r ing  c a v a l r y  a t t a c k  
was, i n  e f f e c t ,  a race a g a i n s t  u n i t  d i s r u p t i o n  and exhaus­
t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h  t h e  heavy c a v a l r y .  The longe r  t h e  
d i s t a n c e  over which mounted u n i t s  charged,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  
f a t i g u e  of t h e  animals  and, i n  t u r n ,  t h e  lower i t s  combat 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  upon impact w i t h  t h e  enemy's l i n e  
o r  mounted u n i t s ,  t h e  a s s a u l t i n g  c a v a l r y  w a s  r a p i d l y  broken 
up, w i t h  t i g h t  format ions  q u i c k l y  r e p l a c e d  by small p a c k e t s  
of t r o o p s  engaged i n  what were b a s i c a l l y ,  p r i v a t e  d u e l s  w i th  
t h e i r  foes .  Thus, i n  t h e  cour se  of a ba t t le ,  c a v a l r y  u n i t s  
c o u l d  be  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  expended only  a couple  of times a t  
b e s t ,  b e f o r e  becoming e f f e c t i v e l y  ~~hors  du combat. Moreover, 
w h i l e  a c a v a l r y  a t t a c k  o r  melee w a s  c u s t o m a r i l y  b r i e f  i n  
d u r a t i o n ,  no more t h a n  h a l f  an hour a t  most, mounted u n i t s ,  
u n l i k e  t h e  i n f a n t r y ,  r e q u i r e d  almost  an e n t i r e  day t o  reform 
themselves for further action. The type of terrain upon 

w h i c h  a b a t t l e  w a s  f o u g h t  c o n t r o l l e d ,  t o  a v e r y  l a r g e  
e x t e n t ,  t h e  deployment and a p p l i c a t i o n  of c a v a l r y  t h e o r y ;  t o  
u s e  mounted u n i t s  on i m p e r f e c t  g round  w a s  t o  c a u s e  t h e  
f r a g i l e  y e t  mighty power of t h e  ho r se  s o l d i e r  t o  be d i s r u p ­
t e d  o r  e v e n  broken. "The h o r s e ' s  power.. .'I, accord ing  t o  
L.V. Buckholtz, ' I . .  . i s  e f f e c t i v e  o n l y  by r a p i d i t y ,  a n d  
t h e r e f o r e ,  motion i s  t h e  t r u e  element of cava l ry . "  Fu r the r ­
more,  "it i s  o n l y  o f f e n s i v e ,  and depends e n t i r e l y  on t h e  
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c o n t o u r s  of t h e  ground, it is  i n v i n c i b l e  on l e v e l  ground, 
b u t  u s e l e s s  i n  broken. . l and ."48  It w a s  t h i s  fundamental  
s ense  of r i s k  and imperi lment ,  enbodied i n  t h e  v e r t i g i n o u s  
n a t u r e  of t h e  charge i t s e l f ,  a gamble wi th  t h e  f a t e s  as it 
were , t h a t  g a v e  c a v a l r y  i t s  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
f o r  be ing  audacious and undaunted i n  b a t t l e ,  q u a l i t i e s  t h a t  
had p a r t i c u l a r  a t t r a c t i o n  t o  t h e  a r i s t o c r a t i c  m i l i t a r y  
e l i t e s  of t h i s  era.49 
C a v a l r y - v e r s u s - c a v a l r y  e n g a g e m e n t  were t h u s ,  by 
d e f i n i t i o n ,  a h igher  sphe re  of b a t t l e  t h a n  e i t h e r  c a v a l r y  
v e r s u s  i n f a n t r y  o r  a r t i l l e r y  engagements. Such a c l a s h  of 
opposing c a v a l r y  w a s  as much a d u e l  as a b a t t l e .  lt w a s  t o  
a ve ry  great e x t e n t ,  a t es t  of o n e ' s  mettle as a horseman, 
of a u n i t ' s  p rowess  a n d  f o r t i t u d e .  S u c c e s s ,  s i n c e  " t h e  
a d v a n t a g e  i s  a l w a y s  w i t h  t h e  a t t a c k i n g  p a r t y "  c o u n s e l l e d  
Capta in  E m r i c  Szabad of t h e  I t a l i a n  Army, t h u s  depended upon 
t h e  execu t ion  of a near  flawless charge.5o O r  as Roemer p u t  
it, 
A charge  i s  a r a p i d  and impetuous o n s e t  of a 
body of c a v a l r y  upon t h e  f o r c e s  of  a body o f  
c a v a l r y  upon t h e  f o r c e s  of  t h e  enemy. T o  be 
u s e f u l ,  it i s  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  t h e  h o r s e s  b e  a t  
t h e i r  utmost speed a t  t h e  moment oE c o l l i s i o n ,  and 
i f  a r r i v e d  w e l l  a l i g n e d  and i n  a compact body, t h e  
shock must... over throw e v e r y t h i n g  t h a t  happens t o  
s t a n d  i n  t h e i r  l eap .  5 1  
Courage ,  i m p e t u o s i t y ,  verve  and honor w e r e  tested t o  
t h e  l i m i t  i n  such an engagement. "Cavalry",  acco rd ing  t o  
No lan ,  " se ldom m e e t  each o t h e r  i n  a c h a r g e  e x e c u t e d  a t  
s p e e d ;  t h e  one  p a r t y  g e n e r a l l y  t u r n s  b e f o r e  j o i n i n g  i s s u e  
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with the enemy, and this often happens when the line is 

unbroken and no obstacles of any sort intervene,"52 In 

regards to the broader tactical aspects of battle, cavalry 

was deemed in the post-Napoleonic era as a necessary adjunct 

to true victory.53 Thus while infantry was the most 

flexible and cost-effective combat arm, the cavalry was, as 

stated by Halleck, "indispensible for beginning a battle, 

for completing a victory, and for reaping its full advantage 

by pursuing and destroying the beaten foe."54 

The moral superiority and intrinsically greater virtue 
of cavalry served to grant true nobility and honor to a 
victorious army. Of course infantry and artillery were 
acknowledged as capable of achieving great tactical success 
in the absence of cavalry yet to the early professional 
military leaders such victories were viewed as tainted by 
lack of true elan and mettle.55 Moreover, the lack OE 
pursuit afforded by mounted troops was seen as robbing the 
victor of long-term success, a point well stated by Roexner:  
Battles have been won with little or no 

cavalry, but they have always proved sterile and 

without results. The enemy is repulsed, but not 

destroyed; and after a few days reappears in the 

field with undiminished numbers, and ready to 

renew the contest.56 [Thus,] no victory is 

brilliant which is not followed up by cavalry, and 

no battle is really destructive which is not 

determined by them. 57 

If the engineer was the most advanced and scientific 

type of officer in the Antebellum era, then, in terms of 

inilitary professionalism, the officer of horse was the most 
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t r a d i t i o n a l  i n  cha rac t e r .58  O r  as Capta in  Nolan p u t  it so 
ab ly  : 
With  t h e  c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r  a lmost  e v e r y t h i n g  
depends on t h e  c l e a r n e s s  of h i s  cou d ' o e i l ,  and 
t h e  f e l i c i t y  w i t h  which  he  s i z e s  +happy momentt e 
of a c t i o n ,  and  when o n c e  a c t i o n  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  
upon, t h e  r a p i d i t y  wi th  which h i s  i n t e n t i o n s  are 
c a r r i e d  i n t o  e f f e c t .  T h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  t i m e  f o r  
t h o u g h t ,  none f o r  h e s i t a t i o n ;  and once t h e  move­
ment i s  commenced, i t s  s u c c e s s f u l  accoanplishment
i s  t h e  ( [ o n l y ] )  t h o u g h t  a l lowed t o  pas s  th rough
t h e  mind of t h e  commander.59 
There was a v i r t u a l  t i m e l e s s n e s s  t o  many a s p e c t s  of t h e  
l e a d e r s h i p  s t y l e  of t h e  c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r .  While s e p a r a t e d  by 
a hundred y e a r s  and by many m i l i t a r y  advances and numerous 
b a t t l e s ,  t h e r e  w a s  none the le s s  a deep k ind red  s p i r i t  between 
b r e t h r e n  o f f i c e r s  of ho r se ,  of t h e  e a r l y  Nine teenth  Century 
and t h o s e  of t h e  e a r l y  Twentieth.  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  percep­
t i o n s  a n d  s t y l e  of  o f f i c e r s h i p  of  e n g i n e e r  o r  i n f a n t r y  
commanders changed  marked ly .  The c a v a l r y  remained, t o  a 
much g r e a t e r  e x t e n t ,  wedded t o  t h e i r  p r e - p r o f e s s i o n a l ,  
w a r r i o r  t r a d i t i o n s .  60 
The b e l i e f  i n  t h e  moral s u p e r i o r i t y  of c a v a l r y  had i t s  
r o o t s  i n  t h e  u n i q u e l y  h a z a r d o u s  n a t u r e  of  mounted duty .  
" I n f a n t r y ,  o r  a r t i l l e r y  i n  p o s i t i o n  may p a s s i v e l y  s t a n d  
f i re ;"  i n s t r u c t e d  Roemer, " t o  s t r ike down h i s  adve r sa ry ,  t h e  
horseman must c l o s e ,  and t h e  chances are t h a t  he r e c e i v e s  a 
blow i n  r e t u r n  f o r  t h e  one he dea ls . "61  Y e t ,  romanticism 
d o m i n a t e d  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  characterist ics of 
mounted warfare .  There w a s  c l e a r l y  a h ighe r  s o c i a l  connota­
t i o n  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  ho r se  s o l d i e r s .  I n  o t h e r  words, h o r s e s  
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and  t h u s  c a v a l r y  were t h e  badge and t h e  p rov ince  of t r u e  
s o c i e t a l  e l i t es ;  i n f a n t r y ,  i n  s h a r p  c o n t r a s t ,  were rep resen ­
t a t i v e s  of t h e  plodding,  l e t h a r g i c  masses of t h e  p e a s a n t r y .  
The bond be tween r i d e r  and mount w a s  esteemed as being a 
t r u l y  s p i r i t u a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  one  c o n n o t i n g  n o t  m e r e l y  
h ighe r  s o c i a l  s t a n d i n g  bu t  a l s o  g r e a t e r  moral f o r c e .  On a 
p r a c t i c a l  l e v e l ,  c a v a l r y m e n  were t r a i n e d  t o  r e g a r d  t h e i r  
mounts  as m e r e l y  a n o t h e r  p i e c e  of e q u i p m e n t  a n d  h e n c e ,  
d i s p o s a b l e .  Y e t  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  c a v a l r y m e n  would h a v e  
e n d o r s e d  t h e  c o n c e p t ,  a r t i c u l a t e d  by Buckhol tz ,  t h a t  "man 
and  h o r s e  a r e  a u n i t y ,  t h e  b r u t e  f o r c e  submi t t ed  t o  t h e  
r a t i o n a l  will, ....62 The ve ry  e s sence  OE c a v a l r y  t h e o r y  w a s  
t h a t  it was an  a r t  and n o t  r e d u c i b l e  t o  a s c i e n c e .  Thus t h e  
n a t u r e  of c a v a l r y ,  q u i t e  u n l i k e  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  of w a r  and t h e  
p r o f e s s i o n  of arms, by d e f i n i t i o n ,  could n o t  be t r a n s l a t e d  
i n t o  mere m e c h a n i z e d  r o u t i n e  o r  s u b j e c t  t o  s c i e n t i � i c  
e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n .  E x p r e s s i o n s  by m i l i t a r y  writers of t h e  
e f f i c a c y  of c a v a l r y  were r e a l l y  s t a t e m e n t s  of f a i t h ;  of a 
deep, unde r ly ing ,  p r e - p r o f e s s i o n a l  commitment t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  
w a r r i o r  va lues .  6 3  N a t u r a l l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  s i n c e  c a v a l r y  w a s  
d e f i n e d  by i t s  advoca tes  as a way, a p a t h  and a t r a d i t i o n ,  
s u c h  s p i r i t u a l  g r o w t h ,  w a r r i o r  p rowess  a n d  e x p e r t i s e  i n  
horsemanship could  no t  be r e a d i l y  t a u g h t  o r  l e a r n e d .  Hence, 
r e l i a n c e  on m i l i t i a  o r  h a s t i l y  o r g a n i z e d  a n d  improvised 
c a v a l r y  u n i t s ,  s a v e  f o r  t h e  most  e l e m e n t a r y  t a s k s  w a s  
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d e f i n e d  a s  sheer f o l l y ,  a p o i n t  v e r y  f o r c i b l y  s t a t e d  by 
Roemer : 
When w e  r e f l e c t  t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e s  t h r e e f o l d  
more  t i m e  t o  t e a c h  a man t o  r i d e  a n d  h a v e  a 
p e r f e c t  mastery of h i s  ho r se  t h a n  t o  teach a Eoot 
s o l d i e r  h i s  complete d r i l l  and t h a t  when t h e  ho r se  
s o l d i e r  is t h u s  fa r  i n s t r u c t e d  he has s t i l l  a v a s t  
d e a l  t o  l e a r n  b e f o r e  h i s  educa t ion  is  complete,  it 
becomes e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  h u r r i e d  augmentat ion of 
c a v a l r y  f o r c e s  should  be sc rupu lous ly  avoided. A 
r e g i m e n t  of  i n f a n t r y  may b e  s p e e d i l y  i n c r e a s e d  
w i t h o u t  g r e a t l y  i m p a i r i n g  i t s  u s e f u l n e s s  i n  t h e  
f i e l d ,  by  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  a c e r t a i n  number o f  
r e c r u i t s ,  most of whom had probably se rved  a l r e a d y  
i n  t h e  m i l i t i a ;  bu t  a few h a l f - d r i l l e d  horsemen, a 
few unbroken h o r s e s ,  w i l l  throw a whole l i n e  i n t o  
d i s o r d e r ,  and  m a r  eve ry  e f f o r t  o� t h e  most a b l e  
comrnander.64 
T h i s  c r u c i a l  r u l e  of c a v a l r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w a s  f u l l y  
suppor ted  by S e c r e t a r y  of W a r  L e w i s  C a s s :  
U n t r a i n e d  men on u n t r a i n e d  h o r s e s ,  form a 
combination of awkwardness t h a t  can e n s u r e  no th ing
bu t  ex t ravagance  and d isgrace .65  
C a v a l r y  warfare  s t o o d  a loof  from t h e  post-Napoleonic 
s u r g e  of p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  and m i l i t a r y  s c i e n c e .  Y e t  as a n  
e l i t e  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e ,  c a v a l r y  se rved  as a l i v i n g  e x p r e s s i o n  
of t h e  e s s e n t i a l  a r i s t o c r a t i c ,  w a r r i o r  v a l u e s  t h a t  u l t i ­
mately were t h e  bedrock of t h e  new mathematic s t y l e  of w a r .  
I n  t i m e ,  however, w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r  arms of s e r v i c e  prospered  
from t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n c e s  engendered  by t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  
R e v o l u t i o n ,  t h e  c a v a l r y  w i t h d r e w  b e h i n d  t h e  r ampar t s  of 
t r a d i t i o n .  T h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  e v i d e n t  o b s o l e s c e n c e  of  
c a v a l r y ,  d u e  t o  enormous i n c r e a s e s  of f i r epower ,  were, i n  
t h e  main, countered  by c a v a l r y  leaders w i t h  r e - expres s ions  
of  t h e  p a s t  t r i umphs  of Gustavus, Freder ick  and Napoleon. 
9 4  

I n  e f f e c t ,  t h e  c a v a l r y  w a s  s lowly  becoming a p r i s o n e r  of i t s  
myths a n d  c u s t o m s ,  r e f u s i n g  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  of  
change .  Y e t  t h i s  w a s  n o t  b l i n d  m i l i t a r y  s t u p i d i t y ,  u n t i l  
perhaps l a t e  i n  t h e  Nine teenth  Century,  when c a v a l r y  z e a l o t s  
began  p u s h i n g  f o r  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  r e v i v a l  of t h e  l a n c e  i n  
face of t h e  growing adop t ion  of t h e  Maxim machine gun. In 
t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of t h e  Nine teenth  Century,  wh i l e  t h e  e f f i c a c y  
of h o r s e  s o l d i e r s  w a s  i n d e e d  dimming, t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  of 
t h i s  f a c t ,  w a s  by and large s t i l l  many y e a r s  away.66 
Chapter I11 

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN CAVALRY --

FRONTIER SECURITY AND THE PROFESSIONAL ARMY 

Part I 

Cavalry, in the years prior to John C. Calhoun's tenure 
as Secretary of War, enjoyed only slight support from either 
the national political leadership or the Army's commanders. 
General George Washington, during the Revolutionary War, 
opposed the development of a large American cavalry arm. 
The objection, drawn from classical European cavalry theory, 
was based upon the less-than-ideal terrain of the eastern 
United States. The absence of broad expanses of flat, open 
country and the existence of dense woods, hilly terrain and 
thick swamps barred the widespread use of mounted troops. 
This basic rule became ingrained in United States tactical 
doctrine through the early years of the Civil War. Two 
collateral arguments against political support for mounted 
forces were commonly raised: first, the significantly 
greater expenses of maintaining cavalry units, which were of 
lower tactical utility than infantry; and secondly, the tra­
ditional association of horse soldiers with aristocratic 
power. The first objection was unquestionably the more tan­
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gible of the two. Cavalry units were nearly twice as expen­
sive to maintain as infantry formations of equivalent size. 
Nonetheless, the pre-War of 1812 Army had occasionally 
experimented with the use of cavalry. The first post-
Revolutionary war cavalry unit was a squadron (about two 
companies of one hundred and sixty or so officers and men) 
created by Congress in 1792. This small force was subse­
quently raised to full regimental strength. The legislative 
warrant for this unit expired in October, 1796, leaving the 
Army with only the original two cavalry companies. Indian 
unrest in the Old Northwest Territory occasioned the crea­
tion on July 16, 1798 of six additional companies, merged 
with the existing force into a single mounted regiment. Due 
to the needs of frontier security, Congress on March 2, 1799 
authorized three regiments of light dragoons, but these 
units never reached their targeted strength. The first era 
in the history of the United States Army's cavalry forces 
ended on March 16, 1802 with Congress's passage of the Jef­
ferson administration's Peace Bill. This legislation abol­
ished all of the Army's cavalry units. Due to increasingly 
troublesome relations with Great Britain, Congress, on April 
12, 1808, legislated a general expansion of the Army, 
including a new regiment of light dragoons. This unit, how­
ever, remained dismounted until the outbreak of hostilities 
in 1812, due to financial restraints. Four years later, on 
January 11, 1812, a second light dragoon regiment was cre-
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a t e d  f o r  d u t y  a g a i n s t  t h e  B r i t i s h .  "Having proved almost  
unse rv iceab le  i n  t h e  s e v e r a l  campaigns", acco rd ing  t o  Secre­
t a r y  of War L e w i s  Cass, " t h e  dragoons were disbanded a t  t h e  
p e a c e  w i t h  l i t t l e  o r  no r e m o n s t r a n c e  f rom any q u a r t e r .  2 
Thus, i n  March, 1815, Congress a b o l i s h e d  t h e  l i g h t  dragoon 
r e g i m e n t s  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  a g e n e r a l  r e d u c t i o n  of t h e  
Army. A s  befo re ,  t h e  o b j e c t i o n s  were t ac t i ca l ,  f i s c a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  i n  na ture .3  AS S e c r e t a r y  of War L e w i s  C a s s  p u t  
it : 
T r o o p s  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  c h a r a c t e r  ( ( i . e .  , 
c a v a l r y ) )  have never done anyth ing  as ye t . . .  t h e  
greater  p o r t i o n  of t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  t h e  E a s t  i s  
u n f i t t e d  f o r  i t s  use i n  masses... t h e r e  on ly  small
numbers would be needed.... 4 
U n i t e d  S ta tes  f r o n t i e r  s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
t h e  r o l e  of t h e  Army i n  t h e  maintenance of o r d e r  and I n d i a n  
c o n t r o l  underwent s i g n i f i c a n t  change du r ing  t h e  Antebellum 
per iod .  Pr ior  t o  t h e  War of 1812, as wi th  most a s p e c t s  of 
United States w a r  p o l i c y ,  t h e  p r e c i s e  miss ion  of t h e  Army as 
t o  t h e  i s s u e  of f r o n t i e r  s e c u r i t y  was q u i t e  i l l - d e f i n e d .  O n  
o c c a s i o n ,  a s  i n  t h e  1790's campaign  by t h e  L e g i o n  ( t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p recu r so r  of t h e  d i v i s i o n )  a g a i n s t  t h e  Indi ­
a n s  of t h e  O l d  Nor thwes t  T e r r i t o r y ,  t h e  Army played t h e  
l e a d i n g  r o l e  i n  fo rmula t ing  and execu t ing  f r o n t i e r  s e c u r i t y  
p 0 1 i c y . ~  I n  t h e  main, however, p r i o r  t o  t h e  War of 1 8 1 2 ,  
t h e  Army lacked a coherent  miss ion  i n  regards t o  t h e  i s s u e  
of p o l i c i n g  t h e  western and sou the rn  t e r r i t o r i e s .  A f t e r  
t h e  War of  1812 ,  however ,  t h e  Army g r a d u a l l y  assumed a 
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virtual monopoly of organized military power on the fron­

tier. Thus, with brief and rare exceptions, principally 

during the Civil War years, the Army was gradually assigned 

the exclusive role of providing military protection to fron­

tier settlers. The acceptance of such a responsibility, in 

contrast to the earlier mixture of militia and regular 

troops, was assumed reluctantly by the Army's leadership. 

To them the Army's mission, as a progressive, professional 

and French-Austrian military organization, was the defense 

of the nation against an invasion by a European power. 

Congress and, in the main, the President defined the immedi­

ate justification for the maintenance of a military estab­

lishment in ensuring the peace of the country's frontiers. 

Nonetheless, while unenthusiastic about being saddled with 

the duty of frontier security, the Army's leadership 
accepted this irksome, fatiguing and even dishonorable work 
as a kind of unofficial quid pro quo, a bargain as it were, 
between the Army and its civilian masters: the profession­
alization of the regular military service in exchange for 
the use of the Army in frontier security. In other words, 
the far greater fighting power and organizational effective­
ness of the regulars, as compared to the militia, was accep­
ted as essential for ensuring the successful pacification of 
the Indian, despite the resulting development of a strong 
professional Army. While this unofficial compact would be 
beat and challenged severely in the course of the recurring 
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and quite ferocious debate over the utility and even the 

legitimacy of the regular Army, it nonetheless survived 

more-or-less intact through the Civil War. 

Prior to the creation of the Civilian Indian Bureau in 

1849, as a division of the Interior Department, the Army 

stood in the problematical role of being at once both the 

guardian of the Indian and the protector of frontier sett­

lers. Such an ambiguous and potentially contradictory set 

of responsibilities would seem to have demanded carefully 

crafted policy guidelines f o r  the frontier officer. In­
stead, officers were required to muddle along, protecting 

settlers, maintaining a semblance of order and all the while 

guarding the Indian from the designs of unscrupulous whites, 
particularly those engaged in the nefarious whiskey trade, 

with no clear guidelines. Or as Inspector General Edmund P. 

Gaines put it, with less than clarity, in 1821: 

No specific instructions can be given to the 
commandants of frontier posts, to govern their 
intercourse with the Indians in their vicinity, so 
as to meet all the exigencies of the service. 

After receiving such general directions as the 

case admits they must be left to exercise a sound 

discretion, being careful to avoid all occasions 

of collisions and of involving the country in 

hostilities with them.9 

Army frontier policy in the immediate post-War of 1812 

years, during Jacob Brown's tenure as Commanding General, 

was essential and reactive in nature. The Army's field com­

mand structure was changed in 1821 from a North-South align­

ment to an East-West division of active combat forces. This 
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realignment was made in order to improve the Army's ability 

to carry out the task of frontier policing. In tactical 

terms, the new policy emphasized the establishment of a line 

of forts and cantonments along the principal rivers of the 

Mississippi Valley as far south as present day Arkansas and 

Louisiana and as far north as Minnesota. Water transport, 

via flatboat and more-or-less portable water craft served as 

the principal linkage between individual garrisons and fron­
tier settlements. Essentially, there was the establishment 
of a firebreak between the white settlers and the western 
Indians. The problems with this wholly defensive approach 
to frontier security were numerous and substantial. Minus­
cule packets of infantrymen scattered over several thousand 
square miles, were simply too few in number and too widely 
scattered to be more than locally effective. A closely 
related problem was the inherent lack of mobility of the 
regulars. Water transport into the Indian country was 
usable only so long as the river systems remained navigable. 
The frontier Army, bereft of mobility and speed of movement 
on land, was incapable, with rare exceptions such as the 
1819-1820 Yellowstone campaign against the Arikara and Sioux 
Indians, of mounting effective retaliatory strikes against 
marauders. A still larger failing of this static defensive 
scheme lay in the very nature of frontier settlement. The 
idea was to create a barrier between the Indians to the west 
of the Mississippi River network and the settlers to the 
101 

east. Moreover, eastern Indians would be forcibly resettled 
onto the western plains creating, as it were, a cordon 
sanitaire to further guard against attacks. In reality, the 
plan never succeeded. As soon as an Army post was estab­
lished, traders and then pioneers would aggressively move 
beyond the effective range of the infantry garrison, fifty 
miles or so. During the 1830s a far more active and mobile 
frontier defense policy emerged during the tenure of Alexan­
der Macomb and later, Winfield Scott as Commanding General 
of the Army. The primary hitch in implementing a more 
effective policy lay in overcoming Congressional opposition 
to the enlargement of the Army in general and in the crea­
tion of a cavalry force in particular.10 
Notwithstanding the political and military objections 

to equipping the Army with a mounted component, demands for 

a cavalry force began to rumble eastward from the West from 

the 1820s on. One major source of political pressure for 

the establishment of a mounted unit stemmed from the growing 

Santa Fe Trail trade. Starting in 1823, the Missouri cara­

vans for the first few years managed to complete their expe­

ditions without any Indian interference. The caravans of 

1825 and 1826, however, were both attacked by increasingly 

belligerent groups of Comanche and Kiowa Indians. In the 

main, such attacks were little more than nuisances. The 

merchant caravans, with over a hundred armed men and 

equipped with even small brass cannon, were quite formidable 

1 0 2  
as an armed force in their own right.ll And, on the Mexican 

side of the border, the undermanned and poorly equipped 

light cavalry or pictadores, nonetheless provided a limited 

military force to cover the most dangerous leg of the 
journey.12 
Many merchants involved in this commerce were either 

unenthusiastic or even hostile toward the idea of American 

Army escorts. However, such voices were a minority among 

the influential St. Louis merchants engaged in the Santa Fe 

trade. Ironically, the leading (and by far the most power­

ful) advocate for Army escorts, was Missouri Senator Thomas 

Hart Benton, the leader of Congressional opposition to the 

professional army. l3  The sharpness of one member of the 
expedition, generated sufficient political pressure to 

compel the Army to provide an escort. In 1829 such an es­

cort was provided, on an experimental basis, consisting of a 

detachment of foot soldiers from the Third Infantry Regiment 

commanded by an experienced Indian fighter, Major Bennett 

Riley. The fleet Indian tribes of the Southwest plains, 

such as the Navaho, Kiowa and Comanche, were undaunted by 

the presence of American troops. The infantry, "walk-a­
heaps" to use the derogatory Cheyenne term, proved wholly 

ineffectual as a deterrent to the frequent hit-and-run raids 

on the caravan. What was so discouraging to the officers in 

command of the protective guard was their lack of mobility. 

As Major Riley put it with a deep sense of frustration: 

103 

Think what our feelings must have been to see 
the [Indians] carry off our cattle and horses,
when if we had been mounted, we could have beaten 
them to pieces, but we were obliged to content 
ourselves with whipping them from our camp. We 
did not see any of them killed or  wounded but we 
saw the next day where they had dragged them off. 
They have said sense ( (sic.) ) that our fire from 
the big gun ( (i-e., a six-pounder cannon)) killed 
five or six.14 
A similar sense of resignation at his inability to 
mount an aggressive pursuit was recalled by Major-General 
Philip St. George Cooke, then a second lieutenant and later, 
one of the leading Army cavalry experts in the pre-Civil War 
years: 
It was a humiliating condition to be surroun­
ded by these rasically ( (sic.) ) Indians, who, by 
means of their horses, could tantalize us with 
hopes of battle, and elude our efforts; who would 
insult us with impunity
we were not mounted too,1 5  
much did we regret that 
No further effort was made to provide an Army escort on 
the Santa Fe Trail until 1 8 3 3 . 1 6  Field performance clearly 
demonstrated the lack of tactical effectiveness of rela­
tively immobile foot soldiers against the fleet Indians of 
the West. The result of such an ignoble performance of arms 
was even louder calls by Western politicians for enhanced 
military protection in the form of cavalry units.17 Leading 
the growing chorus of support f o r  such units were such 
traditional opponents of a large standing army and military 
professionalism as Senator Benton and Secretary of War Cass, 
of the Jackson administration. Joseph Duncan, a Congressman 
from Illinois, on March 25, 1828, wrote to Major-General Ed-
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mund P. Gaines, arguing for the formation of mounted units 

composed of "young men of vigor and enterprise, reared in 

the western country, acquainted with the Indian artifice and 

their mode of warfare, full of pride and patriotic spir­

it."18 Such units, embodying the full spirit of opposition 

to the regular Army, were claimed not only to be a more 

formidable threat to the Indians, but also far more respons­

ive to the needs of Western pioneers. 

By 1829 reports of difficulties with frontier security 
as then provided by small packets of relatively ponderous 
infantry manning static garrisons began to filter back east 
to an ever more receptive War Department. In April, 1830, 
Quartermaster-General Thomas S. Jessup, in a formal position 
paper, signaled the growing enthusiasm for the resurrection 
of a mounted arm. The problem, however, was the fear that a 
penny-pinching Congress would simply order one or  more exis­
ting infantry regiments to be converted into cavalry units. 
Such a course of action would in no way address the critical 
lack of numbers of the Regular Army, increasingly burdened 

by the demands of frontier security. Moreover, infantry 

units, manned according to the tenets of limited war 

doctrine, were composed of the dregs and sweepings of 

society, hardly the kind of personnel required for what 

would be, according to European practice, an elite forma­

tion. Thus, as Jessup pointed out, there did in fact exist 

a paramount need for regular Army mounted units: 
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As well you might leave the defense of our 

maritime frontiers and the protection of our 

foreign commerce to the artillery stationed on our 
seaboard. The means of pursuing rapidly and 
punishing promptly those who oppress whether on 
the ocean or on the land are indispensable to a 
complete security, and if ships-of-war are 
required in one case, a mounted force is equally 
so in the other. Were we without a navy, pirates
might operate with entire impunity, not only on 
the high seas, but in our very harbors, and within 
view of our forts. So, without a mounted force on 
the frontier south of the Missouri, the Indian 
confident in the capacity of his horses to bear 
him beyond the reach of pursuit, despises our 
power, chooses his point of attack, and often 
commits the outrages to which he is prompted by
either a spirit of revenge or love of plunder in 
the immediate vicinity of our troops, and the 

impunity of the first act invariably leads to new

oppression.19 

The Black Hawk War of 1832 constituted the first signi­

ficant military problem faced by the Army following the War 

of 1812. The suppression of the Sac and Fox Indians and 

their allies, demonstrated the need for a reasonably large 

and professional military force. The state and territorial 

militia units, in the main, proved ineffectual as military 

forces. Troops broke and ran, were far less than diligent: 

in the pursuit of their duties and of course, were far less 

proficient than the regulars in the performance of tactical 

operations and in maintaining discipline. Still another 

major problem was the constant wrangling and less than fully 

cooperative behavior of many state, territorial and local 

politicians; General Henry Atkinson, in overall command, 

labored mightily to employ his militia troops, in conjunc­

tion with handfuls of regulars, to bring Black Hawk's 
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w a r r i o r s  under c o n t r o l . 2 0  The l a c k  of s u f f i c i e n t  numbers of 
r e g u l a r  t r o o p s  and  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  dependence upon m i l i t i a  
f o r c e s ,  which prolonged h o s t i l i t i e s  and i n  t u r n  he ightened  
t h e  c o s t  to c i v i l  s o c i e t y ,  aga in ,  demonstrated t o  p ro fes ­
s i o n a l  o f f i c e r s  t h e  clear need f o r  an  o v e r a l l  i n c r e a s e  i n  
Army s t r e n g t h .  Thus t h e  Army's l e a d e r s h i p ,  i n  accordance 
wi th  l i m i t e d  war d o c t r i n e ,  s t r o n g l y  ques t ioned  t h e  wisdom of 
r e l y i n g  on i n e f f e c t u a l  m i l i t i a  f o r c e s ,  t h e  absence of which 
f rom t h e  c i v i l  economy w a s  c o s t l y  and exceedingly  waste-
The Black Hawk War a l s o  demonstrated t h e  need f o r  a new 
Army mounted a r m .  The r e g u l a r  i n f a n t r y  were simply n o t  
f l e e t  enough t o  pursue t h e i r  a d v e r s a r i e s ;  t h e  Army w a s  cor­
r e s p o n d i n g l y  d e p e n d e n t  upon t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  m i l i t i a  
mounted i n f a n t r y  u n i t s  t o  form t h e  c h a s e  element  i n  t h e  
order  of b a t t l e .  And as an  Army o f f i c e r  p u t  it, w i t h  a f a i r  
degree  of f r u s t r a t i o n :  
The  w a r  o f  l a s t  summer showed ve ry  c l e a r l y  
t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s u c c e e d i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  
I n d i a n s  w i t h  i n f a n t r y  a lone .  March a f te r  march 
w a s  made by t h e  r e g u l a r  t r o o p s  wi thout  coming i n  
c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  enemy and it w a s  on ly  a f te r  many
f o r c e d  marches of t h e  most h a r a s s i n g  d e s c r i p t i o n  
t h a t  h e  w a s  f i n a l l y  over taken  and brought  t o  an  
engagement .2 2  
L i m i t e d  funds w e r e  sc raped  t o g e t h e r  to mount a few com­
pan ies  of r e g u l a r s  as mounted i n f a n t r y ,  bu t  t h i s  improvised 
t e c h n i q u e  w a s  n o t  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  One of Atk inson ' s  major 
c o m p l a i n t s  t o  Commanding-General A lexande r  Macomb w a s  
e x a c t l y  t h i s  lack of m o b i l i t y  of h i s  r e g u l a r  f o r c e s :  
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As the Regular troops had no means of 
transportation by land and our supply of provi­
sions and munitions required protection; and 
feeling unwilling to leave my base of operations I 
fell back with the regulars to this place to act 
as circumstances might require; besides none but a 
mounted force could come up with the Indians,
unless they made a stand to contest the point of 
superiority, which was not expected.23 
Heeding the wishes of his field commanders, President 
Andrew Jackson openly pushed f o r  the re-establishment of an 
Army mounted force as a result of the tactical experience of 
the Black Hawk War. Congress, however, quite unlike Cal­
houn's days as Secretary of War, was now dominant in the 
determination of a national war policy. While it was in­
creasingly evident that a cavalry force was needed, there 
was no consensus whatsoever in Congress as to the form such 
a unit should take. Congressman William Drayton of South 
Carolina expressed the recognition of Congress that the 
issue of cavalry forces for frontier security was indeed a 
pressing one: 
It would have been a vain attempt to pursue
the Indians who committed these outrages, f o r  they 
were all mounted on fleet horses, while the troops
of the United States consisted of infantry alone,
and they were therefore compelled to endure all 
the insults and injuries so sure to arise from 
Indian hostility.2 4  
The 1832 Congressional debate on the formation of a 
cavalry arm reflected the broader debate over the standing 
army. The distinctly minority position in the House of 
Representatives favored establishing formal cavalry units as 
a full branch of the regular. As articulated by such 
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Congressmen as Dutee J. Pierce of Rhode Island and interest­

ingly enough, former advocate of volunteer mounted forces, 

Duncan of Illinois, their position was expressly founded 

upon professional Army doctrine.25 The majority perspec­

tive, to the contrary, was seething with opposition to pro­

fessional military forces of whatever stripe. The regulars, 

as pointedly stated by Congressman John Carr of Indiana, 

were simply incapable of manning and operating any form of 

mounted force: 

There was not... twenty of them ([i.e.,

regular Army troops]) who could ride a horse fifty

yards, and if the Government should furnish them 

with horses, they knew nothing about taking care 

of them, and would destroy just as many horses as 

were put under their management.26 

Secondly, aside from the supposed lack of horsemanship 

of the regular Army, Congressional objections centered upon 

the very character and physical condition of line troops. 

Thus as the delegate from the Arkansas Territory, Ambroshe 

H. Sevier, critically noted: 

What were the garrison troops? They consis­
ted generally of the refuse of society, collected 
in the cities and seaport towns; many of them 
broken down with years and infirmities; none of 
them use to rid [(sic.]) nor in anywise f i t  f o r  
the service to be assigned them.27 
Finally, as passionately stated by Representative 

George Grennell of Massachusetts, the volunteer soldier, 

drawn from the environs of the frontier, would possess vir­

tues and skills which would render him vastly more effective 

as an Indian fighter: 
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Frontier volunteer soldiers would "counter wile with 

wile, and frustrate one stratagem by another, and loss 

((sic.)) upon those savage men their own schemes of surprise 

and blood." 

Moreover, the frontiersmen-soldier would be intrinsic­

ally loyal; thus, unlike the scurvy lot of the regular army, 

such noble men could not be corrupted into following the 

trumpet call of some would-be Napoleon: 

There was no danger that these farmers would 
become... ( (tempted to join)) the flying corps. .. 
[by] a summer's term of duty in defense of their 
farms and their firesides.28 
On June 10, 1832 Congress authorized the establishment 

of a battalion of mounted rangers, signaling the victory 

against the regular Army. The rangers, numbering some six 

hundred officers and men and organized into six companies, 

was clearly not an orthodox, professional military outfit. 

Rather they constituted a unique federalized species of 

volunteer unit; the men were subject only to a single year 

of service and were expected to arm and equip themselves.29 

The problem was that this unit, expressly unprofessional in 

character, was certainly not the cavalry force sought by the 

Army's leadership. This rough-hewed, highly undisciplined 

assemblage, which saw no action against the Indians, was 

simply too irregular an outfit to be freely accepted into 

the professional ranks of the Army. This short-lived 

experiment, unsuccessful and impractical, succeeded, iron­

ically, in providing the advocates of a regular mounted ser-

-- 
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vice with the evidence necessary to prevail in Congress. 
Support for converting the mounted ranger battalion into a 
proper cavalry unit came from all quarters responsible for 
developing and implementing war policy in the Antebellum 
era. Captain Cooke, expressing the verdict of professional 
officers, curtly rejected the battalion as a military unit, 
with even less prowess in arms than some of the volunteer 
and militia units field in the Black Hawk War: 
Of this corps (in justice not so formidable 
to its friends ((in Congress)) as a certain 
brigade of Illinois volunteers of notorious 
memory),... none more readily than myself would 
presume its requiescat in pace.30 
Similarly, Secretary of War Cass, reflecting a major 
shift in the war policy of the Jackson administration argued 
strongly for the creation of a full-fledged regular cavalry 
force, using of all things, the very rhetoric of military 

professionalism that he had so long been opposed: 
Besides other important objects, it is 
desirable to preserve in our military system the 
elements of cavalry tactics and to keep pace with 
the improvements in them by other nations. The 
establishment of a regiment of dragoons would 
complete the personnel of our army, and would 
introduce a force which would harmonize with and 
participate in the esprit du corps so essential to 
military efficiency, and easily.. . created by
military principles. 3 1  
Congress as well moved to support the establishment of 

a regular Army cavalry service, following the complete fail­

ure of its non-professional mounted ranger battalion. The 

development of the new regiment of dragoons was spearheaded 

by Congressman Richard M. Johnson. Chairman of the House 
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Committee on Military Affairs and interestingly, a renowned 
former Captain of the Kentucky Volunteer Mounted Rifles. 
Johnson succinctly listed the numerous failings of the 
battalion of mounted rangers when he wrote: 
...the organization of the present battalion 
of mounted rangers... does appear to the committee 
to be very defective. It must be evident from the 
constitution of the corps of rangers, and from the 
short period of their service, their efficiency
will be but little superior to that of the 
ordinary militia -- every year there must be loss 
of time in organizing and recruiting the corps and 
the acquisition of the necessary experience and 
knowledge, besides it cannot be expected that 
their equipment and horses will be equal to those 
furnished by the public.32 
Congress, therefore, on March 2, 1 8 3 3 ,  passed an "Act 
for the more perfect defense of the frontiers," converting 
the battalion of mounted rangers into the (First) Regiment 
of Dragoons.33 The creation of the Regiment of Dragoons 
established a precedent for other pre-Civil Wax mounted 
units. Essentially jerry-judged, with no organic ties to 
any tradition of mounted warfare, these units fell com­
pletely outside of table of  organization and division of 
functions established fox European cavalry regiments. At 
this stage in American military affairs, Congress was domi­
nant in the development of national war policy. Consequent­
ly, the dragoons were largely a reflection of Congress's 
limited expertise in the mechanics of cavalry organization. 
Input from the Army's leadership was indirect and fragmen­
tary. Congressmen Johnson, principally responsible for the 
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f i n a l  form of t h e  dragoons,  d e t a i l e d  t h e  in t ended  f u n c t i o n s  
and d u t i e s  of t h e  Army's new hor se  s o l d i e r s :  
R e g u l a r  dragoons,  it i s  b e l i e v e d ,  are f u l l y  
competent t o  d i s c h a r g e  a l l  t h e  d u t i e s  t h a t  can be 
r e q u i r e d  of mounted rangers . . . .  I n  c e l e r i t y  of 
movement t h e y  w i l l  of cour se  be e q u a l ,  and as it 
i s  t h e  d u t y  of d r a g o o n s  t o  s e r v e  on h o r s e  and 
f o o t ,  t h e y  may be t r a i n e d  t o  t h e  use  of t h e  r i f l e  
and t h e  sword as occas ion  may r equ i r e .34  
T h e  d r a g o o n s  c o u l d  n o t ,  i n  a n y  f o r m a l  s e n s e ,  b e  
r e g a r d e d  as  a n  American i m p o r t a t i o n  of European  c a v a l r y  
d o c t r i n e  . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Johnson spoke of t h e  a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  d r a g o o n s  t o  f i g h t  b o t h  mounted and  dismounted. The 
f o r m a l  , European d e f i n i t i o n  of "dragoon" b e a r s  a t  b e s t ,  a 
s l i g h t  r e s e m b l a n c e  t o  t h e  American form of t h i s  t y p e  of 
u n i t .  A s  one European m i l i t a r y  d i c t i o n a r y  pu t  it, i n  1745 ,  
dragoons were : 
...mounted, who s e r v e  sometimes on Foot ,  and 
somet imes  on Horseback;  be ing  always ready  upon 
any t h i n g  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  e x p e d i t i o n ,  as be ing  able 
pace wi th  t h e  Horse, and do t h e  s e r v i c e  of 
Foot .to ke% 
Thus,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  dragoons w e r e  expec ted  t o  f i g h t  
when n e c e s s a r y ,  on f o o t .  However, u n l i k e  i n f a n t r y ,  which 
u s u a l l y  f o u g h t  i n  t i g h t  d i s c i p l i n e d  fo rma t ions ,  dragoons '  
customary t ac t i ca l  deployment w a s  i n  sk i rmisher  o rde r .  T h i s  
l o o s e  and even s t y l i z e d  format ion  w a s  des igned  t o  a l low t h e  
dragoons t o  do no more t h a n  s imply harass enemy u n i t s  w i t h  
c a r b i n e  f i r e .  I n  o t h e r  words, when dismounted, t h e  Europe­
a n - s t y l e  dragoons would form a long ,  l o o s e  l i n e ,  one rank  
d e e p ,  and  t h e n ,  by t h e  s p e c i f i e d  s t e p s  of  t h e  S k i r m i s h  
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d r i l l ,  p r o c e e d  t o  l a y  down, on t h e  enemy's  i n f a n t r y  and 
a r t i l l e r y ,  s e v e r a l  v o l l e y s  of h a r a s s i n g  f i r e .  Dragoons had 
g r a d u a l l y  mutated i n t o  a g e n e r a l l y  or thodox c a v a l r y  forma­
t i o n ;  c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  theilc earlier i n f a n t r y  a t t r i b u t e s  had 
e i t h e r  become l a r g e l y  v e s t i g i a l  o r  were shorn  completely.  
T h e r e f  o r e ,  t h e y  g e n e r a l l y  fought  as s t i l l  ano the r  mounted 
u n i t ,  a l b e i t  w i th  t h e  c a r b i n e  as w e l l  as sword and p i s t o l . 3 6  
What, t h e r e f o r e ,  w a s  i n t ended  by d e s i g n a t i n g  t h e  f i r s t  
post-War of 1 8 1 2  c a v a l r y  as "dragoons"? They were c e r t a i n l y  
n o t  i n t e n d e d  t o  serve as  " l i g h t  c a v a l r y " ,  as h u s s a r s  o r  
chaussures .  While t h e  a p p e l l a t i o n  of l i g h t  c a v a l r y  has  been 
commonly a p p l i e d  by la ter  writers t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  t r u e  char­
acter of t h e  American dragoons,  it is ,  m i ~ l e a d i n g . 3 ~Being 
capable  of f i g h t i n g  on f o o t  as t r u e  l i g h t  i n f a n t r y ,  e x p l o i t ­
i n g  t h e  t e r r a i n  f o r  concealment and cover ,  t h e  Regiment of 
Dragoons had cons ide rab ly  more t ac t ica l  f l e x i b i l i t y  t h a n  t h e  
European h u s s a r s ,  which were in t ended  t o  f i g h t  e x c l u s i v e l y  
on horseback and t o  perform s c o u t i n g  and r a i d i n g  d u t i e s ,  ox 
t h e  European s t y l e  dragoonO3* Nor were t h e  Regiment of D r a ­
goons mounted r if les,  i n  t h a t  t h e y  lacked  i n f a n t r y  weapons 
and  were t h o r o u g h l y  t r a i n e d  t o  f i g h t  w h i l e  on horseback. 
What l a y  behind Congress ' s  e s t ab l i shmen t  of a dragoon- l ike  
c a v a l r y  u n i t  w a s  two-fold: f i r s t ,  of less importance,  w a s  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  pre-War of 1 8 1 2  u n i t s  had borne a similar des­
i g n a t i o n ;  a n d  secondly and more impor t an t ly ,  was t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  of a l l  t h e  or thodox t y p e s  of mounted u n i t s ,  t h e  dra-
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goons were those which most approximately fitted the 
requirements of the frontier. Congressman Johnson had been 
a highly successful exponent of the Kentucky style of 
mounted volunteer rifles, which had performed with consider­
able effectiveness against both Indians and the British. 39 
This experience was probably most important in determining 
the rough organizational make-up of the Regiment of Dra­
goons. The American dragoon regiment was thus a unique 
admixture of European dragoon, light cavalry, mounted rifle 
and light infantry principles, plus a liberal dash of the 
mounted volunteer experience of one highly influential Con­
gressman, the by-product of political expediency and mili­
tary necessity and not the creation of any conventional man­
ual of cavalry organization.40 

Part I1 

The establishment of the Regiment of Dragoons, regard­
less of its lack of formal ties to the classical European 
cavalry tradition, was, nonetheless, a telling, if tempo­
rary, victory fox the advocates of the professional army. 
In what amounted to direct competition, the volunteer ranger 
concept had failed as an alternative to the use of mounted 
regulars in providing frontier security. However, as a much 
broader consequence of the Black Hawk War, the Army, con­
trary to its self-defined, professional mission of preparing 
to meet an invasion by a major European power, was hereafter 
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saddled  w i t h  t h e  primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of p rov id ing  organ­
i z e d  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  Ind ian  i n c u r s i o n s .  
The dragoons were a v a r i e t y  of c a v a l r y ,  more or less, 
and t h u s  t h e  Army's l e a d e r s h i p ,  i n  a manner u n a n t i c i p a t e d  by 
Congress, determined t o  mold them i n t o  t h e  shape of an  or­
t h o d o x  mounted u n i t ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  r e g a r d s  t o  tact ics  and 
equipment.  S t r u c t u r a l l y ,  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of t h e  dragoons 
w a s  t h a t  of an American i n f a n t r y  regiment .  The re fo re ,  t h e  
Reg imen t s  of Dragoons p o s s e s s e d  t e n  companies i n s t e a d  of 
t r o o p s ,  w i t h  b a t t a l i o n s  i n s t e a d  of squadrons as t h e  n e x t  
smaller u n i t  below t h e  r e g i m e n t a l  level.  The r eg imen ta l  
commander, f o r  t h e  i n t e r i m  p e r i o d  of u n i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  w a s  
t h e  mounted r a n g e r s  ' s e n i o r  o f f i c e r  , Colonel  Henry Dodge. 
P r i o r  t o  h i s  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  United State  Army, Dodge had 
earned a r e p u t a t i o n  as an e f f i c i e n t  v o l u n t e e r  o f f i c e r  i n  t h e  
War of 1812.  During t h e  Black Hawk War, Dodge d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
h i m s e l f  as  a c o l o n e l  i n  t h e  Michigan T e r r i t o r i a l  Mounted 
M i l i t i a ,  by winning the l a s t  and ve ry  d e c i s i v e  v i c t o r y  over  
t h e  Sac and Fox Indians .  S ince  Dodge w a s  no t  a p r o f e s s i o n a l  
Army o f f i c e r  and  d e s i r e d  e a r l y  r e t i r e m e n t  t o  e n t e r  c i v i l  
p o l i t i c s ,  real  l e a d e r s h i p  of t h e  dragoons f e l l  t o  Lieuten­
a n t - C o l o n e l  S t e p h e n  Watts Kearny ,  f o r m e r l y  of  t h e  T h i r d  
I n f a n t r y .  P r i n c i p a l l y  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r easons ,  s i x  of t h e  
f o r m e r  o f f i c e r s  of t h e  mounted r a n g e r s  w e r e  accep ted  f o r  
s e r v i c e  w i t h  t h e  dragoons. T h i s  d e c i s i o n  occas ioned  a f a i r  
degree  of resentment  among r e g u l a r  army o f f i c e r s ,  who s a w  it 
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as  " a n  a b s o l u t e  inf r ingement  of t h e i r  impl ied  r i g h t s "  and 
which i n  t u r n ,  reduced t h e  number of new s l o t s  on t h e  v e r y  
s l o w  p r o m o t i o n  l i s t O 4 1  A l l  o t h e r  o f f i c e r s  w e r e  e i t h e r  
r e c e n t  West P o i n t  g radua te s ,  t r apped  i n  t h e  limbo of b r e v e t  
s econd- l i eu tenan t  s t a t u s  awa i t ing  an  opening i n  t h e  career 
l ists ,  o r  seconded from e x i s t i n g  i n f a n t r y  un i t s .42  
The dragoons were a t  once r e c o n s t i t u t e d  i n t o  an e l i t e  
regiment ,  n o t  d i s s i m i l a r  from t h e  B r i t i s h  Guards . Because 
o f  t h e  h i g h e r  w o r t h  of  mounted u n i t s  i n  t h e  h i e r a r c h y  of 
t r a d i t i o n a l ,  a r i s t o c r a t i c  w a r r i o r  va lues ,  d e s p i t e  be ing  a t  
t h e  bottom of t h e  career l i s t  i n  t h e  ranking  of t h e  d i f f e r ­
e n t  c a t e g o r i e s  of Army o f f i c e r s ,  t h e  d r a g o o n s  o f f e r e d  a 
h igher  degree of s o c i a l  s t a t u s  and p r e s t i g e . 4 3  The romant ic  
c h a r a c t e r  of  t h e  d r a g o o n s  w a s  s p r i g h t l y  p re sen ted  i n  t h e  
b a r r a c k s  s o n g  ( o r ,  i n  m i l i t a r y  s l ang ,  "Jody") ,  "The Bold 
Dragoon'', of t h e  la ter  Second Regiment of Dragoons (who were 
t a g g e d  t h e  "sons of Bacchus", f o r  t h e i r  supposed o f f  d u t y  
revelries) : 
Oh: t h e  dragoon bold! he  s c o r n s  a l l  care as he 
g o e s  R o u n d s  w i t h  u n c a p p e d  h a i r  r e v e r e n d s  no  
t h o u g h t  on t h e  C i v i l  s tar t h a t  s e n t  h i m  away t o  
t h e  border  w a r .  4 4  
T h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  of t h e  rank-and-f i le  of t h e  dragoons 
w a s  t o  be v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  from any o t h e r  Army regiment .  I n  
accordance w i t h  l i m i t e d  w a r  d o c t r i n e ,  t h e  rank-and-f i le  w e r e  
u s u a l l y  f i l l e d  o u t  w i th  t h e  r e f u s e  and sweepings of s o c i e t y ;  
accord ing  t o  Frederick Marryat,  a B r i t i s h  t r a v e l e r :  
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The privates of the American regular army are 

not the most creditable soldiers in the world; 

they are chiefly composed of Irish emigrants;

Germans, and deserters from the English regiments

in Canada. Americans are very rare; only those 

who can find nothing else to do, and have to 

choose between enlistment and starvation, will 

enlist in the American army.45 

While such men "were necessarily inferior as material 

to the... volunteers enlisted... expressly to fight...," re­

called General Ulysses s. Grant, the value of such soldiers, 

to a professional army, one expressly founded on the limited 

war traditions of the French-Austrian school, was consider­

ably greater than the eagerest of volunteers.46 Such men 

were by nature of little use to civil society, hence the 

cost to the nation of manning a military establishment was 

correspondingly lessened. Moreover, such men, particularly 

the immigrants and British deserters (prized by Army offi­

cers for their high level of training and discipline),47 

lacking any ties to the larger society, were thus dependent 

on the military for succor. In turn, they could be subject 

to far more stringent discipline than would have been 

tolerated by citizen soldiers. In its recruitment policies, 

the United States Army therefore continued to follow the 

principles of limited war doctrine, in the Frederickian 

tradition. 

The dragoons, however, were to be organized quite dif­
ferently from all other Army units. The rank-and-file were 
intentionally recruited from every state in the union; the 
manpower was to be distinctly American in character, as 
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opposed to the usual offscourings of society dredged up by 

the Army's recruiters, and the unit's spirit, that of highly 

motivated volunteers. This was not, most assuredly, and 

abandonment of one of the central tenets of limited war 

doctrine. This style of recruiting was the norm in most 

European elite units and the reliance on one's own nationals 

was increasingly common over the course of the Nineteenth 

Century as the demands for labor grew with the development 

of the Industrial Revolution.48 The recruitment for the 

dragoons was enormously facilitated by the fact that the 

unit was cavalry and by the lure of western adventure. A s  
then Lieutenant Cooke pointed out, a recruiting expedition 

to Tennessee was a wholly successful undertaking: 

Early in the summer of 1 8 3 3 ,  I was among the 
hardy sons of West Tennessee seeking to infuse an 
ardor for service in a wide regiment of cavalry, 
one destined, we believed, to explore far and wide 

the western territory, and bear the arms of the

Union into the country of many Indian tribes. It 

was a prospect that did not fail to excite the 

enterprising and roving disposition of many fine 

young men, in that military state.49 

The army's haul from their recruiting efforts was, ac­

cording to one of those enthusiastic Dragoon recruits, James 

Hildreth, composed of "young men... which in point of tal­

ent, appearance and respectability, perhaps never were.. . 
surpassed in the history of military affairs."50 The high 

quality of the recruits and their boisterous spirit occa­

sioned a fair degree of press attention. The Albany Daily 
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Advertiser, for example, commented quite favorably on the 
unusually high quality of the new cavalrymen: 
...a particular fine body of men being
selected with the greatest care--not only as to 
thews and sinews, and horsemanship, but as to 
their moral qualifications, and their general
adaptation for a service requiring an unusual 
degree of skill, courage, coolness, and power of 

endurance. 51 

In part, the strategy of presenting the dragoons as an 

elite unit was no more than a recruiting ploy. Certainly 
the artful blandishments and sales puffing of the recruiters 
exploited fully this sense of superiority of the dragoons as 
an Army unit. According to Hildreth, such advertising meth­
ods were necessary because " s o  superior a band of young men 
could not have been induced to enlist themselves as common 
soldiers... where the very fact of a man's being a soldier 
seems to imply that he is fit f o r  no other employment."52 
On a deeper level, however, the deliberate recruitment of 
Americans rather than immigrants was representative of the 
same spirit of military professionalism as the Army's devo­
tion to the French-Austrian school of war. In effect, the 
Regiment of Dragoons created an elite, pan-nationalistic 
unit: a physical representation of the central political 
tenet of the French-Austrian school of war that a country's 
army was to stand separate-and-apart from civil society, as 
a guardian of order and tradition.53 
There were substantial problems associated with the 

establishment of the dragoons as an active Army unit. First 
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and most critical was the simple fact that the Army had few 

if any regular officers with cavalry experience. Due to the 

passage of some eighteen years since the disbandment of the 

light dragoons, the Army had to start anew with the creation 

of a cavalry establi~hment.~~ 
As one of the harried offi­

cers (some in Congress were pressing for an early termina­

tion of the dragoons if they did not take the field with 

dispatch), Cooke elaborated on the numerous difficulties 
facing the new unit's commanders: 

These persons who may at times have felt 
symptoms of envy at the fortunes of officers 
preferred to new regiments, might console them­
selves if they could but realize the amount of 
labor, care, and vexations attendant upon the task 
of enlisting, organizing, disciplining, and 
instructing a new corps, of producing order from 
chaos (and much the more cavalry) where the amount 
of duty, instruction, and responsibility may
safely be considered double in comparison with the 
infantry. And this, without consideration of the 
extra-ordinary fact, that cavalry tactics were 
unknown in the army, and with the whole theory and 
practical detail, were to be studiously acquired
in manner invented- by officers, before they could 
teach others. 55 
Much of what Cooke complained could be traced to the 

fiscal restraints imposed by Congress. "The most egregious 

oversight on the part of Congress," according to Hildreth, 

was "...in not providing proper instruction in horsemanship 

and dragoon tactics.... The result of this combination 

of inadequate funding and planning with Congressional pres­

sure for quick deployment of the regiment was forcefully 

pointed out by western traveller Charles Fenno Hoffman: 
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The omission of p rov id ing  r i d i n g  masters and 
a school  of p r a c t i c e  f o r  both ho r se  and men is  a 
d e f e c t  t h a t  a l l  t h e  care and  e x e r t i o n s  of  t h e  
accompl ished  and e n e r g e t i c  o f f i c e r s  of t h e  co rps  
can h a r d l y  remedy. 
The omiss ion  of t h e  necessa ry  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  
t h e  b i l l  r e p o r t e d  by Congress and t h e  d i s p e r s i o n  
of t h e  regiment  on t h e  f r o n t i e r  as each company i s  
r e c r u i t e d . . .  f o r b i d s  an approach t o  such a s ta te  
o f  d i s c i p l i n e .  The t h ree  new compan ies  h e r e  
( ( e . g . ,  F o r t  G i b s o n ,  i n  what  i s  p r e s e n t  d a y  
Kansas) ) are n e a r l y  p e r f e c t  i n  t h e  l i g h t  i n f a n t r y
d r i l l ,  which enters l a r g e l y  i n t o  t h e  maneuver of 
dragoons,  bu t  t h e  e x a c t n e s s  of t h e i r  movement when 
mounted v a r i e s  w i t h  t h e  s k i l l  of each i n d i v i d u a l  
horseman .57 
T h e  clear t h r u s t  of Colonel Dodge's e x a c t i n g  t r a i n i n g  
regimen w a s  t o  create a h igh  q u a l i t y ,  European-style  c a v a l r y  
u n i t .  The d i f f i c u l t y  w a s  i n  t r a n s l a t i n g  f o r e i g n  d r i l l  man­
u a l s  i n t o  everyday p r a c t i c e  f o r  t h e  o f f i c e r s  and men of t h e  
dragoons. "Everything w a s  new t o  them," recalled t h e n  Lieu­
t e n a n t  P h i l i p  Kearny, nephew of t h e  r eg imen t ' s  L ieu tenant -
C o l o n e l  S t e p h e n  Rearny. "The c a v a l r y  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
maneuvers  were t a k e n  f rom t h e  F r e n c h ,  a l m o s t  l i t e r a l l y  
t r a n s l a t e d .  " 5 8  T h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of t r y i n g  t o  t r a i n  men, 
when t h e  o f f i c e r s  and non-commissioned o f f i c e r s  w e r e  v i r t u ­
a l l y  i g n o r a n t  of c a v a l r y  tact ics  and w i t h  on ly  three o r  f o u r  
c o p i e s  of an o b s o l e t e  French manual t o  guide  them,  i s  i l l u s ­
t r a t e d  by how t h e  i n t r i c a t e  saber dance o r  d r i l l  w a s  t a u g h t .  
A t  n i g h t ,  t h e  o f f i c e r s  were d r i l l e d  as i f  t h e y  w e r e  back on 
t h e  p a r a d e  f i e l d  a t  t h e  P o i n t ;  t h e  fo l lowing  morning, t h e  
s e r g e a n t s  and c o r p o r a l s  w e r e  pu t  through t h e i r  paces  and, i n  
t u r n ,  t r ied t o  i n s t r u c t  t h e  men i n  t h i s  v e r y  d i f f i c u l %  w e a -
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pone Moreover, there were no qualified riding masters to 

oversee the training in horsemanship; only in 1837 was a 

cavalry school established at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyl­

vania. 59 
The Regiment of Dragoons, at least for parade drill 
purposes and in the eyes of western travelers inexperienced 
in the military arts, was quickly assuming the appearance of 
a disciplined and polished unit. "They were," as Edmund 
Flagg wrote, " a l l  Americans, resolute looking fellows 
enough.. .It and apparently ready for the rigors of frontier 
patrol duty.60 What caught the eye of most observers was 
the supposedly higher level of individual motivation and the 
"ethnically pure" character of the men. Charles Joseph La­
trode commenting favorably on the new regiment, stated that 
"the recruits for the service of the newly-raised regiment 
of Dragoons organizing for the future service of the fron­
tier in place of the Rangers. .. were distinguished from the 
rag-tag-and-bob-tail herd drafted in to the ranks of the 
regular army by being for the most part, ( [  "all Americans"]1 
athletic young men of decent character and breeding."61 In 
reality, the unit was seething with discontent and plagued 
by such high rates of desertion (as many as one hundred by 
October, 1833) as to seriously undermine the process of unit 
formation. The chief cause of this deep dissatisfaction 
among the men was the unexpected reality of the unpleasant 
conditions of frontier service. Upon the unit's initial 
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p o s t i n g  t o  J e f f e r s o n  B a r r a c k s ,  S t .  Louis ,  t h e  f i r s t  f o u r  
compan ies  t h a t  had been organized  were r e q u i r e d  t o  act  as 
common l a b o r e r s  i n  e r e c t i n g  b a r r a c k s  and stables f o r  t h e  
regiment .  Such mundane l a b o r s  c o n t r a s t e d  q u i t e  un favorab le  
w i t h  t h e  r e c r u i t i n g  o f f i c e r ' s  hyperbole  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  sup­
posed ease of s e r v i c e  i n  an e l i t e  c a v a l r y  regiment.62 
I n  1834 t h e  First Dragoons, f o r  t h e  f i r s t  and only  t i m e  
p r i o r  t o  t h e  C i v i l  War, went i n t o  t h e  f i e l d  a t  something 
approaching f u l l  s t r e n g t h .  O v e r a l l  command of t h e  expedi­
t i o n  w a s  v e s t e d  i n  Brigadier-General  Henry Leavenworth, t h e n  
i n  c h a r g e  of F o r t  Gibson  and t h e  Western D i v i s i o n  of t h e  
United S t a t e s  Army.63 The purpose of t h i s  campaign w a s  t o  
p r e s e n t  a show of f o r c e  so  as t o  overawe t h e  P l a i n s  I n d i a n s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  r e c a l c i t r a n t  Pawnee, Kiowa and Comanche, 
i n t o  r e s p e c t i n g  t h e  r i g h t s  and i n t e r e s t s  of Santa  Fe T r a i l  
merchants,  Arkansas T e r r i t o r y  settlers and r e c e n t l y  r e l o c a ­
t e d  Eas t e rn  Ind ians .  A second and perhaps c r u c i a l  purpose 
of t h e  e x p e d i t i o n  w a s  t o  p r e p a r e  t h e  w a r  f o r  t h e  f o r c e d  
r e s e t t l e m e n t  of t h e  Sou theas t  Ind ians  onto  t h e  P l a i n s .  The 
o r i g i n a l  May date f o r  launching  t h e  e x p e d i t i o n  w a s  cance led  
due t o  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  complet ing t h e  format ion  and i n i t i a l  
t r a i n i n g  of t h e  regiment .  Only i n  e a r l y  June w a s  t h e  r e g i ­
ment 's  second b a t t a l i o n  f u l l y  formed; t h e  l a s t  three com­
pan ies  a r r i v e d  only  t h r e e  days be fo re  t h e  d e p a r t u r e  of t h e  
e x p e d i t i o n .  On June 15, 1834,  approximately f i v e  hundred 
o f f i c e r s ,  men, Ind ian  s c o u t s  and a s s o r t e d  c i v i l i a n s  embarked 
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on this ill-fated campaign. The primary failing was a 

dangerous combination of ignorance and bravado. Virtually 

to a man, the Dragoons were wholly incognizant of the 

dangers associated with travel on the Great Plains, particu­

larly by such a relatively large force. The campaign set 
out in June, during a year of exceptionally high tempesa­
tures, when potable water and forage were at their scarcest. 
Furthermore, the formation of the dragoons as a combat unit 
was nowhere complete. Not only was over half of the regi­
ment either in transit to Fort Gibson or still in training, 
there had been no time for the assemblage to coalesce into 
an effective military force. Consequently, the poor per­
formance of the regiment could be attributed to lack of 
organization and planning; or as Hildreth commented, "with 
but about six months training, and that under officers who 
know less of the maneuvers of a cavalry corps, than some of 
the dragoons themselves.n 6 4  Accompanying this expedition 
was noted artist and western chronicler George Catlin, then 
engaged in gathering information for his major work on North 
American Indian tribes. Catlin succinctly diagnosed the 
causes of the expedition's problems when he wrote: 
In the first place, from the great difficulty
of organizing and equipping, these troops are 
starting too late in the season f o r  their summer's 
campaign by two months. The journey which they
will have to perform is a very long one, and 
although the first part of it will be picturesque
and pleasing, the after part of it will be tire­
some and fatiguing in the extreme. As they
advance into the West, the grass (and consequently 
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t h e  game) w i l l  be g r a d u a l l y  d imin i sh ing ,  and water 
i n  many p a r t s  of t h e  coun t ry  w i l l  no t  be found.65 
The  e x p e d i t i o n  ended i n  d i s a s t e r .  C a t l i n  au thored  a 
haunt ing  assessment  of t h e  p r o g r e s s  of t h e  campaign i n  mid-
course:  "of t h e  450 [ a c t u a l l y ,  f i v e  hundred p l u s ]  f i n e  f e l ­
lows who s t a r t e d  from t h i s  p l a c e  [ F o r t  Gibson] f o u r  months 
s i n c e ,  about  one t h i r d  have a l r e a d y  d i e d ,  and I b e l i e v e  many 
more... w i l l  y e t  f a l l  v i c t i m  t o  t h e  deadly  d i s e a s e s  con t r ac ­
t e d  i n  t h a t  f a t a l  country. t166 Some sense  of t h e  seve r  hard­
s h i p s  and p r i v a t i o n s  which b e f e l l  t h e  dragoons i s  a f f o r d e d  
by t h e  j o u r n a l  of F i r s t - L i e u t e n a n t  Thomas B. Wheelock: 
August 8. Marched a t  e i g h t  o ' c lock .  Hal ted  
a t  t h r e e  o ' c lock ;  d i s t a n c e  e i g h t e e n  m i l e s ;  cou r se  
eas t  by s o u t h .  Exceedingly w a r m  day. Stubborn 
t h i c k e t s .  Crossed and encamped i n  t h e  bottom of 
L i t t l e  R i v e r ;  s h a l l o w  stream, na r row bed, miry 
shores .  No water from morning till t h e  h a l t  f o r  
t h e  n igh t .  Passed many c r e e k s  t h e  beds of which 
were e n t i r e l y  dry.  Our Horses looked up and down 
t h e i r  parched s u r f a c e s  and t h e  men gazed i n  v a i n  
a t  t h e  w i l l o w s  ahead, which proved only  t o  mark 
w h e r e  w a t e r  h a d  b e e n .  The t i m b e r  i s  l a r g e r  
h e r e . .  .. No l o n g e r  a n y  t r ace  of t h e  b u f f a l o .  
S i c k  r e p o r t  numbers t h i r t y  men and three o f f i ­
cers .67 
The r e s u l t  of t h i s  f o l l y  w a s  t o  p u t  t h e  regiment  o u t  of 
a c t i o n  f o r  some f o u r  months as an e f f e c t i v e  m i l i t a r y  u n i t  
w i t h  t h e  l o s s  of o v e r  one  hundred t r o o p e r s  and o f f i c e r s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  G e n e r a l  Leavenworth,  as w e l l  as a t h i r d  of i t s  
mounts. Nonetheless ,  there were ve ry  impor tan t  and v a l u a b l e  
g a i n s  r e c o r d e d  by t h e  Army's f i rs t  major campaign on t h e  
Great P l a i n s .  F i r s t ,  it se rved  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  basis f o r  
subsequent  i n t e r c o u r s e  between t h e  United States  government 
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and the assorted Indian tribes of the Great Plains. Second­

ly, it served as vast classroom in which the Army was tu­

tored, although quite harshly, in the skills essential to 

the effective operation of military forces on the Great 

Plains.68 Such was the speed of the Army in mastering these 

lessons, a point too easily obscured by the misfortunes of 

the Leavenworth-Dodge expedition, that within a year's time, 

the dragoons could easily mount reconnaissance and diploma­

tic forays of well over a thousand miles without incident. 

For example, on June 7, 1835, Lieutenant-Colonel Kearney 

began a highly successful expedition into the Iowa Terri­

tory, a journey of some one thousand miles, with B, H and I 

Companies. This force returned to base on August 19, 1835, 

without the loss of a single man or horse; or as the anony­
mous chronicler of this expedition put it, in words wholly 
different than those penned for the Leavenworth-Dodge 
mission: "Come 20 miles to the Fort ((Gibson)). Arrived 
there about 2 P.M. having been absent almost 3 months. 
Sickness and disease has been a stranger to the camp and all 
have emerged in good spirits.. . upon the whole I convey we 
have had a pleasant campaign."69 
Part I11 

The Second Seminole War, 1835-1843, was perhaps the 

Army's "dirtiest" war of the Nineteenth Century. It sub­

stantially influenced the development of military profes-
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sionalism in the officer corps. Indirectly, as well, it led 

to the creation of the Antebellum Army's second cavalry 

regiment. It was a war of shadows, of small patrols strug­

gling through the inhospitable mire of the Florida Ever­

glades hunting and in turn being hunted by the Seminoles, 

Creeks and their black allies, of ambuscades and reprisals. 

It was as well a second major test of the professional 

American Army in the post-War of 1812 era. The severe 

trials occasioned by this war stemmed as much from the 

numerous difficulties of jungle warfare, as from the con­

fusion and disarray at the highest levels of the nation's 

war policy decision process. Ceaseless political pressure 

from Washington on the Army for a swift resolution of hos­

tilities in conjunction with the failure of Congress to 

legislate adequate military resources to accomplish this 

task, served to derail any coherent and effective tactical 

solutions. The reasons for the Army's eventual success were 

principally ones of exhaustion and attrition of their ene­

mies coupled with the painfully slow development of effec­

tive jungle war techniques. Seven senior officers and seven 

different tactical schemes were hastily devised and then 

just as hastily aborted due to the ever-louder chorus for an 

end to hostilities by Congress. The thoroughly European 

American Army was unsuited by organization, equipment and 

tactical doctrine, for the challenges posed by the unortho­

dox guerilla-style warfare. It took several years to devise 
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effective combined Army-Navy operations; lack of cooperation 
between these two services was as much a lack of tactical 
theory and practice in joint small-unit operations as it was 
one of politics. The lessons learned by the Army's leader­
ship were not, however, those of flexibility and innovation 
in military doctrine. Instead, as in the earlier Black Hawk 
War, this protracted campaign served as a vindication of the 
essential correctness of the Army's post-War of 1812 deci­
sion to realign itself on the French-Austrian school of war. 
Thus, as before, effective military action had been crip­
pled, vast resources of men and money squandered and lives 
lost due to the interference and lack of fiscal support of 
politicians in both the executive and legislative branches. 
There was as well the usual lack of cooperation of state, 
territorial and local officials; the customary lack of mili­
tia effectiveness as combat troops; and the persistent lack 
of adequate numbers of men, equipment and funds.70 
For eight long years, under the most oppressive and 
difficult of conditions, the Army labored in its thankless 
and ignoble job of suppressing the Seminole and Creek In­
dians. The terrain of the Florida Everglades presented ex­
ceptionally inhospitable country for the operation of con­
ventional troops. The men were plagued by the heat, the 
swamps, disease, alligators and the hard biting "tiny sand-
flies popularly called 'noseeums'.n71 The difficulties of 
campaigning in the Everglades were catalogued with a good 
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deal of anguish by Assistant Adjutant-General J. A. Cham­
bers: 
The troops have endured every hardship and 

privation, they had ((been)) exposed to the 

drenching rains, noxious vapors, and the scorching 

sun of an almost torrid climate; they had waded 

rivers, made long marches over burning sands, 

traversed almost impassable swamps, and sought the 

enemy in fastness such, as American soldiers had 

seldom penetrated before, and with a perseverance

and energy, and a courage, worthy of the best era 

of the republic.72 

The Army's travails in the Florida mires and glades 

presented yet another example of an orthodox European-style 

army struggling to overcome an adversary that refused to 

fight by the standards of civilized warfare and on terrain 

that was inhospitable to standard tactics. From the Scot­

tish Borderlands and the Balkans of the 1740s which had 
spawned the concept of light infantry, to the dense North 
American woodlands and General Braddock's massacre during 
the Seven Years War, to Wellington and the Spanish Peninsu­
la, where modern guerilla warfare was born, to the burning 
sands of French Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s and the Great 

Plains and Florida Everglades of the United States, Europe­

an-style armies had labored mightily and, on occasion, with 

a fair degree of ingenuity, to wage unconventional warfare. 

In the main, such efforts were rarely reflected in the 

manuals or in the training regimens of officer cadets. The 

only major influence on orthodox tactics lay in the use of 

light infantry as skirmishers to cover the advance of col­

umns of conventional infantry. 
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Guerilla-warfare, in order to be effectively prosecuted 

required highly unorthodox tactics, the willingness of sen­

ior officers to trust the judgments of junior officers in 

the field and an effective, coordinated strategy with the 

diplomats and civil officials. The Army eventually solved 

the first two problems of tactics and command leadership. 
Out of the jumble of strategies tried in the Florida swamps, 
what emerged was basically the same strategy used seventy 
years later by the British in the Boer War. The swamps were 
sub-divided into a series of three-square-mile districts. 
In the heart of each district was a blockhouse and a lieu­
tenant, captain or ensign with forty soldiers, Marines o r  
volunteers. The emphasis was on aggressive patrolling, 
thereby severely curtailing the mobility of the Indians. In 
turn, larger detachments traversed the glades by water and 
on foot, progressively tightening the Army's grip on the 
Florida mires, in effect, squeezing the swamps dry of its 
Indian population. Indian Bureau agents, whose ineptitude 
and belligerence had been one of the primary causes of the 
outbreak of hostilities, eventually proved somewhat useful 
in securing the surrender of some of the Indians. Eventu­
ally, the Army more or less succeeded in pacifying the 
Everglades and bringing about the deportation of much, if 
not all, of the Indian population. These painful innova­
tions in waging unconventional warfare, however, had no 
measurable impact at all on formal Army doctrine. The harsh 
131 

tactical lessons learned in the Everglades remained behind 

when the bulk of the Army was withdrawn to deal with the 

problem of frontier security on the Great Plains. It was 

the national political establishment which had failed to 

support the military effort effectively, from which the Army 

again learned the painful lesson that in a crisis, it would 

ultimately have to rely on itself to defend the country.73 

The professional officer corp's assessment of the 

causes of this war appear, on first reading startling: the 

two primary factors in bringing about open hostilities they 

argued, were white greed for land and the conflict between 

two quite different cultures. In fact, these factors were, 

from the perspective of most professional officers, the 

usual causes of Indian-white hostilities in this period. 

The Seminoles had therefore been pushed into war by the 

unscrupulous acts of some white settlers and the fraudulent 

and corrupting practices of the whiskey dealers, a problem 

found on both the Southern and Western frontiers:74 

...the passions of a people ((i.e., the 
Seminoles)), which had been smothered for fifteen 
years... were let loose, and the savage massacres 
which had appalled the stoutest breast, gave
undisputed evidence of the character of the 
conquest. Florida, from this time forward, was a 
scene of devastation, murder, sorrow, and dis­
tress.75 
The patrician members of the officer corps, charged 

with the conflicting duties of looking after the welfare of 

the Indian and in turn protecting the frontier settlers, 

whose greed all too often brought on hostilities, found the 
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process  of Ind ian  c o n t r o l  q u i t e  d i s t a s t e f u l .  Y e t  t h e y  d u t i ­
f u l l y  set about  t h e i r  d i r t y  work when t h e  shoo t ing  s t a r t e d ,  
t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e t h o s  of t h e  o f f i c e r  co rps  p l a c i n g  it above 
t h e  p e t t y  mach ina t ions  and i n t r i g u e s  of t h e  c i v i l  p o l i t i ­
c i a n s .  The Army had l i t t l e  a f f e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  savagery  of 
t h e i r  a d v e r s a r i e s  y e t  t h e  members of t h e  o f f i c e r  co rps  un­
d e r s t o o d  t h a t  it was a f u n c t i o n  of t h e  I n d i a n s '  ve ry  d i f ­
f e r e n t  c u l t u r e ,  " their  rude  and uncu l tu red  code of l a w s . " 7 6  
The g r e a t e s t  compla in t  of t h e  Army's l e a d e r s h i p ,  however, 
w a s  t h e  u s u a l  l a c k  of adequate  manpower t o  p r o s e c u t e  e f f e c ­
t i v e l y  and s p e e d i l y  t h e  wars f o i s t e d  on them by t h e  n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c a l  e s t ab l i shmen t ,  o r  as P o t t e r  p u t  it: 
I f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  w a s  de te rmined  t o  g r a t i f y
t h e  c r a v i n g  a p p e t i t e s  of a f e w  a v a r i c i o u s  specula­
t o r s ,  it was h i s  du ty  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  r e s p e c t a b l e  
c i t i z e n s  o f  F l o r i d a  a g a i n s t  any i n j u r y  ( ( t h a t ) )
m i g h t  r e s u l t  f rom h i s  measu re ,  h e  s h o u l d  h a v e  
t h r o w n  s u c h  a f o r c e  i n t o  t h e  t e r r i t o r  a s  t o  
p reven t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of r e s i s t a n c e . . . .  7Y 
A t  t h e  o n s e t  of  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  t h e  Army's f o r c e s  i n  
F l o r i d a  numbered some f i v e  hundred men, mostly a r t i l l e r y  
t r o o p s  manning t h e  p e n i n s u l a ' s  f o r t r e s s e s .  T h e i r  opponents ,  
whose growing i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  r e s o r t  t o  w a r  had been known 
f o r  months, t o t a l e d  some f i f t e e n  hundred Seminoles,  C r e e k s  
and b l ack  a l l i e s .  A c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f o r t  w a s  t h u s  s p e n t  by 
t h e  Army a n d  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of War i n  s c r a p i n g  up enough 
t r o o p s  t o  p rosecu te  t h e  war.78 Lacking r e s o u r c e s  and under 
i n t e n s i v e  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  t o  produce a qu ick  v i c t o r y ,  t h e  
Army tackled its formidable  problem w i t h  grim d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
1 3 3  

and, in time, considerable skill. Brevet Captain John T. 

Sprague, chronicler of this war, expressed the bitter feel­

ing of most Army officers toward their civil political 

masters when he wrote: "Blood is spilt, millions are 

squandered, the country ravaged, when the means upon which 
the only hope was based, to avert the calamity, one put in 
requisition ( (i.e., creating an Indian reservation in 
Florida)), and the army, amid vindictive abuse and unreser­
ved condemnation, accomplished the desired end."79 AS 
usual, the militia proved largely ineffectual; in the best 
tradition of limited war doctrine, Sprague stated the Army's 
severe criticism of citizen soldiers.80 
If mustered into service, each man inevitably
leaves his home unprotected while absent, solici­
tous for the safety of others, his own dwelling 
may be fired, and his family murdered; his farm 
from which he draws his daily food, becomes a 
barren waste, and the habits of industry, which 
have grown with his... ((efforts)), become 
enervated by pernicious example.81 
At about the same time as the beginning of the Seminole 

War, the Second Dragoons were created by Congress as the 

Antebellum Army's second cavalry unit. The exact motivation 

behind the establishment of a second dragoons regiment is 

quite murky. The Second Dragoons appear to have been part 

of the temporary expansion of the Army in 1836 due to the 

outbreak of hostilities in Florida.g2 Consequently, the 

Second Dragoons have been frequently identified as having 

been authorized specifically for duty in the Seminole War.83 

This portion is supported by the fact that in 1843, after 
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cessation of hostilities in Florida, Congress moved first to 
disband and then to retain them as a dismounted rifle regi­
ment. This decision was in turn reversed in 1844, when Con­
gress authorized the remounting of the Second Dragoons due 
to strong Western political pressure for increased Army pro­
tection on the Great Plains.84 The problem with this neat 
and quite linear progression of events in the complicated 

gestation period of the Second Dragoons is in the fact that 

the Everglades were the worst possible terrain in which to 

deploy cavalry. The morassy terrain of the Florida glades 
was completely impassable to mounted troops. Consequently, 

the Second Dragoons, during this campaign, were compelled to 

slog through the muck of the Everglades as lowly infantry 

along with the rest of the Army and Marines. Moreover, 

there is the interesting fact that the first; posting of the 

Second Dragoons was not to Florida but rather to Jefferson 

Barracks, St. Louis, apparently for Western frontier secur­

ity duty. It is thus probable that the Second Dragoons were 

created by Congress pursuant to increasingly vocal Western 

political demands fox adequate military protection; in turn, 
the establishment of this regiment would have allowed for 

reassignment of an infantry regiment for Florida duty. How­

ever, the massive manpower requirements created by the Sec­

ond Seminole War forced the Army high command to gut the 

Western Department for troops of all kind, including the 

Second Dragoons. The First Dragoons, save for perhaps a few 
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companies in the first months of hostilities, labored alone 

as the Army's only western cavalry unit until the 1840s.85 

A third unit of cavalry, the Regiment of Mounted 
Rifles, was established by Congress in 1846, professedly to 
man a series of new outposts along the now heavily-travelled 
Oregon The origins of the Mounted Rifles if 
anything, are more shrouded in the obscurities of Congres­
sional legislative history than the Second Dragoons. Cer­
tainly, this unit was one of congress's most whimsical and 
peculiar creations in the field of war policy. The primary 
armament was designated as the 1841-pattern rifle and, of 
all things, very oversized Bowie knives, which many officers 
replaced as soon as possible with a saber. The 1841-pattern 
rifles were simply too unwieldy and possessed too low a rate 
of fire to be effective for mounted frontier service. 

Moreover, there was simply no way such weapons could be used 

by a soldier when on horseback. Further complicating mat­

ters was the fact that a different table of organization 

than that of the Dragoons was established for the Mounted 

Rifles; thus this new regiment had two extra companies and 

over two hundred more men and officers. Even the facings on 

the uniforms were different: yellow (or orange after 1851) 

fox dragoons, green for mounted rifles, as in British Army 

practice. The motive of Congress in creating such a unit 

instead of a third regiment of dragoons, which would have 

ensured the rationalization of Army units into a few spe-
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cific types is obscure. The primary motivations appear to 

have been those of foreign policy and protection of the 

"true" Anglo-Saxon character of the American people and not 

the actual defense of pioneers on the Oregon Trail. In 

other words, nativism plus the then white-hot political 

issue of the Oregon boundary were really the principal 

influences upon Congress in creating the mounted rifles. 

The Congressional debates express concern for the racial 

purity of American society, the untoward threat of immi­

grants and the need to prove the superiority of youthful 

American society in the tussle over the Oregon Territory 

with decadent old Great Britain.87 Of course such concerns 

had little rational connection with issues of national war 

policy; the mounted rifles was the least desirable form of 

cavalry in terms of European mounted warfare doctrine and 

the Army's senior leadership. Nonetheless, Congress did 

establish the mounted rifles, reasserting, if in a rather 

roundabout manner, its traditional opposition to military 

professionalism. The style of the mounted rifles--Bowie 

knives and long guns--conjure up images of such pioneer 

legends as Daniel Boone and Davy Crockett rather than 

regular Army soldiers. As an added benefit (if of small 

import), was the Army's growing surplus of expensive new 

percussion cap rifles (in the main, loathed by line infantry 

officers fox their very slow rate of fire) could finally be 
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put to productive use rather than gathering dust in federal 

arsenals.88 

Part IV 

The American West from 1812 to 1861 provided few oppor­

tunities for the youthful cavalry service to employ formal 

European mounted-warfare principles. The central obstacle 

to the effective mastery of cavalry tactics lay in the very 

wide dispersal of the Army on the Great Plains. At no time 

until 1861, did more than six companies of any mounted regi­

ment ever serve together, after the initial assignment to 

the West. The ten companies of each mounted unit were 

scattered to isolated waddles vain-gloriously titled forts. 

Moreover, each company was further subdivided into still 

smaller detachments to man assorted cantonments and posts. 
The positioning of such detachments was chiefly a political 
and not a military decision; Army bases in this period were 
usually situated near settlements or astride commercial and 
pioneer trails, In 1835 the First Dragoons, according to 
the Annual Report of the Secretary of War, listed three 
companies at Des Moines, four at Fort Leavenworth and three 
at Fort Gibson (Arkansas). In 1848, the First Dragoons 
listed three companies within the New Mexico Territory and 
one each at Fort Leavenworth, at Fort Scott (in present day 
Oklahoma) and at Fort Snelling (upper Minnesota). For the 
same year, the Dragoons had deployed six companies in the 
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New Mexico territory, two in Texas and two in transit to 

California.89 To put these numbers in perspective and to 

facilitate an understanding of how hard-pressed the Ante­

bellum Army was in fulfilling its frontier defense obliga­

tions, consider the following (and quite typical) statement 

of the Army's western deployment in 1854; 

A. The Department of the West, including

the country between the Mississippi River and the 

Rocky Mountains, save for the Departments of Texas 

and New Mexico, with a total of 2,400 square miles 

of territory to be patrolled, occupied by an 

estimated 180,000 Indians and policed by a total 

of 1,855 officers and men; 

B. The Department of Texas, consisting of 
that state and adjacent land for a total of some 
2,000 square miles, with 30,000 Indians watched 
over by 2,886 officers and men; 
C. The Department of New Mexico, with 1,500 

square miles, 50,000 Indians and 1,654 officers 

and men. 

D. The Department of the Pacific, embracing
California and the Territories of Oregon, Washing­
ton, Utah and part of New Mexico, 3,100 square
miles to be patrolled, 134,000 Indians and 1,365 
officers and men for the job.90 
Fundamentally, the professional Army viewed the task of 

frontier security as not constituting a military problem. 

Irregular or partisan warfare, according to the prevailing 

military-legal doctrine, was barbaric and intrinsically 

dishonorable. John P. Curry, an author of field manuals for 

the militia, penned a precise statement, in 1861, of the 

formal military animus toward guerilla warfare: 

This, the most barbarous and inhuman mode of warfare 

known, and by no means recognizable among honorable comba-
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tants, is generally resorted to by irregular troops for the 
purpose of harassing and annoying an invading army entering 
an enemy's territory. They ((e.g., guerrillas)) usually
murder f o r  pay and plunder, and are not prompted by any
spirit of patriotism or honor. Guerrilla warfare consists, 

mainly in making night attacks, way laying strangers, the 

free use of poison... firing upon victims from ambush... and 

in robbery, pillage and assassination. If a guerilla is 

caught, no clemency whatever should be extended to him.91 

This pronounced opposition to partisan warfare by mem­
bers of the trans-Atlantic military community, was part of 
the legacy of the limited war tradition and the profound 
intellectual reaction against the unrestrained violence and 
the brigandage of the Thirty Years War. War was thus sup­
posed to be fought according to universal rules of engage­
ment, by clearly identified combatants f o r  limited objects 
and restrained by reason and honor. 92 The problem, there­
fore, for the Professional American Army, was how to wage an 
unorthodox war without sacrificing its hard-won commitment 
to a European style of war and in turn, without sullying its 
honor, "that active and heaven-born principle,... that puri­
fying an ennobling sentiment which pervades every word and 
action, while it regulates and controls the passions.. .' I .  9 3  
The Army, it should be recalled, was bound as well by its 
seconds obligation of protecting the samesaid Indians from 
the unlawful conduct of some whites. The problem was never 
formally tackled by the Army's leader of how to blend these 
disparate duties into a coherent policy: tactical problems 
of frontier security and legal questions involved in the 
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management of Indian affairs were largely left to the imagi­

nation and discretion of field officers. 

That is not to say that the European military tradi­

tions and practices on which the professional Army was 

modeled had no utility in aiding officers in tackling the 

complex and thorny issues involved in frontier security 

duty. Surprisingly, it was again the tactics of the French 
Army which proved invaluable in solving the question of how 
to control the Indians. A frequently used term to describe 
the Indians, was that they were "Arabs" or "mussulmen". 
Captain John Pope, for example in describing the Indians of 
the Southwest in 1853, stated that their habits (including 

in battle) were similar to the "wild Arabs" of the desertOg4 

Similarly, Army Surgeon R. Gilson, described the Comanches 

as "those arabs of the western prairies."95 The origin of 

this practice of defining the Army's problem of Indian con­

trol as analogous to management of the Arabs was derived 

directly from recent French Army experience in North 

AfricaOg6 In the 1830s and 1840s, French armies waged a 

protracted and highly fluid war with the Berber tribes. The 

initial and wholly unsuccessful tactical scheme was the 

"Great Wall", entailing reliance upon numerous small, static 

garrisons to seal off the Berber threat from populated 

areas. Essentially, therefore, in terms of American 

frontier military policy, the same type of tactics which had 

proved equally ineffective on the Great Plains and in the 
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Mississippi Valley in the immediate post-War of 1812 period. 

In 1840 Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud was dispatched to 

Algeria to take command of the flagging war effort and to 

implement his quite original and even daring tactical solu­

tion to the Arab's guerilla tactics. Within his command 
were three American Cavalry lieutenants sent to France by 
Secretary of War Joel Poinsett with the objective of 
returning with the most up-to-date training and manuals in 
mounted warfare so as to ensure that the dragoons were truly 
an effective cavalry unit. Bugeaud replaced the numerous 
small garrisons with large, strategically positioned concen­
trations of troops. The new tactical emphasis was on celer­
ity and mobility; heavy supply wagons were replaced by mules 
and the heavy artillery left at base. Small detachments of 
cavalry and infantry were sent out as scouts to shadow the 
Arabs and pinpoint their location. Aggressive patrolling 
and rapid and effective retaliatory strikes by cavalry and 
infantry, exploiting their new swiftness of action to the 
fullest, accomplished in four years what France had failed 
to do in the previous twenty; or as Bugeaud himself put it: 
I have made myself as much an Arab as you 
are. More than you perhaps for I can remain on 
campaign longer without returning for supplies.
Your vast solitudes, your steepest mountains, your
deepest ravines cannot frighten me or stop me for 
a moment.. .. I am mobile as you are. There is 
not as single corner of your territory which I 
cannot reach. Like a river of fire I will scourge
it in a l l  directions, today to the south, tomorrow 
to the east, the day after to the west, then to 
the north.97 
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Arab and Indian societies were highly dissimilar, the 
former being considerably more organized. Yet the styles of 
warfare of these two peoples bore many similarities: fleet, 
highly mobile adversaries, specializing in hit-and-run tac­
tics, and exploiting the harsh, inhospitable terrain in 
which they lived to their advantage. Thus, there was a 
common bond of experience, based on the solution of broadly 
similar tactical problems, between American and French offi­
cers. Lieutenant Philip Kearny, who distinguished himself 
in the Algeria campaign of 1841-1842, returned to the dra­
goons imbued with the latest advances in waging both ortho­
dox and unorthodox warfare. For Kearny, "the French theory 
of tactics.. . ((was)) the most perfect" of his day, a 
statement which would have been readily agreed to by most 
professional officers on both sides of the Atlantic. While 
the French tactics in Algeria, unlike their formal princi­
ples of mounted warfare, were never written down in any 
formal military treatise, they nonetheless influenced 
American counter-Indian tactics in the Antebellum era. Mule 
trains were used for resupply in rough country, infantry 
were employed to screen cavalry and supply trains from am­
bush in mountainous terrain and small herds of sheep and 
cattle were driven behind the troops to provision large 
field operations.98 Thus, the definition of frontier secur­
ity problems in the context of European military practice, 
particularly that of the Army's mentor, France, further 
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s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  t i es  of t h e  o f f i c e r  co rps  t o  t h e  p ro fes ­
s i o n a l  concept  of war. 
Both t h e  French and t h e  American armies a r r i v e d ,  inde­
pendent ly ,  a t  t h e  conc lus ion  t h a t  c a v a l r y  was fundamental  t o  
t h e  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  of h o s t i l e s ,  Arab o r  Ind ian .  Thus 
w i t h o u t  c a v a l r y ,  accord ing  t o  Colonel George Croghan, "our 
i n t e r i o r  commerc ia l  c a n  ( ( n o t )  ) be p r o t e c t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  
t a r t a r s  of t h e  p r a i r i e s  by I n f a n t r y  s t a t i o n e d  a t  p o s t s ,  
w i t h o u t  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  of  a mounted force."99 Again, as 
po in ted  o u t  by Capta in  Cooke: " i n  no coun t ry  of Europe, nor 
i n  A s i a ,  can h o r s e s  be so  numerously and so  cheaply suppor­
t e d  as i n  t h e  U n i t e d  States;  and our p l a i n s  and p r a i r i e s  
p l a i n l y  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  c a v a l r y  i s  t h e  most s u i t a b l e  m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e .  "100 An a l t e r n a t i v e  t ac t ica l  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  problem 
of s u p p r e s s i n g  t h e  r a i d s  of t h e  P l a i n s  I n d i a n s  would have 
been by t h e  use  of a l a r g e l y  mounted combat f o r c e ,  suppor ted  
by l i m i t e d  numbers of infantrymen t o  man g a r r i s o n s  and f o r  
use  i n  h i l l y  t e r r a i n .  Such tact ics  were used i n  t h e  Nine­
t e e n t h  C e n t u r y  by I m p e r i a l  Russ i a  t o  s e c u r e  c o n t r o l  over  
t h e i r  C e n t r a l  A s i a  t e r r i t o r y .  Such a r a d i c a l  d e p a r t u r e  from 
orthodox m i l i t a r y  tact ics  never developed due t o  two i n s u r ­
m o u n t a b l e  o b s t a c l e s .  F i r s t  of a l l ,  Congres s  had l i t t l e  
enthusiasm f o r  expanding t h e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  Army, r e s u l t i n g  
i n  a c o n t i n u a l  s h o r t a g e  of t r o o p s  t h a t  w a s  on ly  g r a d u a l l y  
so lved  over  t h e  cour se  of t h e  Antebellum pe r iod .  The second 
key  o b s t a c l e  l a y  i n  t h e  i n t r i n s i c  m i l i t a r y  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  
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of t h e  Army i t s e l f  . T h e  fundamental  t ac t i ca l  p r e c e p t  of 
formal  European-style  war fa re  w a s  t h a t  t h e  i n f a n t r y  w a s  t h e  
k ing  of b a t t l e ;  c a v a l r y  w a s  no more t h a n  a u s e f u l  a d j u n c t  t o  
t h e  f o o t - s o l d i e r s .  The Army t h e r e f o r e  went about  t h e  d i f f i ­
c u l t  t a s k  of Ind ian  c o n t r o l  by bending and t w i s t i n g  t h e i r  
European o r i e n t e d  war f i g h t i n g  system t o  t h e  requi rements  of 
t h e  f r o n t i e r ;. 
P r a c t i c a l l y  speaking,  t h e  b a s i c  o p e r a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r  
of t h e  Army's means of s u p p r e s s i n g  I n d i a n  i n c u r s i o n s  w a s  
wholly m i l i t a r y  i n  c h a r a c t e r .  It w a s  n o t ,  however, d e f i n e d  
as  b e i n g  m i l i t a r y  i n  n a t u r e  by t h e  o f f i c e r s  waging t h e s e  
campa igns .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  it was c l e a r l y  n o t  t h e  
p o l i c e - l i k e  campaign employed a c r o s s  t h e  border  i n  Canada. 
The  Royal  Canadian Mounted P o l i c e  tackled t h e  q u e s t i o n  of 
Ind ian  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  f a s h i o n  of a conven t iona l  p o l i c e  prob­
l e m  of ma in ta in ing  l a w  and o rde r .  This  approach w a s  wholly 
r e a c t i v e  i n  na tu re :  i n  t h e  main, i n d i v i d u a l  v i o l a t o r s  of 
Canadian l a w  would be apprehended and t r i e d  f o r  t h e i r  o f f en ­
ses. Only i n f r e q u e n t l y  d id  t h e  R.C.M.P. r e s o r t  t o  t h e  u se  
of l a r g e  scale detachments of p o l i c e  and s o l d i e r s  t o  c o n t r o l  
t h e i r  I n d i a n  p o p u l a t i o n s  ; f o r  example ,  be tween 1886 and 
1895 ,  there  w e r e  943 m i l i t a r y  engagements i n  t h e  American 
West compared w i t h  on ly  s i x  o r  seven i n  t h e  Canadian North­
w e s t  T e r r i t o r y .  Of enormous i m p o r t a n c e  i n  a i d i n g  t h e  
e f f o r t s  of t h e  R.C.M.P. w a s  t h e  f ac t  t h a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  Cana­
d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  worked v i g o r o u s l y  t o  r e s t r a i n  w e s t e r n  
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settlement until the Indians had been pacified. Conse­

quently, the R.C.M.P. was not nearly as burdened as was the 

American Army with the task of safeguarding large numbers of 

western settlers from Indian attack. While seemingly more 

orderly and less combative, the Canadian police model did 

not, in fact, prove successful. It was rather the far more 

massive and belligerent campaigns of the American Army to 

the south that broke the resistance of the Great Plains 

Indians on both sides of the border.101 

A second, very different strategy of Indian control was 
that of the Texas Rangers. Basically, in dealing with the 
Comanche and other tribes, their technique was to out-
Indian-the-Indian, including, on occasion, the ferocity of 
combat. The Rangers attempted to drive their opponents to 
ground and then decisively engage them, exploiting the enor­
mous firepower advantage of their Colt cap-and-ball revol­
vers to the fullest (the Rangers had these weapons in action 
some twelve years prior to official Army service adoption); 
an average company of one hundred and twenty men, armed with 
two revolvers each, could discharge a then mind-boggling 
total of fourteen hundred and twenty rounds without reload­
ing compared to the earlier total of one hundred and twenty 
with single-shot weapons. When the Cossack-like Rangers 
were infused with military discipline, as in R i p  Ford's 
famed 1858-1859 campaign on the Canadian River against the 

Comanches, the results could be devastating against the 
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Ind ians  .IO2 The United S t a t e s  Army, i n h e r e n t l y  a m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e  and governed i n  i t s  a c t i o n s  by i t s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  code 
of honor, chose i n s t e a d  t o  c o r r a l  t h e  I n d i a n s ,  who w e r e  a t  
once  t h e i r  a d v e r s a r i e s  a n d  i n  e f f e c t ,  t h e i r  wards, on to  
s e c u r e  r e s e r v a t i o n s .  
The concept  of t h e  American Ind ian  h e l d  by Army o f f i ­
cers was marked by a p r o f o u n d  s e n s e  of  ambigui ty .  Many 
o f f i c e r s ,  accord ing  t o  t h e  popular  s t e r e o t y p e ,  d i d  f i n d  t h e  
Ind ians  t o  be savages--cruel ,  s e l f i s h ,  t r e a c h e r o u s ,  d i s g u s t ­
i n g  i n  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  and  s o c i e t a l  h a b i t s  and i n v e t e r a t e  
begga r s ,  A s  f o r c i b l y  a r t i c u l a t e d  by L ieu tenan t  W i l l i a m  
Avera l l ,  there was something q u i t e  demeaning i n  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  
p r a c t i c e  of  s q u a n d e r i n g  i t s  West P o i n t  g r a d u a t e s  on t h e  
lowly and o c c a s i o n a l l y  d i shonorab le  d u t y  of I n d i a n  c o n t r o l :  
W i t h  a l l  t h e  e l e m e n t s  of s c i e n c e  and r u d i ­
ments of a r t  wi th  which w e  had been loaded  d u r i n g  
t h e  fou r  y e a r s  ( ( a t  West P o i n t ) ) ,  w e  w e r e . . .  now 
t o  b e  u s e d  s i m p l y  a n d  s a d l y  t o  s u p e r v i s e  t h e  
l e a r n i n g  and d i s c i p l i n i n g  of s o l d i e r s  and t o  t r a i n  
them i n  t h e  a r t  of k i l l i n g  Indians. lO* 
A s  a r u l e ,  t h e  greater t h e  f e r o c i t y  and t h e  larger t h e  vari­
a n c e  f r o m  accepted pract ices  of  American c u l t u r e ,  t h e  
g r e a t e r  t h e  d i s l i k e  of such I n d i a n s  by members of t h e  o f f i ­
cer c o r p s .  One Army w i f e ,  Theresa V i e l e ,  w r i t i n g  f o r  her  
husband, a c a p t a i n ,  described t h e  Comanche i n  t h e  harshest 
of terms: "there could n o t  be a blacker r e c o r d  of infamy 
and r apac iousness .  The Comanche posses ses  no v e s t i g e  of t h e  
noble  t ra i ts  of t h e  redmen of t h e  northwest ."  R a t h e r ,  "he 
i s  a b l o o d y ,  b r u t a l  l i c e n t i o u s ,  and an  i n n a t e  t h i e f  . ' ' lo5  
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Such perceptions, however, reflected only part of the 

complex set of viewpoints held by members of the officer 

corps concerning the Indian, who as Surgeon Gilsan pointed 

out, "range from the primitive savage to the half-civi­

lized...."106 The perceptions of individual officers thus 
varied with their own personal experiences and in turn, due 

to the particular tribe(s) with which they had contact. 

Thus, Major-General George A. McCall, as a youthful junior 

officer serving in Florida in the late 1820s, penned a quite 

perceptive assessment of the Seminole Indian and his 

relationship to white society: 

The difference in the development of the 
intellectual facilities as well as moral, had they
been by nature carved in the two races, which I am 
satisfied is -not the case... ((lies in)) education 

or in other words, the habitual experience of the 

mental moral faculties in the different pursuits

of savage and civilized life, would, in the course 

of ages, have produced the differences between the 

white man and the red which now exist.107 

Indian warfare, savage and barbaric to most whites, 

could thus be understood by the professional soldier as a 

function of his less developed culture, a point which was 

succinctly stated by Lieutenant Potter: 

In war, the Indian has been regarded as a 

ferocious beast, and therefore life and death was 

a matter of mere precaution. He goes into battle 

smarting under manifold injuries and indignities,

and he is driven into madness and despair by the 

overwhelming ruin which results from a war with 

us. 108 

The duty of the Army in regards to the Indian was 

inherently contradictory, requiring it to protect both red 

-- -- 
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and w h i t e  i n t e r e s t s .  Moreover, t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e t h o s  of 
t h e  o f f i c e r  co rps ,  their  s t r o n g  p a t r i c i a n  v a l u e s  and s e n s e  
of a r i s t o c r a t i c  honor, mot iva ted  them t o  i n t e r v e n e  on behal f  
of t h e  I n d i a n s  and t o  p r o t e c t  them from t h e  f r o n t i e r s m e n ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  infamous whiskey d e a l e r s ,  f o r  whom t h e y  had 
l i t t l e  a f f e c t i o n .  109 Y e t  w i th  s k i l l  and d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  i f  
no t  enthusiasm, t h e s e  o f f i c e r s  undertook t h e  f o r c e d  r e l o c a ­
t i o n s  of  t h e  I n d i a n s  f u r t h e r  West, onto  i n c r e a s i n g l y  less 
d e s i r a b l e  t e r r a i n . l 1 0  Whi le  such e f f o r t s  were " c r u e l  i n  t h e  
e x t r e m e "  t h e y  were n o n e t h e l e s s  c a r r i e d  o u t  .lll Perhaps 
Surgeon  G i l s a n  b e s t  expressed  t h e  t a n g l e d  p e r c e p t i o n s  and 
v a l u e s  h e l d  by Army o f f i c e r s  toward " t h o s e  c h i l d r e n  of t h e  
f o r e s t " ,  when h e  w r o t e  w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n s i g h t  a n d  
compassion: 
Thus it ever  is: t h e  r e d  man of t h e  A t l a n t i c  
s l o p e  must  b e  crowded f u r t h e r  w e s t ,  w h i l s t  h i s  
race on t h e  f a r - o f f  P a c i f i c  sho res ,  are j o s t l e d
and pushed towards t h e  r i s i n g  sun. When a t  l a s t  
t h e  g r e a t  t i d e s  of immigration m e t  midway between 
t h e  t w o  o c e a n s ,  t h e  r e m n a n t s  o f  t h e  s i x t e e n  
m i l l i o n s  of t h o s e  n a t i v e  bands of t h e  s o i l ,  t h a t  
once roamed over t h i s  broad l a n d ,  who sha l l  have 
l e f t  t h e i r  bones  b l each ing  beneath t h e  waves of 
a d v a n c i n g  c i v i l i z a t i o n .  One s h u d d e r s  a t  t h e  
thought  of t h e  many blood c o n f l i c t s  y e t  t o  occur  
between t h e s e  contending races of human beings. . . .  
I f  w e  a r e  t o  t ake  h i s t o r y  as  our gu ide  i n  
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  f u t u r e ,  t h e  r i g h t  and wrong of 
t h o s e  c r u e l  e n c o u n t e r s  w i l l  n o t  a l w a y s  rest  
e x c l u s i v e l y  on e i ther  s i d e  bu t  one t i m e  w i t h  
t h e  r e d  man a t  a n o t h e r  w i t h  h i s  p a l e - f  ace 
b r o t h e r .  1 1 2  
Whatever i t s  r e s e r v a t i o n s  toward t h e  b u s i n e s s  of Ind ian  
c o n t r o l ,  t h e  Army none the le s s  had on occas ion  t o  use  f o r c e  
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to suppress uprisings. Few comprehensive descriptions of 
cavalry versus Indian engagements were recorded in the Ante­
bellum period, by American cavalry officers. One exception 
is the illuminating account by then Second-Lieutenant John 
B. Hood. The distinguishing feature in this skirmish was 
that Hood's men, due to insufficient numbers leaving no one 
to spare to act as horse handlers, fought mounted, rather, 
than as was customary, as dismounted light infantry. On 
July 5, 1857, Hood set out from Fort Manon, in the Texas 
Department of the West, with twenty-five men of Company G of 
the later First United States Cavalry. Their mission was a 
routine patrol of the area. After some ten days in the 
field, Hood's men chanced upon a two or three-day old Indian 
trail, which the patrol proceeded to follow along a line of 
dried-up waterholes. The Indians being stalked were sus­
pected by Hood to have been a band of marauders, incorrectly 
identified as being Tokaways (who usually fought as scouts 
along side the Army), who had previously ambushed American 
soldiers whole under the guise of a flag of truce. After 
several days of difficult travel through the arid, rocky, 
desert country, Hood's detachment finally came upon the 
Indian band they had been diligently hunting. Hood's opera­
tional strength had diminished to only seventeen men as a 
consequence of  injuries to eight of  his horses. Upon 
reaching the Indian encampment, Hood proceeded to make an 
initial inspection while mounted. The Indians held a 
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waterhole, positioning their encampment on a hillock, con­

cealed by thick clumps of Spanish bayonet. What Hood had 

come across was in fact a band of some one hundred Comanche 
and Lyan-Apache warriors and their families.113 While de­
cisively outnumbered, these troopers had the advantage of 

greatly superior fixepower: 

Every man was armed with an Army rifle 

((e-g., A Sharps 1854-pattern single shot, breech 

loading carbine)) and six shooter, a few of us had 
sabers and two revolvers, whilst I was armed with 
a double barrel shot-gun loaded with buckshot, and 
two navy six-shooters ( ( - 3 6  caliber as opposed to 
-44 caliber - officers still commonly purchased
their own side arms in this period)).ll4 

Indian armament consisted of bows-and-arrows, lances, 

buffalo hide shields and a few single shot trade muskets 

(so-called, because they were cheaply made especially for 

the Indian trade).l l - 5  Despite the unfavorable disparity in 
numbers, Hood elected to close with the Indian warriors or 

dog soldiers because he, like many other officers, was per­

sonally inclined to accept "the belief... that twenty well 

armed soldiers should be able to successfully engage four 

times their number of Indians...."116 Such beliefs did not 
constitute idle boasting or false bravado on Hood's part. 

The combination of superior firepower, as provided by Colt-

Dragoon pattern cap-and-ball-revolvers and Hall and Sharps 

carbines, with vastly greater discipline, fire control and 

marksmanship allowed small bodies of troopers to deal with 

much larger Indian warrior bands.117 
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Indian tribes did not fight according to European 

concepts of warfare; tactics as such were largely 

unknown.118 By-and-large, most cavalry-infantry skirmishes 

arose from chance encounters; it was the Army which was the 

aggressor on most occasions. For the most part, Plains 

Indians fought what were essentially individual battles 

regardless of how many warriors were involved. The aims of 

the combatants were completely different: for the Indian, 

war was a question of honor and necessity, such as contests 

for horses or valuable hunting land; for the Army, it was 

their full-time occupation. The first phase of such a 
battle was for the Indian warriors to charge in mass and 
then, at about one hundred yards, split into two formations 
skirting the soldier's position so as to avoid their greater 
firepower. The Indians hoped to cause sufficient disarray 
among their opponents so as to draw them into their style of 
individual, close-order combat. The warrior's greatest 
achievement lay in the accumulation of personal honor, 
achieved by scoring coups or touches with a specially non­
sharpened stick or performing some other equally brave feat. 
Killing an opponent, while prestigious, constituted a some­
what lower level of achievement. Once one's personal honor 
had been vindicated, it was perfectly acceptable for that 
brave to sit out the remainder of the engagement. And there 
was no obligation of honor for any warrior to participate 
actively if he and the spirits did not feel it was a good 
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d a y  f o r  hiin t o  d i e .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  Army's s o l d i e r s  
a t tempted  t o  ensu re  t h e  d e a t h  of t h e i r  opponents by aiming 
t h e i r  weapons,  u n l i k e  t h e  I n d i a n  p r a c t i c e  o f  f i r i n g  i n  
b a r r a g e - l i k e  f a sh ion ,  t h e  same as t h e y  would when hun t ing  
b u f f a l o .  Furthermore,  t h e  Army fought  i n  c o n t r o l l e d ,  d i s c i ­
p l i n e d  format ions  w i t h  a clear,  conce r t ed  o b j e c t  of t roun­
c i n g  their  foes.119 
Returning t o  Hood's n a r r a t i v e :  
When w e  were w i t h i n  about  twenty ox t h i r t y  
p a c e s  of t h e  mound occupied by t h e  Indians . . .  a 
f o r c e  of t h e m  advanced towards us  wi th  t h e  f l a g
( ( i . e . ,  a whi te  s h e e t  f r a u d u l e n t l y  o u t  as a f l a g  
of peace)  1. 
and f i r e d  uponSudde?Aft h e y  threw it t o  t h e  ground us. 
The  Comanche a n d  Apaches p r o c e e d e d  t o  l a u n c h  t h e i r  
at tack, on f o o t  and horse ,  a g a i n s t  Hood's detachment:  
Thus began  a most  d e s p e r a t e  s t r u g g l e .  The 
w a r r i o r s  were a l l  p a i n t e d ,  s t r i p p e d  t o  t h e  wais t ,  
w i t h  e i t h e r  h o r n s  or w r e a t h e s  of f e a t h e r s  upon 
t h e i r  h e a d s ;  t h e y  bore  s h i e l d s  f o r  de fense ,  and 
were armed w i t h  r i f l e s ,  l a n c e s  and arrows. The 
f u l l  and s h a r p  r e p o r t  of our  r i f l e s ,  t h e  smoke and 
encroaching  n o i s e  of t h e  f i r e  ( ( a  d e f e n s i v e  b l a z e  
s e t  b y  t h e  I n d i a n s  t o  s c r e e n  t h e i r  women a n d  
c h i l d r e n )  ) , t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  g r e a t  odds a g a i n s t  
u s ,  t h e  s h o u t s  of t h e  s o l d i e r s  and t h e  y e l l s  of 
t h e  I n d i a n s ,  betokened ( (sic.  ) ) t h e  deadly  p e r i l
f rom w h i c h  seeming ly  naught bu t  a miracle could  
e f f e c t  our d e l i v e r a n c e .  Each man af ter  d i scha rg ­
i n g  h i s  r i f l e ,  drew h i s  r e v o l v e r ,  and used it wi th  
t e r r i b l e  e f f e c t  as t h e  w a r r i o r s ,  i n  many i n s t a n c e s  
w e r e  w i t h i n  a few f e e t  of t h e  muzzle of our arms. 
S t u b b o r n l y  d i d  my b r a v e  men h o l d  t h e i r  ground; 
a g a i n  and a g a i n  t h e y  drove t h e  enemy back t o  t h e  
edge and i n  rear of t h e  burning m a s s  of weeds i n  
o u r  f r o n t ,  when f i n a l l y  t h e  I n d i a n s  c h a r g e d
d e s p e r a t e l y  and f o r c e d  our l i n e  back a f e w  paces
i n  t h e  cen t r e .121  
Thus raged t h i s  hand t o  hand c o n f l i c t  u n t i l  
a l l  our s h o t s  were expended, and it w a s  found t h a t  
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owning to the restiveness of the horses we could 

not reload while mounted. We then fell back about 

fifth yards and dismounted for that purpose.122 

At this point in the engagement the Indians broke off 
the fight, signaled by a loud piercing scream from their 
squaws for their dead and wounded, with an estimated ten 
warriors killed. Hood's detachment had suffered two men 
killed, four severely wounded and several flesh wounds; the 
unit's commander himself suffered a grievous injury as a re­
sult of an arrow which struck his left hand, pinning it to 
his bridle. After retreating some fifty yards to reload, 
Hood decided to first care for his injured. Despite his 
wound, Hood continued the chase, which forced the Indians 
back on their reservation, first with infantry and then with 
cavalry reinforcements. Later intelligence from the local 
Indian agent confirmed the actual l o s s  of nineteen warriors, 
including two minor chiefs, and many wounded. The Army's 
dead were buried with full honors, with the following 
eulogy: 
No useless coffin confined his breast 

Nor in sheet or shroud they buried him 

But he lay like a warrior taking his rest 

With his martial cloak around him.123 

For his handling of this action, Hood was personally 

commended by Brevet Major-General D. E. Twiggs, commanding 

the Department of Texas, and quite unusually, by Commanding 

General Scott, for his gallantry, coolness and effi­

ciency.124 
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The tact ics  which t h e  American c a v a l r y  adapted  f o r  use 
on t h e  f r o n t i e r  were w h o l l y  French i n  o r i g i n ;  L ieu tenan t  
Kearny championed t h e  s u p e r i o r i t y  of t h e i r  mounted war fa re  
d o c t r i n e  when he wrote ,  " i n  c a v a l r y  which... t h e  French,  has  
kep t  p r o g r e s s i n g  i n  p e r f e c t i o n  ever  s i n c e  t h e  g r e a t  wars of 
Europe ,  e v e r y t h i n g  u s e l e s s  h a s  been r e j e c t e d ,  and every­
t h i n g  ... is p r a c t i c e d  i n  t h e  b e s t  manner.n125 The 1841 o r  
so -ca l l ed  P o i n s e t t  manual of c a v a l r y  tactics w a s  l i f t e d  i n  
t o t a l  from t h e  t h e n  s t a n d a r d  French work on mounted war fa re .  
A t  Car l i s le  Barracks Army hor se  s o l d i e r s  were d r i l l e d  i n  t h e  
t e c h n i q u e s  a n d  cus toms of European-style  c a v a l r y  war fa re ,  
w h i l e  f i e l d  commanders were l e f t  f r e e  t o  d e v i s e  t h e i r  own 
schemes f o r  i n s t r u c t i n g  t h e i r  men i n  I n d i a n  f i g h t i n g .  And 
a t  W e s t  P o i n t ,  s a v e  f o r  Cap ta in  George �3. Thomas's b r i e f  
t e n u r e  (1850-1851) as i n s t r u c t o r  of c a v a l r y  tact ics ,  c a d e t s  
r e c e i v e d  no i n s t r u c t i o n  wha t soeve r  i n  t h e  i n t r i c a c i e s  of 
Ind ian  management.126 
Not o n l y  were t h e  c a v a l r y  t a c t i c s  n o t  a f f e c t e d  by 
f r o n t i e r  e x p e r i e n c e  bu t  t h e  Army's equipment and weaponry 
w a s  e q u a l l y  l i t t l e  a f f e c t e d .  The enormous gu l f  between t h e  
formal ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  Army and t h e  r a g t a g  f o r c e  guard ing  t h e  
f r o n t i e r ,  w a s  demonstrated by t h e i r  c o n t i n u i n g  commitment t o  
t h e  arme b l a n c h e  a s  t h e  p r i m a r y  c a v a l r y  weapon. Only a 
handfu l  of men and o f f i c e r s  c a r r i e d  a sabe r  i n t o  t h e  f i e l d ;  
i t s  p r i n c i p a l  f u n c t i o n s  i n  t h e  W e s t  w e r e  ones of ceremony 
and  a s  a badge  of  rank .  Saber charges  of t h e  c lass ical ,  
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European variety were virtually unknown in the Indian wars 

of the Great Plains. Moreover, many a cavalry officer ques­

tioned the utility of carrying swords when engaged in Indian 

fighting. Major Albert Gallatin Brackett pointedly expres­

sed the limitations of the saber, when he wrote: 

The saber in Indian fighting is simply a 
nuisance, they jingle abominably, and are of no 
earthly use. If a soldier gets close enough to 
use a saber, it is about an even thing as to who 
goes under first....I27 
Similarly, Major-General William Hardee argued that in 

Indian fighting, a saber was unnecessary because: 

In marching it makes a noise which may be 

heard at some distance, perhaps preventing a 

surprise, and in a charge when not drawn is
particularly an encumbrance.1'2 8 

The cavalry was very deficient, as well, in its fire­

arms. Granted that most soldiers, of whatever branch of 

service, were only "average marksmen", and that most com­

manders rarely emphasized target practice, yet the cavalry's 

firearms were exceedingly inefficient even by the standards 

of the day.129 A s  Inspector General, Colonel Joseph Mans-
field put it in his official report, "the musketoon as arm 

for the dragoon or mounted man in any way is almost worth­

less."l30 While "illy suited" for the demands of Indian 

fighting, the smoothbore remained in service until the Civil 

War.131 The Ordinance Bureau, hidebound in its devotion to 

orthodoxy in fixearm design, fought aggressively to block 
I the adoption of first the Hall carbine, then the Sharps 
carbine and the Colt revolver as mechanically unreliable, as 

156 

t o o  complex t o  b e  i s s u e d  t o  common s o l d i e r s ,  and f a r  t o o  
expensive .132 
I The u n i f o r m s  of t h e  dragoons and mounted r i f les  were 
wholly u n s u i t e d  f o r  t h e  r i g o r s  of f r o n t i e r  s e r v i c e .  Heavy 
wool c l o t h ,  t i g h t l y  c u t  and adorned wi th  
shou lde r s  t o  ward o f f  s abe r  blows were 
sur roundings  of an  eastern parade f i e l d .  
o f f  icers improvised t h e i r  own pe r sona l  
s i s t i n g  of  a m i x t u r e  of  c i v i l i a n  and  
b r a s s  scales on t h e  
f i t  on ly  f o r  p l a c i d  
Most s o l d i e r s  and 
f i e l d  uniform, con-
Army-issued c l o t h ­
i n g  .133 Perhaps t h e  most g l a r i n g  example of t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  
domination of formal European m i l i t a r y  d o c t r i n e ,  r e g a r d l e s s  
of a c t u a l  exper ience  i n  I n d i a n  f i g h t i n g ,  can be found i n  t h e  
s e l e c t i o n  of mounts f o r  t h e  c a v a l r y .  The dragoons and t h e  
mounted r i f l e s  were c r e a t e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  combat t h e  s w i f t  
and h i g h l y  mobile Ind ians  of t h e  Great P l a i n s .  The Army's 
l e a d e r s h i p ,  however, d e s i r i n g  t o  make t h e i r  c a v a l r y  u n i t s  
f i t - a n d - p r o p e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  European  m i l i t a r y  s t a n d a r d s ,  
chose s t a n d a r d b r e d s ,  t h o r o u g h b r e d s  a n d  Morgans as t h e i r  
mounts. Such majestic animals  were f u n c t i o n a l l y  o u t c l a s s e d  
by t h e  unimpressive- looking Ind ian  pony. The Army's h o r s e s  
r e q u i r e d  g r e a t e r  care and were dependent f o r  t h e i r  s u s t e ­
nance on g r a i n ,  p r e f e r a b l y  o a t s ,  and n o t  t h e  abundant w i l d  
p r a i r i e  g r a s s e s .  Not on ly  were t h e  Army's h o r s e s  i n f e r i o r  
as c a v a l r y  mounts, i n  r e g a r d s  t o  t h e  requi rements  of Western 
I n d i a n  f i g h t i n g ,  t h e y  were d e c i d e d l y  s l o w e r  as  w e l l .  
Furthermore,  speed was not  an a p p r o p r i a t e  term to d e s c r i b e  a 
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t r o o p e r  i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  weighed wi th  up t o  a hundred pounds of 
I 
weapons and s u p p l i e s .  Even tua l ly ,  c a v a l r y  commanders, once 
h a v i n g  become a d j u s t e d  t o  t h e  real i t ies  of p a t r o l  du ty  on 
t h e  Great P l a i n s ,  trimmed t h e  weight of t h e  l o a d s  carried by 
t h e i r  t r o o p e r s  t o  a more f u n c t i o n a l  f i f t e e n  t o  f o r t y  pound 
I range. The Army, u n l i k e  t h e  Mexicans and t h e  cowboys, never 
a d o p t e d  t h e  s e n s i b l e  Ind ian  p r a c t i c e  of ma in ta in ing  a re­
s e r v e  supply of ho r ses  fox t h e i r  dog s o l d i e r s .  The absence 
of such a remada system, as shown i n  Hood's account  of one 
f i r e  f i g h t ,  meant t h a t  each t r o o p e r  had t o  depend upon h i s  
one animal  which, i n  t u r n ,  r e q u i r e d  over  e i g h t  hours  of rest 
per  day.134 Thus, t o  many c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r s ,  or thodox con­
c e p t s  of mounted w a r f a r e ,  as  o f f i c i a l l y  a d o p t e d  by t h e  
Un i t ed  State Army, were i n a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  t h e  r equ i r emen t s  
of f r o n t i e r  s e c u r i t y  duty.  Colonel  Randolph B. Marcy suc­
c i n c t l y  s t a t e d  t h e  p rob lem of  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  and l a r g e l y  
unworkable t ac t ica l  t h e o r y  be ing  o u t  of l i n e  wi th  t ac t i ca l  
r e a l i t y  on t h e  wes tern  p r a i r i e s  when he wrote:  
The a r t  of w a r ,  as t a u g h t  and p r a c t i c e d  among 
c i v i l i z e d  n a t i o n s  a t  p r e s e n t  day, i s  no doubt w e l l  
adapted  t o  t h e  purposes  f o r  which it w a s  des igned
v i z . . . .  T h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of  armies a c t i n g  i n  
p o p u l a t e d  d i s t r i c t s ,  f u r n i s h i n g  ample r e s o u r c e s ,  
and  a g a i n s t  a n  enemy who i s  t a n g i b l e ,  and makes 
u s e  of s i m i l a r  t a c t i c s  and  s t r a t e g y .  B u t  t h e  
modern s c h o o l s  of m i l i t a r y  s c i e n c e  are b u t  i l l y
s u i t e d  t o  c a r r y i n g  on a w a r f a r e  w i t h  t h e  w i l d  
t r ibes of t h e  p l a i n s  .135 
The q u a i n t  n o t i o n  of t r y i n g  t o  s p e a r  such a s w i f t  and 
d a u n t l e s s  adve r sa ry  as t h e  mounted American I n d i a n s  w i t h  a 
l a n c e  o r  sending  a r e l a t i v e l y  p lodding  c u i r a s s i e r  waving h i s  
sabe r  a f t e r  such a nimble f o e  was p a t e n t l y  absurd.  Y e t  t h a t  
w a s  what  was p r e s c r i b e d  by t h e  Army's manuals on c a v a l r y  
warfare .  C e r t a i n l y ,  had t h e  Army been so i n c l i n e d ,  it could  
have  d e v e l o p e d  i t s  own u n i q u e  school  of c a v a l r y  tact ics ,  
t a i l o r e d  t o  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  of  t h e  Great  P l a i n s .  The 
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  opponen t s  of t h e  r e g u l a r  c a v a l r y  emphasized 
t h e  v a l u e  of i r r e g u l a r  t r o o p s ,  unburdened by t h e  f o r m a l i t i e s  
of European war fa re  a la  t h e  Texas Rangers, as a p r e f e r a b l e  
m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  f o r  t h e  t a s k  of Ind ian  c o n t r o l .  The 1833 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Army had  no a c t i v e  c a v a l r y  t r a d i t i o n  f o x  
n e a r l y  e i g h t e e n  y e a r s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of t h e  
d r a g o o n s .  As Cooke e f f e c t i v e l y  argued: " t h e  service of 
c a v a l r y  had become wi th  us  a f o r g o t t e n  and unknown branch of 
m i l i t a r y  knowledge, something t o  be r ead  o f ,  as w e  do, of 
t h e  Macedonian phalanx. The Army's l e a d e r s h i p ,  however, 
had d e d i c a t e d  t h e  r e g u l a r  m i l i t a r y  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  t o  t h e  
F r e n c h - A u s t r i a n  s c h o o l  a n d  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  of waging a 
E u r o p e a n - s t y l e  war, so as t o  avoid  f u r t h e r  h u m i l i a t i o n  of 
American arms as  produced by t h e  War of 1812.  There w a s  
s imply no room f o r  t h e  o f f i c i a l  s a n c t i o n i n g  of deviance  from 
t h e  o r t h o d o x y  of European  w a r f a r e .  A f t e r  all, f r o n t i e r  
p o l i c i n g  w a s  no t  even a m i l i t a r y  t a sk  a t  a l l  bu t  rather a 
n e c e s s a r y  b u t  o n e r o u s  d u t y  imposed upon t h e  Army by t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  and Congress. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  even among t h e  h a r d e s t  
and  most  e x p e r i e n c e d  of  c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r s  t h e r e  ex i s t ed  a 
d e e p ,  p e r s o n a l  commitment t o  m i l i t a r y  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m .  
I 
I 
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Thus, for example, Cooke, long a dragoon officer and even­

tual commander of the First Regiment, could, in the best 

romantic style of military writing, author a stirring tri­

bute to the ethos of cavalry warfare of the classical 

tradition: 

The speed of a line of charging cavalry, the 
aggregate of life, motion, mass, and power ives a 
spiritual momentum to both rider and horse.?37 
The long isolated service on the Great Plains would 

have appeared to have been a poor incubator in which to 

develop American military professionalism. Indian fighting 

certainly provided the Army's officer corps with few if any 

opportunities to employ their formal skills in the art of 

war. The political necessity of maintaining numerous tiny 

forts and garrisons scattered on the western prairies was 

clearly not conducive to supporting a high level of morale. 

Colonel Maxcy, reflecting a general consensus of the officer 

corps on this issue, vigorously attacked this practice when 

he wrote: "The morale of the troops must thereby ((be)) 

impaired and the confidence of the savages correspondingly 

augmented. The system of small garrisons has a tendency to 

discourage the troops in proportion as they are scattered, 

and renders them correspondingly inefficient."l38 Consider­

able amounts of time and labor while on post had to be ex­

pended on such non-military chores as heavy construction and 

farming due to the financially stringent budgets passed by 

Congresso139 Frontier service was hard, tiring, and un-
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i m a g i n a t i v e  work. Most g a r r i s o n  posts c o n s i s t e d  of a few 
h u t s ,  a w e l l  and l i t t l e  else, s i t u a t e d  i n  t h e  main, f a r  from 
any town. The p r i v a t i o n s  and ha rdsh ips  of t h e  f r o n t i e r  made 
Army s e r v i c e  unrewarding and u n a t t r a c t i v e .  As one army wife  
so p l a i n t i v e l y  pu t  it: 
L i t t l e  does t h e  c a s u a l  observer  of West P o i n t  
know of t h e  a f t e r  e x i s t e n c e  of i t s  g r a d u a t e s  and 
t h e i r  l i v e s  of  ex i le  and p r i v a t i o n  on t h e  f ron­
t i e r ,  passed i n  l a r g e l y  s e c l u s i o n  from t h e  world,  
a s t r a n g e r  t o  t h e  o r d i n a r y  comforts  of c i v i l i z a ­
t i o n .  140 
The arduous requi rements  of f r o n t i e r  d u t y  w e r e  reflec­
t e d  i n  t h e  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  high rates of d e s e r t i o n .  I n  any 
g i v e n  y e a r  d u r i n g  t h e  Antebellum p e r i o d ,  as much as one-
t h i r d  of Army s t r e n g t h  was l o s t  t o  d e s e r t i o n .  T h i s  w a s  i n  
s p i t e  of b r u t a l  c o r p o r a l  punishment, i n c l u d i n g  f l o g g i n g  and 
branding.  F i e l d  p a t r o l s  o f f e r e d  only an  o c c a s i o n a l  r e s p i t e  
from t h e  tedium of g a r r i s o n  duty.  For o f f i c e r s ,  t h e r e  w a s  
no formal  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  pursu ing  t h e i r  s t u d i e s  i n  t h e  ar t  of 
w a r .  For l i n e  o f f i c e r s ,  t h e r e  were few of t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
f o r  v a r i e d  and i n t e r e s t i n g  careers a v a i l a b l e  t o  e n g i n e e r s ,  
c o a s t a l  a r t i l l e r y  and staff  o f f i c e r s .  141 The g r u e l i n g  and 
h i g h l y  t a x i n g  n a t u r e  of f r o n t i e r  s e r v i c e  w a s  p a i n f u l l y  
described by Capta in  Lemuel Ford, who i n  h i s  f i n a l  two y e a r s  
of f r o n t i e r  du ty  w i t h  t h e  First  Dragoons (1834-1836) s a w  h i s  
f a m i l y  f o r  o n l y  a c o u p l e  of  weeks and who d ied  due t o  a 
disease c o n t r a c t e d  on t h e  P l a i n s :  “ I  a m  c l e a r l y  of ( ( t h e ) ) 
opin ion  t h a t  a s o l d i e r  be so disencumbered from t h e  t h i n g s  
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of the world as to be all wasy ((sic.)) Ready to March, 
Ready to Fight and Ready to -Die."142 

It might seem, upon initial examination, that the con­

ditions of western frontier security duty afforded the Army 

opportunities to employ the doctrine and skills of a 

European-style military service. Certainly the task of 

Indian control, with an emphasis upon highly unorthodox 

modes of warfare, provided no chance for the use of either 
classical cavalry or infantry tactics or permitted more than 
the infrequent employment of such key weapons as the saber 
or the bayonet. Yet valuable lessons of command and lead­
ership were extracted from their long years of frontier 
service by Army officers. "The Dragoon regiments," as one 
officer stated it, "are almost constantly upon the move at 
the West, and the continued marching gives officers and men 
the practical knowledge of their duties so eminently essen­
tial to cavalry."l43 The heart of a nation's war fighting 
system is not the particular tactical and strategical doc­
trines in use or the weapons which equip their soldiers. 
Rather, it is the constellation of social, professional, 
political and intellectual concepts and values that consti­
tute the world view of an officer corps and which in turn, 
serves as the foundation of a country's war fighting system. 
Thus, it was the long, unrewarding and solitary years of 
fxontier duty which served to create ties of fellowship and 
professionalism among members of the officer corps. It was 
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precisely the isolation and insularity of frontier service 
that gradually converted the goal of military professional­
ism in the American Army officer corps into reality. The 
long hours spent in casual conversation, when officers 
"fought their battles o'ver ((sic.)), from West Point and 
the girls they left behind them through the swamps of 
Florida, the wilds of Texas, over the great plains, the 
mountains, on the fields of Mexico" as well as other forms 
of social interaction created the mortar which bonded these 
soldiers together as professionals engaged in a unique 
activity as part of a collective enterprise.144 
Granted that individual enmities and personal dislikes 

between officers, many forged at West Point, were fueled by 

the smallness of the American officer corps and by the 

restricted opportunities for career advancement. In the 

main, however, military professionalism grew strongly in the 

Antebellum era. Of perhaps even greater importance, to the 

development of military professionalism were the continual 

proofs, provided by the various campaigns of the Army during 

the Antebellum period, of the essential validity of the 

post-War of 1812 reforms. Thus, the Black Hawk War and the 

Seminole War served powerfully to demonstrate the key les­

sons that due to massive and unwarranted political interfer­

ence, the Army would have to rely on its own expertise to 

save the nation from foreign invasion and that in turn, 

reliance on the militia was dangerous and ineffectual.145 
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The long years of frontier duty, hampered by grossly 

inadequate resources and funding, further reinforced ties of 

solidarity among the officer corps. The ceaseless and 

frequently unproductive involvement of Congress and the 

executive branch in what the officer corps viewed as 

intrinsically internal military matters, further solidified 

the sense of collegiality among Army officers.146 

Part V 

In 1846, the United States Army was finally provided an 
opportunity to vindicate its faith in military professional­
ism and the French-Austrian school of war. The Mexican War 
(1846-1848) offered the Army its first chance since the War 
of 1812 to field brigade and division-size units. This war 
can be divided into two parts. The first was the irregular 
war, fought in what is now the Southwest United States and 
California. The centerpiece, insofar as the cavalry was 
concerned, was Colonel Stephen Kearny's almost bloodless 
seizure of Santa Fe, New Mexico, and his subsequent epic 
march through the uncharted Southwest desert to California. 
Kearny, with only one hundred regular dxagoons of the First 
Regiment, prevailed against some five thousand Mexican regu­
lars due to highly efficient and quite unusual close cooper­
ation with a regiment of Missouri volunteer rifles. After 
almost effortlessly securing his assigned target, Kearny 
elected to take a proportion of his command westward to the 
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Pacific. The crossing of some twelve hundred miles of 

largely unmapped and exceedingly inhospitable country, with­

out incident in three months, was brilliant proof that the 

United States Army had mastered the difficulties of long 

range western travel. While fascinating and heroic, 

Kearny's expedition was at best only a sideshow of the war 

with Mexico. The only significant application of American 

cavalry in this war, it was wholly lacking influence on Army 

tactical doctrine. The real war, to the south, was instead 

to be fought according to conventional tactical principles, 

under which cavalry would assume its proper function as an 

adjunct to the infantry.147 

The Mexican War proper, encompassing the campaigns of 

General Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor, was marked by 

only limited and not particularly effective use of American 

cavalry. One crucial factor in hindering the field effec­

tiveness of the regular cavalry was the notable lack of 

regimental unity. Neither the First, Second or Third Dra­

goons (the latter created by Congress for temporary war 

service on February 11, 1847) ever served as fully organic 

cavalry regiments. These units, as with the assorted vol­

unteer cavalry formations, were habitually broken up into 

ever smaller detachments, doled out to various grades of 

field commanders when the need for mounted troops arose and 

when adequate numbers of horses were available. The Mounted 

Rifles fared much better in retaining regimental unity due 
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to the humiliating fact that all their mounts were lost when 

the transport carrying them to Mexico sank in a storm. Sur­

prisingly, only a single company of the mounted rifles ever 

served on horseback in this war, despite the huge numbers of 

mounts captured from the Mexican Army.14* The volunteer 

cavalry units were rarely more than nuisances, having only 

marginal offensive combat effectiveness as horse soldiers. 

According to one regular cavalry trooper, Samuel Chamber­

lain, sounding the complaint of most dragoons, the volun­

teers were almost useless: 

The material that these regiments were 
composed of was excellent.. . the men possessed
fine... strength combined with activity, but they
had no discipline, or confidence in their offi­
cers.. .. 
Their impatience of all restraint and egotism
made them worse than useless on picket; while in 

camp, they were a perfect nuisance.149 

The adversaries of the American mounted forces were 

highly trained, thoroughly European in their organization 

and tactics and superb horsemen. The Mexican cavalry num­

bered in the thousands, not counting auxiliaries. In com­

parison, the Americans never managed to muster more than six 

hundred troopers on horseback for any given battle. The 

high level of Mexican horsemanship earned their cavalry 

ample praise from their North American antagonists. 

According to Colonel Brackett, who served in Mexico: 

Our people had the advantage of larger horses 

and heavier men as a general thing, but the 

Mexicans were much more agile, and would handle 

their horses as well as perhaps any people on 
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earth... as the Mexicans, accustomed as many of 
them are to a life on horseback, and all of them 
feeling a pride in owning horseflesh, it did not 
take them as long a time to train them as it did 
us, who particulaxly those from older states, knew 
little or nothing about riding or managing
horses.150 
American mounted forces played only small, supporting 

roles in such key battles as Palo Alto, Buena Vista, Molino 

Del Rey and Mexico City. Their functions were principally 

ones of drudgery: guarding lumbering supply columns, sew­ 

ing as officer escorts and, more dangerously, hunting down 

the unprincipled Mexican guerrillas. Even cavalry's tra­

ditional forte, scouting, was performed by another branch of 

the Army--mounted engineers, with horse soldiers acting only 

as an escort. Aside from organizational disruption and the 

xough, jagged terrain of Mexico, the primary obstacle to the 

more innovative employment of American mounted forces lay 

with senior officers and their devotion to European rules of 

warfare. Both Scott and Taylor, by training and vocation, 

were infantrymen, with little more than theoretical knowl­

edge of the use of cavalry in battle. Both officers were 

professionals, grounded in European concepts of tactics 

which made cavalry simply a handmaiden of the infantry. 

Where cavalry participated in major engagements, it usually 

fought dismounted. The general lack of troops caused the 

use of every available man--soldiers, Marines, volunteers 

and even sailors--as infantry. While the fortunes of the 

cavalry arm did not prosper in the course of the Mexican 

- 
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War, the Army itself reaped massive benefits. With speed 

and dispatch, the Army had defeated a much more numerous foe 

on his home territory and quite distant from its supply 

sources. Granted that on a contemporary scale of interna­

tional significance, the Mexican War was a rather piffling 

affair, it nonetheless was a considerable achievement for 

American arms. It was in particular, a triumph of military 

professionalism. Scott's brilliant campaign against Mexico 

City was a textbook application of Jomini's concepts to the 

solution of a particularly thorny military problem, which as 

the Commanding General himself put it, was "to compel a 

people, singularly obstinate, to sue for peace it is abso­
-
lutely necessary... to strike effectively at the vitals of 

the nation."l51 Scott therefore directed the main American 

military effort at the Mexican capital, in classic limited 

war fashion, avoiding pitched battle as much as possible and 

having accomplished his objective, forcing the Mexicans to 

sue for peace. 

The relative isolation of the Mexican theater of opera­
tions from the United States lessened the availability of 
the militia forces and correspondingly increased the impor­
tance of the regulars; or as Captain W. S. Henry put it, "1 
can not but repeat, that we all ( (i.e., the officer corps)) 
feel proud that these conquests had been effected by the 
army proper." That is not to say that the volunteers were 
unnecessary, far from it, since the regular Army was simply 
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too small to have undertaken the war by itself. The volun­
teers, overall, thus fit into the niche assigned them by the 
Army's warfighting system, as auxiliaries to the regulars. 
However, as in the earlier frontier wars, the Army retained 
its strong aversion toward the citizen soldiers as less than 
effective in battle. The general position of the Army that 
"campaigning is entirely out of... ( (the militia's 1 ) line,I' 
was as once again demonstrated by the Mexican War, as was 
forcefully stated by Henry: 
Before this war is over, the government will 

be forced to confess, and the volunteers freely

acknowledge, without any charge against their 

patriotism or efficiency, that the volunteer 

system is one of the most outrageously expensive

and inefficient way with which any government

could undertake a war of invasion.152 

A more savage criticism of the volunteers was made by a 

then highly promising Second-Lieutenant of Engineers, George 

B. McClellan, reflecting a good deal of the Army's pent-up 

resentment at these amateur soldiers: 

I allude to the sufferings of the volunteers. 
They literally... ( (act like)) dogs. Were it all 
known in the States, there would be no more hue 
and cry against the Army, all would be willing to 
have a large regular army that we could dispense
entirely with the volunteer system.153 
The conduct of the war and the subsequent occupation of 

Mexican soil was conducted with honor and integrity, "that 

high standard of virtue and honor", according to General 

Scott, "which we boasted at home."154 The Mexican War, 

however, was completely unoriginal in regards to the arts of 

war. Aside from a few percussion-capped rifles (which Scott 
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a t t e m p t e d  t o  b l o c k  f rom e n t e r i n g  s e r v i c e  on g r o u n d s  o f  
o r d n a n c e  c o n s e r v a t i s m )  t h e r e  were no d i f f e r e n c e s  from t h e  
tact ics ,  weapons and equipment used a t  Waterloo some t h i r t y -
two y e a r s  earlier.  Moreover, there were none of t h e  numer­
ous problems of command and l o g i s t i c s  t h a t  plagued t h e  B r i ­
t i s h  Army i n  t h e  Crimean War t o  mar t h e  Army's o v e r a l l  h igh  
l e v e l  of m i l i t a r y  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  Of cour se  t h e r e  were s t i l l  
p r o b l e m s  between t h e  Army and t h e  e x e c u t i v e  branch i n  t h e  
d i v i s i o n  of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  d i r e c t i n g  t h e  war e f f o r t ;  
S c o t t  a n d  P r e s i d e n t  James P o l k  were a l m o s t  c o n s t a n t l y  
q u a r r e l l i n g  o v e r  A m e r i c a n  w a r  a i m s  a n d  t a c t i c s ,  f o r  
example.  155 Measured by r e s u l t s ,  however ,  t h e  American 
m i l i t a r y  e f f o r t  a g a i n s t  Mexico w a s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  b e t t e r  
managed t h a n  t h e  War of 1812  f i a s c o .  Acceptance of m i l i t a r y  
p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  t h u s  enjoyed a badly needed and q u i t e  con­
s i d e r a b l e  b o o s t  from t h e  s te l lar  performance of t h e  regu­
lars.156 W e s t  P o i n t ,  accord ing  t o  Ashbel Smith, as a r e s u l t  
of t h e  s u p e r b  pexformance of i t s  g r a d u a t e s  i n  Mexico, had 
" f o u g h t  i t s e l f  i n t o  f a v o r  a t  home; t h e  s c i e n c e ,  skill, 
s o l d i e r l y  d e p o r t m e n t ,  a n d  v a l o r  of  t h e  g r a d u a t e s  of t h e  
Academy have ga ined  a g r e a t  tr iumph over t h e  p r e j u d i c e s  of 
t h e  i g n o r a n t  among our c i t i z e n s .  "157 
T h e  Army had  t h u s ,  i n  t h e  span of on ly  t h i r t y  o r  s o  
y e a r s ,  m a t u r e d  i n t o  a t r u l y  modern and  c a p a b l e  m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e .  It had done so  i n  t h e  face of massive popular  and 
p o l i t i c a l  o p p o s i t i o n ,  c r i p p l e d  by  l a c k  of  r e s o u r c e s  and 
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manpower and despite its long, odious and dishonorable 

misuse as a police force to suppress the Indians. The War 

of 1812 had been the nadir of the Army's prowess and 

reputation as a fighting force. Secretary of War Cass 

expressed this point exceptionally well in 1836: 

We were comparatively ignorant of the state 

of military science and we did not fully recover 

our true position till we had received many severe 

lessons, at what expense of life and treasury need 

not be stated.I58 

The efforts of the post-War of 1812 reformers-- Gaines, 

Macomb, Thayer, Calhoun, Scott and the others--was thus vin­

dicated by the triumph of American arms in Mexico. While to 

many Americans the regular military establishment would 

remain tainted with the traits of decadent, aristocratic 

Europe and subject to obloquy and hounded with political 

opposition, the Army, despite the shrill cries of a few that 

in fact American victory in Mexico was really the rejection 

of European principles of scientific warfare, had won fox 

itself a new and valid claim to be vital for national 

defense and an effective agent of the country's foreign 

policy.l59 Jefferson Davis, a West Point graduate and 

himself a hero of the Mexican War as a volunteer officer, in 

a speech given as a Congressman to honor General Taylor, 

annunciated the apparent lessons of the conflict quite 

effectively when he proclaimed: 

Much was due to the courage which Americans 

have displayed on many battlefields in former 

times; but this courage, characteristic of our 

people, and pervading all sections and all 
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classes, could ever have availed so much had it 
not been combined with military science. And the 
occasion seem suited to enforce this lesson on the 
minds of those who have been accustomed in reason 
and out of reason, to rail at the scientific 
attainments of our officers.. . arms, like any
occupation, requires to be studied before it can 
be understood, and from those things, to which he 
had called his attention, he will learn the power
and advantages of military science. 
This newly won sense of military honor and the potency 

of arms enormously increased Army morale and confidence. 

The final verdict on the effectiveness of the Army in trans­

forming itself into a proper military service was best ren­

dered by Captain Mahan, the United States' foremost military 

theorist of the Antebellum era. The West Point professor 

praised the achievements of the professional Army he had 

labored so long to create: 
Of all the civilized states of Christendom, 
we are perhaps the least military, though not 
behind the foremost as a warlike one. A sounder 
era, however, is dawning upon us.... It was 
reserved for the expedition to Vera-Cruz, and its 
sequel, Cerro-Gordo, to bring into strong relief 
the fact, that we were unostentatiously, and 
almost silently becoming a powerful military 
state. The lesson will not be lost upon our 
neighbors, however slowly we, in the end, may
profit by it. A shout has gone forth from the 
Rio-Grande, and the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, 
which heard on the Thames and the Seine, has 
resounded along the far-off shores of the Baltic 
and the Black Sea, and will reach farther Id.,
bearing with it a significance that no prudent
statesman will hereafter affect to misunderstand. 
What are the military resources of this great
republic is no longer a question; a more thorough
organization is alone wanting for their complete
development.161 
Chapter IV 

JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE 1856 MILITARY COMMISSION TO EUROPE 

AND THE MINIE BULLET RIFLE: 

THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE FRENCH-AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 

IN AN ERA OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE 

Part I 

The clear victory for military professionalism won by 

the United States Army in Mexico was translated into 

tangible gains for the nation's military service in 1853. 

Congress, at the request of President Franklin Pierce's 

newly inaugurated administration, approved the largest 

single increase in Army strength since the War of 1812. In 

addition to four infantry regiments, two new mounted units 

were added to the Army's order of battle, the First and 
Second Cavalry Regiments. Numerically, the strength of the 
A r m y  expanded from approximately eleven thousand men to over 
sixteen thousand. For the first time since the War of 1812 
the United States Army possessed sufficient numbers of 
troops to free it from dependence upon the militia save in 
F 
the largest; of conflicts. While the Army was still "in­

ferior to the best armies of Europe," according to the 

former Secretary of War Joel Poinsett, the 1855 expansion 

signaled a new era enhanced military effectiveness as well 
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as new political enthusiasm for military professionalism.1 

In a very clear fashion the nation's political leadership, 
at least for the moment, had conceded Poinsett's conclusion: 
...that no nation, whatever may be its resources 
and money, can long carry on an aggressive war 
with volunteer forces, or with a majority of its 
troops composed of volunteers who have, for the 
most part, to be dri led and disciplined in the 
presence of the enemy.!2 
Succeeding John C. Calhoun as the leading political 

advocate of  a professional military service, was the new 
Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis. An 1828 graduate of West 

Point, Davis had soldiered some seven years with both the 

infantry and the First Dragoons on the western frontier. In 

the Mexican War, Davis had served with distinction as 

commander of the volunteer Mississippi Rifles. Davis was an 

ardent and influential proponent of the regular Army and of 
military professionalism. A student of military theory and 

history, Davis's personal philosophy of the art of war was 
totally Jominean and French-Austrian in character. In his 

1854 Report as Secretary of War, Davis succinctly expressed 

his faith in military professionalism when he formally 

attacked the opponents of the regular military establish­
ment: "It has been stated... that if in 1831 a small 

mounted force had been at the disposal of the War Depart­
ment, the Black Hawk War might have been prevented; and... 

in 1835, if a few additional companies had been sent to 

Florida, the Seminole War would have not occurred."3 
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Under Davis I s  exceptionally effective administration, 
numerous significant improvements were made in Army wea­
ponry, force structure and its preparation to wage war 
against a European would-be adversary. Davis compelled 
adoption of  the 1856-pattern Springfield Rifle of the new 
Minie bullet type over the strong objections of some senior 
officers. To accompany this new weapon, a major revision in 
the infantry manual was authorized by Davis. Moreover, the 
first pay raises in twenty years were authorized as well as 
the introduction of a more modern and spiffier uniform, both 
items aiding the general uplift in the morale of the Army. 
Fortress design was overhauled as well, during Davis's 
tenure as Secretary of War, to bring American practice in 
line with the latest European advances. One of Davis's more 
whimsical experiments consisted of the formation of a camel 
corps, patterned on French Algerian experience, for patrol 
duty in the Southwest. 
The establishment of the first American regular units 
to bear the designation cavalry, complete with the revived 
use of yellow facings and stripes on their uniforms, was 
a l s o  undertaken in these years. The first and Second 
Cavalry Regiments were the personal favorites of Davis, and 
were intended to be elite units. Granted that the less 
dashing Corps of Engineers and the Corps of Topographical 
Engineers ranked at the top of the list of career positions 
and that the cavalry was at the bottom. Yet the tradi-
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t i o n a l ,  a r i s t o c r a t i c  l u r e  of g a l l a n t  t r o o p e r s  and powerful 
s t e e d s ,  as  w e l l  a s  D a v i s ' s  p e r s o n a l  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  
s e l e c t i o n  of o f f i c e r s  f o r  these reg iments ,  l e d  many prom­
i s i n g  men t o  j o i n  these u n i t s .  Moreover ,  t he re  w a s  a 
d i s t i n c t  Southern bias t o  t h e  o f f i c e r s  of t h e s e  two r e g i ­
m e n t s .  O f f i c e r s  s u c h  a s  L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l  J o s e p h  E.  
Johnson ( g e n e r a l  C S A ) ,  Capta in  George B. McClellan ( g e n e r a l  
U S A ) ,  L i eu tenan t  George H. S t u a r t  ( g e n e r a l  CSA) and Lieuten­
a n t  James E. S t u a r t  ( g e n e r a l  CSA) were among t h e  s t a f f  of 
t h e  F i r s t  Regiment ;  t h e  Second, i n  t u r n ,  i nc luded  i n  i t s  
r a n k s  s u c h  f u t u r e  l u m i n a r i e s  as C o l o n e l  A l b e r t  S i d n e y  
Johnston ( g e n e r a l  C S A ) ,  Lieutenant-Colonel  W i l l i a m  J. Hardee 
( g e n e r a l  C S A ) ,  Captain George E. Stoneman ( g e n e r a l  U S A )  and 
L ieu tenan t  F i tzhugh L e e  ( g e n e r a l  CSA). T h e  predominance of 
S o u t h e r n  o f f i c e r s  i n  t h e s e  reg iments  would later s e r v e  as 
"evidence",  du r ing  t h e  C i v i l  War, t h a t  Davis w a s  i n  l eague  
w i t h  some f i e n d i s h  c a b a l  t o  create s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y  a f u t u r e  
c o n f e d e r a t e  mounted s e r v i c e  . 
The  i m m e d i a t e  t a c t i c a l  r o l e  of t h e  F i r s t  and Second 
C a v a l r y  l a y  i n  c o n v e n t i o n a l  I n d i a n  c o n t r o l  d u t y  i n  t h e  
S o u t h w e s t  and  Texas .  T h e s e  two new r e g i m e n t s ,  p l u s  t h e  
a d d i t i o n a l  i n f a n t r y  u n i t s  and  t h e  camel c o r p s  were t h e  
o p e r a t i o n a l  component of Dav i s ' s  new, so -ca l l ed  desert p l a n  
of p a c i f y i n g  t h e  wes tern  f r o n t i e r .  P a t t e r n e d  af ter  Marshal 
T h o m a s - R o b e r t  Bugeaud ' s  b r i l l i a n t  p l a n  f o r  t h e  F r e n c h  
conquest  of t h e  Alger ian  i n t e r i o r ,  Davis ' s  new program f o r  
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suppressing Indian hostilities was intended to correct many 
of the deficiencies in the Army's earlier stratagem of fron­
tier control. The cornerstone of the great desert plan was 
the abandonment of numerous small garrisons and the concen­
tration of the Army's troops in large, strategically located 
forts. The problems of morale, isolation and poor logisti­
ical support were simultaneously dealt with by setting major 
Army garrisons near towns, and on major water transport 
routes near the edges of the western frontier. The addition 
to the Army's mounted resources was of vital importance; the 
desert plan required extensive patrolling and swift and 
efficient retaliatory action for Indian incursions. This 
new plan was thus the final abandonment of the static de­
fense system implemented in the immediate post-War of 1812 
years, during Jacob Brown's tenure as Commanding General. 
In turn, the great desert plan would serve as the foundation 
of the Army's Indian control policy for the remainder of the 
~entury.~On the higher level of Army planning and organi­
zation, the First and Second Cavalry conformed closer, in 
theory at least, to European mounted warfare doctrine than 
had the earlier dragoon regiments. As a former cavalryman, 
Davis penned an authoritative and informed explanation of 
the organizational nature of the new mounted regiments and 
in turn, a withering criticism of earlier Congressional in­
terference in internal War Department and Army matters, as 
to the composition, mission and equipment of horse units. 
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The c a v a l r y  f o r c e  of our army be ing  a l l  r e q u i r e d  
f o r  a c t i v e  s e r v i c e  of t h e  same k ind ,  there appea r s  
no p r o p r i e t y  i n  making a permanent d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  
t h e  d e s i g n a t i o n  and armament of t h e  s e v e r a l  regi­
ments; it is t h e r e f o r e ,  proposed t o  p l a c e  a l l  t h e  
r eg imen t s  on t h e  same f o o t i n g  i n  t h e s e  r e s p e c t s ,  
and t o  leave it i n  t h e  power of t h e  e x e c u t i v e  t o  
arm and  e q u i p  t h e m  i n  t h e  manner as may be re­
q u i r e d  by th& n a t u r e  of t h e  s e r v i c e  i n  which t h e y  
be employed. 
Davis's p o l i c y  s t a t emen t  as t o  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  new 
c a v a l r y  reg iments  and h i s  s h a r p  rebuke of Congress iona l  
i n v o l v e m e n t ,  a s  f o r  example  i n  t h e  mounted r i f l e s ,  i n  
i n t e r n a l  Army matters, had s e v e r a l  a s p e c t s .  The emphasis on 
u n i t  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  i n t o  a few s p e c i f i c  t y p e s  (wh ich  fox 
t h e  Army's h o r s e  u n i t s  w a s  f i n a l l y  achieved  i n  1 8 6 1  when 
C o n g r e s s  f o r m a l l y  r e d e s i g n a t e d  t h e m  a l l  as  c a v a l r y )  w a s  
c l e a r l y  one of Davis ' s  o b j e c t i v e s .  The s p e c i f i c  form of t h e  
F i r s t  and  Second Cavalry as a l l -pu rpose  mounted u n i t s ,  as 
opposed  t o  being l i g h t ,  heavy o r  dragoon, was no t  however 
i n t e n d e d  t o  improve t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  Army's ho r se  
s o l d i e r s  i n  I n d i a n  f i g h t i n g .  As w i t h  b o t h  t h e  mounted 
r i f les  and dragoons,  t h e  c a v a l r y  fol lowed t h e  u s u a l  dismoun­
t e d ,  i n fo rma l  tactics of Ind ian  f i g h t i n g .  The emphasis on 
u t i l i t y  r e f l e c t e d ,  i n s t e a d ,  t h e  t h e n  la tes t  f a d  i n  European-
s t y l e  c a v a l r y  u n i t s .  R e c a l l  t h e  deba te  between t h e  propon­
e n t s  of heavy and l i g h t  c a v a l r y  over f i r s t ,  which t y p e s  of 
mounted u n i t s  would be r e q u i r e d  i n  f u t u r e  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  and 
s e c o n d l y ,  w h e t h e r  a d v a n c e s  i n  f i r e p o w e r  r e n d e r e d  t h e  
c u i r a s s i e r s  and t h u s  t h e  u s e  of shock as be ing  
I 
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obsolete. This rather lively debate peaked late in the 

1860s, when cavalry traditionalism reasserted itself. Thus 

the organizational character of the First and Second Cavalry 

reflected the perspective of those cavalry experts champion­

ing flexibility over tradition; mounted units which could 

effectively serve all three roles as light, heavy, and 

dragoons. 

On a broader level, that of national war policy, 
Davis's viewpoint was representative of the new, assertive 
sense of professionalism then being articulated by the 
officer corps. The growing sense of group identification 
among members of the officer corps was strongly articulated 
by Davis in direct criticism of Congress of overstepping its 
authority when it: had involved itself directly in determin­
ing internal military policy matters, such as weapon types 
or uniform design, which properly were within the jurisdic­
tion of the War Department and the executive branch. In 
this respect, Davis vocalized a far more direct and pungent 
critique of Congressional encroachment onto the authority of 
the executive branch in determining the particulars of 
national military policy than had earlier been expressed by 
Calhoun. The officer corps' new influence was the result: of 
Calhoun's administrative reforms, the bureau system, which 

was thus beginning to assert itself in military policy 

formation. Thus, through the bureau's superior knowledge of 

military matters, the determination of the particulars of 
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Army equipment and organization, swung almost permanently to 

the executive branch.8 

Part I1 

The 1 8 5 0 s  background to Davis's Army reforms constitu­
ted an era of considerable change in not only military 
affairs, but also technology and society as well. On the 
broadest level were major changes in the nature, quality and 
quantity, of economic output. The enormous increase in the 
production of iron and the emergence of highly efficient 
steel manufacturing processes resulted in immediate changes 
in the nature of weapons production. The use of steel not 
only allowed for considerably higher levels of weapon 
performance, but also facilitated standardized and easily 
repairable machined parts which significantly reduced the 
costs, in both time and money, entailed in the manufacture 
of arms. Artillery, for example, was virtually reborn as a 
weapon system. No longer were clumsy reinforcing bands 
needed around the muzzle; unit construction permitted the 
use of much stronger charges of powder, hence greater range 
and the use of larger and more potent projectile^.^ The 
development of mechanized, factory assembly lines for the 
production of weapons, allowed for unheard of speed in 
equipping large numbers of troops with the tools of war. 10 
The railroad worked to dramatically multiply the quantities 
of goods and men which could be moved from one area to 
another. The speed of army movement, as regards the number 
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of miles per day, escalated from a maximum of sixty to 

eighty miles by forced march to between one hundred and two 

hundred and fifty by rail. And a unit transported by rail 

suffered none of the debilitating effects to unit efficiency 

and fighting power which followed a forced march.11 Steam 

power also revolutionized ocean transportation. Ships were 

no longer captive to the currents and winds, sailing times 

dropped by as much as half and the size of cargos expanded. 

Steel in turn was being employed in the construction of 

larger, faster and more durable vessels than had heretofore 

been possible. l2 Communications were transformed as well, 

due to the invention of the telegraph. For the first time 

in history, senior army commanders could immediately and 

effectively direct military formations dispersed over 

distances of hundreds of miles.13 

These new technologies were known to military leaders; 

the problem, however, was a lack of perception of how deep 

the impact would be on the practices of war. Moreover8 

except for the Prussians and their centralized staff command 

system, no army of this period possessed one central body to 

oversee and manage significant technological change. The 

series of innovations, which converged into a new industrial 

order in the 1850s, was not, however, without precedent. 

The agricultural revolution had by the end of the Eighteenth 

Century caused an enormous increase in fodder and food 

production. Consequently, there was a dramatic increase in 

I 
I 
I 
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the ability of nations, during the Napoleonic Wars, to 
support armies of unprecedented size, hundreds of thousands 
in number, without the massive damage, as in the previous 
Thirty Years War, to the agrarian resources of those 
countries.l4 Similarly, the considerable improvement in 
road construction in conjunction with the widespread 

building of canals had significantly increased the mobility 

of armies and the capacity of logistic nets during these 

wars. Furthermore, the enormous increase in army size and 

the corresponding growth in mobility occasioned the develop­

ment out of the quartermasters corps the first general 

staffs in European military history. 

The most immediate effect on military theory and 
planning lay in the field of artillery improvement. The 
1850s seemed to be the beginning of a new era in military 
tactics in which artillery would finally come to dominate 
the battlefield. The Queen of Battle only began to assert 
herself as a dominant weapon during the Napoleonic Wars, as 
the French Imperial Army, saddled with ever more poorly 
trained soldiers, shifted the tactical emphasis of battle 
from the bayonet to the cannon. The new iron and steel 
rifled cannon of this era could throw a shell the astounding 
distance of over two thousand yards compared to the rather 
feeble eight hundred or so of the smoothbores. Accuracy was 
greatly improved as well, with the introduction of the new 
weapons. The enthusiasm of the artillerists was in no way 
182 

dampened by the then little-understood fact that there was 

no way of directing long range cannon fire on land. 

Traditionally, smoothbore guns, characterized by relatively 

long range and flat trajectory, were unlimbered close to the 

forward edge of battle to be used as scatterguns. Such 

weapons could be directed very effectively against line-of­

sight targets such as fortresses. Except for a small number 

of howitzers, featuring short range and high angle fire, 

little attempt was made to deliver indirect fixe on enemy 

troops shielded by protective cover or to direct counter 

battery fire against enemy artillery. The problem lay in 

being able to observe the enemy's positions without the 
obstructions of smoke and obstacles and in turn being able 
to communicate quickly this information to the gunners. 
Artillerists for the previous three hundred or so years had 
developed their art on the basic premise that their target 
would be visible; the difficulty was therefore how to 
develop a system of indirect fire control by forward 
observers, with more effective field communication methods 
than flags, bugle calls or messengers, and in turn, having 
the gunners accurately deliver fire out of sight of and 
miles from their target. At sea, in contrast, with wide 
expanses of flat, open water, long range fire was not only 
possible but was in fact, standard for naval gunnery by the 
mid 1850s.16 
183 

The aspect of the new arms technology which would have 
the most immediate impact was the less impressive but vastly 
improved rifled musket. For one hundred and fifty years the 
primary weapon of the infantry had been the smoothbore 
musket of .54 to -75 caliber, firing a lead ball three 
quarters of an inch or so in diameter, weighing nine to 
twelve pounds and some eleven feet in length. Between forty 
and fifty yards, the smoothbore musket was a truly terrify­
ing weapon. The hail of lead generated by a line of 

musketeers at this range hit with the impact of a huge 

shotgun, inflicting fearsome casualties. At greater 

distances, however, effectiveness greatly declined. One 

British ordnance expert, Colonel Henger, in 1814, expressed 

quite well the widely understood limitations of the smooth­
bore musket when he stated: 

A soldier's musket, if not exceedingly
ilbored ( (sic.) as many are, will strike the 
figure of a man at 80 yards... but a soldier must 
be very unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by 
a common musket at 150 yardsI provided his 

antagonist aims, and as for fixin 

you might as well fire at the moon. ?7 
at 200 yards 

As with all smoothbore weapons, the ball once fired, 

followed a trajectory that soon became excessively curved 

and erratic. Consequently, therefore, this severely limited 

the range of these weapons. Moreover, a smoothbore musket 

with an attached bayonet could not even be aimed. There 

were no rear sights and the primitive front sight (usually 

no more than a small knob of metal at the end of the barrel) 

1 8 4  
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was c o m p l e t e l y  o b s c u r e d  b y  t h e  b a y o n e t  s o c k e t  r i n g .  
Accuracy  of t h i s  weapon w a s  t h e r e f o r e  m i n i m a l ;  o n l y  a n  
a v e r a g e  of  be tween 0 . 2  t o  0.5 p e r c e n t  of a l l  rounds d i s ­
charged per  engagement, or about  one o u t  of eve ry  thousand 
o r  so,  a c t u a l l y  r e g i s t e r e d  a h i t .  I n  e f f e c t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n  
order  t o  k i l l  a man i n  an  a t t a c k i n g  i n f a n t r y  column, one had 
t o  f i r e  up t o  seven t i m e s  an average man's w e i g h t  i n  lead 
bal ls .  Hence, i n  order  t o  maximize i n f a n t r y  f i repower ,  t h e  
t r o o p s  of t h e  l i n e  were a r r ayed  i n  t i g h t ,  compact format ions  
and  r u t h l e s s l y  t r a i n e d  t o  f u n c t i o n  l i k e  well-programmed 
a u t o m a t o n s .  The weapon i t s e l f  p o s s e s s e d  many p o s s i b l e  
dangers  t o  t h e  s o l d i e r  us ing  it. The f l a s h  of t h e  i g n i t i o n  
powder i n  t h e  pan of t h e  weapon no t  on ly  obscured v i s i o n ,  it 
could,  on occas ion ,  even b l i n d  a man. S l i g h t  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  
t h e  q u a l i t y  of powder could  cause s i g n i f i c a n t  changes i n  t h e  
f o r c e  o f  t h e  r e c o i l  o r  even cause t h e  weapon t o  explode. 
Frequent ly ,  i n  t h e  h e a t  and confus ion  of b a t t l e ,  men f o r g o t  
if t h e  weapon had i n  fac t  been discharged, r e loaded  and i n  
t u r n  caused t h e  double  or even t r i p l e  l oad ing  of t h e  p i e c e ,  
t h e  excess  charges caus ing  t h e  weapon t o  explode. And i f  a 
s o l d i e r  were a mere f o o t  ahead o f  t h e  f i r i n g  l i n e ,  h i s  
eardrums would be i n s t a n t l y  r u p t u r e d  by t h e  discharge of a 
vo l l ey .  Furthermore,  t h e  s o l d i e r s  had t o  move i n  format ion ,  
t o  w i t h i n  one  hundred  ya rds  of t h e  enemy be fo re  f i r e  w a s  
normally commenced, exposing themselves  t o  t h e  f u l l  weight 
of a counter  vo l l ey .  Infantrymen, f i rs t  and foremost ,  had 
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to be experienced and highly disciplined for Eighteenth 
Century tactics to work. For men to stand fire under such 
circumstances and in turn to be calmly able to receive the 
still more frightening bayonet charge, when they were 

dispassionate mercenaries, frequently dragooned into 

service, demanded the most brutal of corporal punishment. 

Consequently, the terror of being caught as a deserter had 

to outweigh the risk of staying in formation. 

From a design standpoint, the smoothbore had other 
significant failings as a weapon. The exposed panner meant 
it could not be used in inclement weather. And it was 
unreliable as well; out of an average 6,000 rounds fired 
from flintlocks, there were an average of 922 misfires or 
one in each six and a half rounds discharged.18 There were, 
however, no better weapons available to European-style 
armies. Tactically the one hundred and sixty years prior to 
the Civil War can be defined as a process of experimentation 
and refinement, of finding the best means of making do with 
the smoothbore in battle. Volley fire was expressly devised 
so as to concentrate the greatest number of projectiles at a 
specific target. The fundamental principles of effective 
volley fire were well described by Eighteenth Century 
military writer, Bland Humphrey, an accounting which would 
remain valid through the Civil War: 
Draw your enemy's fire if you can, and if 

your battalion still advances you must win.. .it 

being certain that when troops see others advance,

and going to pour in their fixe amongst them when 
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I theirs is gone, they will immediately give way, or 

at least it seldom happens otherwise.19 

The solution to the numerous and manifest deficiencies 
of the smoothbore musket lay in the development of the 
military rifle, "the most formidable description of small 
fire-arms yet known," according to Lieutenant Richard 
Nicholson Magrath of the British Army.20 The problems in 

making the rifle a truly practical replacement fox the 

smoothbore musket, were, however, complex and extremely 

technical. 

The rifle had been in use, principally as a sporting 
weapon, since the early Sixteenth Century. The distinctive 
grooves (or rifling) carved into the interior sides of the 
barrel, served to give the rifle ball greater velocity and 
higher angle of trajectory. The result was a considerable 
improvement in both accuracy and range relative to the 
smoothbore musket. The famed Kentucky or Pennsylvania rifle 
of Davy Crockett was accurate up to four hundred yards while 
the British Baker rifle, used in the Peninsular Campaign (by 
the rifle brigade) could do work up to three hundred yards. 
Mass use of rifles by armies, however, was simply not 
feasible. The overriding technical problem was the slowness 
of reloading the weapon. Whereas a smoothbore musket, in 
the hands of an average infantryman, could be fired at the 
rate of three or four rounds per minute, the rifle, at best, 
could be discharged no more than once very two minutes. The 
difficulty in reloading the rifle arose from the fact that 
I 
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the soft lead ball had to be forcibly rammed down the 
barrel. The rifling, to which the ball was forced to 
conform by use of the ramrod and thus causing the character­
istic spin of the projectile when fired, worked, however, as 
well, to obstruct passage of the round down the barrel. In 
fact, it was not uncommon for riflemen to resort to the use 
of hammers to pound the ramrod home when the ball became 
stuck in the barrel. A second major problem with most 
rifles was that a bayonet could not be attached. The 
dangerous combination of an exceeding slow rate of fire and 
the lack of a bayonet caused the rifle to be loathed by most 
infantrymen. Still another major failing of the rifle lay 
in the poor fit between the rifling and the ball (since both 
were handmade, no standardization was possible, further 
imperiling performance). This resulted in the gas created 
by the ignition of the powder charge being able to escape, 
reducing velocity and range, and in turn causing the weapon 
to foul far faster than a musket. Thus, after the discharge 
of only a few rounds, the barrel became so obstructed as to 
cause a sharp decline in range. The combination of techni­
cal problems, the active hostility toward the rifle by most 
line soldiers and the resulting need for highly trained and 
quite expensive specialized units to use this weapon 
properly, worked against the wider employment of the rifle 
as a combat weapons. 21 
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T h e  f i r s t  major t e c h n o l o g i c a l  improvement i n  i n f a n t r y  
weaponry s i n c e  t h e  deve lopmen t  o f  t h e  f l i n t l o c k  musket-
b a y o n e t  combina t ion  w a s  t h e  i n v e n t i o n  of t h e  fu lmina te  of 
mercury pe rcuss ion  cap. I n  1 8 0 7  Reverend Alexander Forsy th  
of S c o t l a n d  pa ten ted  use of t h i s  subs tance  as t h e  starter 
charger  f o r  t h e  musket; p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  d e t o n a t i o n  of pr imary 
c h a r g e  by s t r i k i n g  i n s t e a d  of  by i g n i t i o n .  Only i n  t h e  
1830s, however, w a s  a p r a c t i c a l  means found t o  package t h e  
f u l m i n a t e  of  mercury .  The use of an  enc losed  copper cap  
c o n t a i n i n g  a small amount of t h i s  material a l lowed f o r  t h e  
f i r s t  p r a c t i c a l  u s e  of  muskets i n  r a i n y  weather s i n c e  no 
powder w a s  exposed t o  t h e  elements.  Var ious ly  inven ted  by 
any  number of  p e r s o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  c e l e b r a t e d  B r i t i s h  
gunsmi th  f i r m  of Montan, Egg and Purdy, by Colonel  Hawken 
and by Joshua Shaw, a B r i t i s h  a r t i s t  r e s i d e n t  i n  P h i l a d e l ­
p h i a  a s  e a r l y  a s  1 8 1 4 ,  t h e  p e r c u s s i o n  c a p  d r a m a t i c a l l y  
reduced t h e  number of m i s f i r e s  and t h e r e b y  improved accuracy 
o r  a t  l e a s t  combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  For eve ry  one thousand 
rounds f i r ed ,  t h e  number of m i s f i r e s  f e l l  from four  hundred 
and e l even  t o  fou r  and a ha l f  and t h e  number of h i t s  r o s e  
from an average of two hundred and twenty t o  t h r e e  hundred 
and e igh ty - f ive .  Adoption of t h e  pe rcuss ion  cap  by m i l i t a r y  
services w a s ,  i n  s p i t e  of i t s  clear s u p e r i o r i t y ,  exceedingly  
slow. I n  p a r t  t h i s  w a s  a f u n c t i o n  of c o s t ,  t h e  expense of 
conve r t ing  e x i s t i n g  weapons t o  t h e  new system; i n  p a r t ,  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  conserva t i sm of ordnance bureaus and, i n  p a r t ,  
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the organizational gulf between line officers and staff 
weapon-experts. The United States, f o r  example, only 
ordered the complete change-over to the percussion cap in 
1848 and then, at a virtual snail's pace. While percussion 
cap was a significant improvement in the capability of the 
smoothbore musket it did not, however, solve the major 

problems of limited range and accuracy.22 

The key to any successful improvement in the rifle lay 

in the development of a practical cylindro-conical or oblong 

bullet, to overcome the problem of slow loading time f o r  
this weapon. Various experimenters, both military and 
civilian, labored on a solution. The ideal form of such a 
new rifle would have been a breechloader, provided that some 
form of effective sealer could be applied to the breech to 
prevent escape of propellant gasses. Only Prussia aggres­
sively moved to develop a breechloader as its primary 
service weapon. The famed Prussian needlegun, perfected in 
the 1840s but only issued to line troops in 1851 f o r  
security reasons, was the first massed-produced military 
rifle. The weapon, however, was far too heavy as was its 
projectile, which due to a vastly higher rate of fire, 
created severe problems, f o r  the first time, of ammunition 
supply. Nonetheless, the needlegun possessed an excellent 
effective range of eight hundred yards and like all breech 
loaders, and quite unlike the smoothbore musket, could be 
reloaded from the prone position.23 The United States Army 
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f l i r t e d  wi th  t h e  use of t h e  Halls r i f l e  and c a r b i n e  f o r  some 
f o r t y  y e a r s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  C i v i l  War. Despi te  t h e  weapon's 
c l e a r  s u p e r i o r i t y  i n  o f f i c i a l  o r d n a n c e  t e s t s  a n d  t h e  
enthusiasm of most l i n e  o f f i c e r s  who came i n t o  c o n t a c t  w i t h  
t h e  H a l l s  weapons , t h e  Ordnance Bureau s t e a d f a s t l y  r e f  used 
t o  a u t h o r i z e  l a r g e  scale product ion  of t h i s  firearm.24 Two 
p r i n c i p a l  o b j e c t i o n s  were marshaled by t r a d i t i o n a l  ordnance 
e x p e r t s  a g a i n s t  t h e  breechloaders ;  f i r s t  w a s  t h e  i s s u e  of 
whe the r  s u c h  a weapon could  bear  up i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  i n  t h e  
hands of poor ly  educated s o l d i e r s .  It w a s  feared t h a t ,  "NO 
b r e a c h - l o a d i n g  weapon c a n  s t a n d  t h e  wear a n d  t e a r  of  a 
c a m p a i g n ,  a n d  t h e  c a r e l e s s  a n d  awkward  u s a g e  of  t h e  
s o l d i e r .  I' 25 
The second o b j e c t i o n  w a s  drawn from t r a d i t i o n  and t h e  
use of t h e  f l i n t l o c k  musket f o r  t h e  p rev ious  one hundred and 
f i f t y  years :  
I f  by b r e a c h - l o a d i n g . . .  it w a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  
f i r e  t e n  o r  t w e n t y  times a m i n u t e ,  t h e  r e s u l t  
would be a g r e a t  i n c r e a s e  i n  n o i s e  and smoke, w i t h  
no more e f f e c t  [ t h a n  a smoothbore musket] .26 
T h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  m i l i t a r y  a n d  f i s c a l  conserva t i sm 
fo rced  most i n v e n t o r s  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  so -ca l l ed  French-Belgium 
s o l u t i o n :  u s ing  t h e  e x i s t i n g  format of t h e  musket t o  make a 
be t te r  r i f l e .  The  c u l m i n a t i o n  of t hese  l a b o r s  w a s  t h e  
i n a c c u r a t e l y  l a b e l e d  Minie " b a l l "  r i f l e .  The t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
breakthrough of Captain Claude Et ienne  Minie, of t h e  French 
Army, w a s  t h e  u s e  of  a p i l l a r  i n  t h e  breech of a muzzle 
load ing  r i f l e .  T h i s  device w a s  d r i v e n  by t h e  f o r c e  of t h e  
1 9 1  

d e t o n a t i o n  of t h e  pe rcuss ion  cap  i n t o  t h e  base  of t h e  b u l l e t  
so  t h a t  it would cause t h e  l a t te r  t o  expand i n t o  t h e  grooves 
of t h e  r i f l i n g .  I n  t u r n  a cup w a s  p laced  a t  t h e  base  of t h e  
b u l l e t  which t h e  p i l l a r  s t r u c k ;  it was t h i s  cup, i n  conjunc­
t i o n  w i t h  t h e  d i scha rge  of gas from t h e  powder exp los ion ,  
i n s t e a d  of t h e  earlier method of ramming, which fo rced  t h e  
p r o j e c t i l e  i n t o  t h e  r i f l e  g r o o v e s .  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
Ordnance Bureau qu ick ly  devised a s u p e r i o r  v e r s i o n  of t h e  
new Minie-bul le t .  The improved p r o j e c t i l e  used a steel  s t e m  
o r  l i g e ,  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  base of t h e  b u l l e t ,  which worked 
"as a wedge t o  spread  o u t  t h e  b a l l "  and t h e r e b y  caus ing  it 
t o  assume t h e  shape of t h e  r i f l i n g  when f i r ed .27  The key 
advantage w a s  a greater conformity of b u l l e t  t o  r i f l i n g  and 
a c o r r e s p o n d i n g  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  loss of p r o p e l l a n t  gas. 
The e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  t hese  new weapons w a s  a s t o n i s h i n g .  
C l e a r l y ,  as  C a p t a i n  E m r i c  Szabad  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  " t h e  new-
f i r e a r m s  present . .  .a most formidable  a p p a r a t u s  of des t ruc ­
t i o n ,  b o t h  f r o m  t h e i r  p r e c i s i o n  a n d  wide  r a n g e . .  ..It 2 8 
E f f e c t i v e  range  mushroomed from s i x t y  o r  one hundred ya rds  
t o  e i g h t  hundred or more; reasonably  s k i l l e d  s h o o t e r s  w e r e  
a s s u r e d  good a c c u r a c y  w i t h  some models  up t o  t h i r t e e n  
hundred yards .  Furthermore,  t h e  use of pre-packaged paper  
c a r t r i d g e s  ( t o  be r e p l a c e d  i n  o n l y  f i f t e e n  y e a r s  by t h e  
modern p r o j e c t i l e - p r o p e l l a n t  e n c l o s e d  b u l l e t )  served t o  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  speed of r e l o a d i n g  t h e  weapon. There fo re ,  as 
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many as twelve rounds could  be f i r e d  a minute .  And it could  
be used under a lmost  a l l  weather cond i t ions .  29 
The b a s i c  t ac t ics  of b a t t l e ,  as p r a c t i c e d  by armies on 
both s i d e s  of t h e  A t l a n t i c ,  i n  t h e  y e a r s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  C i v i l  
War, a s  s u c c i n c t l y  d e s c r i b e d  by General Henry H a l l e c k  i n  
1 8 6 1  were based on t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  of smooth­
bore  weaponry. 
The a t t a c k  i s  f i r s t  opened by a cannonade, 
l i g h t  t r o o p s  a r e  s e n t  f o r w a r d  t o  a n n o y  t h e  
i n f a n t r y ,  a n d  i f  p o s s i b l e ,  t o  p i c k  o f f  h i s  
a r t i l l e r i s t s .  The main body t h e n  advances i n t o  
l i n e s  ( ( i . e . ,  dep loymen t  f rom column t o  l i n e a r  
f o r m a t i o n ) ) ;  t h e  f i r s t  d i s p l a y s  i t s e l f  i n  l i n e  as 
it a r r i v e s  n e a r l y  w i t h i n  r a n g e  o f  g r a p e s h o t  
( ( a b o u t  2 0 0  y a r d s ) ) ;  t h e  second l i n e  remains i n  
columns of a t t a c k  formed i n  b a t t a l i o n s  by d i v i s i o n  
a t  a d i s t a n c e  f rom t h e  f i r s t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b e  
beyond t h e  r each  of t h e  enemy's musketry,  b u t  near  
enough t o  suppor t  t h e  f i r s t  l i n e  o r  cover  it i f  
d r i v e n  back .  The a r t i l l e r y ,  i n  t h e  meant ime,  
c o n c e n t r a t e s  i t s  f i r e  on some weak p o i n t  t o  open a 
way f o r  t h e  r e s e r v e  which rushes  i n t o  t h e  opening
and takes t h e  enemy i n  t h e  f l a n k s  and rear. The 
c a v a l r y  charges a t  t h e  o p p o r t u n e  moment on t h e  
f l a n k  o f  t h e  enemy's  columns o r  p e n e t r a t e s  a n  
o p e n i n g  i n  h i s  l i n e ,  and  c u t t i n g  t o  p i e c e s  h i s  
s t a g g e r e d  t r o o p s ,  f o r c e s  them i n t o  retreat ,  and 
completes t h e  v i c t o r y .  During t h i s  t i m e  t h e  whole 
l i n e  of  t h e  enemy should be kept  occupied as t o  
p r e v e n t  f r e s h  t r o o p s  from be ing  concen t r a t ed  on 
t h e  t h r e a t e n e d  p o i n t  .30 
The impact of t h e  Minie-bul le t  r i f l e  and i t s  progeny on 
c o n v e n t i o n a l ,  p o s t - N a p o l e o n i c  t a c t i c s  w a s  i n  t i m e  t o  be 
d e v a s t a t i n g  and even world s h a t t e r i n g .  Over a c e n t u r y  of 
c a r e f  u l l y  t h o u g h t - o u t  m i l i t a r y  t h e o r y  a n d  h a r d - e a r n e d  
e x p e r i e n c e  w a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e n d e r e d  o b s o l e t e .  Shock 
t a c t i c s ,  r e l y i n g  on  c o l d  s t ee l ,  no l o n g e r  made s e n s e .  
F o r m e r l y ,  i n f a n t r y  c o u l d  s a f e l y  a p p r o a c h  t o  w i t h i n  o n e  
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hundred  a n d  f i f t y  y a r d s  o f  an  enemy's l i n e  b e f o r e  coming 
unde r  e f f e c t i v e  f i r e  f rom t h e i r  a d v e r s a r i e s .  Smoothbore 
cannon, p a r t i c u l a r l y  of t h e  ho r se  a r t i l l e r y  v a r i e t y ,  could  
n o  l o n g e r  g a l l o p  u p  t o  w i t h i n  t h r e e  h u n d r e d  y a r d s  o f  
o p p o s i n g  i n f a n t r y  a n d  p r o v i d e  d i r ec t  f i r e  s u p p o r t  i n  
re la t ive s a f e t y .  Thei r  gunners now would be e a s i l y  picked 
o f f  by o r d i n a r y  s o l d i e r s  armed w i t h  t h e  new r i f l e s  long  
be fo re  t h e i r  p i e c e s  could be unlimbered, l e t  a l o n e  brought  
i n t o  a c t i o n .  Moreover ,  e v e n  medium and heavy smoothbore 
cannon, w i th  e f f e c t i v e  ranges  of no more t h a n  e i g h t  hundred 
y a r d s l  were w e l l  w i t h i n  t h e  range of t r a i n e d  s n i p e r s  armed 
w i t h  t h e  new r i f l e s .  C a v a l r y  charges  were rendered  v i r ­
t u a l l y  u s e l e s s .  I n f a n t r y  f i r e ,  f rom e n t r e n c h e d  f i e l d  
p o s i t i o n s ,  would a n n i h i l a t e  mounted u n i t s  long  b e f o r e  t h e y  
could s u c c e s s f u l l y  c l o s e  wi th  t h e i r  a d v e r s a r i e s .  While such 
d i f f i c u l t  and harrowing f a c t s  were t o  be stumbled upon i n  
t i m e  by t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  
Europe, t h e  awesome r e a l i t y  of j u s t  what t h e  new r i f l e  cou ld  
i n  fact ach ieve  w a s ,  i n  t h e  1850s, l a r g e l y  understood on ly  
by  a h a n d f u l  o f  o r d n a n c e  o f f i c e r s .  One s u c h  o f f i c e r ,  
C a p t a i n  Camdus Wilcox o f  t h e  United States Army, i n  1859 
desc r ibed  t h e  s t a r t l i n g  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  new r i f l e s :  
I n  service use  of t h e  improved r i f l e  it may
be c o n f i d e n t l y  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  ba t t les  w i l l  be more 
d e s t r u c t i v e  t h a n  f o r m e r l y ,  a g r e a t e r  number of 
bal ls  w i l l  take e f f e c t ,  it w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  f o r  
t h e  s o l i d e r  t o  f i n d  himself i n  t h e  presence  of t h e  
enemy, and... [ r e s u l t i n g ]  f i r e  beyond t h e  r ange  of 
h i s  p r e s e n t  p i e c e  .3 1  
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Formerly, t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  enemy could  be 
a p p r o a c h e d  t o  w i t h i n  3 0 0  y a r d s  w i t h o u t  expe r i ­
e n c i n g  much l o s s  from t h e  f i r e  of t h e  i n f a n t r y .  
Now t h i s  f i r e  i s  d e s t r u c t i v e  a t  1 0 0 0  o r  1 2 0 0  
y a r d s ,  a n d  w e l l  d i r e c t e d  a t  6 0 0  y a r d s  becomes 
i r r e s i s t i b l e .  The range  of t h e  r i f l e ,  p e r m i t t i n g
b a t t l e s  t o  commence a t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i s t a n c e s  
wi thout  great care on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  g e n e r a l ,  h i s  
w h o l e  l i n e  may become e x p o s e d  a t  o n c e  t o  a 
d e s t r u c t i v e  f i re ,  t h e  p o s i t i o n  a s s igned  t o  t r o o p s  
n o t  i m m e d i a t e l y  engaged  w i l l  r e  u i r e  as  much 
a t t e n t i o n  as t h o s e  t h a t  are engaged.3 2  
I n s o f a r  as t h e  c a v a l r y  was concerned, t h e  e f f e c t  would 
be t o  f o r e c l o s e  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of shock tact ics :  
Formerly, c a v a l r y  could  take as i t s  p o s i t i o n
i n  c o l u m n s  o f  s q u a d r o n s  i n  f u l l  v iew of  t h e  
i n f a n t r y  t o  be charged,  a t  a d i s t a n c e  of 40  ya rds ,
a n d  c o u l d  a p p r o a c h  w i t h i n  3 0 0  y a r d s  w i t h o u t  
expe r i enc ing  much loss .  A t  t h i s  d i s t a n c e  it moved 
a g a i n s t  ( ( t h e ) )  i n f a n t r y ,  f i r s t  a t  a t r o t ,  t h e n  
g a l l o p ,  and f i n a l l y  a t  f u l l  speed.... Even wi th  
t h e  smoothbore musket, t h e  c a v a l r y  charge  a g a i n s t  
i n f a n t r y ,  t o  b e  made w i t h  a p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
s u c c e s s ,  had  t o  be  i n  g e n e r a l  proceeded by t h e  
f i r e  of a r t i l l e r y ;  o r  t h e  i n f a n t r y  must have been 
a l r e a d y  exhausted o r  demoral ized from i t s  c o n t e s t  
w i t h  o t h e r  arms.... Under t h e  e x i s t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  
of  t h e  i n f a n t r y  armament, c a v a l r y  w i l l  be w i t h i n  
i t s  sphe re  of a c t i o n  a t  1 2 0 0  o r  more ya rds ,  and as 
it a p p r o a c h e s  n e a r e r ,  t h e  f i r e  w i l l  become more 
and more d e s t r u c t i v e .  33  
T h e  f o u n d a t i o n  of C a p t a i n  W i l c o x ' s  conc lus ion  w a s  a 
series of ordnance tests,  f irst  undertaken i n  Great B r i t a i n  
and la te r  d u p l i c a t e d  by every  l e a d i n g  power, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  w i t h  t h e  new i n f a n t r y  arms. The 1855 and 
1 8 5 6  H y t h e  t r i a l s  w e r e  c o n d u c t e d  w i t h  t h e  new E n g l i s h  
Enf i e l d  r i f l e d  muske t ,  w i t h  which ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Capta in  
Sazaband ,  "a t o l e r a b l y  good r i f l e m a n  w i l l  now f i r e  w i th  
e f f e c t  a t  600... ((to)) 800 yards."34 The 1855 tes t  p i t t e d  
twen ty - seven  i n f a n t r y m e n  a g a i n s t  a t h e o r e t i c a l  i n f a n t r y  
I 
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column, firing of the guns being carried out at five hundred 

and fifty yards (or the tail of the column) and at two 

hundred and twenty yards (the head). Within four minutes 

the infantrymen had succeeded in decimating their imaginary 

foes under fairly realistic battle conditions. And in 1856 

a similar test was conducted against a theoretical artillery 

battery at a distance of eight hundred and ten yards, 

resulting in complete destruction of the unit in only three 

minutes. These tests were clearly devastating in their 

results on the effectiveness of conventional tactics. They 

were also either ignored or even incomprehensible to most 

military leaders. Firing at targets was one thing; firing 

at real adversaries, capable of returning fire was another. 

Moreover, there were significant problems of perception as 

regards the meaning of the term "firepower". The criticism 

of the breechloader, regardless of whether it was capable of 

being fired ten or twenty times that of a musket, stated 

above, was characteristic of most military thinking of this 

period. The comprehension of officers as to the effect of 

concentrated fire was expressed usually as the weight of the 

volley or the number of projectiles discharged. What was 

absent was any real understanding of the effect of multiply­

ing the rate of discharge and thus creating zones of fire. 

Precisely the same lack of comprehension blocked the later 

adoption of the machine gun, in large numbers, prior to 

World War 1-35 
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The great master of the French-Austrian school of War, 

Baron de Jomini, initially examined the weaponry with 

trepidation, as to the potentially grave consequences on the 

process of military science in civilizing warfare: 

The means of destruction are approaching the 

perfection with frightful rapidity. The Congreve

rockets...the shrapnel howitzers, which can throw 

a stream of canister as far as the range of a 

bullet, will multiply the chances of destruction, 
as though the hecatombs of Eylau, Borodino,
Leipzig, and Waterloo were not sufficient to 
decimate the European races.36 
In its first, limited employment in the Crimean War of 

1856, the Minie-bullet rifle's impact was largely negligi­

ble. And in the 1859 War of Italian Unification, the French 

trounced the Austrians with the bayonet, instead of exploit­

ing the capabilities of their new rifles. Jomini, along 

with most other officers, concluded that there would in fact 

be no telling affect on battle as a result of the new 

weapons: 
The improvements in firearms will not 
introduce any important change in the manner of 
taking troops into battle, but that it would be 
useful to introduce into tactics of infantry the 
formation of columns by companies, and to have a 
numerous body of good riflemen or skirmishers, and 
to exercise the troops considerably in firing.37 
Thus there would be little direct affect on tactics by 
the Minie-bullet rifle, save fox a slight increase in the 
importance of sniper fire. The formal response of the 

United States Army to the Minie-bullet rifle was the 

issuance of a new manual of infantry tactics. Major William 

Hardee, at the direction of Secretary or War Davis, under-
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took a limited revision of General Scott's translation of 

the official 1836 French manual of infantry tactics. The 

changes introduced by Hardee were relatively minor. Of note 

were the introduction of two new commands for the movement 

of infantry; the double quick time (ninety steps per minute) 

and the run (120 steps per minute). The greater exertions 

required for these evolutions earned Hardee's tactics the 

sarcastic label of a "Shanghai fire drill" from both 
officers and soldiers.38 In part, the lack of substantial 
change in infantry tactics was due to the problem of 
controlling troops in battle. In the heat of combat and the 
general din of war, auditory signal devices such a5 drums 
and bugles were largely useless. Alternative methods such 
as runners, flags or heliographs were equally unsuccess­
fu1.39 Thus, prior to the development of the radio, small 
unit tactics as practiced today were highly impractical; 
troops command was still premised on the Frederickian 
concept of soldiers as mercenary robots. Loss of control 
over individual units, it was thus feared, would result in 
wholesale desertion while under fire.40 
On a deeper level than the mere technical aspects of 
infantry tactics, were the powerful restraints of tradition 
and experience of aristocratically oriented armies. Thus 
Jomini, with complete confidence, could conclude that in the 
end, regardless of the greater lethality of the Minie-
I 
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bullet rifle, orthodoxy would prevail, as before, on the 

battlefield: 
In spite of the improvements of firearms, two 
armies in battle will not pass the day in firing 
at each other from a distance; it will always be 
necessary for one of them to advance to the attack 
of the other. 
That victory may with much certainty be 
expected by the party taking the offense when the 
general in command possesses the talent of taking
his troops into action in good order and of boldly
attacking the enemy, adopting the spirit and 
quality of troops. .to his own character.41 
Fundamentally, therefore, understanding of just how 

potent the impact of the new rifle could be on orthodox 

tactics was lacking among most officers of this period. 

Simply put, it meant comprehending the fact that the new 

weapon had more than twice the rate of fire of the old one, 

with at least six times the effective range, which could be 

used in all weather conditions and was machine built, at 

very little expense and in vastly greater numbers than its 

predecessor. Granted that the actual range at which most 
soldiers could be reasonably expected to aim and hit a 
target was about two to four hundred yards, yet the very 
fact that a common infantryman could now actually pinpoint 
his fire at such a range was still a great change from the 
old smoothbore musket.42 An even greater problem of 
perception for traditional military leaders involved the 
concept of firepower, of the effect of the rapid discharge 
of many weapons in a confined space. Thus, for example, the 
quite typical assessment of Dutch cavalry officer J. Roemer, 
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a traditionalist in the field of mounted warfare doctrine, 

of the general lack of impact of the new rifles on battle 

tactics: 

Infantry must...depend wholly on its fire, it 
has time to deliver only two volleys and these 
with largely the power to cripple every sixth 
horse. Experience shows that the effect of 
musketry is very trifling at more than three 
hundred yards and within this distance it is not 
prudent to try more than two discharges ((i.e.,
before the cavalry descended upon the infantry's
position. 4 3  
As late as 1868, after making a thorough study of the 

American Civil War, Lieutenant-Colonel George T. Denison, of 

the Canadian Army and one of the most progressive and 

reform-minded cavalry officers of h i s  day, could just as 
easily misgauge the impact of the rifled musket on mounted 

tactics: 

From 800 to 400 yards cavalry can advance at 
the trot in about one minute and a quarter. In 
that time some six or seven shots may be fired,
but practically with no effect, the rapidly
changing distances, the difficulties of guessing
the proper elevation to strike a moving body, the 
necessity of having the sights accurate, will do 
away with much danger from these shots. From 400 
to 100 yards--300 yards at a gallop will take half 
a minute, two shots can be fired in this time,
leaving one for the last hundred yards, which can 
be run over in ten seconds.44 
The problem with these calculations is that they lacked 

understanding of the impact of volume of fire. A single 

rank formation of a cavalry company covered some three 

hundred yards. For two minutes or so it could be expected 
to be under concentrated infantry fire, from say an infantry 

company. Assuming a reasonable rate of fire of six rounds 
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per minute, a total as high as twelve hundred projectiles 
would be placed into those three hundred yards occupied by 
two hundred men and an equal number of horses. In turn, a 
bullet, when fired, travels at a speed of between eight 
hundred and five thousand feet per second, far faster than 
any horse. The resulting zone of fire would be such as to 
destroy the cavalry company or at least render it -­hors du 

combat. Moreover, the infantry would be deployed in the 

protective square formation or, as was increasingly the 

fashion, entrenched or positioned between defensive cover, 

further reducing the cavalry's potential effectiveness. 

Aside from the lack of understanding of the effect of 
tremendously increased firepower, there were other intellec­
tual problems associated with the adaptation by Nineteenth 
Century armies to these new weapons. Take fox example the 
deceptively simple problem of how to train a soldier to 
"aim" his weapon. The basic pattern of using small arms of 
military purposes had been by volley. With an attached 
bayonet it was simply not possible to line the barrel of the 
piece with a desired target. Secondly, the very limited 
range of the smoothbore musket ruled out the use of long 
range fire. Finally, the paramount emphasis in infantry 
tactics on shock and the use of cold steel, reduced engage­
ment of foot soldiers to short range, hand-to-hand engage­
ments. Targeting a firearm was a matter left to the 
sportsmen and the hunter; many European light infantry 
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u n i t s ,  i n  f a c t ,  were, as i n  t h e  case o f  German jaeqers, 
f o r m e r  woodsmen r e c r u i t e d  f o r  t h e i r  s u p e r i o r  marksmanship. 
S o l d i e r s  were almost  never g iven  any i n s t r u c t i o n  i n  how t o  
d i r e c t  t h e i r  f i r e  a c c u r a t e l y .  S ince  t h e  i n f a n t r y  f i r e  had 
b e e n ,  f o r  s e v e r a l  c e n t u r i e s  ( a t  l eas t  as f a r  back as t h e  
F i f t e e n t h  Century and t h e  d e c l i n e  of t h e  crossbow) equiva­
l e n t  t o  t h e  scatterl ike f i r e  of a shotgun,  there were t h u s  
no immediate h i s t o r i c a l  examples of mass aiming of weapons 
t o  be  drawn upon. N o t i c e  t h e  r e p e a t e d  a s s e r t i o n s  of t h e  
a u t h o r s  above  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  s p e e d  of  f i r e  would b e  
negated by t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of t h e  s o l d i e r  q u i c k l y  t o  a i m  h i s  
weapon. P u t t i n g  a s i d e  t h e  i s s u e  of volume of f i r e ,  it is  
i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  how a weapon w a s  aimed i n  t h i s  
per iod .  Targe t  weapons f e a t u r e d  e l a b o r a t e  s i g h t i n g  systems 
w h i l e  h u n t i n g  f i r e a r m s  r e l i e d  upon t h e  expe r i ence  of t h e  
shoo te r .  B a s i c a l l y ,  one s e l e c t e d  a t a r g e t ,  determined range  
and  s p e e d  o f  movement, i f  a p p l i c a b l e ,  and t h e n  c a r e f u l l y  
s i g h t e d  and  f i r e d .  Such methods  were n e c e s s a r i l y  t o o  
complex and  t o  slow f o r  u s e  i n  combat ,  s a v e  by h i g h l y  
s p e c i a l i z e d  s o l d i e r s ,  Only g r a d u a l l y  would armies begin t o  
master t h e  t e c h n i q u e s  by w h i c h  g r o u p s  of  s o l d i e r s  could  
s p e e d i l y  i d e n t i f y  and  h i t  t a r g e t s .  The modern system of 
combat a iming  began t o  be experimented w i t h  i n  t h e  1860s. 
E s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  r i f l e  i s  t r e a t e d  as  a n  e x t e n s i o n  of t h e  
p e r s o n ,  it i s  t h u s  p o i n t e d  a t  t h e  c e n t e r  of t h e  d e s i r e d  
t a r g e t s  a n d  t h e  weapon l e v e l e d  so t h e  b u l l e t  w i l l  s t r ike  
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about six feet above ground. In effect, therefore, the 

soldier shoots as if he were making a bayonet thrust. 

Though some difficulties as directed-firing by troops in 

battle seemed insurmountable, rendering the superior range 

of the new rifles useless, a few ballistic experts were 

already attempting to solve the problem. According to 

Captain Wilcox, the future promised a revolution in how a 

common soldier would manipulate his weapon in combat--the 

shift from volley and bayonet to firepower and controlled 

shooting: 

He will be inspired with more confidence 
knowing the range and accuracy of his arms. At 
great distances he will no longer fire by hazard,
but will use his elevating ((i..e., aiming)), at 
short distances, knowing the power of his rifle,
he will fire with the utmost coolness, and with a 
certainty the smoothbore and round ball could 
never inspire.45 
The Industrial Revolution was, in addition to profound 
changes in technology, causing as well, considerable 
alterations in the composition and orientation of civil 
society that was to affect greatly the conduct of war. The 
Minie-bullet rifle was not simply a matter of improved 
hardware. As the question of aiming shows quite clearly, an 
intellectual as well as a social revolution in military 
science and organization was needed to exploit fully the 
possibilities of the new arms technology. Guilbert, in the 
1760s pioneered the column as the solution of the complexi­
ties and failings of Eighteenth Century linear tactics. The 
intellectual breakthrough and in unison as opposed to the 
203 

earlier method of starting each movement from a fixed point 
and defining it as an end-to-itself . It was only until the 
French Revolution and the immediate need to convert un­
trained citizens into soldiers that Guilbert's concepts 
could finally be exploited to the fullest and in turn, under 
Napoleon, destroying the fundamental Eighteenth Century 
maxim that one army could not destroy another. 
Similarly, the basic revision in the science of war 
made possible by the Minie-bullet rifle was one which 
required a massive redefinition of military theory and 
organization, which transcended such relatively mundane 
matters as increased range or firepower. Rather it offered 
the immediate end to the Frederickian tradition of soldiers 
as mere robots. The weapon required the use of loose­
skirmish-order tactics in place of tight, disciplined 
formations. Neither exposed linear or column formations, 
designed to accommodate traditional volley fire and the 
bayonet charge, were practical against the fire of the 
Minie-bullet rifle. Even with such modifications as those 
developed by Hardee to conventional infantry tactics, of 
increasing the speed of movement, there was simply no way to 
close with an adversary without suffering massive casualties 
from his fire. To disperse men on the battlefield, however, 
demanded considerably more than simple tinkering with the 
infantry manuals. A s  shown by the French Revolution, 
effective soldiers could be trained in Guilbertian tactics 
I 
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in about eight weeks; the Minie-bullet rifle, in turn, 

further speeded up training time. 

The emergence of large middle class, urban populations 

and the development of national political culture on both 

sides of the Atlantic was as well rendering the principles 

of limited warfare anachronistic. The idea of war fought 

for limited gain by competitive princes, with small pro­

fessional mercenary forces was increasingly out of line with 

mid-Nineteenth Century society; the Crimean War, for 

example, with popular involvement in the war effort by 

ordinary citizens and coverage in the newspapers was a 

portent of still greater change. The new style of tactics 

would require a willingness to trust the initiative of 

individual soldiers. Men would thus have to be led, not 

driven into battle, and non-commissioned officers would have 

to be redefined from brutal task masters to team leaders. 

The armies of the trans-Atlantic military community, save 

for Prussia, however, continued to plan and wage war as it 

had been done for the previous one hundred and fifty 

years.46 

Part I11 

The 1850s were in the United States, as well as in 

Europe, an era in which change in the military arts was 

beginning to be officially analyzed. Two major technologi­

cal advancements, steam powered ships and the new rifled 

naval artillery threatened at once to sweep aside the twin 
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I p i l l a r s  o f  t h e  C a l h o u n - n a t i o n a l  war p o l i c y .  F o r  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  f o r t y  y e a r s  t h e  b a s i c  war-planning assumption of 
t h e  Army h a d  b e e n  t h a t  a minimum of  th ree  months  w a s  
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  a European power t o  t r a n s p o r t  and deploy an 
i n i t i a l  i n v a s i o n  f o r c e ;  t h a t  i n  t u r n ,  s a i l  powered s h i p s  
c o u l d  n o t  suppor t  a f o r c e  much l a r g e r  t h a n  f i f t y  thousand 
men f o r  any extended p e r i o d  of t i m e ;  and t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  
masonry s e a c o a s t  f o r t r e s s e s  could wi ths t and  naval  bombard­
ment l o n g  enough f o r  r e in fo rcemen t s  t o  a r r i v e .  Thus, t h e  
army would have s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  t o  e n l a r g e  i t s  f o r c e s  and i n  
t u r n  be  r e a d y  t o  m e e t  a European invader .  By t h e  1850s' 
none of these assumptions were v a l i d .  Steam powered s h i p s  
could c a r r y  t e n s  of thousands of men i n  a matter of weeks t o  
America's sho res  and i n  t u r n ,  e f f e c t i v e l y  supply them. The 
n a v a l  r i f  l e d  cannon rendered  America's c o a s t a l  f o r t r e s s e s  
u s e l e s s ;  t h e y  could now be demolished i n  a matter of hours ,  
as  opposed  t o  weeks i n  t h e  p a s t .  And t h e  army w a s  now 
saddled  w i t h  a v a s t l y  g r e a t e r  coun t ry  t o  defend,  i n  r e g a r d s  
t o  t o t a l  area, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  two sea c o a s t s .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  b r i n g  American m i l i t a r y  d o c t r i n e  a n d  
p r a c t i c e s  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  l a t e s t  b r e a k t h r o u g h s  i n  t h e  
s c i e n c e  of w a r ,  S e c r e t a r y  of War Davis, i n  1856,  a r r anged  
f o r  a m i l i t a r y  commission t o  under take  a grand i n s p e c t i o n  of 
t h e  l e a d i n g  armies of t h e  day. Moreover, t h e  t h e n  on-going 
C r i m e a n  War o f f e r e d  a s p l e n d i d  c h a n c e  t o  v i ew t h e  new 
hardware and  d o c t r i n e s  of  w a r  i n  o p e r a t i o n  and i n  t u r n ,  
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allow the army to gather invaluable field data on the 
fighting capabilities of potential enemies. The officers 
selected for this Commission were Majors Richard Delafield 
and Albert Mordecai and Captain George Brinton McClellan. 47 
The first two officers were noted experts in their respected 
areas of military science (Delafield, fortifications; 

Mordecai, artillery), both were senior West Point professors 

and in their fifties. The third member of the Commission, 

Captain McClellan, was the representative of the mounted 

arm, a line officer with the First Cavalry (although his 

corps affiliation was with the Engineers) and barely thirty. 

McClellan was by no means an elder and accomplished officer 

in his supposed area of specialization; in fact, he had been 

in the saddle, as it were, for less than a year. Rather 

this plum was awarded to him as recognition that he was one 

of the most promising and gifted young officers in the 

Army.48 The composition of the Commission reflected the War 

Department's concern that rifled artillery had rendered the 

nation's seacoast defense system ineffective. Delafield and 

Mordecai had strong engineering backgrounds, equipping them 

to understand collateral military advances such as steam-

powered ships. The assignment of a would-be cavalry officer 

to the Commission reflected Davis's personal bias toward the 

cavalry. The absence of any representative of the King of 

Battle, the infantry, was characteristic of the general lack 
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of interest  o r  unders tanding  of t h e  Minnie b u l l e t ' s  consid­
e r a b l e  impact on orthodox tactics.49 
T h e  Commission t o u r e d  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  Crimean b a t t l e ­
f i e l d s ,  a l though most of t h e  f i g h t i n g  w a s  over by t h e  t i m e  
t h e y  l a n d e d  i n  R u s s i a .  The Crimean War had been l a r g e l y  
t r a d i t i o n a l  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  technology used by both s i d e s  
and even more so  i n  t h e  tact ics .  Most i nnova t ions  t h a t  were 
t r i e d  o u t  i n  t h i s  w a r - - r i f l e d  n a v a l  a r t i l l e r y  and steam 
powered s h i p s  ( t h e  M i n i e - b u l l e t  r i f l e  w a s  i n  l i m i t e d  use  
w i t h  French and B r i t i s h  t r o o p s ,  who, however, cont inued  t o  
employ t r a d i t i o n a l  tact ics)  among others--had l i t t l e  d i r e c t  
b e a r i n g  on t h e  b a t t l e f i e l d  a s  s u c h .  Y e t  t h e  c r i p p l i n g  
f a i l u r e s  of l o g i s t i c s  of t h e  B r i t i s h  Army demonstrated t h e  
need  f o r  g r e a t e r  improvements i n  m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and 
l o g i s t i c s . 5 o  The m i l i t a r y  t h e o r i s t s  of  t h e  d a y ,  w h i l e  
n o t i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  new developments i n  t h e  t o o l s  of w a r ,  
g e n e r a l l y  d e f i n e d  t h e  Crimean War as u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of 
f u t u r e  wars. J o m i n i  e x p r e s s e d  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  q u i t e  a p t l y  
when he wrote:  
T h i s  ... c o n t e s t  be tween two v a s t  en t renched  
camps, o c c u p i e d  by e n t i r e  armies. . is  an  even t  
wi thout  precedent ,  which w i l l  have no e q u a l  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e ,  f o r  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  which produced it 
cannot  occur aga in .  Moreover, t h i s  c o n t e s t  cannot  
i n f l u e n c e  i n  any r e s p e c t  t h e  g r e a t  combinat ions of 
w a r ,  o r  even t h e  tact ics  of b a t t l e . 5 1  
Y e t  t h e  Crimean War d i d ,  as one of t h e  l a s t ,  t r a d i ­
t i o n a l  e x a m p l e s  of  E i g h t e e n t h  C e n t u r y  w a r ,  h e r a l d  t h e  
beginnings of a s i g n i f i c a n t  a l t e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  of w a r  
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occasioned by the first arms race in history and by the 

effects of social and political change on the conduct of 

war.52 

Cooperation with the French and Russian military 

services was difficult, but the British amicably welcomed 

the Americans. The return to the United States was routed 

through the leading European states. Thus the trio of 

American officers was able to scrutinize the military 

establishments of France, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and 

Prussia, centering much of their attention on depots and 

fortresses. The reports that were subsequently published of 

their observations were of mixed quality. Delafield's 

Report on the Art of War in Europe and Mordecai's Military 

Commission to Europe were objective and professional in 

nature.53 Delafield concentrated on his area of specialty, 

fortifications, while Mordecai emphasized the latest 

advances in artillery and other aspects of military hard­

ware; both authors, as well, provided illuminating intelli­

gence on virtually every other important aspect of military 

science and the capabilities of the leading European armies. 

In striking contrast to the reports of the two senior 

members of the Commission, McClellan's European Cavalry and 

The Armies of Europe (both of which were privately published 

and distributed far more widely than either of the two 

government-produced reports1 were flaccid and exceedingly 
undiscriminating. What was clearly absent from McClellan's 
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official reports were practical and comprehensive assess­

ments of the military effectiveness of the various cavalry 

services of Europe. Moreover, McClellan made little effort 

to evaluate the combat worth of cavalry in the Crimean War; 

certainly the infamous charge of the British Light Brigade 

merited considerable inquiry as to the future prospects of 

horse soldiers in battle. One can learn from McClellan all 

kinds of quaint but largely useless trivia such as the types 

of drums used in the Prussian Army or even the relative 

merits of Sardinian wooden water caskets. Yet nowhere did 

the young Captain attempt to evaluate or analyze his data; 

rather McClellan was apparently content simply to report, 

without investigation or inquiry. The British Cavalry, for 

example, widely rated as the worst of any major power by the 

leading cavalry theorists of the day, was cheerfully 

presented in terms of its formal order of battle without a 

whiff of criticism by McClellan. One of the positive gains 

for the United States Cavalry service was the adoption of 

the Hungarian saddle (albeit that the original horsehair 

cover, due to the extreme discomfort it caused, was replaced 

by one of tanned leather); McClellan, in describing this key 

piece of cavalry equipment, however, did not lay out a 

process of evaluation from which the reader could trace out 

and comprehend how he arrived at the merits of his conclu­

sions. The reason for McClellan's lack of analysis stemmed 

from the fact that, unlike either Delafield or Mordecai, he 
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was not an experienced student of his assigned area of the 
art of war. In fact, McClellan's understanding of cavalry 
theory was superficial at best. Analyzing European cavalry 
theory and practice on the basis of official tables of 
organization and elite demonstration units was for 
McClellan, the representative of a second rate power, akin 
to letting loose a very studious child in a marvelous store 
of infinite wonders, all very pretty and overwhelming in 
their splendor.5 4  
As an official observer of the major European cavalry 
services, McClellan was to exert considerable influence on 
the development of the American cavalry in the late Antebel­
lum years. Yet McClellan, despite the adoption of a new 
saddle and helping to pave the way for the formal adoption 
of the new single-rank mounted tactics, was thoroughly 
traditional in his analysis of cavalry. The image of a 
young, overly enthusiastic junior cavalry officer, in effect 
a novice journeying as part of a distinguished United States 
Military Commission to study at the feet of the masters as 
it were, is well supported by McClellan's fanciful and 
utterly impractical notion of transforming Plains Indians 
into Cossacks: 
It is impossible to repress the conviction 

that in many of the tribes of our frontier 

Indians, such as the Delaware, Kickapoos ti c., we 

possess the material for the formation of partisan 

troops fully equal to the Cossacks, in the event 

of a serious war on this continent, their employ­

ment, under the regulations and restrictions 

necessary to restrain their tendency to un-
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necessary cruelty, would be productive of most 
important advantage.55 
Far more biting was McClellan's assessment of the types 

of mounted units then in Army service and in turn, what 

improvements were necessary. Echoing Davis's argument for 

general-purpose cavalry, McClellan listed all the conceiv­
able and probable types of wars in which American mounted 
units would be needed. The classifications of armed 
conflict which McClellan entertained in his report were the 
same essential types which had been the focus of national 
war policy since Calhoun's tenure as Secretary of War. What 
was not at all likely, McClellan concluded, was a full-
scale, unrestrained and nationalistic struggle, of the 
Napoleonic variety, which of course had, as a consequence of 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the emergence of scienti­
fic concepts of war, been exercised from the lexicon of 
armed hostilities. Thus three possible uses of cavalry for 
three types of potential wars were enumerated by McClellan: 
a. use against the Indians; 

b. to repel foreign invaders [which due to 

the limited capacity of mid-19th Century ships,

would be woefully short of cavalry; 

c. an offensive war involving limited use of 

cavalry [as in Mexico]-56 

Thus: 
It could therefore, seem that heavy cavalry
would be worse than useless for our purposes, and 
that we need only light cavalry, in the true and 
strict sense of the term. 
Since the primary purpose of such cavalry would be 

frontier security (the East, as per traditional doctrine, 
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w a s  s u p p o s e d l y  u n f i t  f o r  c o n v e n t i o n a l  mounted u n i t s ) ,  
McClellan argued t h a t :  
The t a c t i c a l  u n i t  should be s m a l l ,  t h a t  it 
may be handled wi th  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p o s s i b l e  ease and 
c e l e r i t y ,  and t h a t  it may never be broken up. The 
r e g i m e n t ,  a l s o ,  s h o u l d  b e  s m a l l ,  f o r  t h e  same 
reasons  . 
It fo l lowed t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t :  
The  n a t u r e  of c a v a l r y  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  be ing  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  performed 
by any i n  Europe, w e  ought no t  t o  f o l l o w  b l i n d l y  
any one system, bu t  should endeavor t o  select t h e  
good f e a t u r e s ,  and e n g r a f t  them upon a system of 
our  own.57 
S u p e r f i c i a l l y ,  M c C l e l l a n  a p p e a r e d  t o  have addressed  
many of t h e  concerns of f r o n t i e r  o f f i c e r s  as t o  t h e  need t o  
m a i n t a i n  u n i t  i n t e g r i t y  as  w e l l  a s  a u t h o r i n g  a uniquely  
American form of mounted warfare .  McClellan, however, most 
c e r t a i n l y  d i d  n o t  d e s i r e  t o  c u t  l o o s e  American c a v a l r y  
p r a c t i c e s  f rom i t s  t h e o r e t i c a l  u m b i l i c a l  co rd  t o  European 
t r a d i t i o n s  and d o c t r i n e s  of mounted warfare .  Thus, as i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  c lass ical  c a v a l r y  t h e o r y ,  McClellan wrote:  
" t h e  firearms ...'I, of a mounted format ion ,  I'...used solely 
on guard,  v e d e t t e ,  ti c., t o  g i v e  t h e  alarm, it being  t a k e n  
as a maxim t o  t r u s t  t h e  saber . "  Furthermore,  " a g a i n s t  t h e  
Ind ians  of our  p l a i n s ,  who have no sabers, t h e  f a r  r each ing  
l a n c e  would be  no d o u b t  an e f f e c t i v e  weapon; y e t  a l i g h t  
s abe r  would be about  as much so,  and fa r  less i n  t h e  w a r . " 5 8  
T h u s ,  i n  t h e  g r a n d  t r a d i t i o n  of  mounted warfare ,  t h e  
s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  c a v a l r y  i s  a l w a y s  i n  i t s  " s p u r s  and  
sabers ."59 What McClellan, who had no expe r i ence  a t  a l l  i n  
I 
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Indian fighting, intended was not the creation of a unique 

American style of cavalry adapted to the requirements of the 

Great Plains. Rather he was clearly in the long tradition 

of professional officers, dating back to the efforts to turn 

the First Dragoons into a proper European-like mounted unit, 

who were dedicated to the classical tradition of horse 

soldiering. Thus the desire to prepare the cavalry to fight 

a "real" war with a European adversary. The adoption of 

such useless European practices as the lance or saber, as 

argued for by McClellan, demonstrated his lack of comprehen­

sion of the practical requirements of Indian fighting. 

The professional American Army approached the irksome 

task of Indian control as a non-military activity, of little 

honor, as the price for its dedications to the European-

style of war. None of the official Army manuals, cavalry or 

otherwise, up to the 1850s, had made the slightest reference 

to the unique tactical problems of Indian fighting. Rather 

the Army chose to leave such problems to the discretion of 

individual field commanders. For example, General Dabney 

Maury, recalled in the 1890s, that in the late 1850s, as a 

consequence of frontier fighting and McClellan's examination 

of contemporary cavalry doctrine, a new system of tactics 

was introduced which: 

...would enable men to dismount quickly and 
use their rifles [Sharps carbines] on foot and 
demanded also single rank formations. By this new 
system of tactics, a troops.. could be moving at 
the gallop, and when the trumpet sounded, 'Dis­
mount to fight', could halt, link their horses, 
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and be handl ing  t h e i r  r i f l e s  i n  l i n e  of b a t t l e , .  
[ w i t h i n ]  seconds 60 
W h i l e  s t a r t l i n g l y  similar t o  la ter ,  i n n o v a t i v e  Union 
c a v a l r y  p r a c t i c e ,  Maury's s t a t emen t  is  unsupported by any 
c a v a l r y  manual i n  use  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  b e f o r e  o r  d u r i n g  
t h e  C i v i l  War. Moreover, i n  i t s  use  of d e c i d e d l y  nonstan­
dard  c a v a l r y  tact ics ,  it r e p r e s e n t e d  a clear d e p a r t u r e  from 
M c C l e l l a n ' s  e m p h a s i s  upon o r t h o d o x y  i n  mounted w a r f a r e  
p r a c t i c e .  E i t h e r  Maury w a s  r ead ing  la ter  e v e n t s  back i n t o  
h i s  h i s t o r y  ( h e  w a s  a Southern c a v a l r y  commander) o r  (more 
l i k e l y  w a s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  growing emphasis on musketry i n  
t h i s  p e r i o d - - c o n f u s i n g  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  mounted w a r f a r e  
manuals w i th  t h e  sea t -of - the-pants ,  ad hoc c a v a l r y  p r a c t i c e  
of f r o n t i e r  commandexs.61 Only Major-General P h i l i p  Cooke, 
one of America's pre-eminent c a v a l r y  e x p e r t s  made a s p e c i f i c  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  W e s t e r n  m i l i t a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  h i s  own, 
o f f i c i a l  manual of c a v a l r y  t ac t i c s .  Y e t  Cooke wrote  no th ing  
more t h a n  such common sense  adv ice  as  t h e  need f o r  g r e a t e r  
camp s e c u r i t y ;  t h e r e  i s  no m e n t i o n  o r  e v e n  h i n t  of a 
d e t a i l e d  a n d  u n i q u e  b o d y  o f  f r o n t i e r  mounted w a r f a r e  
p r i n c i p l e s .  6 2  McClellan c l e a r l y  sugges ted  i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  
recommendations t h a t  most American f r o n t i e r  cavalrymen d i d  
not  d e f i n e  themselves  as t r u e  ho r se  s o l d i e r s  o r  cons ide red  
t h a t  t h e i r  g r u b b y  work c o n s t i t u t e d  t r u e  mounted warfare, 
Fundamentally t h e y  were l i t t l e  more t h a n  mounted gendarmes 
f o r c e d  t o  do t h e  d i r t y  work of I n d i a n  c o n t r o l .  The p r o f e s s ­
i o n a l  Army, t h e  one  d e d i c a t e d  t o  f i g h t i n g  a n  i n v a d i n g  
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European army in the classical manner of the French-Austrian 

school of war, paid scant attention to the unique require­

ments of frontier security duty. Only one American officer, 

an anonymous Captain of infantry, actually formulated a 

unique system of war to deal with the elusive and extraordi­

narily mobile Plains Indians in the Antebellum era. 

Unerringly, this author rejected the use of classical 

European tactics as being inappropriate as well as ineffec­

tual: 
It [the Army] was...warfare in a country of 

resources and of comparatively contracted space,

and for operations against forts, fieldwork, lines 

of men, communication or supply, or something that 

was accessible [which] could be found and seen.63 

The formal tradition of post-Napoleonic warfare was 

unsuited to the demands of the frontier security according 

to the Captain: 

This condition is changed; and so the system.
The change consists in the field of operations,

its extent, resources and people. It is almost 

the entire country, washed by the waters of the 

Rocky Mountains...destitute of resources, its 

people...without permanent habitation, independent

of agriculture, good hunters and horsemen and,

with few exceptions, hostile.64 

The failure of the Army to undertake a complete 

reorientation of its tactics to meet the unique problems of 

the far West, lay in the military's unshakable commitment to 

European style warfare, according to this Captain: 

Those having the power are looking across the 

Atlantic to France, waiting to adapt her practice

in similar exigencies, while our officers are at 

least the equals of the French officers, and our 

men superior. Our line officers, have no voice, 
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they bear these evils and exercise the same quiet
stoicism under: existing deficiencies which they
tolerate, the incubus, the man who shuns his duty 
or throws it on his superior, and with which they
endure their life-long exile, and we have the 
material to make, as good light cavalry and 
infantry as any in the world. France felt a 
similar need in Algeria and she has her chasseurs 
d'Afrique and spahia....G5 
It is time we acted upon our necessities. 

Europe comes to us for pistols and rifles, and we 

take back the latter, altered but not improved.66 

The assessment offered by this Captain of the limita­

tions of the French-Austrian school of war carried no weight 

in official circles. Nonetheless, this officer brilliantly 

identified and criticized the futility of applying orthodox, 

European concepts of war to the American frontier. Unlike 

McClellan's romantic, and rather simplistic call for 

traditional light cavalry and for the conversion of the 

Plains Indians into Cossacks, this Captain's remarks were 

directly attuned to the actual difficulties of frontier 

security duty. Moreover, unlike the direct importation of 

French Algerian practice in unconventional warfare, as 

embodied in Davis's great desert Indian control plan, this 

Captain's concepts reflected, instead, the very originality 

of Marshal Bugeaud in developing unorthodox tactics uniquely 

suited to North African conditions. Thus, the development 

of Indian fighting tactics uniquely designed for the Far 

West. Specifically, therefore, "the inadequacy and unfit­

ness of present organization.. .such as the injustice to 

heavy cavalry [i.e., the Dragoons] and infantry of employing 
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them to subdue a nation of mounted spies who have no home 

and leave no trace."67 The correct, and pointedly unortho­

dox method of solving the prickly problem of dealing with an 

exceedingly mobile and fleeting adversary as the Plains 

Indians, was set forth by the Captain when he wrote: 

To control these people or making a step
towards doing so,  it is proposed to do what has 
often been done before with a people to be 
conquered: take a lesson from them. Assimilate 
and equalize the two by giving to the soldier the 
horse, arms and dress of a hunter, the wont of 
which prevents his efficiency, without giving up
the present organization for attacks and self 
support groups of fours [i.e., a kind of early
fire team system adopted by some Western comman­
ders]-68 
The tactics which were in turn devised by this Captain 

constituted what could be defined as the nucleus of modern 

counterinsurgency tactics. The emphasis was on the use of 

small units, not dissimilar from today's LRPs (long range 

reconnaissance patrols) teams combined with the speed and 

endurance of the Indian dog soldiers. Specifically, he 

advocated the creation of a special, commando-like corps 

combining light infantry and light cavalry (but distinctly 

not of the usual European variety)--the former to deal with 

the Indians in mountainous terrain, the latter for pursuit 

on the Plains. The proposed armament would be principally 

breechloading carbines and revolvers plus sabers if required 

for close-quarter work.6g The record, both before and after 

the Civil War, however, reveals no instance of such strik­

ingly original tactics being employed by the Army. Thus 
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f r o n t i e r  commanders cont inued ,  as i n  t h e  p a s t ,  t o  make do 
w i t h  t h e  e x i s t i n g ,  v e r y  i l l - s u i t e d  r e s o u r c e s  a t  t h e i r  
d i s p o s a l  i n  handl ing  f r o n t i e r  s e c u r i t y  problems. 
I n  t h e  main, du r ing  t h e  y e a r s  immediately p r i o r  t o  t h e  
C i v i l  War, t h e  o f f i c i a l ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  Army r e d e d i c a t e d  
i t s e l f  t o  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  miss ion ,  t h e  de fense  of t h e  United 
S t a t e s  a g a i n s t  f o r e i g n  ty ranny  w i t h  t h e  d o c t r i n e s ,  weapons 
and  equipment  of t h e  French-Austrian school  of w a r  and of 
contemporary France. The advent  of r a d i c a l  t e c h n o l o g i c a l ,  
economic and s o c i a l  change w a s  l i t t l e  understood and l i t t l e  
e x p l o i t e d  i n  t h e  f i n a l  y e a r s  of t h e  Antebellum era. I n  1861 
t h e  U n i t e d  States Army would f i n d  i t s e l f  f i g h t i n g  a mass, 
i n d u s t r i a l  and  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  war of  s u r v i v a l .  This  w a s  
c l e a r l y  no t  t h e  kind of w a r  p r e d i c t e d  by e i t h e r  t h e  strate­
g i s t s  of t h e  French-Austrian school  of war or by McClellan 
i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  x e p o r t .  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  had  g r e a t l y  
changed  s i n c e  Calhoun's t e n u r e  as S e c r e t a r y  of War. What 
had b e e n  a minor  power,  p e r i l o u s l y  pe rched  on t h e  o u t e r  
f r i n g e s  of European c i v i l i z a t i o n  w a s  now a c o n t i n e n t a l  s i z e  
n a t i o n ,  a g rowing  commercial power, i n c r e a s i n g l y  urban i n  
i t s  s o c i a l  make-up. 
The Calhoun w a r  p o l i c y  l a y  i n  r u i n s  by t h e  mid-1850s; 
casemate s e a c o a s t  f o r t r e s s e s  and t h e  concept  of t h e  s k e l e t o n  
army were r e n d e r e d  o b s o l e t e  by t h e  deve lopment  of steam 
powered s h i p s ,  by t h e  g r e a t  improvements i n  nava l  a r t i l l e r y  
and by t h e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  w e s t w a r d  expansion of t h e  count ry .  
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Y e t  t h e  v e r y  F r e n c h - A u s t r i a n  s c h o o l  of  war was a l r e a d y  
o b s o l e t e  b e f o r e  i t s  f i r s t  t h e o r i s t s  a t tempted  t o  set i t s  
i d e a s  down on paper.  Only P r u s s i a  and General  Clausewi tz  
had f u l l y  understood t h a t  t h e  Napoleonic Wars were t r u l y  t h e  
p o r t e n t  of f u t u r e  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  t u s s l e s  be tween  warr ing  
peoples ,  dominated by ideology and by i n d u s t r y  and t echno l ­
ogy. The G u i l b e r t i a n  t a c t i c a l  r e v o l u t i o n  demolished t h e  
c a r d i n a l  m i l i t a r y  t e n e t  of Eighteenth  Century l i m i t e d  w a r  
d o c t r i n e ,  namely t h a t  one army could not  move w i t h  s u f f i ­
c i e n t  d i s p a t c h  t o  e n c i r c l e  an d e s t r o y  ano the r .  I t  had as 
w e l l  made t h e  need f o r  a F r e d e r i c k i a n ,  r o b o t - l i k e  army of 
m e r c e n a r i e s  o b s o l e t e  as  w e l l .  I n  t u r n ,  t h e  Min ie -bu l l e t  
r i f l e ,  t h e  cu lmina t ion  of t h e  g radua l  s h i f t  toward f i repower  
as  d o m i n a t i n g  t h e  b a t t l e f i e l d  s i n c e  t h e  end of t h e  Seven­
t e e n t h  C e n t u r y ,  r e n d e r e d  n o t  o n l y  t h e  f o r m a l  t a c t i c a l  
s y s t e m s  o b s o l e t e  b u t  a l s o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of  command and 
l e a d e r s h i p .  And it l a u n c h e d  t h e  armies of t h e  t r a n s -
A t l a n t i c  m i l i t a r y  community on t o  t h e  f i r s t  arms race;  
weapons would be r e d e f i n e d  and improved no t  e v e r y  couple  of 
hundred  of y e a r s  o r  more as  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  b u t  now e v e r y  
f i f t e e n  o r  less. However, t o  t h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  of m i l i t a r y  
o f f i c e r s  and t h e o r i s t s ,  u n t i l  World War I ,  t h e  f u l l  impact 
of s u c h  r a d i c a l  change w a s  a t  b e s t ,  i l l - u n d e r s t o o d  and i n  
t h e  main ignored.  
POSTSCRIPT 

The An tebe l lum f r o n t i e r  e x p e r i e n c e s  of t h e  American 
c a v a l r y  had no d i r e c t  e f f e c t  upon t h e  development of mounted 
warfare  p r a c t i c e  du r ing  t h e  C i v i l  War. Both Confedera te  and 
Union ho r se  s o l d i e r s  g r a d u a l l y  adapted t o  t h e  dense woodland 
t e r r a i n  of t h e  E a s t e r n  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  th rough t h e  use  of 
d i s m o u n t e d  tact ics .  Y e t ,  t h e  charges  and t h e  arme blanche  
c o n t i n u e d  t o  dominate formal  Confederate  and Union c a v a l r y  
p r a c t i c e  u n t i l  1864.  The s o u t h e r n e r s  achieved  more s u c c e s s  
i n i t i a l l y  due t o  t h e  s imple f a c t  t h a t  Confederate  m i l i t a r y  
commanders had t o  use  t h e i r  mounted v o l u n t e e r s  due t o  t h e  
i n i t i a l  a b s e n c e  of any m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  The North,  
however, b l e s s e d  ( o r  more a p t l y ,  c u r s e d )  wi th  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
A n t e b e l l u m  a rmy  o r g a n i z a t i o n  d u t i f u l l y ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
European  c a v a l r y  d o c t r i n e ,  blocked t h e  format ion  of s ta te  
h o r s e  u n i t s .  Only p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  and t h e  demands of 
f i e l d  commanders f o r  c a v a l r y  caused t h e  m i l i t a r y ’ s  s e n i o r  
l e a d e r s h i p  t o  begrudgingly accep t  such t r o o p s .  
T h e  i n i t i a l  Southern s u p e r i o r i t y  i n  t h e  l a r g e  scale use  
o f  c a v a l r y  s t e m m e d  d i r e c t l y  f rom s u p p o r t  f rom s e n i o r  
C o n f e d e r a t e  commanders f o r  t h e i r  h o r s e  s o l d i e r s .  Thus, 
C o n f e d e r a t e  c a v a l r y  pe r fo rmed  b e t t e r  i n  t h e  f i e l d  due t o  
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r e t a i n i n g  t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n t e g r i t y  (Union reg iments ,  i n  
c o n t r a s t ,  were broken up and s c a t t e r e d  among v a r i o u s  larger 
u n i t s )  and b e t t e r  l e a d e r s h i p ,  Confederate  Capta in  John N. 
Opie  e x p r e s s e d  v e r y  w e l l  t h e  i n i t i a l  low op in ion  he ld  by 
both sou the rn  and no r the rn  m i l i t a r y  men of ho r se  s o l d i e r s .  
It w a s  t h e  custom of t h e  i n f a n t r y  t o  t a u n t  
a n d  jeer  t h e  c a v a l r y  whenever  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  
a r o s e .  They c a l l e d  them,  t h e  ' B u t t e r m i l k  Ran­
g e r s ' ,  I f  t h e  c a v a l r y  w a s  going forward,  t h e y  a l l  
c r i e d  o u t ,  ' N o  f i g h t  t o d a y ,  t h e  ' B u t t e r m i l k  
R a n g e r s '  are going t o  t h e  F r o n t ' .  I f  t h e y  were 
g o i n g  t o  t h e  rear ,  t h e y  shouted 'The Bu t t e rmi lk  
R a n g e r s '  r u n n i n g  f rom t h e  y a n k s ,  lookout  f o r  a 
b a t t l e .  70 
I t  w a s  s u c h  s t u n t s  as Colonel J e b  S t u a r t ' s  1 8 6 2  r i d e  
a r o u n d  G e n e r a l  McClellan' s Army of t h e  Potomac du r ing  t h e  
P e n i n s u l a r  campaign which g r e a t l y  improved t h e  morale of 
C o n f e d e r a t e  c a v a l r y .  I n  t u r n ,  rebel  h o r s e  u n i t s  won a 
measure of suppor t  from s e n i o r  Confederate  g e n e r a l s .  Y e t ,  
t h e  South f a i l e d  t o  develop any advances i n  c a v a l r y  tact ics ;  
h o r s e  s o l d i e r s  were w a s t e d  on u n p r o d u c t i v e  r a i d s .  Such 
e x p e r i e n c e s - - h a r d  c h a r g i n g  u n i t s  s c o r i n g  a few q u i c k  
successes- - i s  bu t  of l i t t l e  s u b s t a n t i a l  m i l i t a r y  va lue .  Only 
t h e  C o n f e d e r a t e  g u e r i l l a  leader ,  Genera l  Bedford F o r r e s t  
d e v e l o p e d  a form of  h i g h l y  mobile mounted i n f a n t r y  as an  
a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  or thodox c a v a l r y  tact ics .  The t r a d i t i o n a l  
l ack  of  f i r e p o w e r  of h o r s e  s o l d i e r s  and  t h e  l o g i s t i c a l  
p r o b l e m s  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  a c a v a l r y  f i e l d  f o r c e  c r i p p l e d  
F o r r e s t ' s  e f f o r t s  a t  d e v i s i n g  a h i g h l y  mobile Confedera te  
s t r i ke  fo rce .71  
I 
I 
I 
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In 1864, during the wilderness campaign, General 

Sheridan radically altered Union military practice. 

Essentially his thrust toward Richmond was not a raid, 

rather, his sole purpose was to draw out and destroy 

Confederate mounted units. The real break-through in Union 

cavalry, came with Brevet Major-General James Harrison 

Wilson. Incredibly, only twenty-three years old, in 

December, 1864, during the Battle of Nashville, Wilson's 

cavalry forces, fighting both mounted and dismounted and 

exploiting the enormous fire power of their seven-shot 

Spencer carbines, played the key role in annihilating 

General Hood's invading army. The culmination of Union 

innovative cavalry tactics was Wilson's 1865 Selma expedi­

tion. Combining firepower and mobility with the simple 

Napoleonic logistical solution of living off the land, 

Wilson's cavalry army destroyed the last major industrial 

center of the confederacy, crushed Forrest's army and 

captured Selma, protected by some of the most formidable 

defenses of the Civil War.7* While there was no direct link 

to the Antebellum army's frontier experience, the innova­

tions of Wilson were of the same sort as earlier army 

officers' ad hoc solutions to the difficulties of western 

and southeastern border control. Thus while the French-

Austrian school of war, overall failed during the course of 

the Civil War, professionalism allowed for the development 

of innovative and dedicated officers. 
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The development of military professionalism was by no 
means a complete success. Certainly, the vigorous and 
frequently virulent politicking of even senior officers in 
the public domain, for position within the Army was not 
conducive to the achievement of political isolation of the 
military as required by the tenets of professionalism. In 
the 1 8 2 0 s  and 1 8 3 0 s  professionalism by-and-large was 
practiced by Army officers in their official capacity as 
soldiers but not in their own private sphere. Slowly, 
nonetheless, as more West Pointers entered the officer 
corps, professionalism grew substantially in dominating, 
however imperfectly, the perceptions and beliefs of the 
Army's leaders. Moreover, a strong, administratively 
centralized Army emerged, which unlike its pre-War of 1 8 1 2  
predecessor, was fully capable of warding off the attacks of 
its many critics and riding out fluctuations in popular 
opinion toward the professional military establishment. The 
Army which emerged in the years 1 8 1 5 - 1 8 2 1  would not alter 
its essential mission, its professionalism or its doctrine 
until late in the Civil War. It remained until then, a 
modern, progressive military service, the embodiment of the 
French-Austrian school of war. 
-- 
CHAPTER I1 

THE FRENCH-AUSTRIAN SCHOOL OF WAR: 

STRATEGY, TACTICS AND CAVALRY WARFARE 
Part I 

Two great war-fighting systems emerged from the wake of 
the Napoleonic Wars. For the preponderance of the Nine­
teenth Century, military science in Europe and the United 
States was dominated by the tenets of the French-Austrian 
school of War-1 Within its ranks could be numbered such 
luminaries of the new science of strategy as Archduke 
Charles of Austria, Colonel Henry Halleck of the United 
States and Colonel Patrick MacDougall of Great Britain. Its 
grandmaster was Baron Antoine Henri de Jornini of Switzerland 
and France, whose clear, precise and traditionally-grounded 
writings served as the foundation of the nascent concepts of 
military professionalism, science and education on both 
sides of the Atlantic Ocean.2 The other school of strategy 
was that of Prussia, and was led by General Karl von 
Clausewitz, whose writings would only begin to have influ­
ence on the trans-Atlantic military community after France's 
crushing defeat in 1870. In the Antebellum era, Clausewitz 
was known to some American officers (his seminal treatise, 
On War, is listed in Halleck's bibliography to Elements of 
Military Art and Science for example), but generally was not 
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influential since the Prussian's writings constituted such a 

radical departure from the orthodox military tradition.3 

The French-Austrian school of strategy constituted the 
conservative military reaction to the excesses of the French 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. It embodied the conserv­
ative reaction against the legacy of the French Revolution 
as manifested by the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Fundament­
ally, as the keystone of the French-Austrian school of war, 
Jomini and his followers concluded that the Napoleonic Wars 
were an historical fluke, a brief retreat into the ideo­
logically-motivated style of the earlier Thirty Years War. 
They advocated that the Eighteenth Century limited-war 
tradition should be restored so that wars would once again 
be limited in purpose and scope. Essentially, the French-
Austrian school failed to come to grips with the militant 
nationalism, the development of citizen armies, the impor­
tance of ideology and the increasing importance of economics 
and technology in determining the outcome of armed hostili­
ties. These innovative aspects of the French Revolutionary 
and Napoleonic Wars were not comprehensible to traditional­
ists like Jomini, who expected the profession of arms to 
resume its function as an increasingly scientific and yet 
deeply heroic and aristocratic discipline. 
As a second fundamental conclusion, future wars would 
not assume the colossal scale of the Napoleonic Wars. Army 
size would shrink to the proper size of fifty to two hundred 
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thousand men. Such small armies would accommodate fully the 

needs of professional military services with only limited 

requirements for reserve forces, Such numbers reflected the 

optimum size of a military force which could be commanded 

and directed with orthodox principles of command and 
leadership doctrine, A warrior commander could, with 
traditional line-of-sight techniques and without the 
necessity (or nuisance) of a large staff and more complex, 
sub-army formations such as divisions OK corps, direct no 
more than fifty or so thousand men. Essentially, the 
warfighting system of the Antebellum American Army was that 
of the French-Austrian school. In turn, the French-Austrian 
school, in the main, was a slightly updated version of 
Eighteenth Century limited war. The goal of limited warfare 
was to minimize, to the greatest possible extent, the cost 
to society of war by insulating it from its worst and most 
destructive effects. This same goal motivated the profes­
sional soldiers of the post-Napoleonic era, in their quest 
for a cleaner, more scientific warfare. 4 
Strategically, warfare was, from the Seventeenth 

Century on, essentially a �unction of siegecraft until the 

French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. None of the 

uncertainties or hazards of pitched battle in unfamiliar 

enemy country were present in a well executed siege. The 

geometrically precise techniques of siegecraEt were certain 

and highly effective, Armies on the move, on the other 
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hand ,  were s u b j e c t  t o  an i r o n  l a w  of d e c l i n i n g  e f f e c t i v e ­
ness ,  as wear and tear  i n c r e a s e d ,  as t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  of t h e  
p a r a d e  g r o u n d  f l a g g e d  a n d  as  d e s e r t i o n  i n c r e a s e d .  While 
s i e g e c r a f t  c o u l d ,  i f  b u n g l e d ,  r e s u l t  i n  a n  army penned  
between a f o r t r e s s  and an a d v e r s a r y ' s  f i e l d  f o r c e s ,  it w a s  
f a r  less r i s k y  t h a n  open b a t t l e .  
S t i l l  a n o t h e r  b r i c k  i n  t h e  founda t ion  of l i m i t e d  w a r  
l a y  i n  t h e  tact ical  movement of armies. Due t o  t h e  pronoun­
c e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  of E i g h t e e n t h  Century d r i l l  systems,  one 
army could  no t  maneuver w i t h  s u f f i c i e n t  d i s p a t c h  o r  c e l e r i t y  
t o  f o r c e  a second i n t o  b a t t l e  o r  even s u r p r i s e  it. P u r s u i t  
of a r e t r e a t i n g  f o e  w a s  no t  f e a s i b l e ,  save i n  t h e  ex t remely  
rare case of a r o u t .  The danger w a s  t h a t  t h e  pu r su ing  army 
w o u l d  b e  drawn o u t  and  e x t e n d e d  o v e r  many mi l e s ,  t h u s  
p rov id ing  a ve ry  tempting t a r g e t  t o  t h e  enemy.5 
Army m o b i l i t y  w a s  f u r t h e r  imper i l ed  by t h e  p a u c i t y  of 
good roads  and nav igab le  r i v e r s ,  a problem which only  began 
t o  be so lved  by t h e  close of t h e  Nine teenth  Century.  Maps 
w e r e  i n  s h o r t  s u p p l y  a n d  o f  e x c e e d i n g  p o o r  q u a l i t y .  
P r i n c i p l e s  a n d  t echn iques  of army d i r e c t i o n  were t h o s e  of 
l i n e - o f - s i g h t  command; t h e  w a r r i o r  commander w a s ,  due t o  t h e  
p r i m i t i v e  q u a l i t y  of s i g n a l  communications and t h e  absence 
of s t a f f s ,  p e r s o n a l l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  lead h i s  men i n t o  combat. 
Arms t e c h n o l o g y  p l a c e d  l i m i t a t i o n s  on t h e  n a t u r e  of w a r .  
The f l i n t l o c k  musket and bayonet combinat ion,  mandated t h e  
u s e  of h i g h l y  t r a i n e d  and d i s c i p l i n e d  s o l d i e r s ;  t h e  c l o s e  
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o r d e r  n a t u r e  of  b a t t l e  i n  t h e s e  y e a r s ,  compelled by t h e  
l i m i t e d  r a n g e  of  t h e  muske t ,  r e s u l t e d  i n  t h e  f r i g h t f u l l y  
h i g h  a v e r a g e  c a s u a l t y  r a t e  of  be tween  t h i r t y  a n d  f o r t y  
p e r c e n t  p e r  b a t t l e .  The n e e d  f o r  h i g h l y - d i s c i p l i n e d ,  
v e t e r a n  (most men were i n  t h e i r  m i d - t h i r t i e s )  s o l d i e r s  l e d  
commanders t o  p l a c e  a premium on e x p e r i e n c e  over youth,  
p r o f i c i e n c y  o v e r  a g i l i t y  and s t r e n g t h  and d i s c i p l i n e  over  
i n n o v a t i o n .  6 T h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  of a l l  of t h e s e  v a r i e d  
f a c t o r s ,  i n  con junc t ion  wi th  t h e  l i m i t e d  f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  
of a g r a r i a n ,  p r e - i n d u s t r i a l  s tates and t h e  s c a r c i t y  of a l l  
k i n d s  of m i l i t a r y  r e s o u r c e s ,  e s t a b l i s h e d  a s t r o n g  i n c l i n a ­
t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  f r e e  expend i tu re  of manpower i n  b a t t l e . 7  
T h e  F r e n c h - A u s t r i a n  s c h o o l  o f  war, however, d i d  n o t  
simply r e v i v e  E igh teen th  Century war fa re  i n  t o t a l .  I n s t e a d ,  
t h e y  f o r c i b l y  g r a f t e d  upon t h i s  earl ier m i l i t a r y  d o c t r i n e  
N a p o l e o n ' s  e m p h a s i s  o n  t h e  o f f e n s i v e .  T h e  d e f e n s i v e  
c h a r a c t e r  of l i m i t e d  w a r  w a s  t h u s  augmented, i f  on ly  i n  
spirit, by a new emphasis on the offensive; o r  as forcibly 
stated by Jomini:  
B a t t l e  o n c e  r e s o l v e d  upon, be t h e  f i r s t  t o  
a t tack;  i f  t h e  d e f e n s i v e  i s  t o  be avoided i n  t h e  
g e n e r a l  conduct of w a r ,  it i s  e n t i r e l y  unreason­
a b l e  i n  a c t i o n .  I t  i s  a known f a c t  t h a t  t h e  
o f f e n s e ,  besides i t s  tac t ica l  advantages ,  e x c i t e s  
t h e  a r d o r  and  c o u r a g e  of t h e  men. Thus ,  when 
c o m p e l l e d  t o  f i g h t ,  a l w a y s  a d v a n c e  towards t h e  
enemy, u n l e s s  you are under t h e  cover  of impreg­
n a b l e  entrenchments ,  and even t h e n  always manage 
some o u t l e t s  t h a t  w i l l  a l l ow you t o  debouch from 
them. 8 
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The fundamental maxim of grand tactics, according to 
American military writer Jacob R. NPff, was "to attack the 
most vulnerable point of the enemy, which conquered, would 
be the most decisive in terminating the war.9 At the same 
time however, the goal of war remained firmly within the 

limited war tradition--competitive states resorting to the 

use of armed force, when other methods had failed, to 

redress grievances against their neighbors or for limited 

strategical gain such as acquiring, a valuable port or a 

desirable treaty concession.10 

The French-Austrian school of strategy therefore fused 

the defensively centered concept of limited war with 

Napoleon's penchant, for offensive warfare.ll The real 

failure of the French-Austrian school of war, in a strictly 

military sense, was in not understanding how the radical 

changes in tactics brought about by the French Revolutionary 

Wars and later exploited by Napoleon with such outstanding 

success, had in fact washed away much of the bedrock of 
limited war theory.12 This failure of comprehension 
foreshadows the later problem, beginning in the 1840s, of 
how radical technological change, including armament, could 
as well change the practice and nature of warfighting.l3 
Contradiction was the hallmark of the French-Austrian 

school. What thus issued from this marriage of opposites 

was a system of war in which the attack was everything and 

in which the frontal assault was hailed as the true test of 
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an army's martial prowess. At the same time, however, this 

body of military science, with equal emphasis, counseled the 

studious avoidance of pitched battle. Combat was to be 

accepted only when one possessed a decisively superior 

tactical advantage. Furthermore, while championing the 

spirit of the offense, what would in time be called the elan 

vitale, war, in accordance with the tenets of Jominian 

strategy, was waged for limited political objectives and 

goals, in the classic Eighteenth Century manner.14 

The competitive strategical system was that of Prussia 

and General Clausewitz. The Prussian school serves to 
highlight the deficiencies of their competitor's system. 
Inexplicably, it was one of Europe's most traditional and 
autocratic states that pioneered a wholly different school 
of warfighting. A s  the heirs to the grand legacy oE 
Frederick the Great, the shattering defeat at Jena in 1806 
by the upstart French armies was world shattering in its 
impact on the Prussian high command. It was almost incom­
prehensible to the senior Prussian army commanders how the 
ragtag, undisciplined citizen soldiers of France commanded 
by an ex-corporal could so totally whip the once preeminent 
military power of Europe.15 The basic premise of the 
revamped Prussian warfighting machine was completely 
contrary to the French-Austrian brand of military science. 
Wars were defined as being struggles between not only 
warring nations, but warring peoples as well. Consequently, 
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huge conscript armies would be required, dependent upon the 

availability of well trained, ready reserves; the regular 

army would therefore not bear the brunt oE the war alone but 

instead would serve as the leader of a collective national 

effort. Fundamentally, the Prussian concept of war was 

militantly aggressive; the quaint gentlemanly notion of 

limited war being shunted aside. In addition, the concept 

of soldier as robot, as in Frederick's day was forever 

replaced by a new and radically di�ferent emphasis on 

teamwork. Prussia, became the prototype of the modern 

nation in arms, with the army on a permanent footing.l6 

United States Army warfighting doctrine was completely 

Jominian in the Antebellum era. Tactical theory, whether 

artillery, infantry and later, cavalry, were wholely based 

on standard French manuals, translated into English. 

Winfield Scott's 1818 and 1836 infantry manuals represented 

no more than formal ratification of the 1816 and 1833 French 

works. 18 

Part I1 

The classical tradition of mounted warfare constituted 

a very traditional and aristocratic body of military 

doctrine, increasingly out-of-place in the post-Napoleonic 

era of scientific warfare.19 The cavalry was traditionally 

regarded as morally superior to a11 other branches of army 

service on the ground that it was blessed with inherently 

7 1  

g r e a t e r  endowments of a r i s t o c r a t i c  v i r t u e ,  honor and e l a n  
t h a n  t h e  more p l e b i a n  i n f a n t r y  o r  t e c h n o c r a t i c  a r t i l l e r y .  
The h a l l m a r k s  of t h e  mounted s e r v i c e  were i t s  z e a l ,  i t s  
n o b i l i t y ,  i t s  r i c h e r  sense  of honor and i t s  s u p e r i o r  s t y l e  
and audac i ty .  
The g o l d e n  o r  c l a s s i c a l  a g e  of  European c a v a l r y  r a n  
from t h e  1640s t o  1815.  I n  t h e  mid-Seventeenth Century,  
G u s t a v a s  Adolphus of  Sweden a l m o s t  s ing lehanded ly  r e s u r ­
r e c t e d  t h e  u s e  of  c a v a l r y  as a n  e f f e c t i v e  t o o l  of  w a r .  
P r i o r  t o  t h e  c lass ical  age ,  c a v a l r y  had been i n  a s t a t e  of 
severe d e c l i n e .  Its u t i l i t y  as an e f f e c t i v e  t n i l i t a r y  weapon 
had w i t h e r e d  d u e  t o  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of  v a s t l y  improved 
missile weapons and t h e  r e v i v a l  of t h e  phalanx. Gustavas,  
through t h e  development of combined arms d o c t r i n e ,  developed 
a means of r e d r e s s i n g  t h e  ba lance  of war fa re  so as t o  a l l o w  
f o r  a renewed, if more c i rcumspect ,  r o l e  f o r  mounted t r o o p s .  
S n a l l  l i g h t - w e i g h t  cannon ( f a l c o n e t s )  were in t roduced  i n  
combination with detachments of musketeers  t o  provide direct 
f i r e  suppor t  f o r  t h e  Swedish c a v a l r y .  Whi le  t h i s  t echn ique ,  
due  t o  improvements  i n  a r t i l l e r y ,  of mixing i n f a n t r y  and 
c a v a l r y  i n  t h e  same tact ical  format ion ,  below t h a t  of t h e  
d i v i s i o n  w a s  declared taboo by later c a v a l r y  t h e o r i s t s ,  it 
was n o n e t h e l e s s ,  a s i g n i f i c a n t  b r e a k - t h r o u g h  i n  mounted 
war fa re  i n  i t s  day. The key t o  Swedish c a v a l r y  s u c c e s s  l a y  
i n  t h i s  e f f e c t i v e  use  of missile f i r e  i n  d i s r u p t i n g  opposing 
i n f a n t r y  fo rma t ions  p r i o r  t o  launching  t h e  h o r s e  s o l d i e r s  on 
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their headlong, and hopefully, decisive charge. The net 

effect was a dramatic revival of cavalry effectiveness.20 

Insofar as the specifics of mounted warfare were 

concerned, Gustavas made a crucial advance, perhaps the 

single most significant one prior to the Civil War, in 
cavalry organization by reworking his horse soldiers into a 
disciplined and controlled fighting force. In order to 
maximize their shock potential, Swedish cavalry was re­
organized into formal military units, expressly designed to 
engage the enemy as a tightly disciplined and controlled 
military force and not as a mob on horseback. To this end, 
cavalry was, for the first time, deployed in a linear 
formation of three ranks, replacing the traditional, densely 
clustered cavalcade assemblage. Tactically, cavalry 
deployment would, over the next two-hundred-and-fifty years, 
be largely a matter of gradually reducing mounted formations 
to double and single rank formations. In regards to 
armament, Gustavas authored a revival of the a r m e  blanche, 
or in this case, the saber, as the quintessential calvary-
man's weapon, a position that the sword would retain into 

the 1930s.21 

The next great era of cavalry development was initiated 

by Frederick the Great of Prussia. Inheriting one of 

Europe's worst mounted services, noted for fat troopers on 

slow plow horses, Frederick transformed his cavalry into the 

most effective horse units ever created in the classical 
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t r a d i t i o n .  The key improvement l a y  i n  t h e  u s e  of a r t i l l e r y .  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  F r e d e r i c k  c r e a t e d  t h e  f i r s t  t r u e  h o r s e  
a r t i l l e r y .  Consequently,  t h e  P r u s s i a n  mounted s e r v i c e  w a s  
provided wi th  i t s  own o r g a n i c  f i r e  suppor t .  Horse a r t i l l e r y  
c o n s i s t e d  of small, h i g h l y  mobile cannon drawn by teams of 
f l e e t  h o r s e s  b e s t r i d e  w h i c h  rode  t h e  gunners  r a t h e r  t h a n  
b e i n g  t r a n s p o r t e d  i n  a s e p a r a t e  wagon. Thus hard-moving 
mounted u n i t s ,  f o r  t h e  f i r s t  t i m e ,  were a s s u r e d  of having 
ready a r t i l l e r y  suppor t  capable  of marching t h e i r  own h igh  
r a t e  o f  movement .  T h i s  s y s t e m  r e p r e s e n t e d  a f u r t h e r  
enhancement  of  t h e  c r u c i a l  p r i n c i p l e  of  combined arms; 
t a c t i c a l l y ,  t h e  ho r se  a r t i l l e r y  se rved  t o  p u l v e r i z e  opposing 
i n f a n t r y  fo rma t ions  s o  as t o  f a c i l i t a t e  an  e f f e c t i v e  c a v a l r y  
a t t a c k .  22 
F r e d e r i c k ' s  c a v a l r y  a t t a i n e d  a l e v e l  of t r a i n i n g  and 
o r g a n i z a t i o n  n e v e r  a c h i e v e d  b e f o r e  o r  s i n c e  by classical  
European  mounted u n i t s .  Due t o  t h e  e f f o r t s  of t h e  f i r s t  
m i l i t a r y  v e t e r i n a r y  s e r v i c e  a n d  t h e  f i r s t  army b reed ing  
f a r m s ,  t h e  P r u s s i a n  c a v a l r y  w a s  p r o v i d e d  w i t h  e x c e l l e n t  
h o r s e s .  T a c t i c a l l y ,  t h i s  a d v a n t a g e  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  a n  
a b i l i t y  of P r u s s i a n  ho r se  u n i t s  t o  charge  e x c l u s i v e l y  a t  t h e  
g a l l o p ,  over  unprecedented d i s t a n c e s  of up t o  e ight-hundred 
y a r d s .  Such breakneck speed al lowed t h e  P r u s s i a n  mounted 
t r o o p s  t o  r e a c h  o p p o s i n g  i n f a n t r y  and a r t i l l e r y  be fo re  a 
second v o l l e y  could be d i scha rged  a g a i n s t  %hem. The t r e n d  
toward p l a c i n g  pr imary emphasis on t h e  arme blanche  as t h e  
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cavalry's weapon, was continued by Frederick; pistols and 

carbines were therefore relegated to such secondary tasks as 
reconnaissance and guard duty. To enhance the cavalry's 
shock effect, Frederick popularized the trend toward 
outfitting the largest percentage of his troopers as heavy 
cavalry or cuirassiers, so named due to their distinctive 
breastplates. It was in this period that the tendency 
toward specialization of cavalry into light, heavy and 
dragoon units jelled. Tactically, the cavalry, under 
Frederick, continued to place a key emphasis on the charge; 
all other duties being demoted to a distinctly secondary 
role.23 As the Prussian warrior king himself put it, laying 
down at once both the fundamental principle of cavalry 
warfare as well as its most salient and essential myth: 

"with the cavalry attack it is not the size of the horse but 

the impetuosity of the charge that turns the scales".... 24 

The third and last great cavalry innovator was Napoleon 

of France. The pxe-Revolutionary French cavalry was an 

exceedingly ineffective branch of service even though its 

schools of mounted warfare were without peer in Eighteenth 
Century Europe. The actual worth of French cavalry in 
combat, however, was negligible, due to exceedingly poor 
horseflesh, deficient organization and mediocre officers. 
The key changes introduced in the French cavalry by Napoleon 
lay mainly in organization ( f o r  the first time mounted units 
were concentrated into brigade and even divisional size for-
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mations), unit specialization and the strategic application 
of mounted troopers in intelligence gathering. At no time 
during the assorted Napoleonic Wars did French mounted units 
enjoy the benefits of prime quality mounts or even an ade­
quate supply of horses of any kind. Correspondingly, 
charges had to be made exclusively at the trot rather than 
the gallop and the employment of cavalry in battle was held 
to a minimum, so as to keep as many animals fit as possible. 
Tactically, Napoleon authored no new model of mounted 

warfare. Rather, as in other tactical aspects of war, 

Napoleon was content to borrow wholesale from the earlier 

French Revolutionary generals. Napoleon simply concentrated 

much more of everything--cavalry, artillery and infantry--

in his battles, relying on his personal brilliance at 

tactical and strategical management.25 

The overriding factor in determining the way that 
cavalry was utilized in battle was the type of armament it 
carried. The cardinal weakness of mounted troops, was in 
fact, its extremely ineffectual armament. Granted that all 
weapons were exceedingly limited in range and lethality 
(some infantry commanders, for example, considered the 
musket little better than a fire stick, useful f o r  making a 
disquieting noise and slightly more s o ,  as a convenient 
place to attach a bayonet), cavalry armament was even less 
effective. Three distinctive types of weapons were employed 
by mounted troops: firearms (pistols and carbines), lances 
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and swords. I n  de te rmining  weapon e f f e c t i v e n e s s ,  writers of 
t h i s  p e r i o d  fused  t e c h n i c a l  performance wi th  p e r c e p t i o n s  of 
how such a dev ice  s tood  i n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  such a r i s t o c r a t i c  
v a l u e s  a s  a n  e l a n  a n d  h o n o r .  U n i v e r s a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  
d i s t i n c t l y  i n f e r i o r  t o  t h e  l a n c e  of saber, f i r e a r m s  were 
l a r g e l y  c o n f i n e d  t o  s e c o n d a r y  t a s k s  such as s c o u t i n g  and 
p i c k e t  d u t y  a n d  t h u s  o c c u p i e d  t h e  l o w e s t  r u n g  i n  t h e  
h i e ra rchy .  26 B a s i c a l l y ,  " t h e  p i s t o l  can on ly  be cons ide red  
as a weapon of necess i ty , ' '  accord ing  t o  Count von Bismark of 
t h e  P r u s s i a n  c a v a l r y ,  f o r  " i ts  f i r e  i s  u n c e r t a i n ,  s h o r t ,  and 
se ldom e f f i c a c i o u s  .It27 As f o r  t h e  smoothbore c a r b i n e  or 
musketoon, it w a s  "an impor tan t  weapon f o r  t h e  a t t a c k  of t h e  
s k i r m i s h e r s  i n  extended l i n e , "  bu t  o the rwise  n o t  a u s e f u l  
c a v a l r y  weapon.28  Only t h e  l o w l y ,  j a c k - o f - a l l - t r a d e s  
dragoons were cus tomar i ly  equipped wi th  t h e  c a r b i n e  and i n  
t u r n  expec ted  t o  f i g h t ,  i n  a f a s h i o n ,  wh i l e  dismounted. The 
t r u e  cavalryman, however, had l i t t l e ,  i f  any, a f f e c t i o n  f o r  
t h i s  weapon and would have f u l l y  concurred w i t h  Jomini w h e n  
he wrote  : 
I do no t  know what t h e  c a r b i n e  i s  good f o r ;  
s i n c e  a body armed wi th  it must h a l t  i f  t h e y  wish 
t o  f i r e  w i t h  any accuracy ,  and t h e y  are t h e n  i n  a 
f a v o r a b l e  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  enemy t o  a t t a c k .  
T h e r e  are f e w  marksmen who can w i t h  any accuracy  
f i r e  a musket  w h i l e  on h o r s e b a c k  and  i n  r a p i d
motion. 29 
T h i s  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  f i rearms  w a s  r o o t e d  i n  c a v a l r y  
h i s t o r y  a n d  e x p e r i e n c e .  G u s t a v u s ' s  r e v i v a l  of t h e  arme 
b l a n c h e  w a s  d o n e  p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u s e  of  t h e  p ronounced  
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inaccuracy and lack of range of the firearms of his day. 
The horse pistol was a true monster of a weapon. Virtually 
a miniature cannon, it weighted up to six pounds (about the 
same as a modern infantry rifle), had a hellish kick to it 
when it indeed actually discharged and its effective range 
was less than fifteen yards. The butt of the horse pistol 
was therefore usually bulbous in shape and heavily weighted 
so that it could easily be wielded as a club for the purpose 
of bashing an adversary's skull. Otherwise, one literally 

had to have the barrel touching one's opponent in order to 

insure registering a kill when discharging this gun. 

Furthermore, attempting to fire a pistol accurately while 

sitting astride a moving horse at the trot, let alone at the 

gallop, while simultaneously attempting to stay in formation 

bordered on the impossible. Trying the same stunt with a 

musketoon simply lay beyond the province of most mortals. 

As for the effective range of the smoothbore carbine it was 

at best no more than seventy-five yards. Since both species 
of firearms were flintlocks, with an exposed primer for the 

ignition powder for the primary charge inside the weapon, 

connected by a touchhole, they could never be employed in 

adverse weather. Still another shortcoming was the ever 

present danger that a poorly loaded gun, or  one with an 
inferior grade of powder could easily blow up.30 This lack 

of firepower of traditionally armed cavalry produced, out of 

experience, the following maxim of war, as stated by 
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Lieutenant -Colonel  George T. Denison of t h e  Canadian Army, 
t h a t  c a v a l r y  "has no f i r e ,  and t h e r e f o r e  i s  n o t  s u i t a b l e  f o r  
defense ,  and can only resist an a t t a c k  by making an a n t i c i ­
p a t o r y  o n s e t  . G u s t a v u s ' s  t e c h n i q u e  of  i n t e r s p e r s i n g  
m u s k e t e e r s  among h i s  mounted s q u a d r o n s  o r  F r e d e r i c k ' s  
deve lopmen t  of  h o r s e  a r t i l l e r y  were no more t h a n  p a r t i a l  
s o l u t i o n s  t o  t h i s  p r e s s i n g  l a c k  of  f i r e p o w e r  o r  mounted 
u n i t s .  Thus,  ho r se  s o l d i e r s  were compelled t o  r e l y  l a r g e l y  
on edged weapons, b e s t  s u i t e d  f o r  use  i n  t h e  charge .  
An a l t e r n a t i v e ,  and far more noble ,  c a v a l r y  weapon w a s  
t h e  h i g h l y  c o n t r o v e r s i a l  l a n c e ,  which reappeared  i n  Western 
E u r o p e  i n  t h e  m i d d l e  o f  t h e  E i g h t e e n t h  C e n t u r y .  I t s  
immediate o r i g i n  l a y  w i t h  t h e  Asiatic, semi-nomadic t r ibes­
men of t h e  P o l i s h  and Russian s t eppes .  Made of hardwood, 
p r e f e r a b l y  oak o r  a sh ,  it f e a t u r e d  a sharpened metal t i p  and 
f r e q u e n t l y  as w e l l ,  metal s h e a t h i n g  f o r  t h e  forward t h i r d  of 
i t s  l e n g t h  so as t o  prevent  it from be ing  hacked o f f  by a 
s w o r d .  S u c h  weapons w e r e  i n v a r i a b l y  a d o r n e d  w i t h  t h e  
c o l o r f u l  r eg imen ta l  pennant.  P r e c i s e l y  due t o  t h e  l a n c e ' s  
s u p e r i o r  l e n g t h  and i t s  supposedly g r e a t e r  f e a r - g e n e r a t i o n  
c a p a c i t y  t h a n  t h e  s a b e r ,  more t h a n  a few c a v a l r y  commanders 
p r e f e r r e d  t o  send t h e i r  l a n c e r s  i n  f i r s t  a g a i n s t  t h e  enemy 
l i n e ,  fo l lowed by t h e  heavy cava l ry .  T h i s  g r e a t e r  psycho­
l o g i c a l  terror of t h e  l a n c e  w a s  a r e s u l t  of t h e  "apprehen­
s i o n  of  b e i n g  run  through ( ( w h i c h ) )  has  a powerful e f f e c t  
upon a man."32 But on ly  a few z e a l o t s ,  a t  any g iven  t i m e ,  
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ever  b e l i e v e d  one could a c t u a l l y  f i g h t  a c a v a l r y  melee w i t h  
l a n c e s  a g a i n s t  s a b e r s  a n d  have  t h e  fo rmer  p r e v a i l .  The 
l a n c e  w a s  s imply t o o  clumsy and t o o  unwieldy f o r  c l o s e - i n ,  
mounted horse- to-horse f i g h t i n g .  3 3  
S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  "a l a n c e  i s  u s e l e s s  i n  a melee", accord­
i n g  t o  c a v a l r y  e x p e r t  C a p t a i n  L.E.  Nolan  of t h e  B r i t i s h  
Army, " t h e  moment t h e  l a n c e r  p u l l s  up and impuls ive  power is  
s topped ,  t h e  i n s t a n t  t h e  power of t h e  weapon i s  gone.34 The 
l a n c e  w a s  a whol ly  o f f e n s i v e  weapon accord ing  t o  Bismark, 
"only a p p l i c a b l e  t o  t h e  a t t a c k  and t h e  charge.  1'35 A major 
d i s a d v a n t a g e  of  t h e  lance w a s  t h a t  it t o o k  f a r  more t i m e  
t h a n  t h e  customary two y e a r s  of b a s i c  c a v a l r y  i n s t r u c t i o n  t o  
t r a i n  a t r o o p e r  i n  i t s  u s e .  " T h i s  i s  a most  e f f i c i e n t  
weapon when u s e d  by a t h o r o u g h l y  t r a i n e d  man," cau t ioned  
Bismark ,  " b u t  i n  t h e  hands of new levies it is p e r f e c t l y  
wor th less . "36  The lance enjoyed f i t s  and s p u r t s  of e n t h u s i ­
asm by r a t h e r  f i c k l e  c a v a l r y  leaders. I n  g e n e r a l ,  it w a s  
not terribly effective; its limitations virtually out­ 

weighed, i n  p r a c t i c a l  terms, i t s  a l l e g e d  f r i g h t f u l n e s s .  Y e t  
it possessed  a s t r o n g  v i s c e r a l  appea l  t o  t h e  a r i s t o c r a t i c ­
a l l y  minded p r o f e s s i o n a l  c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r  which t r anscended  
such mundane i s s u e s  as t ac t i ca l  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  .37 
T h e  p r e m i e r  c a v a l r y  weapon w a s  o f  c o u r s e  t h e  arrne 
b l a n c h e :  The  saber o r  sword.  I n  o r d e r  t o  master t h i s  
d e c e p t i v e l y  s i m p l e  weapon, some n i n e  months of i n t e n s i v e  
p r a c t i c e  w a s  devoted t o  l e a r n i n g  t h e  innumerable i n t r i c a c i e s  
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of t h e  s a b e r  d a n c e  or d r i l l .  To t h e  popular  mind, fancy  
uniforms, mighty s t e e d s  and t h e  f l a s h i n g  g l i n t  of c o l d  steel  
c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  images  of  what  c a v a l r y  s h o u l d  b e .  To 
ex t remely  c o n s e r v a t i v e  c a v a l r y  commanders of t h e  E igh teen th  
a n d  N i n e t e e n t h  C e n t u r i e s ,  t h e  saber was wi thou t  pee r ;  t h e  
p i s t o l  and  t h e  c a r b i n e  second-ra te  i n t e r l o p e r s  of l i m i t e d  
u t i l i t y .  Such p e r s p e c t i v e ,  which a t  times bordered  on t h e  
m y s t i c a l ,  d i d  i n  f a c t  make p e r f e c t l y  good s e n s e  i n  an era of 
e x c e p t i o n a l l y  s h o r t  r a n g e  m u s k e t s  a n d  h i g h l y  e x p o s e d ,  
t i g h t l y  packed  i n f a n t r y  f o r m a t i o n s ;  a n  a g e  i n  which t h e  
c a v a l r y  s t i l l  had a f a i r  chance of succeeding  i n  i t s  r o l e  as 
shock. 38 
Even i n  t h e  Eighteenth  Century,  t h e  s a b e r  w a s  h e l d  t o  
be more u s e f u l  f o r  t h e  i n f l i c t i o n  of p sycho log ica l  r a t h e r  
t h a n  p h y s i c a l  i n j u r y ,  bu t  t h e  d r o i t  and e f f o r t l e s s  motion of 
t h e  swordsman on horseback i s  f a r  more t h e  s t u f f  of legend 
t h a n  of  h i s t o r i c a l  r e a l i t y .  Such f e a t s  w e r e  p e r f e c t l y  
p o s s i b l e  i f  one I s  t a r g e t  were meekly s t a n d i n g  still, one I s  
mount n o t  unduly a c t i v e  and o n e ' s  weapon indeed had an  edge 
on it. Such combination of f o r t u i t o u s  c i r cums tances  w a s  a11 
but  unheard of i n  t h e  customary melee o r  i n  c a v a l r y  v e r s u s  
i n f a n t r y  engagements . The hor se  provided a v e r y  u n s t a b l e  
p l a t fo rm;  t h e  t r o o p e r  i n  b a t t l e  w a s  i n  a c o n s t a n t  s ta te  of 
mot ion  a s  were h i s  mount and  h i s  a d v e r s a r i e s .  A goodly 
p o r t i o n  of  t h e  saber d a n c e  w a s  d i r e c t e d  t o  t r a i n i n g  t h e  
would-be t r o o p e r  how t o  f i g h t  i n  t h e  environment of s e v e r a l  
a 1  
different but interrelated planes of space with geometric­

ally precise patterns of sword play in the course of the 

very jumbled and exceedingly disorienting cavalry melee. 

Rarely did a trooper have more than a few opportunities for 

a head-on clear shot. Rather, the norm were glancing blows 

which rarely proved fatal or even disabling. The tradi­

tional heavy cavalry garb afforded ample protection against 

the saber, further diminishing its effectiveness. Moreover, 

it was virtually impossible to maintain a truly sharp edge 

on a saber while in the field. And it was deemed a breach 

of the rules of war to employ a grinder to give a sharp edge 

to a sword. 

Despite the clear ineffectiveness of the saber, cavalry 
men remained, in effect, spiritually wedded to the arme 
blanche. Even the later introduction of revolvers and 
breechloading, magazine carbines failed to shake most 
cavalry leaders in their faith in the deadliness of cold 
steel .  The mys t i ca l  devot ion t o  t h e  saber long a f t e r  Samuel 
Colt had manufactured his first cap and ball revolver had 
little if anything to do with a carefully reasoned and 
rationally based evaluation of the comparative merits and 
demerits of each category of cavalry weapons and the 
corresponding tactics that would best exploit their particu­
lar characteristics. Rather, from the mid-Seventeenth 
Century o n ,  the cavalry branch of service came to be 
dominated by a very aristocratic brand of officer, self-
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c l o i s t e r e d  as it were from t h e  d i s a g r e e a b l e  changes i n  t h e  
t e c h n o l o g y  o f  w a r ,  beginning w i t h  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  of t h e  
f l i n t l o c k  musket  and  r u n n i n g  through t h e  more deadly  by-
p r o d u c t s  of  t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  Revolut ion.  Th i s  overwhelming 
commitment t o  t r a d i t i o n  r e g a r d l e s s  of m i l i t a r y  and s o c i a l  
change  w a s  t h e  h a l l m a r k  of  t h e  b l u e b l o o d e d  European and 
American c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r  .39 
T h e  t y p e s  of c a v a l r y  armament d e s c r i b e d  above, engen­
dered t h e  deve lopmen t  of s p e c i a l i z e d  mounted f o r m a t i o n s  
t a i l o r e d  so as t o  enhance e i ther  a p a r t i c u l a r  weapon o r  a 
s p e c i f i c  t ac t ica l  role. What were i n  e f f e c t  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  
of t o d a y ' s  main b a t t l e  t a n k  were t h e  armored c u i r a s s i e r s  o r  
heavy c a v a l r y .  Out of n e c e s s i t y ,  a s  w e l l  as t o  enhance 
t h e i r  s h o c k  e f f e c t ,  t h e  c u i r a s s i e r s  rode  t h e  l a r g e s t  and 
h e a v i e s t  h o r s e s .  I n  t h e  y e a r s  immediately preceding  t h e  
C i v i l  War, c o n s i d e r a b l e  d e b a t e  raged among c a v a l r y  e x p e r t s  
as t o  t h e  merits and u t i l i t y  of t h e  c u i r a s s i e r s .  The c rux  of 
t h i s  i s s u e  w a s  w h e t h e r  t h e  a d v a n c e s  i n  weaponry  i n  t h e  
1850s, i n  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  Minnie b u l l e t  r i f l e ,  would so s h i f t  
t h e  b a l a n c e  of  t a c t i c s  i n  f a v o r  of  t h e  i n f a n t r y  as  t o  
l i q u i d a t e  t h e  shock  f u n c t i o n  of heavy c a v a l r y  a l t o g e t h e r .  
T h i s  c o n t r o v e r s y  was t h e  l e a d i n g  i s s u e  w i t h  cavalrymen on 
b o t h  s ides  of  t h e  A t l a n t i c  as t o  t h e  f u t u r e  c h a r a c t e r  of 
t h e i r  branch of s e r v i c e .  The m i n o r i t y  view w a s  propounded 
by,  i n  t h e  main ,  l i g h t  c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r s  such as Capta in  
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Nolan, who rather caustically dismissed the worth of heavy 
cavalry when he wrote: 

Composed of large men in defensive armor, 

mounted on heavy, powerful horses are held in hand 

for a decisive charge on the day of battle, and 

their horses are s o  deficient in speed and 
endurance, being so overweighted that they require
light horse to follow up the enemy they had 
beaten. 4 0  
The scantiness of actual battlefield experience as to 

the deadliness of the weapons served to undercut the 

credibility of the position of the light cavalrymen. 

Moreover, the considerable hold of tradition on cavalry 

doctrine further hindered any effort at modernizing mounted 

warfare. J. Roemer, of the Dutch cavalry, and a passionate 

proponent of the cuirassiers as the elite of the mounted 

service, rejected the minority's position as unsound: 

..substituting fervid inclination for cool 
judgment, they have concluded that henceforth 
there is need but for that one kind of cavalry,

and the one in whose welfare they are particularly 

interested.41 

The dragoons were p r o p e r  members of t h e  c a v a l r y  
fraternity, albeit of distinctly lower military status. 

While trained to fight as skirmishers when dismounted, the 

signifying characteristic of the dragoon was that he could, 

in a pinch, deliver a charge, in lieu of heavy cavalry. In 

addition, the dragoons could be gainfully employed for 

reconnoitering and camp security duties. Historically, 

dragoons, named f o r  their early hand armament or dragons, 
first appeared in the English and French armies in the 
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F i f t e e n t h  C e n t u r y  a s  mounted i n f a n t r y .  Such u n i t s  were 
o r i g i n a l l y  c r e a t e d  t o  provide  a more v e r s a t i l e  and cheaper  
form o f  h o r s e  s o l d i e r  t h a n  t h e  mounted k n i g h t .  By t h e  
N i n e t e e n t h  Century,  however, t h e  dragoons had been l a r g e l y  
s h o r n  of  t h e i r  t a i n t e d  i n f a n t r y  t ra i ts .  Correspondingly ,  
t h e i r  p r o w e s s  a t  d i s m o u n t e d  combat d e c l i n e d  a s  mounted 
d u t i e s  t o o k  i n c r e a s i n g  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  t h e  r o l e  of t h e  
dragoons .4 2  
The dragoons were t h e r e f o r e  no t  mounted i n f a n t r y  i n  t h e  
c l a s s i c a l  E u r o p e a n  d e f i n i t i o n .  T e c h n i c a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
mounted r i f l e s  o r  i n f a n t r y  (depending on t h e  k ind  of small 
arms c a r r i e d )  were h a s t i l y  formed o u t f i t s  c u s t o m a r i l y  
c r e a t e d  d u e  t o  a p r e s s i n g  l o c a l  s h o r t a g e  of f u l l - f l e d g e d  
c a v a l r y  u n i t s .  Mounted i n f a n t r y ,  as unders tood  i n  t h e  f i r s t  
h a l f  o f  t h e  N i n e t e e n t h  C e n t u r y ,  were e s s e n t i a l l y  ground 
p o u n d e r s  i n e l e g a n t l y  p e r c h e d  on  w h a t e v e r  h o r s e f l e s h  w a s  
r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e .  Under no c i rcumstances  were j e r r y r i g g e d  
o u t f i t s  i n t e n d e d  t o  mount a r e a l ,  saber waving cavalry 
charge.  Ra the r ,  as po in ted  o u t  by Colonel J. Lucius Davis,  
"MOUNTED R I F L E S  d i f f e r s  f rom all o t h e r  c a v a l r y  i n  arms, 
manoeuver and  i n  h a b i t u a l l y  d i s m o u n t i n g  f o r  t h e  combat, 
t h e i r  h o r s e s  c h i e f l y  t h e  means of r a p i d  locomotion. t t43 Such 
f o r m a t i o n s  were r a r e l y ,  i f  e v e r ,  equipped wi th  t h e  proper  
r e g a l i a  and accouterments  of "real" cava l ry .  I n s t e a d ,  t h e  
mounted in fan t ryman ' s  equipage w a s  s t a n d a r d  i s s u e  for f o o t  
s o l d i e r s  p l u s  h a r n e s s ,  s a d d l e  and perhaps a s h o r t  sword. 
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Spurs ,  t h e  earmark of a t r u e  ho r se  s o l d i e r ,  were seldom i f  
ever  bestowed upon t h e  lowly mounted infantryman.  Mounted 
i n f a n t r y  proved e s p e c i a l l y  u s e f u l  i n  European c o l o n i e s  where 
imported ho r ses  d i d  no t  f a r e  as w e l l  due t o  local  d i s e a s e s  
a n d  b e c a u s e  t h e  i n d i g e n o u s  horsemen were o n l y  r a r e l y  
organized  a long  l i n e s  approximate t o  classical  t h e o r y .  
F i n a l l y ,  t h e r e  w a s  t h e  l i g h t  c a v a l r y .  I n  terms of t h e  
peerage of t h e  European mounted s e r v i c e s ,  t h e s e  s p o r t i v e  and 
spunky l a d s  were, i n  e f f e c t ,  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  of t h e  tradi­
t i o n a l l y  g o o d - h e a r t e d  b u t  n a u g h t y  younger  s o n s  of t h e  
a r i s t o c r a c y .  Awash  i n  sp l endor ,  over loaded  wi th  c o l o r  and 
marked by  a s u r f e i t  o f  c h e e k  and  t e m e r i t y ,  these d a r i n g  
d e s c e n d a n t s  of t h e  c a v a l i e r  t r a d i t i o n  were g e n e r a l l y  n o t  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  e f f e c t i v e  i n  t h e i r  d e s i g n a t e d  r o l e  of harass­
ment and  r e c o n n a i s s a n c e .  T h i s  w a s  due  t o  t h e  r e c u r r i n g  
h a b i t  of such u n i t s ,  i n  peacet ime,  of bu lk ing  up, i n  terms 
of h o r s e  s i z e ,  i n t o  t h e  r a n g e  of t h e  heavy c a v a l r y ;  t h e  
B r i t i s h  A r m y  w a s  c lear ly  t h e  w o r s t  o f fenders  i n  t h i s  regard. 
T h e  v e r y  embodiment of  a r i s t o c r a t i c  f r i v o l i t y ,  t h e  l i g h t  
c a v a l r y  w e r e  marked ly  d i f f e r e n t  i n  s p i r i t  and appearance 
t h a n  t h e  somber, s t o u t  oaks of t h e  heavy c a v a l r y ,  which w e r e  
t h e  p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n ,  as  it w e r e ,  o f  r e s p e c t a b i l i t y  a n d  
o r d e r .  T h e  p o p u l a r i t y  of l i g h t  c a v a l r y  was s u b j e c t  t o  
r e c u r r i n g  s h i f t s  o f  e n t h u s i a s m  on t h e  p a r t  O E  m i l i t a r y  
leaders due t h e  waning of combat expe r i ence  fo l lowing  a war 
and t h e  g r a d u a l  r e a s s e r t i o n  of t r a d i t i o n  as dominated i n  
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p e a c e t i m e  c a v a l r y  p lanning .  B a t t l e f i e l d  expe r i ence  tended  
c l e a r l y  t o  show t h e  i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of heavy c a v a l r y  and i n  
t u r n ,  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  most  p r o f  i t a b l e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of 
mounted u n i t s  would l i e  i n  s c o u t i n g ,  which w a s  of c o u r s e  t h e  
s u i t  of t h e  l i g h t  c a v a l r y .  Doct r ine ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  over­
w h e l m i n g l y  r e s t e d  on t h e  s i d e  of  t r a d i t i o n  and  of  t h e  
c u i r a s s i e r s  and t h u s  t rumpeted t h e  c r u c i a l  r o l e  of c a v a l r y  
as be ing  t h e  f o r c e f u l  and e x p e r t  d e l i v e r y  of t h e  charge .  
L i g h t  c a v a l r y  u n i t s ,  however ,  p o s s e s s e d  o t h e r  t h a n  
s t r i c t l y  m i l i t a r y  v i r t u e s .  For o n e ,  t h e y  were s o c i a l l y  
a t t r a c t i v e  t o  t h e  u p p e r  c l a s s ,  what  w i t h  t h e i r  l a r g e l y  
p a t r i c i a n  o f f i c e r s  (it took  c o n s i d e r a b l e  sums t o  ma in ta in  a 
s t a b l e  of f i n e  ho r ses ,  a r e t i n u e  of s e r v a n t s ,  a couple  of 
c l o s e t s  of e x q u i s i t e  uniforms and t o  bear t h e  heavy burden 
of mon th ly  mess f e e s )  a n d  t h e i r  l u s h  f i n e r y  and s p l e n d i d  
pageant ry .  N o  b e t t e r  exponents  could t h u s  be found of t h e  
romantic  s t y l e  of m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of t h e  
N i n e t e e n t h  C e n t u r y .  The l i g h t  cavalry a l s o  afforded an 
e x c e l l e n t  p l a c e  t o  p i g e o n h o l e  d i m w i t t e d  s o n s  of d i s t i n ­
g u i s h e d  o f f i c e r s  and t h e  less menta l ly  a g i l e  youth of t h e  
a r i s t o c r a c y .  
The h u s s a r s  and c h a s s e u r s ,  t h e  s p e c i e s  of l i g h t  c a v a l r y  
most f r e q u e n t l y  encountered  i n  European armies, and func­
t i o n a l l y  i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e  i n  n a t u r e ,  were in t ended  t o  perform 
t h e  more venturesome d u t i e s  of c a v a l r y .  Thus t h e i r  f o r t e  
w a s  t h e  c o l l e c t i o n  of b a t t l e f i e l d  i n t e l l i g e n c e ,  e s c o r t  and 
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p a t r o l  d u t y  a n d  t o  a lesser degree ,  t h e  e x e c u t i o n  of t h e  
s h i f t ,  d a u n t l e s s  r a i d s  on t h e  enemy's f l a n k s  and rear. I n  
a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  l i g h t  c a v a l r y  w a s  a l s o  most r e g u l a r l y  a s s i g n e d  
t h e  g r i n d i n g  and h i g h l y  unp leasan t  t a s k  of p rov id ing  l o c a l  
army s e c u r i t y  as p i c k e t s  and v e d e t t e s .  The romanticism of 
t h e  l i g h t  c a v a l r y  was w e l l  d e s c r i b e d  by Mahan, h i m s e l f  
supposedly a ve ry  p r a c t i c a l  eng inee r :  
T h e  d a s h i n g  b o l d  h u s s a r ,  t h e  e p i t o m e  of  
m i l i t a r y  i m p u d e n c e  a n d  r e c k l e s s n e s s . . . s h o u l d  
p r e s e n t  t h e s e  q u a l i t i e s  i n  a subl imated  form on 
t h e  f i e l d .  Regard less  of f a t i g u e  and danger ,  h i s  
i m a g i n a t i o n  s h o u l d  n e v e r  p r e s e n t  t o  i t s e l f  a n  
o b s t a c l e  as insurmountable .  
Furthermore,  t h e  l i g h t  cavalryman should  always a t t a c k  
h i s  f o e ,  " w i t h  a f a l c o n ' s  speed and g l ance  upon h i s  q u a r r y ,  
h o w e v e r  it may s e e k  t o  e l u d e  h i s  b l o w ,  s u c h  b e  t h e  
hussar ."44 
C a v a l r y  w a s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  d e f i n e d  as an  i n t r i n s i c a l l y  
o f f e n s i v e  t o o l  of w a r ,  i n  t h a t  it "is always weak on t h e  
d e f e n s i v e .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Major  W i l l i a m  
Gelhorn, ''a body of c a v a l r y  which w a i t s  t o  r e c e i v e  a cha rge  
o f  c a v a l r y ,  o r  i s  e x p o s e d  t o  a Eorce  of i n f a n t r y ,  o r  
a r t i l l e r y ,  m u s t  ei ther retire, o r  be destroyed."46 S ince  
t h e  "paramount purpose of c a v a l r y  is t o  attack," it w a s  a 
f u n d a m e n t a l  maxim of c a v a l r y  t a c t i c a l  d o c t r i n e ,  as here 
s t a t ed  by  Roemer, t o  "a lways  husband t h e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  
ho r ses  and never expend more of it t h a n  i s  n e c e s s a r y  for t h e  
o b j e c t  aimed a t . " 4 7  The  charge  of ho r se  w a s  n o t  d i ss imi la r  
t o  t h e  one s h o t  musket: once a round w a s  d i scha rged  o r  a 
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c a v a l r y  a t t a c k  launched,  i n  o rde r  r a p i d l y  t o  reengage t h e  
enemy, a f r e s h  l i n e  had  t o  be  b r o u g h t  up o r  new mounted 
u n i t s  unleashed a t  t h e  enemy. The thunde r ing  c a v a l r y  a t t a c k  
was, i n  e f f e c t ,  a race a g a i n s t  u n i t  d i s r u p t i o n  and exhaus­
t i o n ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  w i t h  t h e  heavy c a v a l r y .  The longe r  t h e  
d i s t a n c e  over which mounted u n i t s  charged,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  
f a t i g u e  of t h e  animals  and, i n  t u r n ,  t h e  lower i t s  combat 
e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  upon impact w i t h  t h e  enemy's l i n e  
o r  mounted u n i t s ,  t h e  a s s a u l t i n g  c a v a l r y  w a s  r a p i d l y  broken 
up, w i t h  t i g h t  format ions  q u i c k l y  r e p l a c e d  by small p a c k e t s  
of t r o o p s  engaged i n  what were b a s i c a l l y ,  p r i v a t e  d u e l s  w i th  
t h e i r  foes .  Thus, i n  t h e  cour se  of a ba t t le ,  c a v a l r y  u n i t s  
c o u l d  be  r e a l i s t i c a l l y  expended only  a couple  of times a t  
b e s t ,  b e f o r e  becoming e f f e c t i v e l y  ~~hors  du combat. Moreover, 
w h i l e  a c a v a l r y  a t t a c k  o r  melee w a s  c u s t o m a r i l y  b r i e f  i n  
d u r a t i o n ,  no more t h a n  h a l f  an hour a t  most, mounted u n i t s ,  
u n l i k e  t h e  i n f a n t r y ,  r e q u i r e d  almost  an e n t i r e  day t o  reform 
themselves for further action. The type of terrain upon 

w h i c h  a b a t t l e  w a s  f o u g h t  c o n t r o l l e d ,  t o  a v e r y  l a r g e  
e x t e n t ,  t h e  deployment and a p p l i c a t i o n  of c a v a l r y  t h e o r y ;  t o  
u s e  mounted u n i t s  on i m p e r f e c t  g round  w a s  t o  c a u s e  t h e  
f r a g i l e  y e t  mighty power of t h e  ho r se  s o l d i e r  t o  be d i s r u p ­
t e d  o r  e v e n  broken. "The h o r s e ' s  power.. .'I, accord ing  t o  
L.V. Buckholtz, ' I . .  . i s  e f f e c t i v e  o n l y  by r a p i d i t y ,  a n d  
t h e r e f o r e ,  motion i s  t h e  t r u e  element of cava l ry . "  Fu r the r ­
more,  "it i s  o n l y  o f f e n s i v e ,  and depends e n t i r e l y  on t h e  
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c o n t o u r s  of t h e  ground, it is  i n v i n c i b l e  on l e v e l  ground, 
b u t  u s e l e s s  i n  broken. . l and ."48  It w a s  t h i s  fundamental  
s ense  of r i s k  and imperi lment ,  enbodied i n  t h e  v e r t i g i n o u s  
n a t u r e  of t h e  charge i t s e l f ,  a gamble wi th  t h e  f a t e s  as it 
were , t h a t  g a v e  c a v a l r y  i t s  d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
f o r  be ing  audacious and undaunted i n  b a t t l e ,  q u a l i t i e s  t h a t  
had p a r t i c u l a r  a t t r a c t i o n  t o  t h e  a r i s t o c r a t i c  m i l i t a r y  
e l i t e s  of t h i s  era.49 
C a v a l r y - v e r s u s - c a v a l r y  e n g a g e m e n t  were t h u s ,  by 
d e f i n i t i o n ,  a h igher  sphe re  of b a t t l e  t h a n  e i t h e r  c a v a l r y  
v e r s u s  i n f a n t r y  o r  a r t i l l e r y  engagements. Such a c l a s h  of 
opposing c a v a l r y  w a s  as much a d u e l  as a b a t t l e .  lt w a s  t o  
a ve ry  great e x t e n t ,  a t es t  of o n e ' s  mettle as a horseman, 
of a u n i t ' s  p rowess  a n d  f o r t i t u d e .  S u c c e s s ,  s i n c e  " t h e  
a d v a n t a g e  i s  a l w a y s  w i t h  t h e  a t t a c k i n g  p a r t y "  c o u n s e l l e d  
Capta in  E m r i c  Szabad of t h e  I t a l i a n  Army, t h u s  depended upon 
t h e  execu t ion  of a near  flawless charge.5o O r  as Roemer p u t  
it, 
A charge  i s  a r a p i d  and impetuous o n s e t  of a 
body of c a v a l r y  upon t h e  f o r c e s  of  a body o f  
c a v a l r y  upon t h e  f o r c e s  of  t h e  enemy. T o  be 
u s e f u l ,  it i s  n e c e s s a r y  t h a t  t h e  h o r s e s  b e  a t  
t h e i r  utmost speed a t  t h e  moment oE c o l l i s i o n ,  and 
i f  a r r i v e d  w e l l  a l i g n e d  and i n  a compact body, t h e  
shock must... over throw e v e r y t h i n g  t h a t  happens t o  
s t a n d  i n  t h e i r  l eap .  5 1  
Courage ,  i m p e t u o s i t y ,  verve  and honor w e r e  tested t o  
t h e  l i m i t  i n  such an engagement. "Cavalry",  acco rd ing  t o  
No lan ,  " se ldom m e e t  each o t h e r  i n  a c h a r g e  e x e c u t e d  a t  
s p e e d ;  t h e  one  p a r t y  g e n e r a l l y  t u r n s  b e f o r e  j o i n i n g  i s s u e  
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with the enemy, and this often happens when the line is 

unbroken and no obstacles of any sort intervene,"52 In 

regards to the broader tactical aspects of battle, cavalry 

was deemed in the post-Napoleonic era as a necessary adjunct 

to true victory.53 Thus while infantry was the most 

flexible and cost-effective combat arm, the cavalry was, as 

stated by Halleck, "indispensible for beginning a battle, 

for completing a victory, and for reaping its full advantage 

by pursuing and destroying the beaten foe."54 

The moral superiority and intrinsically greater virtue 
of cavalry served to grant true nobility and honor to a 
victorious army. Of course infantry and artillery were 
acknowledged as capable of achieving great tactical success 
in the absence of cavalry yet to the early professional 
military leaders such victories were viewed as tainted by 
lack of true elan and mettle.55 Moreover, the lack OE 
pursuit afforded by mounted troops was seen as robbing the 
victor of long-term success, a point well stated by Roexner:  
Battles have been won with little or no 

cavalry, but they have always proved sterile and 

without results. The enemy is repulsed, but not 

destroyed; and after a few days reappears in the 

field with undiminished numbers, and ready to 

renew the contest.56 [Thus,] no victory is 

brilliant which is not followed up by cavalry, and 

no battle is really destructive which is not 

determined by them. 57 

If the engineer was the most advanced and scientific 

type of officer in the Antebellum era, then, in terms of 

inilitary professionalism, the officer of horse was the most 
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t r a d i t i o n a l  i n  cha rac t e r .58  O r  as Capta in  Nolan p u t  it so 
ab ly  : 
With  t h e  c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r  a lmost  e v e r y t h i n g  
depends on t h e  c l e a r n e s s  of h i s  cou d ' o e i l ,  and 
t h e  f e l i c i t y  w i t h  which  he  s i z e s  +happy momentt e 
of a c t i o n ,  and  when o n c e  a c t i o n  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  
upon, t h e  r a p i d i t y  wi th  which h i s  i n t e n t i o n s  are 
c a r r i e d  i n t o  e f f e c t .  T h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  t i m e  f o r  
t h o u g h t ,  none f o r  h e s i t a t i o n ;  and once t h e  move­
ment i s  commenced, i t s  s u c c e s s f u l  accoanplishment
i s  t h e  ( [ o n l y ] )  t h o u g h t  a l lowed t o  pas s  th rough
t h e  mind of t h e  commander.59 
There was a v i r t u a l  t i m e l e s s n e s s  t o  many a s p e c t s  of t h e  
l e a d e r s h i p  s t y l e  of t h e  c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r .  While s e p a r a t e d  by 
a hundred y e a r s  and by many m i l i t a r y  advances and numerous 
b a t t l e s ,  t h e r e  w a s  none the le s s  a deep k ind red  s p i r i t  between 
b r e t h r e n  o f f i c e r s  of ho r se ,  of t h e  e a r l y  Nine teenth  Century 
and t h o s e  of t h e  e a r l y  Twentieth.  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  percep­
t i o n s  a n d  s t y l e  of  o f f i c e r s h i p  of  e n g i n e e r  o r  i n f a n t r y  
commanders changed  marked ly .  The c a v a l r y  remained, t o  a 
much g r e a t e r  e x t e n t ,  wedded t o  t h e i r  p r e - p r o f e s s i o n a l ,  
w a r r i o r  t r a d i t i o n s .  60 
The b e l i e f  i n  t h e  moral s u p e r i o r i t y  of c a v a l r y  had i t s  
r o o t s  i n  t h e  u n i q u e l y  h a z a r d o u s  n a t u r e  of  mounted duty .  
" I n f a n t r y ,  o r  a r t i l l e r y  i n  p o s i t i o n  may p a s s i v e l y  s t a n d  
f i re ;"  i n s t r u c t e d  Roemer, " t o  s t r ike down h i s  adve r sa ry ,  t h e  
horseman must c l o s e ,  and t h e  chances are t h a t  he r e c e i v e s  a 
blow i n  r e t u r n  f o r  t h e  one he dea ls . "61  Y e t ,  romanticism 
d o m i n a t e d  t h e  c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n  of t h e  characterist ics of 
mounted warfare .  There w a s  c l e a r l y  a h ighe r  s o c i a l  connota­
t i o n  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  ho r se  s o l d i e r s .  I n  o t h e r  words, h o r s e s  
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and  t h u s  c a v a l r y  were t h e  badge and t h e  p rov ince  of t r u e  
s o c i e t a l  e l i t es ;  i n f a n t r y ,  i n  s h a r p  c o n t r a s t ,  were rep resen ­
t a t i v e s  of t h e  plodding,  l e t h a r g i c  masses of t h e  p e a s a n t r y .  
The bond be tween r i d e r  and mount w a s  esteemed as being a 
t r u l y  s p i r i t u a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  one  c o n n o t i n g  n o t  m e r e l y  
h ighe r  s o c i a l  s t a n d i n g  bu t  a l s o  g r e a t e r  moral f o r c e .  On a 
p r a c t i c a l  l e v e l ,  c a v a l r y m e n  were t r a i n e d  t o  r e g a r d  t h e i r  
mounts  as m e r e l y  a n o t h e r  p i e c e  of e q u i p m e n t  a n d  h e n c e ,  
d i s p o s a b l e .  Y e t  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  c a v a l r y m e n  would h a v e  
e n d o r s e d  t h e  c o n c e p t ,  a r t i c u l a t e d  by Buckhol tz ,  t h a t  "man 
and  h o r s e  a r e  a u n i t y ,  t h e  b r u t e  f o r c e  submi t t ed  t o  t h e  
r a t i o n a l  will, ....62 The ve ry  e s sence  OE c a v a l r y  t h e o r y  w a s  
t h a t  it was an  a r t  and n o t  r e d u c i b l e  t o  a s c i e n c e .  Thus t h e  
n a t u r e  of c a v a l r y ,  q u i t e  u n l i k e  o t h e r  a s p e c t s  of w a r  and t h e  
p r o f e s s i o n  of arms, by d e f i n i t i o n ,  could n o t  be t r a n s l a t e d  
i n t o  mere m e c h a n i z e d  r o u t i n e  o r  s u b j e c t  t o  s c i e n t i � i c  
e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n .  E x p r e s s i o n s  by m i l i t a r y  writers of t h e  
e f f i c a c y  of c a v a l r y  were r e a l l y  s t a t e m e n t s  of f a i t h ;  of a 
deep, unde r ly ing ,  p r e - p r o f e s s i o n a l  commitment t o  t r a d i t i o n a l  
w a r r i o r  va lues .  6 3  N a t u r a l l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  s i n c e  c a v a l r y  w a s  
d e f i n e d  by i t s  advoca tes  as a way, a p a t h  and a t r a d i t i o n ,  
s u c h  s p i r i t u a l  g r o w t h ,  w a r r i o r  p rowess  a n d  e x p e r t i s e  i n  
horsemanship could  no t  be r e a d i l y  t a u g h t  o r  l e a r n e d .  Hence, 
r e l i a n c e  on m i l i t i a  o r  h a s t i l y  o r g a n i z e d  a n d  improvised 
c a v a l r y  u n i t s ,  s a v e  f o r  t h e  most  e l e m e n t a r y  t a s k s  w a s  
9 3  

d e f i n e d  a s  sheer f o l l y ,  a p o i n t  v e r y  f o r c i b l y  s t a t e d  by 
Roemer : 
When w e  r e f l e c t  t h a t  i t  r e q u i r e s  t h r e e f o l d  
more  t i m e  t o  t e a c h  a man t o  r i d e  a n d  h a v e  a 
p e r f e c t  mastery of h i s  ho r se  t h a n  t o  teach a Eoot 
s o l d i e r  h i s  complete d r i l l  and t h a t  when t h e  ho r se  
s o l d i e r  is t h u s  fa r  i n s t r u c t e d  he has s t i l l  a v a s t  
d e a l  t o  l e a r n  b e f o r e  h i s  educa t ion  is  complete,  it 
becomes e v i d e n t  t h a t  t h e  h u r r i e d  augmentat ion of 
c a v a l r y  f o r c e s  should  be sc rupu lous ly  avoided. A 
r e g i m e n t  of  i n f a n t r y  may b e  s p e e d i l y  i n c r e a s e d  
w i t h o u t  g r e a t l y  i m p a i r i n g  i t s  u s e f u l n e s s  i n  t h e  
f i e l d ,  by  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  a c e r t a i n  number o f  
r e c r u i t s ,  most of whom had probably se rved  a l r e a d y  
i n  t h e  m i l i t i a ;  bu t  a few h a l f - d r i l l e d  horsemen, a 
few unbroken h o r s e s ,  w i l l  throw a whole l i n e  i n t o  
d i s o r d e r ,  and  m a r  eve ry  e f f o r t  o� t h e  most a b l e  
comrnander.64 
T h i s  c r u c i a l  r u l e  of c a v a l r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  w a s  f u l l y  
suppor ted  by S e c r e t a r y  of W a r  L e w i s  C a s s :  
U n t r a i n e d  men on u n t r a i n e d  h o r s e s ,  form a 
combination of awkwardness t h a t  can e n s u r e  no th ing
bu t  ex t ravagance  and d isgrace .65  
C a v a l r y  warfare  s t o o d  a loof  from t h e  post-Napoleonic 
s u r g e  of p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  and m i l i t a r y  s c i e n c e .  Y e t  as a n  
e l i t e  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e ,  c a v a l r y  se rved  as a l i v i n g  e x p r e s s i o n  
of t h e  e s s e n t i a l  a r i s t o c r a t i c ,  w a r r i o r  v a l u e s  t h a t  u l t i ­
mately were t h e  bedrock of t h e  new mathematic s t y l e  of w a r .  
I n  t i m e ,  however, w h i l e  t h e  o t h e r  arms of s e r v i c e  prospered  
from t e c h n o l o g i c a l  a d v a n c e s  engendered  by t h e  I n d u s t r i a l  
R e v o l u t i o n ,  t h e  c a v a l r y  w i t h d r e w  b e h i n d  t h e  r ampar t s  of 
t r a d i t i o n .  T h e  i n c r e a s i n g l y  e v i d e n t  o b s o l e s c e n c e  of  
c a v a l r y ,  d u e  t o  enormous i n c r e a s e s  of f i r epower ,  were, i n  
t h e  main, countered  by c a v a l r y  leaders w i t h  r e - expres s ions  
of  t h e  p a s t  t r i umphs  of Gustavus, Freder ick  and Napoleon. 
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I n  e f f e c t ,  t h e  c a v a l r y  w a s  s lowly  becoming a p r i s o n e r  of i t s  
myths a n d  c u s t o m s ,  r e f u s i n g  t o  a c c e p t  t h e  n e c e s s i t y  of  
change .  Y e t  t h i s  w a s  n o t  b l i n d  m i l i t a r y  s t u p i d i t y ,  u n t i l  
perhaps l a t e  i n  t h e  Nine teenth  Century,  when c a v a l r y  z e a l o t s  
began  p u s h i n g  f o r  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  r e v i v a l  of t h e  l a n c e  i n  
face of t h e  growing adop t ion  of t h e  Maxim machine gun. In 
t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  of t h e  Nine teenth  Century,  wh i l e  t h e  e f f i c a c y  
of h o r s e  s o l d i e r s  w a s  i n d e e d  dimming, t h e  r e c o g n i t i o n  of 
t h i s  f a c t ,  w a s  by and large s t i l l  many y e a r s  away.66 
Chapter I11 

THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE AMERICAN CAVALRY --

FRONTIER SECURITY AND THE PROFESSIONAL ARMY 

Part I 

Cavalry, in the years prior to John C. Calhoun's tenure 
as Secretary of War, enjoyed only slight support from either 
the national political leadership or the Army's commanders. 
General George Washington, during the Revolutionary War, 
opposed the development of a large American cavalry arm. 
The objection, drawn from classical European cavalry theory, 
was based upon the less-than-ideal terrain of the eastern 
United States. The absence of broad expanses of flat, open 
country and the existence of dense woods, hilly terrain and 
thick swamps barred the widespread use of mounted troops. 
This basic rule became ingrained in United States tactical 
doctrine through the early years of the Civil War. Two 
collateral arguments against political support for mounted 
forces were commonly raised: first, the significantly 
greater expenses of maintaining cavalry units, which were of 
lower tactical utility than infantry; and secondly, the tra­
ditional association of horse soldiers with aristocratic 
power. The first objection was unquestionably the more tan­
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gible of the two. Cavalry units were nearly twice as expen­
sive to maintain as infantry formations of equivalent size. 
Nonetheless, the pre-War of 1812 Army had occasionally 
experimented with the use of cavalry. The first post-
Revolutionary war cavalry unit was a squadron (about two 
companies of one hundred and sixty or so officers and men) 
created by Congress in 1792. This small force was subse­
quently raised to full regimental strength. The legislative 
warrant for this unit expired in October, 1796, leaving the 
Army with only the original two cavalry companies. Indian 
unrest in the Old Northwest Territory occasioned the crea­
tion on July 16, 1798 of six additional companies, merged 
with the existing force into a single mounted regiment. Due 
to the needs of frontier security, Congress on March 2, 1799 
authorized three regiments of light dragoons, but these 
units never reached their targeted strength. The first era 
in the history of the United States Army's cavalry forces 
ended on March 16, 1802 with Congress's passage of the Jef­
ferson administration's Peace Bill. This legislation abol­
ished all of the Army's cavalry units. Due to increasingly 
troublesome relations with Great Britain, Congress, on April 
12, 1808, legislated a general expansion of the Army, 
including a new regiment of light dragoons. This unit, how­
ever, remained dismounted until the outbreak of hostilities 
in 1812, due to financial restraints. Four years later, on 
January 11, 1812, a second light dragoon regiment was cre-
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a t e d  f o r  d u t y  a g a i n s t  t h e  B r i t i s h .  "Having proved almost  
unse rv iceab le  i n  t h e  s e v e r a l  campaigns", acco rd ing  t o  Secre­
t a r y  of War L e w i s  Cass, " t h e  dragoons were disbanded a t  t h e  
p e a c e  w i t h  l i t t l e  o r  no r e m o n s t r a n c e  f rom any q u a r t e r .  2 
Thus, i n  March, 1815, Congress a b o l i s h e d  t h e  l i g h t  dragoon 
r e g i m e n t s  i n  c o n j u n c t i o n  w i t h  a g e n e r a l  r e d u c t i o n  of t h e  
Army. A s  befo re ,  t h e  o b j e c t i o n s  were t ac t i ca l ,  f i s c a l  and 
p o l i t i c a l  i n  na ture .3  AS S e c r e t a r y  of War L e w i s  C a s s  p u t  
it : 
T r o o p s  o f  t h e  l a t t e r  c h a r a c t e r  ( ( i . e .  , 
c a v a l r y ) )  have never done anyth ing  as ye t . . .  t h e  
greater  p o r t i o n  of t h e  c o u n t r y  i n  t h e  E a s t  i s  
u n f i t t e d  f o r  i t s  use i n  masses... t h e r e  on ly  small
numbers would be needed.... 4 
U n i t e d  S ta tes  f r o n t i e r  s e c u r i t y  p o l i c y ,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  
t h e  r o l e  of t h e  Army i n  t h e  maintenance of o r d e r  and I n d i a n  
c o n t r o l  underwent s i g n i f i c a n t  change du r ing  t h e  Antebellum 
per iod .  Pr ior  t o  t h e  War of 1812, as wi th  most a s p e c t s  of 
United States w a r  p o l i c y ,  t h e  p r e c i s e  miss ion  of t h e  Army as 
t o  t h e  i s s u e  of f r o n t i e r  s e c u r i t y  was q u i t e  i l l - d e f i n e d .  O n  
o c c a s i o n ,  a s  i n  t h e  1790's campaign  by t h e  L e g i o n  ( t h e  
o r g a n i z a t i o n a l  p recu r so r  of t h e  d i v i s i o n )  a g a i n s t  t h e  Indi ­
a n s  of t h e  O l d  Nor thwes t  T e r r i t o r y ,  t h e  Army played t h e  
l e a d i n g  r o l e  i n  fo rmula t ing  and execu t ing  f r o n t i e r  s e c u r i t y  
p 0 1 i c y . ~  I n  t h e  main, however, p r i o r  t o  t h e  War of 1 8 1 2 ,  
t h e  Army lacked a coherent  miss ion  i n  regards t o  t h e  i s s u e  
of p o l i c i n g  t h e  western and sou the rn  t e r r i t o r i e s .  A f t e r  
t h e  War of  1812 ,  however ,  t h e  Army g r a d u a l l y  assumed a 
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virtual monopoly of organized military power on the fron­

tier. Thus, with brief and rare exceptions, principally 

during the Civil War years, the Army was gradually assigned 

the exclusive role of providing military protection to fron­

tier settlers. The acceptance of such a responsibility, in 

contrast to the earlier mixture of militia and regular 

troops, was assumed reluctantly by the Army's leadership. 

To them the Army's mission, as a progressive, professional 

and French-Austrian military organization, was the defense 

of the nation against an invasion by a European power. 

Congress and, in the main, the President defined the immedi­

ate justification for the maintenance of a military estab­

lishment in ensuring the peace of the country's frontiers. 

Nonetheless, while unenthusiastic about being saddled with 

the duty of frontier security, the Army's leadership 
accepted this irksome, fatiguing and even dishonorable work 
as a kind of unofficial quid pro quo, a bargain as it were, 
between the Army and its civilian masters: the profession­
alization of the regular military service in exchange for 
the use of the Army in frontier security. In other words, 
the far greater fighting power and organizational effective­
ness of the regulars, as compared to the militia, was accep­
ted as essential for ensuring the successful pacification of 
the Indian, despite the resulting development of a strong 
professional Army. While this unofficial compact would be 
beat and challenged severely in the course of the recurring 
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and quite ferocious debate over the utility and even the 

legitimacy of the regular Army, it nonetheless survived 

more-or-less intact through the Civil War. 

Prior to the creation of the Civilian Indian Bureau in 

1849, as a division of the Interior Department, the Army 

stood in the problematical role of being at once both the 

guardian of the Indian and the protector of frontier sett­

lers. Such an ambiguous and potentially contradictory set 

of responsibilities would seem to have demanded carefully 

crafted policy guidelines f o r  the frontier officer. In­
stead, officers were required to muddle along, protecting 

settlers, maintaining a semblance of order and all the while 

guarding the Indian from the designs of unscrupulous whites, 
particularly those engaged in the nefarious whiskey trade, 

with no clear guidelines. Or as Inspector General Edmund P. 

Gaines put it, with less than clarity, in 1821: 

No specific instructions can be given to the 
commandants of frontier posts, to govern their 
intercourse with the Indians in their vicinity, so 
as to meet all the exigencies of the service. 

After receiving such general directions as the 

case admits they must be left to exercise a sound 

discretion, being careful to avoid all occasions 

of collisions and of involving the country in 

hostilities with them.9 

Army frontier policy in the immediate post-War of 1812 

years, during Jacob Brown's tenure as Commanding General, 

was essential and reactive in nature. The Army's field com­

mand structure was changed in 1821 from a North-South align­

ment to an East-West division of active combat forces. This 
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realignment was made in order to improve the Army's ability 

to carry out the task of frontier policing. In tactical 

terms, the new policy emphasized the establishment of a line 

of forts and cantonments along the principal rivers of the 

Mississippi Valley as far south as present day Arkansas and 

Louisiana and as far north as Minnesota. Water transport, 

via flatboat and more-or-less portable water craft served as 

the principal linkage between individual garrisons and fron­
tier settlements. Essentially, there was the establishment 
of a firebreak between the white settlers and the western 
Indians. The problems with this wholly defensive approach 
to frontier security were numerous and substantial. Minus­
cule packets of infantrymen scattered over several thousand 
square miles, were simply too few in number and too widely 
scattered to be more than locally effective. A closely 
related problem was the inherent lack of mobility of the 
regulars. Water transport into the Indian country was 
usable only so long as the river systems remained navigable. 
The frontier Army, bereft of mobility and speed of movement 
on land, was incapable, with rare exceptions such as the 
1819-1820 Yellowstone campaign against the Arikara and Sioux 
Indians, of mounting effective retaliatory strikes against 
marauders. A still larger failing of this static defensive 
scheme lay in the very nature of frontier settlement. The 
idea was to create a barrier between the Indians to the west 
of the Mississippi River network and the settlers to the 
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east. Moreover, eastern Indians would be forcibly resettled 
onto the western plains creating, as it were, a cordon 
sanitaire to further guard against attacks. In reality, the 
plan never succeeded. As soon as an Army post was estab­
lished, traders and then pioneers would aggressively move 
beyond the effective range of the infantry garrison, fifty 
miles or so. During the 1830s a far more active and mobile 
frontier defense policy emerged during the tenure of Alexan­
der Macomb and later, Winfield Scott as Commanding General 
of the Army. The primary hitch in implementing a more 
effective policy lay in overcoming Congressional opposition 
to the enlargement of the Army in general and in the crea­
tion of a cavalry force in particular.10 
Notwithstanding the political and military objections 

to equipping the Army with a mounted component, demands for 

a cavalry force began to rumble eastward from the West from 

the 1820s on. One major source of political pressure for 

the establishment of a mounted unit stemmed from the growing 

Santa Fe Trail trade. Starting in 1823, the Missouri cara­

vans for the first few years managed to complete their expe­

ditions without any Indian interference. The caravans of 

1825 and 1826, however, were both attacked by increasingly 

belligerent groups of Comanche and Kiowa Indians. In the 

main, such attacks were little more than nuisances. The 

merchant caravans, with over a hundred armed men and 

equipped with even small brass cannon, were quite formidable 

1 0 2  
as an armed force in their own right.ll And, on the Mexican 

side of the border, the undermanned and poorly equipped 

light cavalry or pictadores, nonetheless provided a limited 

military force to cover the most dangerous leg of the 
journey.12 
Many merchants involved in this commerce were either 

unenthusiastic or even hostile toward the idea of American 

Army escorts. However, such voices were a minority among 

the influential St. Louis merchants engaged in the Santa Fe 

trade. Ironically, the leading (and by far the most power­

ful) advocate for Army escorts, was Missouri Senator Thomas 

Hart Benton, the leader of Congressional opposition to the 

professional army. l3  The sharpness of one member of the 
expedition, generated sufficient political pressure to 

compel the Army to provide an escort. In 1829 such an es­

cort was provided, on an experimental basis, consisting of a 

detachment of foot soldiers from the Third Infantry Regiment 

commanded by an experienced Indian fighter, Major Bennett 

Riley. The fleet Indian tribes of the Southwest plains, 

such as the Navaho, Kiowa and Comanche, were undaunted by 

the presence of American troops. The infantry, "walk-a­
heaps" to use the derogatory Cheyenne term, proved wholly 

ineffectual as a deterrent to the frequent hit-and-run raids 

on the caravan. What was so discouraging to the officers in 

command of the protective guard was their lack of mobility. 

As Major Riley put it with a deep sense of frustration: 
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Think what our feelings must have been to see 
the [Indians] carry off our cattle and horses,
when if we had been mounted, we could have beaten 
them to pieces, but we were obliged to content 
ourselves with whipping them from our camp. We 
did not see any of them killed or  wounded but we 
saw the next day where they had dragged them off. 
They have said sense ( (sic.) ) that our fire from 
the big gun ( (i-e., a six-pounder cannon)) killed 
five or six.14 
A similar sense of resignation at his inability to 
mount an aggressive pursuit was recalled by Major-General 
Philip St. George Cooke, then a second lieutenant and later, 
one of the leading Army cavalry experts in the pre-Civil War 
years: 
It was a humiliating condition to be surroun­
ded by these rasically ( (sic.) ) Indians, who, by 
means of their horses, could tantalize us with 
hopes of battle, and elude our efforts; who would 
insult us with impunity
we were not mounted too,1 5  
much did we regret that 
No further effort was made to provide an Army escort on 
the Santa Fe Trail until 1 8 3 3 . 1 6  Field performance clearly 
demonstrated the lack of tactical effectiveness of rela­
tively immobile foot soldiers against the fleet Indians of 
the West. The result of such an ignoble performance of arms 
was even louder calls by Western politicians for enhanced 
military protection in the form of cavalry units.17 Leading 
the growing chorus of support f o r  such units were such 
traditional opponents of a large standing army and military 
professionalism as Senator Benton and Secretary of War Cass, 
of the Jackson administration. Joseph Duncan, a Congressman 
from Illinois, on March 25, 1828, wrote to Major-General Ed-
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mund P. Gaines, arguing for the formation of mounted units 

composed of "young men of vigor and enterprise, reared in 

the western country, acquainted with the Indian artifice and 

their mode of warfare, full of pride and patriotic spir­

it."18 Such units, embodying the full spirit of opposition 

to the regular Army, were claimed not only to be a more 

formidable threat to the Indians, but also far more respons­

ive to the needs of Western pioneers. 

By 1829 reports of difficulties with frontier security 
as then provided by small packets of relatively ponderous 
infantry manning static garrisons began to filter back east 
to an ever more receptive War Department. In April, 1830, 
Quartermaster-General Thomas S. Jessup, in a formal position 
paper, signaled the growing enthusiasm for the resurrection 
of a mounted arm. The problem, however, was the fear that a 
penny-pinching Congress would simply order one or  more exis­
ting infantry regiments to be converted into cavalry units. 
Such a course of action would in no way address the critical 
lack of numbers of the Regular Army, increasingly burdened 

by the demands of frontier security. Moreover, infantry 

units, manned according to the tenets of limited war 

doctrine, were composed of the dregs and sweepings of 

society, hardly the kind of personnel required for what 

would be, according to European practice, an elite forma­

tion. Thus, as Jessup pointed out, there did in fact exist 

a paramount need for regular Army mounted units: 

105 

As well you might leave the defense of our 

maritime frontiers and the protection of our 

foreign commerce to the artillery stationed on our 
seaboard. The means of pursuing rapidly and 
punishing promptly those who oppress whether on 
the ocean or on the land are indispensable to a 
complete security, and if ships-of-war are 
required in one case, a mounted force is equally 
so in the other. Were we without a navy, pirates
might operate with entire impunity, not only on 
the high seas, but in our very harbors, and within 
view of our forts. So, without a mounted force on 
the frontier south of the Missouri, the Indian 
confident in the capacity of his horses to bear 
him beyond the reach of pursuit, despises our 
power, chooses his point of attack, and often 
commits the outrages to which he is prompted by
either a spirit of revenge or love of plunder in 
the immediate vicinity of our troops, and the 

impunity of the first act invariably leads to new

oppression.19 

The Black Hawk War of 1832 constituted the first signi­

ficant military problem faced by the Army following the War 

of 1812. The suppression of the Sac and Fox Indians and 

their allies, demonstrated the need for a reasonably large 

and professional military force. The state and territorial 

militia units, in the main, proved ineffectual as military 

forces. Troops broke and ran, were far less than diligent: 

in the pursuit of their duties and of course, were far less 

proficient than the regulars in the performance of tactical 

operations and in maintaining discipline. Still another 

major problem was the constant wrangling and less than fully 

cooperative behavior of many state, territorial and local 

politicians; General Henry Atkinson, in overall command, 

labored mightily to employ his militia troops, in conjunc­

tion with handfuls of regulars, to bring Black Hawk's 
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w a r r i o r s  under c o n t r o l . 2 0  The l a c k  of s u f f i c i e n t  numbers of 
r e g u l a r  t r o o p s  and  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  dependence upon m i l i t i a  
f o r c e s ,  which prolonged h o s t i l i t i e s  and i n  t u r n  he ightened  
t h e  c o s t  to c i v i l  s o c i e t y ,  aga in ,  demonstrated t o  p ro fes ­
s i o n a l  o f f i c e r s  t h e  clear need f o r  an  o v e r a l l  i n c r e a s e  i n  
Army s t r e n g t h .  Thus t h e  Army's l e a d e r s h i p ,  i n  accordance 
wi th  l i m i t e d  war d o c t r i n e ,  s t r o n g l y  ques t ioned  t h e  wisdom of 
r e l y i n g  on i n e f f e c t u a l  m i l i t i a  f o r c e s ,  t h e  absence of which 
f rom t h e  c i v i l  economy w a s  c o s t l y  and exceedingly  waste-
The Black Hawk War a l s o  demonstrated t h e  need f o r  a new 
Army mounted a r m .  The r e g u l a r  i n f a n t r y  were simply n o t  
f l e e t  enough t o  pursue t h e i r  a d v e r s a r i e s ;  t h e  Army w a s  cor­
r e s p o n d i n g l y  d e p e n d e n t  upon t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  m i l i t i a  
mounted i n f a n t r y  u n i t s  t o  form t h e  c h a s e  element  i n  t h e  
order  of b a t t l e .  And as an  Army o f f i c e r  p u t  it, w i t h  a f a i r  
degree  of f r u s t r a t i o n :  
The  w a r  o f  l a s t  summer showed ve ry  c l e a r l y  
t h e  i m p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  s u c c e e d i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  
I n d i a n s  w i t h  i n f a n t r y  a lone .  March a f te r  march 
w a s  made by t h e  r e g u l a r  t r o o p s  wi thout  coming i n  
c o n t a c t  w i t h  t h e  enemy and it w a s  on ly  a f te r  many
f o r c e d  marches of t h e  most h a r a s s i n g  d e s c r i p t i o n  
t h a t  h e  w a s  f i n a l l y  over taken  and brought  t o  an  
engagement .2 2  
L i m i t e d  funds w e r e  sc raped  t o g e t h e r  to mount a few com­
pan ies  of r e g u l a r s  as mounted i n f a n t r y ,  bu t  t h i s  improvised 
t e c h n i q u e  w a s  n o t  s a t i s f a c t o r y .  One of Atk inson ' s  major 
c o m p l a i n t s  t o  Commanding-General A lexande r  Macomb w a s  
e x a c t l y  t h i s  lack of m o b i l i t y  of h i s  r e g u l a r  f o r c e s :  
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As the Regular troops had no means of 
transportation by land and our supply of provi­
sions and munitions required protection; and 
feeling unwilling to leave my base of operations I 
fell back with the regulars to this place to act 
as circumstances might require; besides none but a 
mounted force could come up with the Indians,
unless they made a stand to contest the point of 
superiority, which was not expected.23 
Heeding the wishes of his field commanders, President 
Andrew Jackson openly pushed f o r  the re-establishment of an 
Army mounted force as a result of the tactical experience of 
the Black Hawk War. Congress, however, quite unlike Cal­
houn's days as Secretary of War, was now dominant in the 
determination of a national war policy. While it was in­
creasingly evident that a cavalry force was needed, there 
was no consensus whatsoever in Congress as to the form such 
a unit should take. Congressman William Drayton of South 
Carolina expressed the recognition of Congress that the 
issue of cavalry forces for frontier security was indeed a 
pressing one: 
It would have been a vain attempt to pursue
the Indians who committed these outrages, f o r  they 
were all mounted on fleet horses, while the troops
of the United States consisted of infantry alone,
and they were therefore compelled to endure all 
the insults and injuries so sure to arise from 
Indian hostility.2 4  
The 1832 Congressional debate on the formation of a 
cavalry arm reflected the broader debate over the standing 
army. The distinctly minority position in the House of 
Representatives favored establishing formal cavalry units as 
a full branch of the regular. As articulated by such 
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Congressmen as Dutee J. Pierce of Rhode Island and interest­

ingly enough, former advocate of volunteer mounted forces, 

Duncan of Illinois, their position was expressly founded 

upon professional Army doctrine.25 The majority perspec­

tive, to the contrary, was seething with opposition to pro­

fessional military forces of whatever stripe. The regulars, 

as pointedly stated by Congressman John Carr of Indiana, 

were simply incapable of manning and operating any form of 

mounted force: 

There was not... twenty of them ([i.e.,

regular Army troops]) who could ride a horse fifty

yards, and if the Government should furnish them 

with horses, they knew nothing about taking care 

of them, and would destroy just as many horses as 

were put under their management.26 

Secondly, aside from the supposed lack of horsemanship 

of the regular Army, Congressional objections centered upon 

the very character and physical condition of line troops. 

Thus as the delegate from the Arkansas Territory, Ambroshe 

H. Sevier, critically noted: 

What were the garrison troops? They consis­
ted generally of the refuse of society, collected 
in the cities and seaport towns; many of them 
broken down with years and infirmities; none of 
them use to rid [(sic.]) nor in anywise f i t  f o r  
the service to be assigned them.27 
Finally, as passionately stated by Representative 

George Grennell of Massachusetts, the volunteer soldier, 

drawn from the environs of the frontier, would possess vir­

tues and skills which would render him vastly more effective 

as an Indian fighter: 
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Frontier volunteer soldiers would "counter wile with 

wile, and frustrate one stratagem by another, and loss 

((sic.)) upon those savage men their own schemes of surprise 

and blood." 

Moreover, the frontiersmen-soldier would be intrinsic­

ally loyal; thus, unlike the scurvy lot of the regular army, 

such noble men could not be corrupted into following the 

trumpet call of some would-be Napoleon: 

There was no danger that these farmers would 
become... ( (tempted to join)) the flying corps. .. 
[by] a summer's term of duty in defense of their 
farms and their firesides.28 
On June 10, 1832 Congress authorized the establishment 

of a battalion of mounted rangers, signaling the victory 

against the regular Army. The rangers, numbering some six 

hundred officers and men and organized into six companies, 

was clearly not an orthodox, professional military outfit. 

Rather they constituted a unique federalized species of 

volunteer unit; the men were subject only to a single year 

of service and were expected to arm and equip themselves.29 

The problem was that this unit, expressly unprofessional in 

character, was certainly not the cavalry force sought by the 

Army's leadership. This rough-hewed, highly undisciplined 

assemblage, which saw no action against the Indians, was 

simply too irregular an outfit to be freely accepted into 

the professional ranks of the Army. This short-lived 

experiment, unsuccessful and impractical, succeeded, iron­

ically, in providing the advocates of a regular mounted ser-

-- 
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vice with the evidence necessary to prevail in Congress. 
Support for converting the mounted ranger battalion into a 
proper cavalry unit came from all quarters responsible for 
developing and implementing war policy in the Antebellum 
era. Captain Cooke, expressing the verdict of professional 
officers, curtly rejected the battalion as a military unit, 
with even less prowess in arms than some of the volunteer 
and militia units field in the Black Hawk War: 
Of this corps (in justice not so formidable 
to its friends ((in Congress)) as a certain 
brigade of Illinois volunteers of notorious 
memory),... none more readily than myself would 
presume its requiescat in pace.30 
Similarly, Secretary of War Cass, reflecting a major 
shift in the war policy of the Jackson administration argued 
strongly for the creation of a full-fledged regular cavalry 
force, using of all things, the very rhetoric of military 

professionalism that he had so long been opposed: 
Besides other important objects, it is 
desirable to preserve in our military system the 
elements of cavalry tactics and to keep pace with 
the improvements in them by other nations. The 
establishment of a regiment of dragoons would 
complete the personnel of our army, and would 
introduce a force which would harmonize with and 
participate in the esprit du corps so essential to 
military efficiency, and easily.. . created by
military principles. 3 1  
Congress as well moved to support the establishment of 

a regular Army cavalry service, following the complete fail­

ure of its non-professional mounted ranger battalion. The 

development of the new regiment of dragoons was spearheaded 

by Congressman Richard M. Johnson. Chairman of the House 
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Committee on Military Affairs and interestingly, a renowned 
former Captain of the Kentucky Volunteer Mounted Rifles. 
Johnson succinctly listed the numerous failings of the 
battalion of mounted rangers when he wrote: 
...the organization of the present battalion 
of mounted rangers... does appear to the committee 
to be very defective. It must be evident from the 
constitution of the corps of rangers, and from the 
short period of their service, their efficiency
will be but little superior to that of the 
ordinary militia -- every year there must be loss 
of time in organizing and recruiting the corps and 
the acquisition of the necessary experience and 
knowledge, besides it cannot be expected that 
their equipment and horses will be equal to those 
furnished by the public.32 
Congress, therefore, on March 2, 1 8 3 3 ,  passed an "Act 
for the more perfect defense of the frontiers," converting 
the battalion of mounted rangers into the (First) Regiment 
of Dragoons.33 The creation of the Regiment of Dragoons 
established a precedent for other pre-Civil Wax mounted 
units. Essentially jerry-judged, with no organic ties to 
any tradition of mounted warfare, these units fell com­
pletely outside of table of  organization and division of 
functions established fox European cavalry regiments. At 
this stage in American military affairs, Congress was domi­
nant in the development of national war policy. Consequent­
ly, the dragoons were largely a reflection of Congress's 
limited expertise in the mechanics of cavalry organization. 
Input from the Army's leadership was indirect and fragmen­
tary. Congressmen Johnson, principally responsible for the 
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f i n a l  form of t h e  dragoons,  d e t a i l e d  t h e  in t ended  f u n c t i o n s  
and d u t i e s  of t h e  Army's new hor se  s o l d i e r s :  
R e g u l a r  dragoons,  it i s  b e l i e v e d ,  are f u l l y  
competent t o  d i s c h a r g e  a l l  t h e  d u t i e s  t h a t  can be 
r e q u i r e d  of mounted rangers . . . .  I n  c e l e r i t y  of 
movement t h e y  w i l l  of cour se  be e q u a l ,  and as it 
i s  t h e  d u t y  of d r a g o o n s  t o  s e r v e  on h o r s e  and 
f o o t ,  t h e y  may be t r a i n e d  t o  t h e  use  of t h e  r i f l e  
and t h e  sword as occas ion  may r equ i r e .34  
T h e  d r a g o o n s  c o u l d  n o t ,  i n  a n y  f o r m a l  s e n s e ,  b e  
r e g a r d e d  as  a n  American i m p o r t a t i o n  of European  c a v a l r y  
d o c t r i n e  . R e p r e s e n t a t i v e  Johnson spoke of t h e  a b i l i t y  of 
t h e  d r a g o o n s  t o  f i g h t  b o t h  mounted and  dismounted. The 
f o r m a l  , European d e f i n i t i o n  of "dragoon" b e a r s  a t  b e s t ,  a 
s l i g h t  r e s e m b l a n c e  t o  t h e  American form of t h i s  t y p e  of 
u n i t .  A s  one European m i l i t a r y  d i c t i o n a r y  pu t  it, i n  1745 ,  
dragoons were : 
...mounted, who s e r v e  sometimes on Foot ,  and 
somet imes  on Horseback;  be ing  always ready  upon 
any t h i n g  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  e x p e d i t i o n ,  as be ing  able 
pace wi th  t h e  Horse, and do t h e  s e r v i c e  of 
Foot .to ke% 
Thus,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  dragoons w e r e  expec ted  t o  f i g h t  
when n e c e s s a r y ,  on f o o t .  However, u n l i k e  i n f a n t r y ,  which 
u s u a l l y  f o u g h t  i n  t i g h t  d i s c i p l i n e d  fo rma t ions ,  dragoons '  
customary t ac t i ca l  deployment w a s  i n  sk i rmisher  o rde r .  T h i s  
l o o s e  and even s t y l i z e d  format ion  w a s  des igned  t o  a l low t h e  
dragoons t o  do no more t h a n  s imply harass enemy u n i t s  w i t h  
c a r b i n e  f i r e .  I n  o t h e r  words, when dismounted, t h e  Europe­
a n - s t y l e  dragoons would form a long ,  l o o s e  l i n e ,  one rank  
d e e p ,  and  t h e n ,  by t h e  s p e c i f i e d  s t e p s  of  t h e  S k i r m i s h  
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d r i l l ,  p r o c e e d  t o  l a y  down, on t h e  enemy's  i n f a n t r y  and 
a r t i l l e r y ,  s e v e r a l  v o l l e y s  of h a r a s s i n g  f i r e .  Dragoons had 
g r a d u a l l y  mutated i n t o  a g e n e r a l l y  or thodox c a v a l r y  forma­
t i o n ;  c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  theilc earlier i n f a n t r y  a t t r i b u t e s  had 
e i t h e r  become l a r g e l y  v e s t i g i a l  o r  were shorn  completely.  
T h e r e f  o r e ,  t h e y  g e n e r a l l y  fought  as s t i l l  ano the r  mounted 
u n i t ,  a l b e i t  w i th  t h e  c a r b i n e  as w e l l  as sword and p i s t o l . 3 6  
What, t h e r e f o r e ,  w a s  i n t ended  by d e s i g n a t i n g  t h e  f i r s t  
post-War of 1 8 1 2  c a v a l r y  as "dragoons"? They were c e r t a i n l y  
n o t  i n t e n d e d  t o  serve as  " l i g h t  c a v a l r y " ,  as h u s s a r s  o r  
chaussures .  While t h e  a p p e l l a t i o n  of l i g h t  c a v a l r y  has  been 
commonly a p p l i e d  by la ter  writers t o  d e s c r i b e  t h e  t r u e  char­
acter of t h e  American dragoons,  it is ,  m i ~ l e a d i n g . 3 ~Being 
capable  of f i g h t i n g  on f o o t  as t r u e  l i g h t  i n f a n t r y ,  e x p l o i t ­
i n g  t h e  t e r r a i n  f o r  concealment and cover ,  t h e  Regiment of 
Dragoons had cons ide rab ly  more t ac t ica l  f l e x i b i l i t y  t h a n  t h e  
European h u s s a r s ,  which were in t ended  t o  f i g h t  e x c l u s i v e l y  
on horseback and t o  perform s c o u t i n g  and r a i d i n g  d u t i e s ,  ox 
t h e  European s t y l e  dragoonO3* Nor were t h e  Regiment of D r a ­
goons mounted r if les,  i n  t h a t  t h e y  lacked  i n f a n t r y  weapons 
and  were t h o r o u g h l y  t r a i n e d  t o  f i g h t  w h i l e  on horseback. 
What l a y  behind Congress ' s  e s t ab l i shmen t  of a dragoon- l ike  
c a v a l r y  u n i t  w a s  two-fold: f i r s t ,  of less importance,  w a s  
t h e  f a c t  t h a t  pre-War of 1 8 1 2  u n i t s  had borne a similar des­
i g n a t i o n ;  a n d  secondly and more impor t an t ly ,  was t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  of a l l  t h e  or thodox t y p e s  of mounted u n i t s ,  t h e  dra-
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goons were those which most approximately fitted the 
requirements of the frontier. Congressman Johnson had been 
a highly successful exponent of the Kentucky style of 
mounted volunteer rifles, which had performed with consider­
able effectiveness against both Indians and the British. 39 
This experience was probably most important in determining 
the rough organizational make-up of the Regiment of Dra­
goons. The American dragoon regiment was thus a unique 
admixture of European dragoon, light cavalry, mounted rifle 
and light infantry principles, plus a liberal dash of the 
mounted volunteer experience of one highly influential Con­
gressman, the by-product of political expediency and mili­
tary necessity and not the creation of any conventional man­
ual of cavalry organization.40 

Part I1 

The establishment of the Regiment of Dragoons, regard­
less of its lack of formal ties to the classical European 
cavalry tradition, was, nonetheless, a telling, if tempo­
rary, victory fox the advocates of the professional army. 
In what amounted to direct competition, the volunteer ranger 
concept had failed as an alternative to the use of mounted 
regulars in providing frontier security. However, as a much 
broader consequence of the Black Hawk War, the Army, con­
trary to its self-defined, professional mission of preparing 
to meet an invasion by a major European power, was hereafter 
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saddled  w i t h  t h e  primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  of p rov id ing  organ­
i z e d  p r o t e c t i o n  a g a i n s t  Ind ian  i n c u r s i o n s .  
The dragoons were a v a r i e t y  of c a v a l r y ,  more or less, 
and t h u s  t h e  Army's l e a d e r s h i p ,  i n  a manner u n a n t i c i p a t e d  by 
Congress, determined t o  mold them i n t o  t h e  shape of an  or­
t h o d o x  mounted u n i t ,  a t  l e a s t  i n  r e g a r d s  t o  tact ics  and 
equipment.  S t r u c t u r a l l y ,  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of t h e  dragoons 
w a s  t h a t  of an American i n f a n t r y  regiment .  The re fo re ,  t h e  
Reg imen t s  of Dragoons p o s s e s s e d  t e n  companies i n s t e a d  of 
t r o o p s ,  w i t h  b a t t a l i o n s  i n s t e a d  of squadrons as t h e  n e x t  
smaller u n i t  below t h e  r e g i m e n t a l  level.  The r eg imen ta l  
commander, f o r  t h e  i n t e r i m  p e r i o d  of u n i t  o r g a n i z a t i o n ,  w a s  
t h e  mounted r a n g e r s  ' s e n i o r  o f f i c e r  , Colonel  Henry Dodge. 
P r i o r  t o  h i s  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  United State  Army, Dodge had 
earned a r e p u t a t i o n  as an e f f i c i e n t  v o l u n t e e r  o f f i c e r  i n  t h e  
War of 1812.  During t h e  Black Hawk War, Dodge d i s t i n g u i s h e d  
h i m s e l f  as  a c o l o n e l  i n  t h e  Michigan T e r r i t o r i a l  Mounted 
M i l i t i a ,  by winning the l a s t  and ve ry  d e c i s i v e  v i c t o r y  over  
t h e  Sac and Fox Indians .  S ince  Dodge w a s  no t  a p r o f e s s i o n a l  
Army o f f i c e r  and  d e s i r e d  e a r l y  r e t i r e m e n t  t o  e n t e r  c i v i l  
p o l i t i c s ,  real  l e a d e r s h i p  of t h e  dragoons f e l l  t o  Lieuten­
a n t - C o l o n e l  S t e p h e n  Watts Kearny ,  f o r m e r l y  of  t h e  T h i r d  
I n f a n t r y .  P r i n c i p a l l y  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  r easons ,  s i x  of t h e  
f o r m e r  o f f i c e r s  of t h e  mounted r a n g e r s  w e r e  accep ted  f o r  
s e r v i c e  w i t h  t h e  dragoons. T h i s  d e c i s i o n  occas ioned  a f a i r  
degree  of resentment  among r e g u l a r  army o f f i c e r s ,  who s a w  it 
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as  " a n  a b s o l u t e  inf r ingement  of t h e i r  impl ied  r i g h t s "  and 
which i n  t u r n ,  reduced t h e  number of new s l o t s  on t h e  v e r y  
s l o w  p r o m o t i o n  l i s t O 4 1  A l l  o t h e r  o f f i c e r s  w e r e  e i t h e r  
r e c e n t  West P o i n t  g radua te s ,  t r apped  i n  t h e  limbo of b r e v e t  
s econd- l i eu tenan t  s t a t u s  awa i t ing  an  opening i n  t h e  career 
l ists ,  o r  seconded from e x i s t i n g  i n f a n t r y  un i t s .42  
The dragoons were a t  once r e c o n s t i t u t e d  i n t o  an e l i t e  
regiment ,  n o t  d i s s i m i l a r  from t h e  B r i t i s h  Guards . Because 
o f  t h e  h i g h e r  w o r t h  of  mounted u n i t s  i n  t h e  h i e r a r c h y  of 
t r a d i t i o n a l ,  a r i s t o c r a t i c  w a r r i o r  va lues ,  d e s p i t e  be ing  a t  
t h e  bottom of t h e  career l i s t  i n  t h e  ranking  of t h e  d i f f e r ­
e n t  c a t e g o r i e s  of Army o f f i c e r s ,  t h e  d r a g o o n s  o f f e r e d  a 
h igher  degree of s o c i a l  s t a t u s  and p r e s t i g e . 4 3  The romant ic  
c h a r a c t e r  of  t h e  d r a g o o n s  w a s  s p r i g h t l y  p re sen ted  i n  t h e  
b a r r a c k s  s o n g  ( o r ,  i n  m i l i t a r y  s l ang ,  "Jody") ,  "The Bold 
Dragoon'', of t h e  la ter  Second Regiment of Dragoons (who were 
t a g g e d  t h e  "sons of Bacchus", f o r  t h e i r  supposed o f f  d u t y  
revelries) : 
Oh: t h e  dragoon bold! he  s c o r n s  a l l  care as he 
g o e s  R o u n d s  w i t h  u n c a p p e d  h a i r  r e v e r e n d s  no  
t h o u g h t  on t h e  C i v i l  s tar t h a t  s e n t  h i m  away t o  
t h e  border  w a r .  4 4  
T h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  of t h e  rank-and-f i le  of t h e  dragoons 
w a s  t o  be v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  from any o t h e r  Army regiment .  I n  
accordance w i t h  l i m i t e d  w a r  d o c t r i n e ,  t h e  rank-and-f i le  w e r e  
u s u a l l y  f i l l e d  o u t  w i th  t h e  r e f u s e  and sweepings of s o c i e t y ;  
accord ing  t o  Frederick Marryat,  a B r i t i s h  t r a v e l e r :  
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The privates of the American regular army are 

not the most creditable soldiers in the world; 

they are chiefly composed of Irish emigrants;

Germans, and deserters from the English regiments

in Canada. Americans are very rare; only those 

who can find nothing else to do, and have to 

choose between enlistment and starvation, will 

enlist in the American army.45 

While such men "were necessarily inferior as material 

to the... volunteers enlisted... expressly to fight...," re­

called General Ulysses s. Grant, the value of such soldiers, 

to a professional army, one expressly founded on the limited 

war traditions of the French-Austrian school, was consider­

ably greater than the eagerest of volunteers.46 Such men 

were by nature of little use to civil society, hence the 

cost to the nation of manning a military establishment was 

correspondingly lessened. Moreover, such men, particularly 

the immigrants and British deserters (prized by Army offi­

cers for their high level of training and discipline),47 

lacking any ties to the larger society, were thus dependent 

on the military for succor. In turn, they could be subject 

to far more stringent discipline than would have been 

tolerated by citizen soldiers. In its recruitment policies, 

the United States Army therefore continued to follow the 

principles of limited war doctrine, in the Frederickian 

tradition. 

The dragoons, however, were to be organized quite dif­
ferently from all other Army units. The rank-and-file were 
intentionally recruited from every state in the union; the 
manpower was to be distinctly American in character, as 
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opposed to the usual offscourings of society dredged up by 

the Army's recruiters, and the unit's spirit, that of highly 

motivated volunteers. This was not, most assuredly, and 

abandonment of one of the central tenets of limited war 

doctrine. This style of recruiting was the norm in most 

European elite units and the reliance on one's own nationals 

was increasingly common over the course of the Nineteenth 

Century as the demands for labor grew with the development 

of the Industrial Revolution.48 The recruitment for the 

dragoons was enormously facilitated by the fact that the 

unit was cavalry and by the lure of western adventure. A s  
then Lieutenant Cooke pointed out, a recruiting expedition 

to Tennessee was a wholly successful undertaking: 

Early in the summer of 1 8 3 3 ,  I was among the 
hardy sons of West Tennessee seeking to infuse an 
ardor for service in a wide regiment of cavalry, 
one destined, we believed, to explore far and wide 

the western territory, and bear the arms of the

Union into the country of many Indian tribes. It 

was a prospect that did not fail to excite the 

enterprising and roving disposition of many fine 

young men, in that military state.49 

The army's haul from their recruiting efforts was, ac­

cording to one of those enthusiastic Dragoon recruits, James 

Hildreth, composed of "young men... which in point of tal­

ent, appearance and respectability, perhaps never were.. . 
surpassed in the history of military affairs."50 The high 

quality of the recruits and their boisterous spirit occa­

sioned a fair degree of press attention. The Albany Daily 
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Advertiser, for example, commented quite favorably on the 
unusually high quality of the new cavalrymen: 
...a particular fine body of men being
selected with the greatest care--not only as to 
thews and sinews, and horsemanship, but as to 
their moral qualifications, and their general
adaptation for a service requiring an unusual 
degree of skill, courage, coolness, and power of 

endurance. 51 

In part, the strategy of presenting the dragoons as an 

elite unit was no more than a recruiting ploy. Certainly 
the artful blandishments and sales puffing of the recruiters 
exploited fully this sense of superiority of the dragoons as 
an Army unit. According to Hildreth, such advertising meth­
ods were necessary because " s o  superior a band of young men 
could not have been induced to enlist themselves as common 
soldiers... where the very fact of a man's being a soldier 
seems to imply that he is fit f o r  no other employment."52 
On a deeper level, however, the deliberate recruitment of 
Americans rather than immigrants was representative of the 
same spirit of military professionalism as the Army's devo­
tion to the French-Austrian school of war. In effect, the 
Regiment of Dragoons created an elite, pan-nationalistic 
unit: a physical representation of the central political 
tenet of the French-Austrian school of war that a country's 
army was to stand separate-and-apart from civil society, as 
a guardian of order and tradition.53 
There were substantial problems associated with the 

establishment of the dragoons as an active Army unit. First 
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and most critical was the simple fact that the Army had few 

if any regular officers with cavalry experience. Due to the 

passage of some eighteen years since the disbandment of the 

light dragoons, the Army had to start anew with the creation 

of a cavalry establi~hment.~~ 
As one of the harried offi­

cers (some in Congress were pressing for an early termina­

tion of the dragoons if they did not take the field with 

dispatch), Cooke elaborated on the numerous difficulties 
facing the new unit's commanders: 

These persons who may at times have felt 
symptoms of envy at the fortunes of officers 
preferred to new regiments, might console them­
selves if they could but realize the amount of 
labor, care, and vexations attendant upon the task 
of enlisting, organizing, disciplining, and 
instructing a new corps, of producing order from 
chaos (and much the more cavalry) where the amount 
of duty, instruction, and responsibility may
safely be considered double in comparison with the 
infantry. And this, without consideration of the 
extra-ordinary fact, that cavalry tactics were 
unknown in the army, and with the whole theory and 
practical detail, were to be studiously acquired
in manner invented- by officers, before they could 
teach others. 55 
Much of what Cooke complained could be traced to the 

fiscal restraints imposed by Congress. "The most egregious 

oversight on the part of Congress," according to Hildreth, 

was "...in not providing proper instruction in horsemanship 

and dragoon tactics.... The result of this combination 

of inadequate funding and planning with Congressional pres­

sure for quick deployment of the regiment was forcefully 

pointed out by western traveller Charles Fenno Hoffman: 
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The omission of p rov id ing  r i d i n g  masters and 
a school  of p r a c t i c e  f o r  both ho r se  and men is  a 
d e f e c t  t h a t  a l l  t h e  care and  e x e r t i o n s  of  t h e  
accompl ished  and e n e r g e t i c  o f f i c e r s  of t h e  co rps  
can h a r d l y  remedy. 
The omiss ion  of t h e  necessa ry  p r o v i s i o n s  i n  
t h e  b i l l  r e p o r t e d  by Congress and t h e  d i s p e r s i o n  
of t h e  regiment  on t h e  f r o n t i e r  as each company i s  
r e c r u i t e d . . .  f o r b i d s  an approach t o  such a s ta te  
o f  d i s c i p l i n e .  The t h ree  new compan ies  h e r e  
( ( e . g . ,  F o r t  G i b s o n ,  i n  what  i s  p r e s e n t  d a y  
Kansas) ) are n e a r l y  p e r f e c t  i n  t h e  l i g h t  i n f a n t r y
d r i l l ,  which enters l a r g e l y  i n t o  t h e  maneuver of 
dragoons,  bu t  t h e  e x a c t n e s s  of t h e i r  movement when 
mounted v a r i e s  w i t h  t h e  s k i l l  of each i n d i v i d u a l  
horseman .57 
T h e  clear t h r u s t  of Colonel Dodge's e x a c t i n g  t r a i n i n g  
regimen w a s  t o  create a h igh  q u a l i t y ,  European-style  c a v a l r y  
u n i t .  The d i f f i c u l t y  w a s  i n  t r a n s l a t i n g  f o r e i g n  d r i l l  man­
u a l s  i n t o  everyday p r a c t i c e  f o r  t h e  o f f i c e r s  and men of t h e  
dragoons. "Everything w a s  new t o  them," recalled t h e n  Lieu­
t e n a n t  P h i l i p  Kearny, nephew of t h e  r eg imen t ' s  L ieu tenant -
C o l o n e l  S t e p h e n  Rearny. "The c a v a l r y  r e g u l a t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
maneuvers  were t a k e n  f rom t h e  F r e n c h ,  a l m o s t  l i t e r a l l y  
t r a n s l a t e d .  " 5 8  T h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  of t r y i n g  t o  t r a i n  men, 
when t h e  o f f i c e r s  and non-commissioned o f f i c e r s  w e r e  v i r t u ­
a l l y  i g n o r a n t  of c a v a l r y  tact ics  and w i t h  on ly  three o r  f o u r  
c o p i e s  of an o b s o l e t e  French manual t o  guide  them,  i s  i l l u s ­
t r a t e d  by how t h e  i n t r i c a t e  saber dance o r  d r i l l  w a s  t a u g h t .  
A t  n i g h t ,  t h e  o f f i c e r s  were d r i l l e d  as i f  t h e y  w e r e  back on 
t h e  p a r a d e  f i e l d  a t  t h e  P o i n t ;  t h e  fo l lowing  morning, t h e  
s e r g e a n t s  and c o r p o r a l s  w e r e  pu t  through t h e i r  paces  and, i n  
t u r n ,  t r ied t o  i n s t r u c t  t h e  men i n  t h i s  v e r y  d i f f i c u l %  w e a -
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pone Moreover, there were no qualified riding masters to 

oversee the training in horsemanship; only in 1837 was a 

cavalry school established at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsyl­

vania. 59 
The Regiment of Dragoons, at least for parade drill 
purposes and in the eyes of western travelers inexperienced 
in the military arts, was quickly assuming the appearance of 
a disciplined and polished unit. "They were," as Edmund 
Flagg wrote, " a l l  Americans, resolute looking fellows 
enough.. .It and apparently ready for the rigors of frontier 
patrol duty.60 What caught the eye of most observers was 
the supposedly higher level of individual motivation and the 
"ethnically pure" character of the men. Charles Joseph La­
trode commenting favorably on the new regiment, stated that 
"the recruits for the service of the newly-raised regiment 
of Dragoons organizing for the future service of the fron­
tier in place of the Rangers. .. were distinguished from the 
rag-tag-and-bob-tail herd drafted in to the ranks of the 
regular army by being for the most part, ( [  "all Americans"]1 
athletic young men of decent character and breeding."61 In 
reality, the unit was seething with discontent and plagued 
by such high rates of desertion (as many as one hundred by 
October, 1833) as to seriously undermine the process of unit 
formation. The chief cause of this deep dissatisfaction 
among the men was the unexpected reality of the unpleasant 
conditions of frontier service. Upon the unit's initial 
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p o s t i n g  t o  J e f f e r s o n  B a r r a c k s ,  S t .  Louis ,  t h e  f i r s t  f o u r  
compan ies  t h a t  had been organized  were r e q u i r e d  t o  act  as 
common l a b o r e r s  i n  e r e c t i n g  b a r r a c k s  and stables f o r  t h e  
regiment .  Such mundane l a b o r s  c o n t r a s t e d  q u i t e  un favorab le  
w i t h  t h e  r e c r u i t i n g  o f f i c e r ' s  hyperbole  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  sup­
posed ease of s e r v i c e  i n  an e l i t e  c a v a l r y  regiment.62 
I n  1834 t h e  First Dragoons, f o r  t h e  f i r s t  and only  t i m e  
p r i o r  t o  t h e  C i v i l  War, went i n t o  t h e  f i e l d  a t  something 
approaching f u l l  s t r e n g t h .  O v e r a l l  command of t h e  expedi­
t i o n  w a s  v e s t e d  i n  Brigadier-General  Henry Leavenworth, t h e n  
i n  c h a r g e  of F o r t  Gibson  and t h e  Western D i v i s i o n  of t h e  
United S t a t e s  Army.63 The purpose of t h i s  campaign w a s  t o  
p r e s e n t  a show of f o r c e  so  as t o  overawe t h e  P l a i n s  I n d i a n s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  r e c a l c i t r a n t  Pawnee, Kiowa and Comanche, 
i n t o  r e s p e c t i n g  t h e  r i g h t s  and i n t e r e s t s  of Santa  Fe T r a i l  
merchants,  Arkansas T e r r i t o r y  settlers and r e c e n t l y  r e l o c a ­
t e d  Eas t e rn  Ind ians .  A second and perhaps c r u c i a l  purpose 
of t h e  e x p e d i t i o n  w a s  t o  p r e p a r e  t h e  w a r  f o r  t h e  f o r c e d  
r e s e t t l e m e n t  of t h e  Sou theas t  Ind ians  onto  t h e  P l a i n s .  The 
o r i g i n a l  May date f o r  launching  t h e  e x p e d i t i o n  w a s  cance led  
due t o  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  complet ing t h e  format ion  and i n i t i a l  
t r a i n i n g  of t h e  regiment .  Only i n  e a r l y  June w a s  t h e  r e g i ­
ment 's  second b a t t a l i o n  f u l l y  formed; t h e  l a s t  three com­
pan ies  a r r i v e d  only  t h r e e  days be fo re  t h e  d e p a r t u r e  of t h e  
e x p e d i t i o n .  On June 15, 1834,  approximately f i v e  hundred 
o f f i c e r s ,  men, Ind ian  s c o u t s  and a s s o r t e d  c i v i l i a n s  embarked 
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on this ill-fated campaign. The primary failing was a 

dangerous combination of ignorance and bravado. Virtually 

to a man, the Dragoons were wholly incognizant of the 

dangers associated with travel on the Great Plains, particu­

larly by such a relatively large force. The campaign set 
out in June, during a year of exceptionally high tempesa­
tures, when potable water and forage were at their scarcest. 
Furthermore, the formation of the dragoons as a combat unit 
was nowhere complete. Not only was over half of the regi­
ment either in transit to Fort Gibson or still in training, 
there had been no time for the assemblage to coalesce into 
an effective military force. Consequently, the poor per­
formance of the regiment could be attributed to lack of 
organization and planning; or as Hildreth commented, "with 
but about six months training, and that under officers who 
know less of the maneuvers of a cavalry corps, than some of 
the dragoons themselves.n 6 4  Accompanying this expedition 
was noted artist and western chronicler George Catlin, then 
engaged in gathering information for his major work on North 
American Indian tribes. Catlin succinctly diagnosed the 
causes of the expedition's problems when he wrote: 
In the first place, from the great difficulty
of organizing and equipping, these troops are 
starting too late in the season f o r  their summer's 
campaign by two months. The journey which they
will have to perform is a very long one, and 
although the first part of it will be picturesque
and pleasing, the after part of it will be tire­
some and fatiguing in the extreme. As they
advance into the West, the grass (and consequently 
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t h e  game) w i l l  be g r a d u a l l y  d imin i sh ing ,  and water 
i n  many p a r t s  of t h e  coun t ry  w i l l  no t  be found.65 
The  e x p e d i t i o n  ended i n  d i s a s t e r .  C a t l i n  au thored  a 
haunt ing  assessment  of t h e  p r o g r e s s  of t h e  campaign i n  mid-
course:  "of t h e  450 [ a c t u a l l y ,  f i v e  hundred p l u s ]  f i n e  f e l ­
lows who s t a r t e d  from t h i s  p l a c e  [ F o r t  Gibson] f o u r  months 
s i n c e ,  about  one t h i r d  have a l r e a d y  d i e d ,  and I b e l i e v e  many 
more... w i l l  y e t  f a l l  v i c t i m  t o  t h e  deadly  d i s e a s e s  con t r ac ­
t e d  i n  t h a t  f a t a l  country. t166 Some sense  of t h e  seve r  hard­
s h i p s  and p r i v a t i o n s  which b e f e l l  t h e  dragoons i s  a f f o r d e d  
by t h e  j o u r n a l  of F i r s t - L i e u t e n a n t  Thomas B. Wheelock: 
August 8. Marched a t  e i g h t  o ' c lock .  Hal ted  
a t  t h r e e  o ' c lock ;  d i s t a n c e  e i g h t e e n  m i l e s ;  cou r se  
eas t  by s o u t h .  Exceedingly w a r m  day. Stubborn 
t h i c k e t s .  Crossed and encamped i n  t h e  bottom of 
L i t t l e  R i v e r ;  s h a l l o w  stream, na r row bed, miry 
shores .  No water from morning till t h e  h a l t  f o r  
t h e  n igh t .  Passed many c r e e k s  t h e  beds of which 
were e n t i r e l y  dry.  Our Horses looked up and down 
t h e i r  parched s u r f a c e s  and t h e  men gazed i n  v a i n  
a t  t h e  w i l l o w s  ahead, which proved only  t o  mark 
w h e r e  w a t e r  h a d  b e e n .  The t i m b e r  i s  l a r g e r  
h e r e . .  .. No l o n g e r  a n y  t r ace  of t h e  b u f f a l o .  
S i c k  r e p o r t  numbers t h i r t y  men and three o f f i ­
cers .67 
The r e s u l t  of t h i s  f o l l y  w a s  t o  p u t  t h e  regiment  o u t  of 
a c t i o n  f o r  some f o u r  months as an e f f e c t i v e  m i l i t a r y  u n i t  
w i t h  t h e  l o s s  of o v e r  one  hundred t r o o p e r s  and o f f i c e r s ,  
i n c l u d i n g  G e n e r a l  Leavenworth,  as w e l l  as a t h i r d  of i t s  
mounts. Nonetheless ,  there were ve ry  impor tan t  and v a l u a b l e  
g a i n s  r e c o r d e d  by t h e  Army's f i rs t  major campaign on t h e  
Great P l a i n s .  F i r s t ,  it se rved  t o  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  basis f o r  
subsequent  i n t e r c o u r s e  between t h e  United States  government 
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and the assorted Indian tribes of the Great Plains. Second­

ly, it served as vast classroom in which the Army was tu­

tored, although quite harshly, in the skills essential to 

the effective operation of military forces on the Great 

Plains.68 Such was the speed of the Army in mastering these 

lessons, a point too easily obscured by the misfortunes of 

the Leavenworth-Dodge expedition, that within a year's time, 

the dragoons could easily mount reconnaissance and diploma­

tic forays of well over a thousand miles without incident. 

For example, on June 7, 1835, Lieutenant-Colonel Kearney 

began a highly successful expedition into the Iowa Terri­

tory, a journey of some one thousand miles, with B, H and I 

Companies. This force returned to base on August 19, 1835, 

without the loss of a single man or horse; or as the anony­
mous chronicler of this expedition put it, in words wholly 
different than those penned for the Leavenworth-Dodge 
mission: "Come 20 miles to the Fort ((Gibson)). Arrived 
there about 2 P.M. having been absent almost 3 months. 
Sickness and disease has been a stranger to the camp and all 
have emerged in good spirits.. . upon the whole I convey we 
have had a pleasant campaign."69 
Part I11 

The Second Seminole War, 1835-1843, was perhaps the 

Army's "dirtiest" war of the Nineteenth Century. It sub­

stantially influenced the development of military profes-
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sionalism in the officer corps. Indirectly, as well, it led 

to the creation of the Antebellum Army's second cavalry 

regiment. It was a war of shadows, of small patrols strug­

gling through the inhospitable mire of the Florida Ever­

glades hunting and in turn being hunted by the Seminoles, 

Creeks and their black allies, of ambuscades and reprisals. 

It was as well a second major test of the professional 

American Army in the post-War of 1812 era. The severe 

trials occasioned by this war stemmed as much from the 

numerous difficulties of jungle warfare, as from the con­

fusion and disarray at the highest levels of the nation's 

war policy decision process. Ceaseless political pressure 

from Washington on the Army for a swift resolution of hos­

tilities in conjunction with the failure of Congress to 

legislate adequate military resources to accomplish this 

task, served to derail any coherent and effective tactical 

solutions. The reasons for the Army's eventual success were 

principally ones of exhaustion and attrition of their ene­

mies coupled with the painfully slow development of effec­

tive jungle war techniques. Seven senior officers and seven 

different tactical schemes were hastily devised and then 

just as hastily aborted due to the ever-louder chorus for an 

end to hostilities by Congress. The thoroughly European 

American Army was unsuited by organization, equipment and 

tactical doctrine, for the challenges posed by the unortho­

dox guerilla-style warfare. It took several years to devise 
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effective combined Army-Navy operations; lack of cooperation 
between these two services was as much a lack of tactical 
theory and practice in joint small-unit operations as it was 
one of politics. The lessons learned by the Army's leader­
ship were not, however, those of flexibility and innovation 
in military doctrine. Instead, as in the earlier Black Hawk 
War, this protracted campaign served as a vindication of the 
essential correctness of the Army's post-War of 1812 deci­
sion to realign itself on the French-Austrian school of war. 
Thus, as before, effective military action had been crip­
pled, vast resources of men and money squandered and lives 
lost due to the interference and lack of fiscal support of 
politicians in both the executive and legislative branches. 
There was as well the usual lack of cooperation of state, 
territorial and local officials; the customary lack of mili­
tia effectiveness as combat troops; and the persistent lack 
of adequate numbers of men, equipment and funds.70 
For eight long years, under the most oppressive and 
difficult of conditions, the Army labored in its thankless 
and ignoble job of suppressing the Seminole and Creek In­
dians. The terrain of the Florida Everglades presented ex­
ceptionally inhospitable country for the operation of con­
ventional troops. The men were plagued by the heat, the 
swamps, disease, alligators and the hard biting "tiny sand-
flies popularly called 'noseeums'.n71 The difficulties of 
campaigning in the Everglades were catalogued with a good 
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deal of anguish by Assistant Adjutant-General J. A. Cham­
bers: 
The troops have endured every hardship and 

privation, they had ((been)) exposed to the 

drenching rains, noxious vapors, and the scorching 

sun of an almost torrid climate; they had waded 

rivers, made long marches over burning sands, 

traversed almost impassable swamps, and sought the 

enemy in fastness such, as American soldiers had 

seldom penetrated before, and with a perseverance

and energy, and a courage, worthy of the best era 

of the republic.72 

The Army's travails in the Florida mires and glades 

presented yet another example of an orthodox European-style 

army struggling to overcome an adversary that refused to 

fight by the standards of civilized warfare and on terrain 

that was inhospitable to standard tactics. From the Scot­

tish Borderlands and the Balkans of the 1740s which had 
spawned the concept of light infantry, to the dense North 
American woodlands and General Braddock's massacre during 
the Seven Years War, to Wellington and the Spanish Peninsu­
la, where modern guerilla warfare was born, to the burning 
sands of French Algeria in the 1830s and 1840s and the Great 

Plains and Florida Everglades of the United States, Europe­

an-style armies had labored mightily and, on occasion, with 

a fair degree of ingenuity, to wage unconventional warfare. 

In the main, such efforts were rarely reflected in the 

manuals or in the training regimens of officer cadets. The 

only major influence on orthodox tactics lay in the use of 

light infantry as skirmishers to cover the advance of col­

umns of conventional infantry. 
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Guerilla-warfare, in order to be effectively prosecuted 

required highly unorthodox tactics, the willingness of sen­

ior officers to trust the judgments of junior officers in 

the field and an effective, coordinated strategy with the 

diplomats and civil officials. The Army eventually solved 

the first two problems of tactics and command leadership. 
Out of the jumble of strategies tried in the Florida swamps, 
what emerged was basically the same strategy used seventy 
years later by the British in the Boer War. The swamps were 
sub-divided into a series of three-square-mile districts. 
In the heart of each district was a blockhouse and a lieu­
tenant, captain or ensign with forty soldiers, Marines o r  
volunteers. The emphasis was on aggressive patrolling, 
thereby severely curtailing the mobility of the Indians. In 
turn, larger detachments traversed the glades by water and 
on foot, progressively tightening the Army's grip on the 
Florida mires, in effect, squeezing the swamps dry of its 
Indian population. Indian Bureau agents, whose ineptitude 
and belligerence had been one of the primary causes of the 
outbreak of hostilities, eventually proved somewhat useful 
in securing the surrender of some of the Indians. Eventu­
ally, the Army more or less succeeded in pacifying the 
Everglades and bringing about the deportation of much, if 
not all, of the Indian population. These painful innova­
tions in waging unconventional warfare, however, had no 
measurable impact at all on formal Army doctrine. The harsh 
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tactical lessons learned in the Everglades remained behind 

when the bulk of the Army was withdrawn to deal with the 

problem of frontier security on the Great Plains. It was 

the national political establishment which had failed to 

support the military effort effectively, from which the Army 

again learned the painful lesson that in a crisis, it would 

ultimately have to rely on itself to defend the country.73 

The professional officer corp's assessment of the 

causes of this war appear, on first reading startling: the 

two primary factors in bringing about open hostilities they 

argued, were white greed for land and the conflict between 

two quite different cultures. In fact, these factors were, 

from the perspective of most professional officers, the 

usual causes of Indian-white hostilities in this period. 

The Seminoles had therefore been pushed into war by the 

unscrupulous acts of some white settlers and the fraudulent 

and corrupting practices of the whiskey dealers, a problem 

found on both the Southern and Western frontiers:74 

...the passions of a people ((i.e., the 
Seminoles)), which had been smothered for fifteen 
years... were let loose, and the savage massacres 
which had appalled the stoutest breast, gave
undisputed evidence of the character of the 
conquest. Florida, from this time forward, was a 
scene of devastation, murder, sorrow, and dis­
tress.75 
The patrician members of the officer corps, charged 

with the conflicting duties of looking after the welfare of 

the Indian and in turn protecting the frontier settlers, 

whose greed all too often brought on hostilities, found the 
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process  of Ind ian  c o n t r o l  q u i t e  d i s t a s t e f u l .  Y e t  t h e y  d u t i ­
f u l l y  set about  t h e i r  d i r t y  work when t h e  shoo t ing  s t a r t e d ,  
t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e t h o s  of t h e  o f f i c e r  co rps  p l a c i n g  it above 
t h e  p e t t y  mach ina t ions  and i n t r i g u e s  of t h e  c i v i l  p o l i t i ­
c i a n s .  The Army had l i t t l e  a f f e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  savagery  of 
t h e i r  a d v e r s a r i e s  y e t  t h e  members of t h e  o f f i c e r  co rps  un­
d e r s t o o d  t h a t  it was a f u n c t i o n  of t h e  I n d i a n s '  ve ry  d i f ­
f e r e n t  c u l t u r e ,  " their  rude  and uncu l tu red  code of l a w s . " 7 6  
The g r e a t e s t  compla in t  of t h e  Army's l e a d e r s h i p ,  however, 
w a s  t h e  u s u a l  l a c k  of adequate  manpower t o  p r o s e c u t e  e f f e c ­
t i v e l y  and s p e e d i l y  t h e  wars f o i s t e d  on them by t h e  n a t i o n a l  
p o l i t i c a l  e s t ab l i shmen t ,  o r  as P o t t e r  p u t  it: 
I f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  w a s  de te rmined  t o  g r a t i f y
t h e  c r a v i n g  a p p e t i t e s  of a f e w  a v a r i c i o u s  specula­
t o r s ,  it was h i s  du ty  t o  p r o t e c t  t h e  r e s p e c t a b l e  
c i t i z e n s  o f  F l o r i d a  a g a i n s t  any i n j u r y  ( ( t h a t ) )
m i g h t  r e s u l t  f rom h i s  measu re ,  h e  s h o u l d  h a v e  
t h r o w n  s u c h  a f o r c e  i n t o  t h e  t e r r i t o r  a s  t o  
p reven t  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  of r e s i s t a n c e . . . .  7Y 
A t  t h e  o n s e t  of  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  t h e  Army's f o r c e s  i n  
F l o r i d a  numbered some f i v e  hundred men, mostly a r t i l l e r y  
t r o o p s  manning t h e  p e n i n s u l a ' s  f o r t r e s s e s .  T h e i r  opponents ,  
whose growing i n c l i n a t i o n  t o  r e s o r t  t o  w a r  had been known 
f o r  months, t o t a l e d  some f i f t e e n  hundred Seminoles,  C r e e k s  
and b l ack  a l l i e s .  A c o n s i d e r a b l e  e f f o r t  w a s  t h u s  s p e n t  by 
t h e  Army a n d  t h e  S e c r e t a r y  of War i n  s c r a p i n g  up enough 
t r o o p s  t o  p rosecu te  t h e  war.78 Lacking r e s o u r c e s  and under 
i n t e n s i v e  p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  t o  produce a qu ick  v i c t o r y ,  t h e  
Army tackled its formidable  problem w i t h  grim d e t e r m i n a t i o n  
1 3 3  

and, in time, considerable skill. Brevet Captain John T. 

Sprague, chronicler of this war, expressed the bitter feel­

ing of most Army officers toward their civil political 

masters when he wrote: "Blood is spilt, millions are 

squandered, the country ravaged, when the means upon which 
the only hope was based, to avert the calamity, one put in 
requisition ( (i.e., creating an Indian reservation in 
Florida)), and the army, amid vindictive abuse and unreser­
ved condemnation, accomplished the desired end."79 AS 
usual, the militia proved largely ineffectual; in the best 
tradition of limited war doctrine, Sprague stated the Army's 
severe criticism of citizen soldiers.80 
If mustered into service, each man inevitably
leaves his home unprotected while absent, solici­
tous for the safety of others, his own dwelling 
may be fired, and his family murdered; his farm 
from which he draws his daily food, becomes a 
barren waste, and the habits of industry, which 
have grown with his... ((efforts)), become 
enervated by pernicious example.81 
At about the same time as the beginning of the Seminole 

War, the Second Dragoons were created by Congress as the 

Antebellum Army's second cavalry unit. The exact motivation 

behind the establishment of a second dragoons regiment is 

quite murky. The Second Dragoons appear to have been part 

of the temporary expansion of the Army in 1836 due to the 

outbreak of hostilities in Florida.g2 Consequently, the 

Second Dragoons have been frequently identified as having 

been authorized specifically for duty in the Seminole War.83 

This portion is supported by the fact that in 1843, after 
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cessation of hostilities in Florida, Congress moved first to 
disband and then to retain them as a dismounted rifle regi­
ment. This decision was in turn reversed in 1844, when Con­
gress authorized the remounting of the Second Dragoons due 
to strong Western political pressure for increased Army pro­
tection on the Great Plains.84 The problem with this neat 
and quite linear progression of events in the complicated 

gestation period of the Second Dragoons is in the fact that 

the Everglades were the worst possible terrain in which to 

deploy cavalry. The morassy terrain of the Florida glades 
was completely impassable to mounted troops. Consequently, 

the Second Dragoons, during this campaign, were compelled to 

slog through the muck of the Everglades as lowly infantry 

along with the rest of the Army and Marines. Moreover, 

there is the interesting fact that the first; posting of the 

Second Dragoons was not to Florida but rather to Jefferson 

Barracks, St. Louis, apparently for Western frontier secur­

ity duty. It is thus probable that the Second Dragoons were 

created by Congress pursuant to increasingly vocal Western 

political demands fox adequate military protection; in turn, 
the establishment of this regiment would have allowed for 

reassignment of an infantry regiment for Florida duty. How­

ever, the massive manpower requirements created by the Sec­

ond Seminole War forced the Army high command to gut the 

Western Department for troops of all kind, including the 

Second Dragoons. The First Dragoons, save for perhaps a few 
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companies in the first months of hostilities, labored alone 

as the Army's only western cavalry unit until the 1840s.85 

A third unit of cavalry, the Regiment of Mounted 
Rifles, was established by Congress in 1846, professedly to 
man a series of new outposts along the now heavily-travelled 
Oregon The origins of the Mounted Rifles if 
anything, are more shrouded in the obscurities of Congres­
sional legislative history than the Second Dragoons. Cer­
tainly, this unit was one of congress's most whimsical and 
peculiar creations in the field of war policy. The primary 
armament was designated as the 1841-pattern rifle and, of 
all things, very oversized Bowie knives, which many officers 
replaced as soon as possible with a saber. The 1841-pattern 
rifles were simply too unwieldy and possessed too low a rate 
of fire to be effective for mounted frontier service. 

Moreover, there was simply no way such weapons could be used 

by a soldier when on horseback. Further complicating mat­

ters was the fact that a different table of organization 

than that of the Dragoons was established for the Mounted 

Rifles; thus this new regiment had two extra companies and 

over two hundred more men and officers. Even the facings on 

the uniforms were different: yellow (or orange after 1851) 

fox dragoons, green for mounted rifles, as in British Army 

practice. The motive of Congress in creating such a unit 

instead of a third regiment of dragoons, which would have 

ensured the rationalization of Army units into a few spe-
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cific types is obscure. The primary motivations appear to 

have been those of foreign policy and protection of the 

"true" Anglo-Saxon character of the American people and not 

the actual defense of pioneers on the Oregon Trail. In 

other words, nativism plus the then white-hot political 

issue of the Oregon boundary were really the principal 

influences upon Congress in creating the mounted rifles. 

The Congressional debates express concern for the racial 

purity of American society, the untoward threat of immi­

grants and the need to prove the superiority of youthful 

American society in the tussle over the Oregon Territory 

with decadent old Great Britain.87 Of course such concerns 

had little rational connection with issues of national war 

policy; the mounted rifles was the least desirable form of 

cavalry in terms of European mounted warfare doctrine and 

the Army's senior leadership. Nonetheless, Congress did 

establish the mounted rifles, reasserting, if in a rather 

roundabout manner, its traditional opposition to military 

professionalism. The style of the mounted rifles--Bowie 

knives and long guns--conjure up images of such pioneer 

legends as Daniel Boone and Davy Crockett rather than 

regular Army soldiers. As an added benefit (if of small 

import), was the Army's growing surplus of expensive new 

percussion cap rifles (in the main, loathed by line infantry 

officers fox their very slow rate of fire) could finally be 
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put to productive use rather than gathering dust in federal 

arsenals.88 

Part IV 

The American West from 1812 to 1861 provided few oppor­

tunities for the youthful cavalry service to employ formal 

European mounted-warfare principles. The central obstacle 

to the effective mastery of cavalry tactics lay in the very 

wide dispersal of the Army on the Great Plains. At no time 

until 1861, did more than six companies of any mounted regi­

ment ever serve together, after the initial assignment to 

the West. The ten companies of each mounted unit were 

scattered to isolated waddles vain-gloriously titled forts. 

Moreover, each company was further subdivided into still 

smaller detachments to man assorted cantonments and posts. 
The positioning of such detachments was chiefly a political 
and not a military decision; Army bases in this period were 
usually situated near settlements or astride commercial and 
pioneer trails, In 1835 the First Dragoons, according to 
the Annual Report of the Secretary of War, listed three 
companies at Des Moines, four at Fort Leavenworth and three 
at Fort Gibson (Arkansas). In 1848, the First Dragoons 
listed three companies within the New Mexico Territory and 
one each at Fort Leavenworth, at Fort Scott (in present day 
Oklahoma) and at Fort Snelling (upper Minnesota). For the 
same year, the Dragoons had deployed six companies in the 
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New Mexico territory, two in Texas and two in transit to 

California.89 To put these numbers in perspective and to 

facilitate an understanding of how hard-pressed the Ante­

bellum Army was in fulfilling its frontier defense obliga­

tions, consider the following (and quite typical) statement 

of the Army's western deployment in 1854; 

A. The Department of the West, including

the country between the Mississippi River and the 

Rocky Mountains, save for the Departments of Texas 

and New Mexico, with a total of 2,400 square miles 

of territory to be patrolled, occupied by an 

estimated 180,000 Indians and policed by a total 

of 1,855 officers and men; 

B. The Department of Texas, consisting of 
that state and adjacent land for a total of some 
2,000 square miles, with 30,000 Indians watched 
over by 2,886 officers and men; 
C. The Department of New Mexico, with 1,500 

square miles, 50,000 Indians and 1,654 officers 

and men. 

D. The Department of the Pacific, embracing
California and the Territories of Oregon, Washing­
ton, Utah and part of New Mexico, 3,100 square
miles to be patrolled, 134,000 Indians and 1,365 
officers and men for the job.90 
Fundamentally, the professional Army viewed the task of 

frontier security as not constituting a military problem. 

Irregular or partisan warfare, according to the prevailing 

military-legal doctrine, was barbaric and intrinsically 

dishonorable. John P. Curry, an author of field manuals for 

the militia, penned a precise statement, in 1861, of the 

formal military animus toward guerilla warfare: 

This, the most barbarous and inhuman mode of warfare 

known, and by no means recognizable among honorable comba-
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tants, is generally resorted to by irregular troops for the 
purpose of harassing and annoying an invading army entering 
an enemy's territory. They ((e.g., guerrillas)) usually
murder f o r  pay and plunder, and are not prompted by any
spirit of patriotism or honor. Guerrilla warfare consists, 

mainly in making night attacks, way laying strangers, the 

free use of poison... firing upon victims from ambush... and 

in robbery, pillage and assassination. If a guerilla is 

caught, no clemency whatever should be extended to him.91 

This pronounced opposition to partisan warfare by mem­
bers of the trans-Atlantic military community, was part of 
the legacy of the limited war tradition and the profound 
intellectual reaction against the unrestrained violence and 
the brigandage of the Thirty Years War. War was thus sup­
posed to be fought according to universal rules of engage­
ment, by clearly identified combatants f o r  limited objects 
and restrained by reason and honor. 92 The problem, there­
fore, for the Professional American Army, was how to wage an 
unorthodox war without sacrificing its hard-won commitment 
to a European style of war and in turn, without sullying its 
honor, "that active and heaven-born principle,... that puri­
fying an ennobling sentiment which pervades every word and 
action, while it regulates and controls the passions.. .' I .  9 3  
The Army, it should be recalled, was bound as well by its 
seconds obligation of protecting the samesaid Indians from 
the unlawful conduct of some whites. The problem was never 
formally tackled by the Army's leader of how to blend these 
disparate duties into a coherent policy: tactical problems 
of frontier security and legal questions involved in the 
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management of Indian affairs were largely left to the imagi­

nation and discretion of field officers. 

That is not to say that the European military tradi­

tions and practices on which the professional Army was 

modeled had no utility in aiding officers in tackling the 

complex and thorny issues involved in frontier security 

duty. Surprisingly, it was again the tactics of the French 
Army which proved invaluable in solving the question of how 
to control the Indians. A frequently used term to describe 
the Indians, was that they were "Arabs" or "mussulmen". 
Captain John Pope, for example in describing the Indians of 
the Southwest in 1853, stated that their habits (including 

in battle) were similar to the "wild Arabs" of the desertOg4 

Similarly, Army Surgeon R. Gilson, described the Comanches 

as "those arabs of the western prairies."95 The origin of 

this practice of defining the Army's problem of Indian con­

trol as analogous to management of the Arabs was derived 

directly from recent French Army experience in North 

AfricaOg6 In the 1830s and 1840s, French armies waged a 

protracted and highly fluid war with the Berber tribes. The 

initial and wholly unsuccessful tactical scheme was the 

"Great Wall", entailing reliance upon numerous small, static 

garrisons to seal off the Berber threat from populated 

areas. Essentially, therefore, in terms of American 

frontier military policy, the same type of tactics which had 

proved equally ineffective on the Great Plains and in the 
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Mississippi Valley in the immediate post-War of 1812 period. 

In 1840 Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud was dispatched to 

Algeria to take command of the flagging war effort and to 

implement his quite original and even daring tactical solu­

tion to the Arab's guerilla tactics. Within his command 
were three American Cavalry lieutenants sent to France by 
Secretary of War Joel Poinsett with the objective of 
returning with the most up-to-date training and manuals in 
mounted warfare so as to ensure that the dragoons were truly 
an effective cavalry unit. Bugeaud replaced the numerous 
small garrisons with large, strategically positioned concen­
trations of troops. The new tactical emphasis was on celer­
ity and mobility; heavy supply wagons were replaced by mules 
and the heavy artillery left at base. Small detachments of 
cavalry and infantry were sent out as scouts to shadow the 
Arabs and pinpoint their location. Aggressive patrolling 
and rapid and effective retaliatory strikes by cavalry and 
infantry, exploiting their new swiftness of action to the 
fullest, accomplished in four years what France had failed 
to do in the previous twenty; or as Bugeaud himself put it: 
I have made myself as much an Arab as you 
are. More than you perhaps for I can remain on 
campaign longer without returning for supplies.
Your vast solitudes, your steepest mountains, your
deepest ravines cannot frighten me or stop me for 
a moment.. .. I am mobile as you are. There is 
not as single corner of your territory which I 
cannot reach. Like a river of fire I will scourge
it in a l l  directions, today to the south, tomorrow 
to the east, the day after to the west, then to 
the north.97 
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Arab and Indian societies were highly dissimilar, the 
former being considerably more organized. Yet the styles of 
warfare of these two peoples bore many similarities: fleet, 
highly mobile adversaries, specializing in hit-and-run tac­
tics, and exploiting the harsh, inhospitable terrain in 
which they lived to their advantage. Thus, there was a 
common bond of experience, based on the solution of broadly 
similar tactical problems, between American and French offi­
cers. Lieutenant Philip Kearny, who distinguished himself 
in the Algeria campaign of 1841-1842, returned to the dra­
goons imbued with the latest advances in waging both ortho­
dox and unorthodox warfare. For Kearny, "the French theory 
of tactics.. . ((was)) the most perfect" of his day, a 
statement which would have been readily agreed to by most 
professional officers on both sides of the Atlantic. While 
the French tactics in Algeria, unlike their formal princi­
ples of mounted warfare, were never written down in any 
formal military treatise, they nonetheless influenced 
American counter-Indian tactics in the Antebellum era. Mule 
trains were used for resupply in rough country, infantry 
were employed to screen cavalry and supply trains from am­
bush in mountainous terrain and small herds of sheep and 
cattle were driven behind the troops to provision large 
field operations.98 Thus, the definition of frontier secur­
ity problems in the context of European military practice, 
particularly that of the Army's mentor, France, further 
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s t r e n g t h e n e d  t h e  t i es  of t h e  o f f i c e r  co rps  t o  t h e  p ro fes ­
s i o n a l  concept  of war. 
Both t h e  French and t h e  American armies a r r i v e d ,  inde­
pendent ly ,  a t  t h e  conc lus ion  t h a t  c a v a l r y  was fundamental  t o  
t h e  e f f e c t i v e  c o n t r o l  of h o s t i l e s ,  Arab o r  Ind ian .  Thus 
w i t h o u t  c a v a l r y ,  accord ing  t o  Colonel George Croghan, "our 
i n t e r i o r  commerc ia l  c a n  ( ( n o t )  ) be p r o t e c t e d  a g a i n s t  t h e  
t a r t a r s  of t h e  p r a i r i e s  by I n f a n t r y  s t a t i o n e d  a t  p o s t s ,  
w i t h o u t  t h e  a s s i s t a n c e  of  a mounted force."99 Again, as 
po in ted  o u t  by Capta in  Cooke: " i n  no coun t ry  of Europe, nor 
i n  A s i a ,  can h o r s e s  be so  numerously and so  cheaply suppor­
t e d  as i n  t h e  U n i t e d  States;  and our p l a i n s  and p r a i r i e s  
p l a i n l y  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  c a v a l r y  i s  t h e  most s u i t a b l e  m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e .  "100 An a l t e r n a t i v e  t ac t ica l  s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  problem 
of s u p p r e s s i n g  t h e  r a i d s  of t h e  P l a i n s  I n d i a n s  would have 
been by t h e  use  of a l a r g e l y  mounted combat f o r c e ,  suppor ted  
by l i m i t e d  numbers of infantrymen t o  man g a r r i s o n s  and f o r  
use  i n  h i l l y  t e r r a i n .  Such tact ics  were used i n  t h e  Nine­
t e e n t h  C e n t u r y  by I m p e r i a l  Russ i a  t o  s e c u r e  c o n t r o l  over  
t h e i r  C e n t r a l  A s i a  t e r r i t o r y .  Such a r a d i c a l  d e p a r t u r e  from 
orthodox m i l i t a r y  tact ics  never developed due t o  two i n s u r ­
m o u n t a b l e  o b s t a c l e s .  F i r s t  of a l l ,  Congres s  had l i t t l e  
enthusiasm f o r  expanding t h e  s t r e n g t h  of t h e  Army, r e s u l t i n g  
i n  a c o n t i n u a l  s h o r t a g e  of t r o o p s  t h a t  w a s  on ly  g r a d u a l l y  
so lved  over  t h e  cour se  of t h e  Antebellum pe r iod .  The second 
key  o b s t a c l e  l a y  i n  t h e  i n t r i n s i c  m i l i t a r y  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  
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of t h e  Army i t s e l f  . T h e  fundamental  t ac t i ca l  p r e c e p t  of 
formal  European-style  war fa re  w a s  t h a t  t h e  i n f a n t r y  w a s  t h e  
k ing  of b a t t l e ;  c a v a l r y  w a s  no more t h a n  a u s e f u l  a d j u n c t  t o  
t h e  f o o t - s o l d i e r s .  The Army t h e r e f o r e  went about  t h e  d i f f i ­
c u l t  t a s k  of Ind ian  c o n t r o l  by bending and t w i s t i n g  t h e i r  
European o r i e n t e d  war f i g h t i n g  system t o  t h e  requi rements  of 
t h e  f r o n t i e r ;. 
P r a c t i c a l l y  speaking,  t h e  b a s i c  o p e r a t i o n a l  c h a r a c t e r  
of t h e  Army's means of s u p p r e s s i n g  I n d i a n  i n c u r s i o n s  w a s  
wholly m i l i t a r y  i n  c h a r a c t e r .  It w a s  n o t ,  however, d e f i n e d  
as  b e i n g  m i l i t a r y  i n  n a t u r e  by t h e  o f f i c e r s  waging t h e s e  
campa igns .  On t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  it was c l e a r l y  n o t  t h e  
p o l i c e - l i k e  campaign employed a c r o s s  t h e  border  i n  Canada. 
The  Royal  Canadian Mounted P o l i c e  tackled t h e  q u e s t i o n  of 
Ind ian  c o n t r o l  i n  t h e  f a s h i o n  of a conven t iona l  p o l i c e  prob­
l e m  of ma in ta in ing  l a w  and o rde r .  This  approach w a s  wholly 
r e a c t i v e  i n  na tu re :  i n  t h e  main, i n d i v i d u a l  v i o l a t o r s  of 
Canadian l a w  would be apprehended and t r i e d  f o r  t h e i r  o f f en ­
ses. Only i n f r e q u e n t l y  d id  t h e  R.C.M.P. r e s o r t  t o  t h e  u se  
of l a r g e  scale detachments of p o l i c e  and s o l d i e r s  t o  c o n t r o l  
t h e i r  I n d i a n  p o p u l a t i o n s  ; f o r  example ,  be tween 1886 and 
1895 ,  there  w e r e  943 m i l i t a r y  engagements i n  t h e  American 
West compared w i t h  on ly  s i x  o r  seven i n  t h e  Canadian North­
w e s t  T e r r i t o r y .  Of enormous i m p o r t a n c e  i n  a i d i n g  t h e  
e f f o r t s  of t h e  R.C.M.P. w a s  t h e  f ac t  t h a t  t h e  c e n t r a l  Cana­
d i a n  g o v e r n m e n t  worked v i g o r o u s l y  t o  r e s t r a i n  w e s t e r n  
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settlement until the Indians had been pacified. Conse­

quently, the R.C.M.P. was not nearly as burdened as was the 

American Army with the task of safeguarding large numbers of 

western settlers from Indian attack. While seemingly more 

orderly and less combative, the Canadian police model did 

not, in fact, prove successful. It was rather the far more 

massive and belligerent campaigns of the American Army to 

the south that broke the resistance of the Great Plains 

Indians on both sides of the border.101 

A second, very different strategy of Indian control was 
that of the Texas Rangers. Basically, in dealing with the 
Comanche and other tribes, their technique was to out-
Indian-the-Indian, including, on occasion, the ferocity of 
combat. The Rangers attempted to drive their opponents to 
ground and then decisively engage them, exploiting the enor­
mous firepower advantage of their Colt cap-and-ball revol­
vers to the fullest (the Rangers had these weapons in action 
some twelve years prior to official Army service adoption); 
an average company of one hundred and twenty men, armed with 
two revolvers each, could discharge a then mind-boggling 
total of fourteen hundred and twenty rounds without reload­
ing compared to the earlier total of one hundred and twenty 
with single-shot weapons. When the Cossack-like Rangers 
were infused with military discipline, as in R i p  Ford's 
famed 1858-1859 campaign on the Canadian River against the 

Comanches, the results could be devastating against the 
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Ind ians  .IO2 The United S t a t e s  Army, i n h e r e n t l y  a m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e  and governed i n  i t s  a c t i o n s  by i t s  p r o f e s s i o n a l  code 
of honor, chose i n s t e a d  t o  c o r r a l  t h e  I n d i a n s ,  who w e r e  a t  
once  t h e i r  a d v e r s a r i e s  a n d  i n  e f f e c t ,  t h e i r  wards, on to  
s e c u r e  r e s e r v a t i o n s .  
The concept  of t h e  American Ind ian  h e l d  by Army o f f i ­
cers was marked by a p r o f o u n d  s e n s e  of  ambigui ty .  Many 
o f f i c e r s ,  accord ing  t o  t h e  popular  s t e r e o t y p e ,  d i d  f i n d  t h e  
Ind ians  t o  be savages--cruel ,  s e l f i s h ,  t r e a c h e r o u s ,  d i s g u s t ­
i n g  i n  t h e i r  p e r s o n a l  and  s o c i e t a l  h a b i t s  and i n v e t e r a t e  
begga r s ,  A s  f o r c i b l y  a r t i c u l a t e d  by L ieu tenan t  W i l l i a m  
Avera l l ,  there was something q u i t e  demeaning i n  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  
p r a c t i c e  of  s q u a n d e r i n g  i t s  West P o i n t  g r a d u a t e s  on t h e  
lowly and o c c a s i o n a l l y  d i shonorab le  d u t y  of I n d i a n  c o n t r o l :  
W i t h  a l l  t h e  e l e m e n t s  of s c i e n c e  and r u d i ­
ments of a r t  wi th  which w e  had been loaded  d u r i n g  
t h e  fou r  y e a r s  ( ( a t  West P o i n t ) ) ,  w e  w e r e . . .  now 
t o  b e  u s e d  s i m p l y  a n d  s a d l y  t o  s u p e r v i s e  t h e  
l e a r n i n g  and d i s c i p l i n i n g  of s o l d i e r s  and t o  t r a i n  
them i n  t h e  a r t  of k i l l i n g  Indians. lO* 
A s  a r u l e ,  t h e  greater t h e  f e r o c i t y  and t h e  larger t h e  vari­
a n c e  f r o m  accepted pract ices  of  American c u l t u r e ,  t h e  
g r e a t e r  t h e  d i s l i k e  of such I n d i a n s  by members of t h e  o f f i ­
cer c o r p s .  One Army w i f e ,  Theresa V i e l e ,  w r i t i n g  f o r  her  
husband, a c a p t a i n ,  described t h e  Comanche i n  t h e  harshest 
of terms: "there could n o t  be a blacker r e c o r d  of infamy 
and r apac iousness .  The Comanche posses ses  no v e s t i g e  of t h e  
noble  t ra i ts  of t h e  redmen of t h e  northwest ."  R a t h e r ,  "he 
i s  a b l o o d y ,  b r u t a l  l i c e n t i o u s ,  and an  i n n a t e  t h i e f  . ' ' lo5  
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Such perceptions, however, reflected only part of the 

complex set of viewpoints held by members of the officer 

corps concerning the Indian, who as Surgeon Gilsan pointed 

out, "range from the primitive savage to the half-civi­

lized...."106 The perceptions of individual officers thus 
varied with their own personal experiences and in turn, due 

to the particular tribe(s) with which they had contact. 

Thus, Major-General George A. McCall, as a youthful junior 

officer serving in Florida in the late 1820s, penned a quite 

perceptive assessment of the Seminole Indian and his 

relationship to white society: 

The difference in the development of the 
intellectual facilities as well as moral, had they
been by nature carved in the two races, which I am 
satisfied is -not the case... ((lies in)) education 

or in other words, the habitual experience of the 

mental moral faculties in the different pursuits

of savage and civilized life, would, in the course 

of ages, have produced the differences between the 

white man and the red which now exist.107 

Indian warfare, savage and barbaric to most whites, 

could thus be understood by the professional soldier as a 

function of his less developed culture, a point which was 

succinctly stated by Lieutenant Potter: 

In war, the Indian has been regarded as a 

ferocious beast, and therefore life and death was 

a matter of mere precaution. He goes into battle 

smarting under manifold injuries and indignities,

and he is driven into madness and despair by the 

overwhelming ruin which results from a war with 

us. 108 

The duty of the Army in regards to the Indian was 

inherently contradictory, requiring it to protect both red 

-- -- 
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and w h i t e  i n t e r e s t s .  Moreover, t h e  p r o f e s s i o n a l  e t h o s  of 
t h e  o f f i c e r  co rps ,  their  s t r o n g  p a t r i c i a n  v a l u e s  and s e n s e  
of a r i s t o c r a t i c  honor, mot iva ted  them t o  i n t e r v e n e  on behal f  
of t h e  I n d i a n s  and t o  p r o t e c t  them from t h e  f r o n t i e r s m e n ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  t h e  infamous whiskey d e a l e r s ,  f o r  whom t h e y  had 
l i t t l e  a f f e c t i o n .  109 Y e t  w i th  s k i l l  and d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  i f  
no t  enthusiasm, t h e s e  o f f i c e r s  undertook t h e  f o r c e d  r e l o c a ­
t i o n s  of  t h e  I n d i a n s  f u r t h e r  West, onto  i n c r e a s i n g l y  less 
d e s i r a b l e  t e r r a i n . l 1 0  Whi le  such e f f o r t s  were " c r u e l  i n  t h e  
e x t r e m e "  t h e y  were n o n e t h e l e s s  c a r r i e d  o u t  .lll Perhaps 
Surgeon  G i l s a n  b e s t  expressed  t h e  t a n g l e d  p e r c e p t i o n s  and 
v a l u e s  h e l d  by Army o f f i c e r s  toward " t h o s e  c h i l d r e n  of t h e  
f o r e s t " ,  when h e  w r o t e  w i t h  c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n s i g h t  a n d  
compassion: 
Thus it ever  is: t h e  r e d  man of t h e  A t l a n t i c  
s l o p e  must  b e  crowded f u r t h e r  w e s t ,  w h i l s t  h i s  
race on t h e  f a r - o f f  P a c i f i c  sho res ,  are j o s t l e d
and pushed towards t h e  r i s i n g  sun. When a t  l a s t  
t h e  g r e a t  t i d e s  of immigration m e t  midway between 
t h e  t w o  o c e a n s ,  t h e  r e m n a n t s  o f  t h e  s i x t e e n  
m i l l i o n s  of t h o s e  n a t i v e  bands of t h e  s o i l ,  t h a t  
once roamed over t h i s  broad l a n d ,  who sha l l  have 
l e f t  t h e i r  bones  b l each ing  beneath t h e  waves of 
a d v a n c i n g  c i v i l i z a t i o n .  One s h u d d e r s  a t  t h e  
thought  of t h e  many blood c o n f l i c t s  y e t  t o  occur  
between t h e s e  contending races of human beings. . . .  
I f  w e  a r e  t o  t ake  h i s t o r y  as  our gu ide  i n  
d e t e r m i n i n g  t h e  f u t u r e ,  t h e  r i g h t  and wrong of 
t h o s e  c r u e l  e n c o u n t e r s  w i l l  n o t  a l w a y s  rest  
e x c l u s i v e l y  on e i ther  s i d e  bu t  one t i m e  w i t h  
t h e  r e d  man a t  a n o t h e r  w i t h  h i s  p a l e - f  ace 
b r o t h e r .  1 1 2  
Whatever i t s  r e s e r v a t i o n s  toward t h e  b u s i n e s s  of Ind ian  
c o n t r o l ,  t h e  Army none the le s s  had on occas ion  t o  use  f o r c e  
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to suppress uprisings. Few comprehensive descriptions of 
cavalry versus Indian engagements were recorded in the Ante­
bellum period, by American cavalry officers. One exception 
is the illuminating account by then Second-Lieutenant John 
B. Hood. The distinguishing feature in this skirmish was 
that Hood's men, due to insufficient numbers leaving no one 
to spare to act as horse handlers, fought mounted, rather, 
than as was customary, as dismounted light infantry. On 
July 5, 1857, Hood set out from Fort Manon, in the Texas 
Department of the West, with twenty-five men of Company G of 
the later First United States Cavalry. Their mission was a 
routine patrol of the area. After some ten days in the 
field, Hood's men chanced upon a two or three-day old Indian 
trail, which the patrol proceeded to follow along a line of 
dried-up waterholes. The Indians being stalked were sus­
pected by Hood to have been a band of marauders, incorrectly 
identified as being Tokaways (who usually fought as scouts 
along side the Army), who had previously ambushed American 
soldiers whole under the guise of a flag of truce. After 
several days of difficult travel through the arid, rocky, 
desert country, Hood's detachment finally came upon the 
Indian band they had been diligently hunting. Hood's opera­
tional strength had diminished to only seventeen men as a 
consequence of  injuries to eight of  his horses. Upon 
reaching the Indian encampment, Hood proceeded to make an 
initial inspection while mounted. The Indians held a 
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waterhole, positioning their encampment on a hillock, con­

cealed by thick clumps of Spanish bayonet. What Hood had 

come across was in fact a band of some one hundred Comanche 
and Lyan-Apache warriors and their families.113 While de­
cisively outnumbered, these troopers had the advantage of 

greatly superior fixepower: 

Every man was armed with an Army rifle 

((e-g., A Sharps 1854-pattern single shot, breech 

loading carbine)) and six shooter, a few of us had 
sabers and two revolvers, whilst I was armed with 
a double barrel shot-gun loaded with buckshot, and 
two navy six-shooters ( ( - 3 6  caliber as opposed to 
-44 caliber - officers still commonly purchased
their own side arms in this period)).ll4 

Indian armament consisted of bows-and-arrows, lances, 

buffalo hide shields and a few single shot trade muskets 

(so-called, because they were cheaply made especially for 

the Indian trade).l l - 5  Despite the unfavorable disparity in 
numbers, Hood elected to close with the Indian warriors or 

dog soldiers because he, like many other officers, was per­

sonally inclined to accept "the belief... that twenty well 

armed soldiers should be able to successfully engage four 

times their number of Indians...."116 Such beliefs did not 
constitute idle boasting or false bravado on Hood's part. 

The combination of superior firepower, as provided by Colt-

Dragoon pattern cap-and-ball-revolvers and Hall and Sharps 

carbines, with vastly greater discipline, fire control and 

marksmanship allowed small bodies of troopers to deal with 

much larger Indian warrior bands.117 
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Indian tribes did not fight according to European 

concepts of warfare; tactics as such were largely 

unknown.118 By-and-large, most cavalry-infantry skirmishes 

arose from chance encounters; it was the Army which was the 

aggressor on most occasions. For the most part, Plains 

Indians fought what were essentially individual battles 

regardless of how many warriors were involved. The aims of 

the combatants were completely different: for the Indian, 

war was a question of honor and necessity, such as contests 

for horses or valuable hunting land; for the Army, it was 

their full-time occupation. The first phase of such a 
battle was for the Indian warriors to charge in mass and 
then, at about one hundred yards, split into two formations 
skirting the soldier's position so as to avoid their greater 
firepower. The Indians hoped to cause sufficient disarray 
among their opponents so as to draw them into their style of 
individual, close-order combat. The warrior's greatest 
achievement lay in the accumulation of personal honor, 
achieved by scoring coups or touches with a specially non­
sharpened stick or performing some other equally brave feat. 
Killing an opponent, while prestigious, constituted a some­
what lower level of achievement. Once one's personal honor 
had been vindicated, it was perfectly acceptable for that 
brave to sit out the remainder of the engagement. And there 
was no obligation of honor for any warrior to participate 
actively if he and the spirits did not feel it was a good 
1 5 2  
d a y  f o r  hiin t o  d i e .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  Army's s o l d i e r s  
a t tempted  t o  ensu re  t h e  d e a t h  of t h e i r  opponents by aiming 
t h e i r  weapons,  u n l i k e  t h e  I n d i a n  p r a c t i c e  o f  f i r i n g  i n  
b a r r a g e - l i k e  f a sh ion ,  t h e  same as t h e y  would when hun t ing  
b u f f a l o .  Furthermore,  t h e  Army fought  i n  c o n t r o l l e d ,  d i s c i ­
p l i n e d  format ions  w i t h  a clear,  conce r t ed  o b j e c t  of t roun­
c i n g  their  foes.119 
Returning t o  Hood's n a r r a t i v e :  
When w e  were w i t h i n  about  twenty ox t h i r t y  
p a c e s  of t h e  mound occupied by t h e  Indians . . .  a 
f o r c e  of t h e m  advanced towards us  wi th  t h e  f l a g
( ( i . e . ,  a whi te  s h e e t  f r a u d u l e n t l y  o u t  as a f l a g  
of peace)  1. 
and f i r e d  uponSudde?Aft h e y  threw it t o  t h e  ground us. 
The  Comanche a n d  Apaches p r o c e e d e d  t o  l a u n c h  t h e i r  
at tack, on f o o t  and horse ,  a g a i n s t  Hood's detachment:  
Thus began  a most  d e s p e r a t e  s t r u g g l e .  The 
w a r r i o r s  were a l l  p a i n t e d ,  s t r i p p e d  t o  t h e  wais t ,  
w i t h  e i t h e r  h o r n s  or w r e a t h e s  of f e a t h e r s  upon 
t h e i r  h e a d s ;  t h e y  bore  s h i e l d s  f o r  de fense ,  and 
were armed w i t h  r i f l e s ,  l a n c e s  and arrows. The 
f u l l  and s h a r p  r e p o r t  of our  r i f l e s ,  t h e  smoke and 
encroaching  n o i s e  of t h e  f i r e  ( ( a  d e f e n s i v e  b l a z e  
s e t  b y  t h e  I n d i a n s  t o  s c r e e n  t h e i r  women a n d  
c h i l d r e n )  ) , t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  g r e a t  odds a g a i n s t  
u s ,  t h e  s h o u t s  of t h e  s o l d i e r s  and t h e  y e l l s  of 
t h e  I n d i a n s ,  betokened ( (sic.  ) ) t h e  deadly  p e r i l
f rom w h i c h  seeming ly  naught bu t  a miracle could  
e f f e c t  our d e l i v e r a n c e .  Each man af ter  d i scha rg ­
i n g  h i s  r i f l e ,  drew h i s  r e v o l v e r ,  and used it wi th  
t e r r i b l e  e f f e c t  as t h e  w a r r i o r s ,  i n  many i n s t a n c e s  
w e r e  w i t h i n  a few f e e t  of t h e  muzzle of our arms. 
S t u b b o r n l y  d i d  my b r a v e  men h o l d  t h e i r  ground; 
a g a i n  and a g a i n  t h e y  drove t h e  enemy back t o  t h e  
edge and i n  rear of t h e  burning m a s s  of weeds i n  
o u r  f r o n t ,  when f i n a l l y  t h e  I n d i a n s  c h a r g e d
d e s p e r a t e l y  and f o r c e d  our l i n e  back a f e w  paces
i n  t h e  cen t r e .121  
Thus raged t h i s  hand t o  hand c o n f l i c t  u n t i l  
a l l  our s h o t s  were expended, and it w a s  found t h a t  
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owning to the restiveness of the horses we could 

not reload while mounted. We then fell back about 

fifth yards and dismounted for that purpose.122 

At this point in the engagement the Indians broke off 
the fight, signaled by a loud piercing scream from their 
squaws for their dead and wounded, with an estimated ten 
warriors killed. Hood's detachment had suffered two men 
killed, four severely wounded and several flesh wounds; the 
unit's commander himself suffered a grievous injury as a re­
sult of an arrow which struck his left hand, pinning it to 
his bridle. After retreating some fifty yards to reload, 
Hood decided to first care for his injured. Despite his 
wound, Hood continued the chase, which forced the Indians 
back on their reservation, first with infantry and then with 
cavalry reinforcements. Later intelligence from the local 
Indian agent confirmed the actual l o s s  of nineteen warriors, 
including two minor chiefs, and many wounded. The Army's 
dead were buried with full honors, with the following 
eulogy: 
No useless coffin confined his breast 

Nor in sheet or shroud they buried him 

But he lay like a warrior taking his rest 

With his martial cloak around him.123 

For his handling of this action, Hood was personally 

commended by Brevet Major-General D. E. Twiggs, commanding 

the Department of Texas, and quite unusually, by Commanding 

General Scott, for his gallantry, coolness and effi­

ciency.124 
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The tact ics  which t h e  American c a v a l r y  adapted  f o r  use 
on t h e  f r o n t i e r  were w h o l l y  French i n  o r i g i n ;  L ieu tenan t  
Kearny championed t h e  s u p e r i o r i t y  of t h e i r  mounted war fa re  
d o c t r i n e  when he wrote ,  " i n  c a v a l r y  which... t h e  French,  has  
kep t  p r o g r e s s i n g  i n  p e r f e c t i o n  ever  s i n c e  t h e  g r e a t  wars of 
Europe ,  e v e r y t h i n g  u s e l e s s  h a s  been r e j e c t e d ,  and every­
t h i n g  ... is p r a c t i c e d  i n  t h e  b e s t  manner.n125 The 1841 o r  
so -ca l l ed  P o i n s e t t  manual of c a v a l r y  tactics w a s  l i f t e d  i n  
t o t a l  from t h e  t h e n  s t a n d a r d  French work on mounted war fa re .  
A t  Car l i s le  Barracks Army hor se  s o l d i e r s  were d r i l l e d  i n  t h e  
t e c h n i q u e s  a n d  cus toms of European-style  c a v a l r y  war fa re ,  
w h i l e  f i e l d  commanders were l e f t  f r e e  t o  d e v i s e  t h e i r  own 
schemes f o r  i n s t r u c t i n g  t h e i r  men i n  I n d i a n  f i g h t i n g .  And 
a t  W e s t  P o i n t ,  s a v e  f o r  Cap ta in  George �3. Thomas's b r i e f  
t e n u r e  (1850-1851) as i n s t r u c t o r  of c a v a l r y  tact ics ,  c a d e t s  
r e c e i v e d  no i n s t r u c t i o n  wha t soeve r  i n  t h e  i n t r i c a c i e s  of 
Ind ian  management.126 
Not o n l y  were t h e  c a v a l r y  t a c t i c s  n o t  a f f e c t e d  by 
f r o n t i e r  e x p e r i e n c e  bu t  t h e  Army's equipment and weaponry 
w a s  e q u a l l y  l i t t l e  a f f e c t e d .  The enormous gu l f  between t h e  
formal ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  Army and t h e  r a g t a g  f o r c e  guard ing  t h e  
f r o n t i e r ,  w a s  demonstrated by t h e i r  c o n t i n u i n g  commitment t o  
t h e  arme b l a n c h e  a s  t h e  p r i m a r y  c a v a l r y  weapon. Only a 
handfu l  of men and o f f i c e r s  c a r r i e d  a sabe r  i n t o  t h e  f i e l d ;  
i t s  p r i n c i p a l  f u n c t i o n s  i n  t h e  W e s t  w e r e  ones of ceremony 
and  a s  a badge  of  rank .  Saber charges  of t h e  c lass ical ,  
1 5 5  

European variety were virtually unknown in the Indian wars 

of the Great Plains. Moreover, many a cavalry officer ques­

tioned the utility of carrying swords when engaged in Indian 

fighting. Major Albert Gallatin Brackett pointedly expres­

sed the limitations of the saber, when he wrote: 

The saber in Indian fighting is simply a 
nuisance, they jingle abominably, and are of no 
earthly use. If a soldier gets close enough to 
use a saber, it is about an even thing as to who 
goes under first....I27 
Similarly, Major-General William Hardee argued that in 

Indian fighting, a saber was unnecessary because: 

In marching it makes a noise which may be 

heard at some distance, perhaps preventing a 

surprise, and in a charge when not drawn is
particularly an encumbrance.1'2 8 

The cavalry was very deficient, as well, in its fire­

arms. Granted that most soldiers, of whatever branch of 

service, were only "average marksmen", and that most com­

manders rarely emphasized target practice, yet the cavalry's 

firearms were exceedingly inefficient even by the standards 

of the day.129 A s  Inspector General, Colonel Joseph Mans-
field put it in his official report, "the musketoon as arm 

for the dragoon or mounted man in any way is almost worth­

less."l30 While "illy suited" for the demands of Indian 

fighting, the smoothbore remained in service until the Civil 

War.131 The Ordinance Bureau, hidebound in its devotion to 

orthodoxy in fixearm design, fought aggressively to block 
I the adoption of first the Hall carbine, then the Sharps 
carbine and the Colt revolver as mechanically unreliable, as 
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t o o  complex t o  b e  i s s u e d  t o  common s o l d i e r s ,  and f a r  t o o  
expensive .132 
I The u n i f o r m s  of t h e  dragoons and mounted r i f les  were 
wholly u n s u i t e d  f o r  t h e  r i g o r s  of f r o n t i e r  s e r v i c e .  Heavy 
wool c l o t h ,  t i g h t l y  c u t  and adorned wi th  
shou lde r s  t o  ward o f f  s abe r  blows were 
sur roundings  of an  eastern parade f i e l d .  
o f f  icers improvised t h e i r  own pe r sona l  
s i s t i n g  of  a m i x t u r e  of  c i v i l i a n  and  
b r a s s  scales on t h e  
f i t  on ly  f o r  p l a c i d  
Most s o l d i e r s  and 
f i e l d  uniform, con-
Army-issued c l o t h ­
i n g  .133 Perhaps t h e  most g l a r i n g  example of t h e  c o n t i n u i n g  
domination of formal European m i l i t a r y  d o c t r i n e ,  r e g a r d l e s s  
of a c t u a l  exper ience  i n  I n d i a n  f i g h t i n g ,  can be found i n  t h e  
s e l e c t i o n  of mounts f o r  t h e  c a v a l r y .  The dragoons and t h e  
mounted r i f l e s  were c r e a t e d  s p e c i f i c a l l y  t o  combat t h e  s w i f t  
and h i g h l y  mobile Ind ians  of t h e  Great P l a i n s .  The Army's 
l e a d e r s h i p ,  however, d e s i r i n g  t o  make t h e i r  c a v a l r y  u n i t s  
f i t - a n d - p r o p e r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  European  m i l i t a r y  s t a n d a r d s ,  
chose s t a n d a r d b r e d s ,  t h o r o u g h b r e d s  a n d  Morgans as t h e i r  
mounts. Such majestic animals  were f u n c t i o n a l l y  o u t c l a s s e d  
by t h e  unimpressive- looking Ind ian  pony. The Army's h o r s e s  
r e q u i r e d  g r e a t e r  care and were dependent f o r  t h e i r  s u s t e ­
nance on g r a i n ,  p r e f e r a b l y  o a t s ,  and n o t  t h e  abundant w i l d  
p r a i r i e  g r a s s e s .  Not on ly  were t h e  Army's h o r s e s  i n f e r i o r  
as c a v a l r y  mounts, i n  r e g a r d s  t o  t h e  requi rements  of Western 
I n d i a n  f i g h t i n g ,  t h e y  were d e c i d e d l y  s l o w e r  as  w e l l .  
Furthermore,  speed was not  an a p p r o p r i a t e  term to d e s c r i b e  a 
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t r o o p e r  i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  weighed wi th  up t o  a hundred pounds of 
I 
weapons and s u p p l i e s .  Even tua l ly ,  c a v a l r y  commanders, once 
h a v i n g  become a d j u s t e d  t o  t h e  real i t ies  of p a t r o l  du ty  on 
t h e  Great P l a i n s ,  trimmed t h e  weight of t h e  l o a d s  carried by 
t h e i r  t r o o p e r s  t o  a more f u n c t i o n a l  f i f t e e n  t o  f o r t y  pound 
I range. The Army, u n l i k e  t h e  Mexicans and t h e  cowboys, never 
a d o p t e d  t h e  s e n s i b l e  Ind ian  p r a c t i c e  of ma in ta in ing  a re­
s e r v e  supply of ho r ses  fox t h e i r  dog s o l d i e r s .  The absence 
of such a remada system, as shown i n  Hood's account  of one 
f i r e  f i g h t ,  meant t h a t  each t r o o p e r  had t o  depend upon h i s  
one animal  which, i n  t u r n ,  r e q u i r e d  over  e i g h t  hours  of rest 
per  day.134 Thus, t o  many c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r s ,  or thodox con­
c e p t s  of mounted w a r f a r e ,  as  o f f i c i a l l y  a d o p t e d  by t h e  
Un i t ed  State Army, were i n a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  t h e  r equ i r emen t s  
of f r o n t i e r  s e c u r i t y  duty.  Colonel  Randolph B. Marcy suc­
c i n c t l y  s t a t e d  t h e  p rob lem of  i n a p p r o p r i a t e  and l a r g e l y  
unworkable t ac t ica l  t h e o r y  be ing  o u t  of l i n e  wi th  t ac t i ca l  
r e a l i t y  on t h e  wes tern  p r a i r i e s  when he wrote:  
The a r t  of w a r ,  as t a u g h t  and p r a c t i c e d  among 
c i v i l i z e d  n a t i o n s  a t  p r e s e n t  day, i s  no doubt w e l l  
adapted  t o  t h e  purposes  f o r  which it w a s  des igned
v i z . . . .  T h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  of  armies a c t i n g  i n  
p o p u l a t e d  d i s t r i c t s ,  f u r n i s h i n g  ample r e s o u r c e s ,  
and  a g a i n s t  a n  enemy who i s  t a n g i b l e ,  and makes 
u s e  of s i m i l a r  t a c t i c s  and  s t r a t e g y .  B u t  t h e  
modern s c h o o l s  of m i l i t a r y  s c i e n c e  are b u t  i l l y
s u i t e d  t o  c a r r y i n g  on a w a r f a r e  w i t h  t h e  w i l d  
t r ibes of t h e  p l a i n s  .135 
The q u a i n t  n o t i o n  of t r y i n g  t o  s p e a r  such a s w i f t  and 
d a u n t l e s s  adve r sa ry  as t h e  mounted American I n d i a n s  w i t h  a 
l a n c e  o r  sending  a r e l a t i v e l y  p lodding  c u i r a s s i e r  waving h i s  
sabe r  a f t e r  such a nimble f o e  was p a t e n t l y  absurd.  Y e t  t h a t  
w a s  what  was p r e s c r i b e d  by t h e  Army's manuals on c a v a l r y  
warfare .  C e r t a i n l y ,  had t h e  Army been so i n c l i n e d ,  it could  
have  d e v e l o p e d  i t s  own u n i q u e  school  of c a v a l r y  tact ics ,  
t a i l o r e d  t o  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  of  t h e  Great  P l a i n s .  The 
C o n g r e s s i o n a l  opponen t s  of t h e  r e g u l a r  c a v a l r y  emphasized 
t h e  v a l u e  of i r r e g u l a r  t r o o p s ,  unburdened by t h e  f o r m a l i t i e s  
of European war fa re  a la  t h e  Texas Rangers, as a p r e f e r a b l e  
m i l i t a r y  f o r c e  f o r  t h e  t a s k  of Ind ian  c o n t r o l .  The 1833 
U n i t e d  S t a t e s  Army had  no a c t i v e  c a v a l r y  t r a d i t i o n  f o x  
n e a r l y  e i g h t e e n  y e a r s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  of t h e  
d r a g o o n s .  As Cooke e f f e c t i v e l y  argued: " t h e  service of 
c a v a l r y  had become wi th  us  a f o r g o t t e n  and unknown branch of 
m i l i t a r y  knowledge, something t o  be r ead  o f ,  as w e  do, of 
t h e  Macedonian phalanx. The Army's l e a d e r s h i p ,  however, 
had d e d i c a t e d  t h e  r e g u l a r  m i l i t a r y  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  t o  t h e  
F r e n c h - A u s t r i a n  s c h o o l  a n d  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  of waging a 
E u r o p e a n - s t y l e  war, so as t o  avoid  f u r t h e r  h u m i l i a t i o n  of 
American arms as  produced by t h e  War of 1812.  There w a s  
s imply no room f o r  t h e  o f f i c i a l  s a n c t i o n i n g  of deviance  from 
t h e  o r t h o d o x y  of European  w a r f a r e .  A f t e r  all, f r o n t i e r  
p o l i c i n g  w a s  no t  even a m i l i t a r y  t a sk  a t  a l l  bu t  rather a 
n e c e s s a r y  b u t  o n e r o u s  d u t y  imposed upon t h e  Army by t h e  
P r e s i d e n t  and Congress. I n  a d d i t i o n ,  even among t h e  h a r d e s t  
and  most  e x p e r i e n c e d  of  c a v a l r y  o f f i c e r s  t h e r e  ex i s t ed  a 
d e e p ,  p e r s o n a l  commitment t o  m i l i t a r y  p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m .  
I 
I 
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Thus, for example, Cooke, long a dragoon officer and even­

tual commander of the First Regiment, could, in the best 

romantic style of military writing, author a stirring tri­

bute to the ethos of cavalry warfare of the classical 

tradition: 

The speed of a line of charging cavalry, the 
aggregate of life, motion, mass, and power ives a 
spiritual momentum to both rider and horse.?37 
The long isolated service on the Great Plains would 

have appeared to have been a poor incubator in which to 

develop American military professionalism. Indian fighting 

certainly provided the Army's officer corps with few if any 

opportunities to employ their formal skills in the art of 

war. The political necessity of maintaining numerous tiny 

forts and garrisons scattered on the western prairies was 

clearly not conducive to supporting a high level of morale. 

Colonel Maxcy, reflecting a general consensus of the officer 

corps on this issue, vigorously attacked this practice when 

he wrote: "The morale of the troops must thereby ((be)) 

impaired and the confidence of the savages correspondingly 

augmented. The system of small garrisons has a tendency to 

discourage the troops in proportion as they are scattered, 

and renders them correspondingly inefficient."l38 Consider­

able amounts of time and labor while on post had to be ex­

pended on such non-military chores as heavy construction and 

farming due to the financially stringent budgets passed by 

Congresso139 Frontier service was hard, tiring, and un-
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I 
I 
I 
i m a g i n a t i v e  work. Most g a r r i s o n  posts c o n s i s t e d  of a few 
h u t s ,  a w e l l  and l i t t l e  else, s i t u a t e d  i n  t h e  main, f a r  from 
any town. The p r i v a t i o n s  and ha rdsh ips  of t h e  f r o n t i e r  made 
Army s e r v i c e  unrewarding and u n a t t r a c t i v e .  As one army wife  
so p l a i n t i v e l y  pu t  it: 
L i t t l e  does t h e  c a s u a l  observer  of West P o i n t  
know of t h e  a f t e r  e x i s t e n c e  of i t s  g r a d u a t e s  and 
t h e i r  l i v e s  of  ex i le  and p r i v a t i o n  on t h e  f ron­
t i e r ,  passed i n  l a r g e l y  s e c l u s i o n  from t h e  world,  
a s t r a n g e r  t o  t h e  o r d i n a r y  comforts  of c i v i l i z a ­
t i o n .  140 
The arduous requi rements  of f r o n t i e r  d u t y  w e r e  reflec­
t e d  i n  t h e  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  high rates of d e s e r t i o n .  I n  any 
g i v e n  y e a r  d u r i n g  t h e  Antebellum p e r i o d ,  as much as one-
t h i r d  of Army s t r e n g t h  was l o s t  t o  d e s e r t i o n .  T h i s  w a s  i n  
s p i t e  of b r u t a l  c o r p o r a l  punishment, i n c l u d i n g  f l o g g i n g  and 
branding.  F i e l d  p a t r o l s  o f f e r e d  only an  o c c a s i o n a l  r e s p i t e  
from t h e  tedium of g a r r i s o n  duty.  For o f f i c e r s ,  t h e r e  w a s  
no formal  i n c e n t i v e  f o r  pursu ing  t h e i r  s t u d i e s  i n  t h e  ar t  of 
w a r .  For l i n e  o f f i c e r s ,  t h e r e  were few of t h e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  
f o r  v a r i e d  and i n t e r e s t i n g  careers a v a i l a b l e  t o  e n g i n e e r s ,  
c o a s t a l  a r t i l l e r y  and staff  o f f i c e r s .  141 The g r u e l i n g  and 
h i g h l y  t a x i n g  n a t u r e  of f r o n t i e r  s e r v i c e  w a s  p a i n f u l l y  
described by Capta in  Lemuel Ford, who i n  h i s  f i n a l  two y e a r s  
of f r o n t i e r  du ty  w i t h  t h e  First  Dragoons (1834-1836) s a w  h i s  
f a m i l y  f o r  o n l y  a c o u p l e  of  weeks and who d ied  due t o  a 
disease c o n t r a c t e d  on t h e  P l a i n s :  “ I  a m  c l e a r l y  of ( ( t h e ) ) 
opin ion  t h a t  a s o l d i e r  be so disencumbered from t h e  t h i n g s  
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of the world as to be all wasy ((sic.)) Ready to March, 
Ready to Fight and Ready to -Die."142 

It might seem, upon initial examination, that the con­

ditions of western frontier security duty afforded the Army 

opportunities to employ the doctrine and skills of a 

European-style military service. Certainly the task of 

Indian control, with an emphasis upon highly unorthodox 

modes of warfare, provided no chance for the use of either 
classical cavalry or infantry tactics or permitted more than 
the infrequent employment of such key weapons as the saber 
or the bayonet. Yet valuable lessons of command and lead­
ership were extracted from their long years of frontier 
service by Army officers. "The Dragoon regiments," as one 
officer stated it, "are almost constantly upon the move at 
the West, and the continued marching gives officers and men 
the practical knowledge of their duties so eminently essen­
tial to cavalry."l43 The heart of a nation's war fighting 
system is not the particular tactical and strategical doc­
trines in use or the weapons which equip their soldiers. 
Rather, it is the constellation of social, professional, 
political and intellectual concepts and values that consti­
tute the world view of an officer corps and which in turn, 
serves as the foundation of a country's war fighting system. 
Thus, it was the long, unrewarding and solitary years of 
fxontier duty which served to create ties of fellowship and 
professionalism among members of the officer corps. It was 
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precisely the isolation and insularity of frontier service 
that gradually converted the goal of military professional­
ism in the American Army officer corps into reality. The 
long hours spent in casual conversation, when officers 
"fought their battles o'ver ((sic.)), from West Point and 
the girls they left behind them through the swamps of 
Florida, the wilds of Texas, over the great plains, the 
mountains, on the fields of Mexico" as well as other forms 
of social interaction created the mortar which bonded these 
soldiers together as professionals engaged in a unique 
activity as part of a collective enterprise.144 
Granted that individual enmities and personal dislikes 

between officers, many forged at West Point, were fueled by 

the smallness of the American officer corps and by the 

restricted opportunities for career advancement. In the 

main, however, military professionalism grew strongly in the 

Antebellum era. Of perhaps even greater importance, to the 

development of military professionalism were the continual 

proofs, provided by the various campaigns of the Army during 

the Antebellum period, of the essential validity of the 

post-War of 1812 reforms. Thus, the Black Hawk War and the 

Seminole War served powerfully to demonstrate the key les­

sons that due to massive and unwarranted political interfer­

ence, the Army would have to rely on its own expertise to 

save the nation from foreign invasion and that in turn, 

reliance on the militia was dangerous and ineffectual.145 
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The long years of frontier duty, hampered by grossly 

inadequate resources and funding, further reinforced ties of 

solidarity among the officer corps. The ceaseless and 

frequently unproductive involvement of Congress and the 

executive branch in what the officer corps viewed as 

intrinsically internal military matters, further solidified 

the sense of collegiality among Army officers.146 

Part V 

In 1846, the United States Army was finally provided an 
opportunity to vindicate its faith in military professional­
ism and the French-Austrian school of war. The Mexican War 
(1846-1848) offered the Army its first chance since the War 
of 1812 to field brigade and division-size units. This war 
can be divided into two parts. The first was the irregular 
war, fought in what is now the Southwest United States and 
California. The centerpiece, insofar as the cavalry was 
concerned, was Colonel Stephen Kearny's almost bloodless 
seizure of Santa Fe, New Mexico, and his subsequent epic 
march through the uncharted Southwest desert to California. 
Kearny, with only one hundred regular dxagoons of the First 
Regiment, prevailed against some five thousand Mexican regu­
lars due to highly efficient and quite unusual close cooper­
ation with a regiment of Missouri volunteer rifles. After 
almost effortlessly securing his assigned target, Kearny 
elected to take a proportion of his command westward to the 
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Pacific. The crossing of some twelve hundred miles of 

largely unmapped and exceedingly inhospitable country, with­

out incident in three months, was brilliant proof that the 

United States Army had mastered the difficulties of long 

range western travel. While fascinating and heroic, 

Kearny's expedition was at best only a sideshow of the war 

with Mexico. The only significant application of American 

cavalry in this war, it was wholly lacking influence on Army 

tactical doctrine. The real war, to the south, was instead 

to be fought according to conventional tactical principles, 

under which cavalry would assume its proper function as an 

adjunct to the infantry.147 

The Mexican War proper, encompassing the campaigns of 

General Winfield Scott and Zachary Taylor, was marked by 

only limited and not particularly effective use of American 

cavalry. One crucial factor in hindering the field effec­

tiveness of the regular cavalry was the notable lack of 

regimental unity. Neither the First, Second or Third Dra­

goons (the latter created by Congress for temporary war 

service on February 11, 1847) ever served as fully organic 

cavalry regiments. These units, as with the assorted vol­

unteer cavalry formations, were habitually broken up into 

ever smaller detachments, doled out to various grades of 

field commanders when the need for mounted troops arose and 

when adequate numbers of horses were available. The Mounted 

Rifles fared much better in retaining regimental unity due 
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to the humiliating fact that all their mounts were lost when 

the transport carrying them to Mexico sank in a storm. Sur­

prisingly, only a single company of the mounted rifles ever 

served on horseback in this war, despite the huge numbers of 

mounts captured from the Mexican Army.14* The volunteer 

cavalry units were rarely more than nuisances, having only 

marginal offensive combat effectiveness as horse soldiers. 

According to one regular cavalry trooper, Samuel Chamber­

lain, sounding the complaint of most dragoons, the volun­

teers were almost useless: 

The material that these regiments were 
composed of was excellent.. . the men possessed
fine... strength combined with activity, but they
had no discipline, or confidence in their offi­
cers.. .. 
Their impatience of all restraint and egotism
made them worse than useless on picket; while in 

camp, they were a perfect nuisance.149 

The adversaries of the American mounted forces were 

highly trained, thoroughly European in their organization 

and tactics and superb horsemen. The Mexican cavalry num­

bered in the thousands, not counting auxiliaries. In com­

parison, the Americans never managed to muster more than six 

hundred troopers on horseback for any given battle. The 

high level of Mexican horsemanship earned their cavalry 

ample praise from their North American antagonists. 

According to Colonel Brackett, who served in Mexico: 

Our people had the advantage of larger horses 

and heavier men as a general thing, but the 

Mexicans were much more agile, and would handle 

their horses as well as perhaps any people on 
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earth... as the Mexicans, accustomed as many of 
them are to a life on horseback, and all of them 
feeling a pride in owning horseflesh, it did not 
take them as long a time to train them as it did 
us, who particulaxly those from older states, knew 
little or nothing about riding or managing
horses.150 
American mounted forces played only small, supporting 

roles in such key battles as Palo Alto, Buena Vista, Molino 

Del Rey and Mexico City. Their functions were principally 

ones of drudgery: guarding lumbering supply columns, sew­ 

ing as officer escorts and, more dangerously, hunting down 

the unprincipled Mexican guerrillas. Even cavalry's tra­

ditional forte, scouting, was performed by another branch of 

the Army--mounted engineers, with horse soldiers acting only 

as an escort. Aside from organizational disruption and the 

xough, jagged terrain of Mexico, the primary obstacle to the 

more innovative employment of American mounted forces lay 

with senior officers and their devotion to European rules of 

warfare. Both Scott and Taylor, by training and vocation, 

were infantrymen, with little more than theoretical knowl­

edge of the use of cavalry in battle. Both officers were 

professionals, grounded in European concepts of tactics 

which made cavalry simply a handmaiden of the infantry. 

Where cavalry participated in major engagements, it usually 

fought dismounted. The general lack of troops caused the 

use of every available man--soldiers, Marines, volunteers 

and even sailors--as infantry. While the fortunes of the 

cavalry arm did not prosper in the course of the Mexican 

- 
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War, the Army itself reaped massive benefits. With speed 

and dispatch, the Army had defeated a much more numerous foe 

on his home territory and quite distant from its supply 

sources. Granted that on a contemporary scale of interna­

tional significance, the Mexican War was a rather piffling 

affair, it nonetheless was a considerable achievement for 

American arms. It was in particular, a triumph of military 

professionalism. Scott's brilliant campaign against Mexico 

City was a textbook application of Jomini's concepts to the 

solution of a particularly thorny military problem, which as 

the Commanding General himself put it, was "to compel a 

people, singularly obstinate, to sue for peace it is abso­
-
lutely necessary... to strike effectively at the vitals of 

the nation."l51 Scott therefore directed the main American 

military effort at the Mexican capital, in classic limited 

war fashion, avoiding pitched battle as much as possible and 

having accomplished his objective, forcing the Mexicans to 

sue for peace. 

The relative isolation of the Mexican theater of opera­
tions from the United States lessened the availability of 
the militia forces and correspondingly increased the impor­
tance of the regulars; or as Captain W. S. Henry put it, "1 
can not but repeat, that we all ( (i.e., the officer corps)) 
feel proud that these conquests had been effected by the 
army proper." That is not to say that the volunteers were 
unnecessary, far from it, since the regular Army was simply 
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too small to have undertaken the war by itself. The volun­
teers, overall, thus fit into the niche assigned them by the 
Army's warfighting system, as auxiliaries to the regulars. 
However, as in the earlier frontier wars, the Army retained 
its strong aversion toward the citizen soldiers as less than 
effective in battle. The general position of the Army that 
"campaigning is entirely out of... ( (the militia's 1 ) line,I' 
was as once again demonstrated by the Mexican War, as was 
forcefully stated by Henry: 
Before this war is over, the government will 

be forced to confess, and the volunteers freely

acknowledge, without any charge against their 

patriotism or efficiency, that the volunteer 

system is one of the most outrageously expensive

and inefficient way with which any government

could undertake a war of invasion.152 

A more savage criticism of the volunteers was made by a 

then highly promising Second-Lieutenant of Engineers, George 

B. McClellan, reflecting a good deal of the Army's pent-up 

resentment at these amateur soldiers: 

I allude to the sufferings of the volunteers. 
They literally... ( (act like)) dogs. Were it all 
known in the States, there would be no more hue 
and cry against the Army, all would be willing to 
have a large regular army that we could dispense
entirely with the volunteer system.153 
The conduct of the war and the subsequent occupation of 

Mexican soil was conducted with honor and integrity, "that 

high standard of virtue and honor", according to General 

Scott, "which we boasted at home."154 The Mexican War, 

however, was completely unoriginal in regards to the arts of 

war. Aside from a few percussion-capped rifles (which Scott 
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a t t e m p t e d  t o  b l o c k  f rom e n t e r i n g  s e r v i c e  on g r o u n d s  o f  
o r d n a n c e  c o n s e r v a t i s m )  t h e r e  were no d i f f e r e n c e s  from t h e  
tact ics ,  weapons and equipment used a t  Waterloo some t h i r t y -
two y e a r s  earlier.  Moreover, there were none of t h e  numer­
ous problems of command and l o g i s t i c s  t h a t  plagued t h e  B r i ­
t i s h  Army i n  t h e  Crimean War t o  mar t h e  Army's o v e r a l l  h igh  
l e v e l  of m i l i t a r y  e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  Of cour se  t h e r e  were s t i l l  
p r o b l e m s  between t h e  Army and t h e  e x e c u t i v e  branch i n  t h e  
d i v i s i o n  of  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  i n  d i r e c t i n g  t h e  war e f f o r t ;  
S c o t t  a n d  P r e s i d e n t  James P o l k  were a l m o s t  c o n s t a n t l y  
q u a r r e l l i n g  o v e r  A m e r i c a n  w a r  a i m s  a n d  t a c t i c s ,  f o r  
example.  155 Measured by r e s u l t s ,  however ,  t h e  American 
m i l i t a r y  e f f o r t  a g a i n s t  Mexico w a s  c o n s i d e r a b l y  b e t t e r  
managed t h a n  t h e  War of 1812  f i a s c o .  Acceptance of m i l i t a r y  
p r o f e s s i o n a l i s m  t h u s  enjoyed a badly needed and q u i t e  con­
s i d e r a b l e  b o o s t  from t h e  s te l lar  performance of t h e  regu­
lars.156 W e s t  P o i n t ,  accord ing  t o  Ashbel Smith, as a r e s u l t  
of t h e  s u p e r b  pexformance of i t s  g r a d u a t e s  i n  Mexico, had 
" f o u g h t  i t s e l f  i n t o  f a v o r  a t  home; t h e  s c i e n c e ,  skill, 
s o l d i e r l y  d e p o r t m e n t ,  a n d  v a l o r  of  t h e  g r a d u a t e s  of t h e  
Academy have ga ined  a g r e a t  tr iumph over t h e  p r e j u d i c e s  of 
t h e  i g n o r a n t  among our c i t i z e n s .  "157 
T h e  Army had  t h u s ,  i n  t h e  span of on ly  t h i r t y  o r  s o  
y e a r s ,  m a t u r e d  i n t o  a t r u l y  modern and  c a p a b l e  m i l i t a r y  
f o r c e .  It had done so  i n  t h e  face of massive popular  and 
p o l i t i c a l  o p p o s i t i o n ,  c r i p p l e d  by  l a c k  of  r e s o u r c e s  and 
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manpower and despite its long, odious and dishonorable 

misuse as a police force to suppress the Indians. The War 

of 1812 had been the nadir of the Army's prowess and 

reputation as a fighting force. Secretary of War Cass 

expressed this point exceptionally well in 1836: 

We were comparatively ignorant of the state 

of military science and we did not fully recover 

our true position till we had received many severe 

lessons, at what expense of life and treasury need 

not be stated.I58 

The efforts of the post-War of 1812 reformers-- Gaines, 

Macomb, Thayer, Calhoun, Scott and the others--was thus vin­

dicated by the triumph of American arms in Mexico. While to 

many Americans the regular military establishment would 

remain tainted with the traits of decadent, aristocratic 

Europe and subject to obloquy and hounded with political 

opposition, the Army, despite the shrill cries of a few that 

in fact American victory in Mexico was really the rejection 

of European principles of scientific warfare, had won fox 

itself a new and valid claim to be vital for national 

defense and an effective agent of the country's foreign 

policy.l59 Jefferson Davis, a West Point graduate and 

himself a hero of the Mexican War as a volunteer officer, in 

a speech given as a Congressman to honor General Taylor, 

annunciated the apparent lessons of the conflict quite 

effectively when he proclaimed: 

Much was due to the courage which Americans 

have displayed on many battlefields in former 

times; but this courage, characteristic of our 

people, and pervading all sections and all 
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classes, could ever have availed so much had it 
not been combined with military science. And the 
occasion seem suited to enforce this lesson on the 
minds of those who have been accustomed in reason 
and out of reason, to rail at the scientific 
attainments of our officers.. . arms, like any
occupation, requires to be studied before it can 
be understood, and from those things, to which he 
had called his attention, he will learn the power
and advantages of military science. 
This newly won sense of military honor and the potency 

of arms enormously increased Army morale and confidence. 

The final verdict on the effectiveness of the Army in trans­

forming itself into a proper military service was best ren­

dered by Captain Mahan, the United States' foremost military 

theorist of the Antebellum era. The West Point professor 

praised the achievements of the professional Army he had 

labored so long to create: 
Of all the civilized states of Christendom, 
we are perhaps the least military, though not 
behind the foremost as a warlike one. A sounder 
era, however, is dawning upon us.... It was 
reserved for the expedition to Vera-Cruz, and its 
sequel, Cerro-Gordo, to bring into strong relief 
the fact, that we were unostentatiously, and 
almost silently becoming a powerful military 
state. The lesson will not be lost upon our 
neighbors, however slowly we, in the end, may
profit by it. A shout has gone forth from the 
Rio-Grande, and the shores of the Gulf of Mexico, 
which heard on the Thames and the Seine, has 
resounded along the far-off shores of the Baltic 
and the Black Sea, and will reach farther Id.,
bearing with it a significance that no prudent
statesman will hereafter affect to misunderstand. 
What are the military resources of this great
republic is no longer a question; a more thorough
organization is alone wanting for their complete
development.161 
Chapter IV 

JEFFERSON DAVIS, THE 1856 MILITARY COMMISSION TO EUROPE 

AND THE MINIE BULLET RIFLE: 

THE REAFFIRMATION OF THE FRENCH-AUSTRIAN SCHOOL 

IN AN ERA OF TECHNOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE 

Part I 

The clear victory for military professionalism won by 

the United States Army in Mexico was translated into 

tangible gains for the nation's military service in 1853. 

Congress, at the request of President Franklin Pierce's 

newly inaugurated administration, approved the largest 

single increase in Army strength since the War of 1812. In 

addition to four infantry regiments, two new mounted units 

were added to the Army's order of battle, the First and 
Second Cavalry Regiments. Numerically, the strength of the 
A r m y  expanded from approximately eleven thousand men to over 
sixteen thousand. For the first time since the War of 1812 
the United States Army possessed sufficient numbers of 
troops to free it from dependence upon the militia save in 
F 
the largest; of conflicts. While the Army was still "in­

ferior to the best armies of Europe," according to the 

former Secretary of War Joel Poinsett, the 1855 expansion 

signaled a new era enhanced military effectiveness as well 
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as new political enthusiasm for military professionalism.1 

In a very clear fashion the nation's political leadership, 
at least for the moment, had conceded Poinsett's conclusion: 
...that no nation, whatever may be its resources 
and money, can long carry on an aggressive war 
with volunteer forces, or with a majority of its 
troops composed of volunteers who have, for the 
most part, to be dri led and disciplined in the 
presence of the enemy.!2 
Succeeding John C. Calhoun as the leading political 

advocate of  a professional military service, was the new 
Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis. An 1828 graduate of West 

Point, Davis had soldiered some seven years with both the 

infantry and the First Dragoons on the western frontier. In 

the Mexican War, Davis had served with distinction as 

commander of the volunteer Mississippi Rifles. Davis was an 

ardent and influential proponent of the regular Army and of 
military professionalism. A student of military theory and 

history, Davis's personal philosophy of the art of war was 
totally Jominean and French-Austrian in character. In his 

1854 Report as Secretary of War, Davis succinctly expressed 

his faith in military professionalism when he formally 

attacked the opponents of the regular military establish­
ment: "It has been stated... that if in 1831 a small 

mounted force had been at the disposal of the War Depart­
ment, the Black Hawk War might have been prevented; and... 

in 1835, if a few additional companies had been sent to 

Florida, the Seminole War would have not occurred."3 
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Under Davis I s  exceptionally effective administration, 
numerous significant improvements were made in Army wea­
ponry, force structure and its preparation to wage war 
against a European would-be adversary. Davis compelled 
adoption of  the 1856-pattern Springfield Rifle of the new 
Minie bullet type over the strong objections of some senior 
officers. To accompany this new weapon, a major revision in 
the infantry manual was authorized by Davis. Moreover, the 
first pay raises in twenty years were authorized as well as 
the introduction of a more modern and spiffier uniform, both 
items aiding the general uplift in the morale of the Army. 
Fortress design was overhauled as well, during Davis's 
tenure as Secretary of War, to bring American practice in 
line with the latest European advances. One of Davis's more 
whimsical experiments consisted of the formation of a camel 
corps, patterned on French Algerian experience, for patrol 
duty in the Southwest. 
The establishment of the first American regular units 
to bear the designation cavalry, complete with the revived 
use of yellow facings and stripes on their uniforms, was 
a l s o  undertaken in these years. The first and Second 
Cavalry Regiments were the personal favorites of Davis, and 
were intended to be elite units. Granted that the less 
dashing Corps of Engineers and the Corps of Topographical 
Engineers ranked at the top of the list of career positions 
and that the cavalry was at the bottom. Yet the tradi-
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t i o n a l ,  a r i s t o c r a t i c  l u r e  of g a l l a n t  t r o o p e r s  and powerful 
s t e e d s ,  as  w e l l  a s  D a v i s ' s  p e r s o n a l  i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  
s e l e c t i o n  of o f f i c e r s  f o r  these reg iments ,  l e d  many prom­
i s i n g  men t o  j o i n  these u n i t s .  Moreover ,  t he re  w a s  a 
d i s t i n c t  Southern bias t o  t h e  o f f i c e r s  of t h e s e  two r e g i ­
m e n t s .  O f f i c e r s  s u c h  a s  L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l  J o s e p h  E.  
Johnson ( g e n e r a l  C S A ) ,  Capta in  George B. McClellan ( g e n e r a l  
U S A ) ,  L i eu tenan t  George H. S t u a r t  ( g e n e r a l  CSA) and Lieuten­
a n t  James E. S t u a r t  ( g e n e r a l  CSA) were among t h e  s t a f f  of 
t h e  F i r s t  Regiment ;  t h e  Second, i n  t u r n ,  i nc luded  i n  i t s  
r a n k s  s u c h  f u t u r e  l u m i n a r i e s  as C o l o n e l  A l b e r t  S i d n e y  
Johnston ( g e n e r a l  C S A ) ,  Lieutenant-Colonel  W i l l i a m  J. Hardee 
( g e n e r a l  C S A ) ,  Captain George E. Stoneman ( g e n e r a l  U S A )  and 
L ieu tenan t  F i tzhugh L e e  ( g e n e r a l  CSA). T h e  predominance of 
S o u t h e r n  o f f i c e r s  i n  t h e s e  reg iments  would later s e r v e  as 
"evidence",  du r ing  t h e  C i v i l  War, t h a t  Davis w a s  i n  l eague  
w i t h  some f i e n d i s h  c a b a l  t o  create s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y  a f u t u r e  
c o n f e d e r a t e  mounted s e r v i c e  . 
The  i m m e d i a t e  t a c t i c a l  r o l e  of t h e  F i r s t  and Second 
C a v a l r y  l a y  i n  c o n v e n t i o n a l  I n d i a n  c o n t r o l  d u t y  i n  t h e  
S o u t h w e s t  and  Texas .  T h e s e  two new r e g i m e n t s ,  p l u s  t h e  
a d d i t i o n a l  i n f a n t r y  u n i t s  and  t h e  camel c o r p s  were t h e  
o p e r a t i o n a l  component of Dav i s ' s  new, so -ca l l ed  desert p l a n  
of p a c i f y i n g  t h e  wes tern  f r o n t i e r .  P a t t e r n e d  af ter  Marshal 
T h o m a s - R o b e r t  Bugeaud ' s  b r i l l i a n t  p l a n  f o r  t h e  F r e n c h  
conquest  of t h e  Alger ian  i n t e r i o r ,  Davis ' s  new program f o r  
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suppressing Indian hostilities was intended to correct many 
of the deficiencies in the Army's earlier stratagem of fron­
tier control. The cornerstone of the great desert plan was 
the abandonment of numerous small garrisons and the concen­
tration of the Army's troops in large, strategically located 
forts. The problems of morale, isolation and poor logisti­
ical support were simultaneously dealt with by setting major 
Army garrisons near towns, and on major water transport 
routes near the edges of the western frontier. The addition 
to the Army's mounted resources was of vital importance; the 
desert plan required extensive patrolling and swift and 
efficient retaliatory action for Indian incursions. This 
new plan was thus the final abandonment of the static de­
fense system implemented in the immediate post-War of 1812 
years, during Jacob Brown's tenure as Commanding General. 
In turn, the great desert plan would serve as the foundation 
of the Army's Indian control policy for the remainder of the 
~entury.~On the higher level of Army planning and organi­
zation, the First and Second Cavalry conformed closer, in 
theory at least, to European mounted warfare doctrine than 
had the earlier dragoon regiments. As a former cavalryman, 
Davis penned an authoritative and informed explanation of 
the organizational nature of the new mounted regiments and 
in turn, a withering criticism of earlier Congressional in­
terference in internal War Department and Army matters, as 
to the composition, mission and equipment of horse units. 
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The c a v a l r y  f o r c e  of our army be ing  a l l  r e q u i r e d  
f o r  a c t i v e  s e r v i c e  of t h e  same k ind ,  there appea r s  
no p r o p r i e t y  i n  making a permanent d i s t i n c t i o n  i n  
t h e  d e s i g n a t i o n  and armament of t h e  s e v e r a l  regi­
ments; it is t h e r e f o r e ,  proposed t o  p l a c e  a l l  t h e  
r eg imen t s  on t h e  same f o o t i n g  i n  t h e s e  r e s p e c t s ,  
and t o  leave it i n  t h e  power of t h e  e x e c u t i v e  t o  
arm and  e q u i p  t h e m  i n  t h e  manner as may be re­
q u i r e d  by th& n a t u r e  of t h e  s e r v i c e  i n  which t h e y  
be employed. 
Davis's p o l i c y  s t a t emen t  as t o  t h e  n a t u r e  of t h e  new 
c a v a l r y  reg iments  and h i s  s h a r p  rebuke of Congress iona l  
i n v o l v e m e n t ,  a s  f o r  example  i n  t h e  mounted r i f l e s ,  i n  
i n t e r n a l  Army matters, had s e v e r a l  a s p e c t s .  The emphasis on 
u n i t  r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n  i n t o  a few s p e c i f i c  t y p e s  (wh ich  fox 
t h e  Army's h o r s e  u n i t s  w a s  f i n a l l y  achieved  i n  1 8 6 1  when 
C o n g r e s s  f o r m a l l y  r e d e s i g n a t e d  t h e m  a l l  as  c a v a l r y )  w a s  
c l e a r l y  one of Davis ' s  o b j e c t i v e s .  The s p e c i f i c  form of t h e  
F i r s t  and  Second Cavalry as a l l -pu rpose  mounted u n i t s ,  as 
opposed  t o  being l i g h t ,  heavy o r  dragoon, was no t  however 
i n t e n d e d  t o  improve t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  Army's ho r se  
s o l d i e r s  i n  I n d i a n  f i g h t i n g .  As w i t h  b o t h  t h e  mounted 
r i f les  and dragoons,  t h e  c a v a l r y  fol lowed t h e  u s u a l  dismoun­
t e d ,  i n fo rma l  tactics of Ind ian  f i g h t i n g .  The emphasis on 
u t i l i t y  r e f l e c t e d ,  i n s t e a d ,  t h e  t h e n  la tes t  f a d  i n  European-
s t y l e  c a v a l r y  u n i t s .  R e c a l l  t h e  deba te  between t h e  propon­
e n t s  of heavy and l i g h t  c a v a l r y  over f i r s t ,  which t y p e s  of 
mounted u n i t s  would be r e q u i r e d  i n  f u t u r e  h o s t i l i t i e s ,  and 
s e c o n d l y ,  w h e t h e r  a d v a n c e s  i n  f i r e p o w e r  r e n d e r e d  t h e  
c u i r a s s i e r s  and t h u s  t h e  u s e  of shock as be ing  
I 
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obsolete. This rather lively debate peaked late in the 

1860s, when cavalry traditionalism reasserted itself. Thus 

the organizational character of the First and Second Cavalry 

reflected the perspective of those cavalry experts champion­

ing flexibility over tradition; mounted units which could 

effectively serve all three roles as light, heavy, and 

dragoons. 

On a broader level, that of national war policy, 
Davis's viewpoint was representative of the new, assertive 
sense of professionalism then being articulated by the 
officer corps. The growing sense of group identification 
among members of the officer corps was strongly articulated 
by Davis in direct criticism of Congress of overstepping its 
authority when it: had involved itself directly in determin­
ing internal military policy matters, such as weapon types 
or uniform design, which properly were within the jurisdic­
tion of the War Department and the executive branch. In 
this respect, Davis vocalized a far more direct and pungent 
critique of Congressional encroachment onto the authority of 
the executive branch in determining the particulars of 
national military policy than had earlier been expressed by 
Calhoun. The officer corps' new influence was the result: of 
Calhoun's administrative reforms, the bureau system, which 

was thus beginning to assert itself in military policy 

formation. Thus, through the bureau's superior knowledge of 

military matters, the determination of the particulars of 

179 

Army equipment and organization, swung almost permanently to 

the executive branch.8 

Part I1 

The 1 8 5 0 s  background to Davis's Army reforms constitu­
ted an era of considerable change in not only military 
affairs, but also technology and society as well. On the 
broadest level were major changes in the nature, quality and 
quantity, of economic output. The enormous increase in the 
production of iron and the emergence of highly efficient 
steel manufacturing processes resulted in immediate changes 
in the nature of weapons production. The use of steel not 
only allowed for considerably higher levels of weapon 
performance, but also facilitated standardized and easily 
repairable machined parts which significantly reduced the 
costs, in both time and money, entailed in the manufacture 
of arms. Artillery, for example, was virtually reborn as a 
weapon system. No longer were clumsy reinforcing bands 
needed around the muzzle; unit construction permitted the 
use of much stronger charges of powder, hence greater range 
and the use of larger and more potent projectile^.^ The 
development of mechanized, factory assembly lines for the 
production of weapons, allowed for unheard of speed in 
equipping large numbers of troops with the tools of war. 10 
The railroad worked to dramatically multiply the quantities 
of goods and men which could be moved from one area to 
another. The speed of army movement, as regards the number 
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of miles per day, escalated from a maximum of sixty to 

eighty miles by forced march to between one hundred and two 

hundred and fifty by rail. And a unit transported by rail 

suffered none of the debilitating effects to unit efficiency 

and fighting power which followed a forced march.11 Steam 

power also revolutionized ocean transportation. Ships were 

no longer captive to the currents and winds, sailing times 

dropped by as much as half and the size of cargos expanded. 

Steel in turn was being employed in the construction of 

larger, faster and more durable vessels than had heretofore 

been possible. l2 Communications were transformed as well, 

due to the invention of the telegraph. For the first time 

in history, senior army commanders could immediately and 

effectively direct military formations dispersed over 

distances of hundreds of miles.13 

These new technologies were known to military leaders; 

the problem, however, was a lack of perception of how deep 

the impact would be on the practices of war. Moreover8 

except for the Prussians and their centralized staff command 

system, no army of this period possessed one central body to 

oversee and manage significant technological change. The 

series of innovations, which converged into a new industrial 

order in the 1850s, was not, however, without precedent. 

The agricultural revolution had by the end of the Eighteenth 

Century caused an enormous increase in fodder and food 

production. Consequently, there was a dramatic increase in 

I 
I 
I 
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the ability of nations, during the Napoleonic Wars, to 
support armies of unprecedented size, hundreds of thousands 
in number, without the massive damage, as in the previous 
Thirty Years War, to the agrarian resources of those 
countries.l4 Similarly, the considerable improvement in 
road construction in conjunction with the widespread 

building of canals had significantly increased the mobility 

of armies and the capacity of logistic nets during these 

wars. Furthermore, the enormous increase in army size and 

the corresponding growth in mobility occasioned the develop­

ment out of the quartermasters corps the first general 

staffs in European military history. 

The most immediate effect on military theory and 
planning lay in the field of artillery improvement. The 
1850s seemed to be the beginning of a new era in military 
tactics in which artillery would finally come to dominate 
the battlefield. The Queen of Battle only began to assert 
herself as a dominant weapon during the Napoleonic Wars, as 
the French Imperial Army, saddled with ever more poorly 
trained soldiers, shifted the tactical emphasis of battle 
from the bayonet to the cannon. The new iron and steel 
rifled cannon of this era could throw a shell the astounding 
distance of over two thousand yards compared to the rather 
feeble eight hundred or so of the smoothbores. Accuracy was 
greatly improved as well, with the introduction of the new 
weapons. The enthusiasm of the artillerists was in no way 
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dampened by the then little-understood fact that there was 

no way of directing long range cannon fire on land. 

Traditionally, smoothbore guns, characterized by relatively 

long range and flat trajectory, were unlimbered close to the 

forward edge of battle to be used as scatterguns. Such 

weapons could be directed very effectively against line-of­

sight targets such as fortresses. Except for a small number 

of howitzers, featuring short range and high angle fire, 

little attempt was made to deliver indirect fixe on enemy 

troops shielded by protective cover or to direct counter 

battery fire against enemy artillery. The problem lay in 

being able to observe the enemy's positions without the 
obstructions of smoke and obstacles and in turn being able 
to communicate quickly this information to the gunners. 
Artillerists for the previous three hundred or so years had 
developed their art on the basic premise that their target 
would be visible; the difficulty was therefore how to 
develop a system of indirect fire control by forward 
observers, with more effective field communication methods 
than flags, bugle calls or messengers, and in turn, having 
the gunners accurately deliver fire out of sight of and 
miles from their target. At sea, in contrast, with wide 
expanses of flat, open water, long range fire was not only 
possible but was in fact, standard for naval gunnery by the 
mid 1850s.16 
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The aspect of the new arms technology which would have 
the most immediate impact was the less impressive but vastly 
improved rifled musket. For one hundred and fifty years the 
primary weapon of the infantry had been the smoothbore 
musket of .54 to -75 caliber, firing a lead ball three 
quarters of an inch or so in diameter, weighing nine to 
twelve pounds and some eleven feet in length. Between forty 
and fifty yards, the smoothbore musket was a truly terrify­
ing weapon. The hail of lead generated by a line of 

musketeers at this range hit with the impact of a huge 

shotgun, inflicting fearsome casualties. At greater 

distances, however, effectiveness greatly declined. One 

British ordnance expert, Colonel Henger, in 1814, expressed 

quite well the widely understood limitations of the smooth­
bore musket when he stated: 

A soldier's musket, if not exceedingly
ilbored ( (sic.) as many are, will strike the 
figure of a man at 80 yards... but a soldier must 
be very unfortunate indeed who shall be wounded by 
a common musket at 150 yardsI provided his 

antagonist aims, and as for fixin 

you might as well fire at the moon. ?7 
at 200 yards 

As with all smoothbore weapons, the ball once fired, 

followed a trajectory that soon became excessively curved 

and erratic. Consequently, therefore, this severely limited 

the range of these weapons. Moreover, a smoothbore musket 

with an attached bayonet could not even be aimed. There 

were no rear sights and the primitive front sight (usually 

no more than a small knob of metal at the end of the barrel) 

1 8 4  
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was c o m p l e t e l y  o b s c u r e d  b y  t h e  b a y o n e t  s o c k e t  r i n g .  
Accuracy  of t h i s  weapon w a s  t h e r e f o r e  m i n i m a l ;  o n l y  a n  
a v e r a g e  of  be tween 0 . 2  t o  0.5 p e r c e n t  of a l l  rounds d i s ­
charged per  engagement, or about  one o u t  of eve ry  thousand 
o r  so,  a c t u a l l y  r e g i s t e r e d  a h i t .  I n  e f f e c t ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  i n  
order  t o  k i l l  a man i n  an  a t t a c k i n g  i n f a n t r y  column, one had 
t o  f i r e  up t o  seven t i m e s  an average man's w e i g h t  i n  lead 
bal ls .  Hence, i n  order  t o  maximize i n f a n t r y  f i repower ,  t h e  
t r o o p s  of t h e  l i n e  were a r r ayed  i n  t i g h t ,  compact format ions  
and  r u t h l e s s l y  t r a i n e d  t o  f u n c t i o n  l i k e  well-programmed 
a u t o m a t o n s .  The weapon i t s e l f  p o s s e s s e d  many p o s s i b l e  
dangers  t o  t h e  s o l d i e r  us ing  it. The f l a s h  of t h e  i g n i t i o n  
powder i n  t h e  pan of t h e  weapon no t  on ly  obscured v i s i o n ,  it 
could,  on occas ion ,  even b l i n d  a man. S l i g h t  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  
t h e  q u a l i t y  of powder could  cause s i g n i f i c a n t  changes i n  t h e  
f o r c e  o f  t h e  r e c o i l  o r  even cause t h e  weapon t o  explode. 
Frequent ly ,  i n  t h e  h e a t  and confus ion  of b a t t l e ,  men f o r g o t  
if t h e  weapon had i n  fac t  been discharged, r e loaded  and i n  
t u r n  caused t h e  double  or even t r i p l e  l oad ing  of t h e  p i e c e ,  
t h e  excess  charges caus ing  t h e  weapon t o  explode. And i f  a 
s o l d i e r  were a mere f o o t  ahead o f  t h e  f i r i n g  l i n e ,  h i s  
eardrums would be i n s t a n t l y  r u p t u r e d  by t h e  discharge of a 
vo l l ey .  Furthermore,  t h e  s o l d i e r s  had t o  move i n  format ion ,  
t o  w i t h i n  one  hundred  ya rds  of t h e  enemy be fo re  f i r e  w a s  
normally commenced, exposing themselves  t o  t h e  f u l l  weight 
of a counter  vo l l ey .  Infantrymen, f i rs t  and foremost ,  had 
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to be experienced and highly disciplined for Eighteenth 
Century tactics to work. For men to stand fire under such 
circumstances and in turn to be calmly able to receive the 
still more frightening bayonet charge, when they were 

dispassionate mercenaries, frequently dragooned into 

service, demanded the most brutal of corporal punishment. 

Consequently, the terror of being caught as a deserter had 

to outweigh the risk of staying in formation. 

From a design standpoint, the smoothbore had other 
significant failings as a weapon. The exposed panner meant 
it could not be used in inclement weather. And it was 
unreliable as well; out of an average 6,000 rounds fired 
from flintlocks, there were an average of 922 misfires or 
one in each six and a half rounds discharged.18 There were, 
however, no better weapons available to European-style 
armies. Tactically the one hundred and sixty years prior to 
the Civil War can be defined as a process of experimentation 
and refinement, of finding the best means of making do with 
the smoothbore in battle. Volley fire was expressly devised 
so as to concentrate the greatest number of projectiles at a 
specific target. The fundamental principles of effective 
volley fire were well described by Eighteenth Century 
military writer, Bland Humphrey, an accounting which would 
remain valid through the Civil War: 
Draw your enemy's fire if you can, and if 

your battalion still advances you must win.. .it 

being certain that when troops see others advance,

and going to pour in their fixe amongst them when 
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I theirs is gone, they will immediately give way, or 

at least it seldom happens otherwise.19 

The solution to the numerous and manifest deficiencies 
of the smoothbore musket lay in the development of the 
military rifle, "the most formidable description of small 
fire-arms yet known," according to Lieutenant Richard 
Nicholson Magrath of the British Army.20 The problems in 

making the rifle a truly practical replacement fox the 

smoothbore musket, were, however, complex and extremely 

technical. 

The rifle had been in use, principally as a sporting 
weapon, since the early Sixteenth Century. The distinctive 
grooves (or rifling) carved into the interior sides of the 
barrel, served to give the rifle ball greater velocity and 
higher angle of trajectory. The result was a considerable 
improvement in both accuracy and range relative to the 
smoothbore musket. The famed Kentucky or Pennsylvania rifle 
of Davy Crockett was accurate up to four hundred yards while 
the British Baker rifle, used in the Peninsular Campaign (by 
the rifle brigade) could do work up to three hundred yards. 
Mass use of rifles by armies, however, was simply not 
feasible. The overriding technical problem was the slowness 
of reloading the weapon. Whereas a smoothbore musket, in 
the hands of an average infantryman, could be fired at the 
rate of three or four rounds per minute, the rifle, at best, 
could be discharged no more than once very two minutes. The 
difficulty in reloading the rifle arose from the fact that 
I 
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the soft lead ball had to be forcibly rammed down the 
barrel. The rifling, to which the ball was forced to 
conform by use of the ramrod and thus causing the character­
istic spin of the projectile when fired, worked, however, as 
well, to obstruct passage of the round down the barrel. In 
fact, it was not uncommon for riflemen to resort to the use 
of hammers to pound the ramrod home when the ball became 
stuck in the barrel. A second major problem with most 
rifles was that a bayonet could not be attached. The 
dangerous combination of an exceeding slow rate of fire and 
the lack of a bayonet caused the rifle to be loathed by most 
infantrymen. Still another major failing of the rifle lay 
in the poor fit between the rifling and the ball (since both 
were handmade, no standardization was possible, further 
imperiling performance). This resulted in the gas created 
by the ignition of the powder charge being able to escape, 
reducing velocity and range, and in turn causing the weapon 
to foul far faster than a musket. Thus, after the discharge 
of only a few rounds, the barrel became so obstructed as to 
cause a sharp decline in range. The combination of techni­
cal problems, the active hostility toward the rifle by most 
line soldiers and the resulting need for highly trained and 
quite expensive specialized units to use this weapon 
properly, worked against the wider employment of the rifle 
as a combat weapons. 21 
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T h e  f i r s t  major t e c h n o l o g i c a l  improvement i n  i n f a n t r y  
weaponry s i n c e  t h e  deve lopmen t  o f  t h e  f l i n t l o c k  musket-
b a y o n e t  combina t ion  w a s  t h e  i n v e n t i o n  of t h e  fu lmina te  of 
mercury pe rcuss ion  cap. I n  1 8 0 7  Reverend Alexander Forsy th  
of S c o t l a n d  pa ten ted  use of t h i s  subs tance  as t h e  starter 
charger  f o r  t h e  musket; p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  d e t o n a t i o n  of pr imary 
c h a r g e  by s t r i k i n g  i n s t e a d  of  by i g n i t i o n .  Only i n  t h e  
1830s, however, w a s  a p r a c t i c a l  means found t o  package t h e  
f u l m i n a t e  of  mercury .  The use of an  enc losed  copper cap  
c o n t a i n i n g  a small amount of t h i s  material a l lowed f o r  t h e  
f i r s t  p r a c t i c a l  u s e  of  muskets i n  r a i n y  weather s i n c e  no 
powder w a s  exposed t o  t h e  elements.  Var ious ly  inven ted  by 
any  number of  p e r s o n s ,  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  c e l e b r a t e d  B r i t i s h  
gunsmi th  f i r m  of Montan, Egg and Purdy, by Colonel  Hawken 
and by Joshua Shaw, a B r i t i s h  a r t i s t  r e s i d e n t  i n  P h i l a d e l ­
p h i a  a s  e a r l y  a s  1 8 1 4 ,  t h e  p e r c u s s i o n  c a p  d r a m a t i c a l l y  
reduced t h e  number of m i s f i r e s  and t h e r e b y  improved accuracy 
o r  a t  l e a s t  combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s .  For eve ry  one thousand 
rounds f i r ed ,  t h e  number of m i s f i r e s  f e l l  from four  hundred 
and e l even  t o  fou r  and a ha l f  and t h e  number of h i t s  r o s e  
from an average of two hundred and twenty t o  t h r e e  hundred 
and e igh ty - f ive .  Adoption of t h e  pe rcuss ion  cap  by m i l i t a r y  
services w a s ,  i n  s p i t e  of i t s  clear s u p e r i o r i t y ,  exceedingly  
slow. I n  p a r t  t h i s  w a s  a f u n c t i o n  of c o s t ,  t h e  expense of 
conve r t ing  e x i s t i n g  weapons t o  t h e  new system; i n  p a r t ,  t h e  
t r a d i t i o n a l  conserva t i sm of ordnance bureaus and, i n  p a r t ,  
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the organizational gulf between line officers and staff 
weapon-experts. The United States, f o r  example, only 
ordered the complete change-over to the percussion cap in 
1848 and then, at a virtual snail's pace. While percussion 
cap was a significant improvement in the capability of the 
smoothbore musket it did not, however, solve the major 

problems of limited range and accuracy.22 

The key to any successful improvement in the rifle lay 

in the development of a practical cylindro-conical or oblong 

bullet, to overcome the problem of slow loading time f o r  
this weapon. Various experimenters, both military and 
civilian, labored on a solution. The ideal form of such a 
new rifle would have been a breechloader, provided that some 
form of effective sealer could be applied to the breech to 
prevent escape of propellant gasses. Only Prussia aggres­
sively moved to develop a breechloader as its primary 
service weapon. The famed Prussian needlegun, perfected in 
the 1840s but only issued to line troops in 1851 f o r  
security reasons, was the first massed-produced military 
rifle. The weapon, however, was far too heavy as was its 
projectile, which due to a vastly higher rate of fire, 
created severe problems, f o r  the first time, of ammunition 
supply. Nonetheless, the needlegun possessed an excellent 
effective range of eight hundred yards and like all breech 
loaders, and quite unlike the smoothbore musket, could be 
reloaded from the prone position.23 The United States Army 
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f l i r t e d  wi th  t h e  use of t h e  Halls r i f l e  and c a r b i n e  f o r  some 
f o r t y  y e a r s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  C i v i l  War. Despi te  t h e  weapon's 
c l e a r  s u p e r i o r i t y  i n  o f f i c i a l  o r d n a n c e  t e s t s  a n d  t h e  
enthusiasm of most l i n e  o f f i c e r s  who came i n t o  c o n t a c t  w i t h  
t h e  H a l l s  weapons , t h e  Ordnance Bureau s t e a d f a s t l y  r e f  used 
t o  a u t h o r i z e  l a r g e  scale product ion  of t h i s  firearm.24 Two 
p r i n c i p a l  o b j e c t i o n s  were marshaled by t r a d i t i o n a l  ordnance 
e x p e r t s  a g a i n s t  t h e  breechloaders ;  f i r s t  w a s  t h e  i s s u e  of 
whe the r  s u c h  a weapon could  bear  up i n  t h e  f i e l d ,  i n  t h e  
hands of poor ly  educated s o l d i e r s .  It w a s  feared t h a t ,  "NO 
b r e a c h - l o a d i n g  weapon c a n  s t a n d  t h e  wear a n d  t e a r  of  a 
c a m p a i g n ,  a n d  t h e  c a r e l e s s  a n d  awkward  u s a g e  of  t h e  
s o l d i e r .  I' 25 
The second o b j e c t i o n  w a s  drawn from t r a d i t i o n  and t h e  
use of t h e  f l i n t l o c k  musket f o r  t h e  p rev ious  one hundred and 
f i f t y  years :  
I f  by b r e a c h - l o a d i n g . . .  it w a s  p o s s i b l e  t o  
f i r e  t e n  o r  t w e n t y  times a m i n u t e ,  t h e  r e s u l t  
would be a g r e a t  i n c r e a s e  i n  n o i s e  and smoke, w i t h  
no more e f f e c t  [ t h a n  a smoothbore musket] .26 
T h e  c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  m i l i t a r y  a n d  f i s c a l  conserva t i sm 
fo rced  most i n v e n t o r s  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  so -ca l l ed  French-Belgium 
s o l u t i o n :  u s ing  t h e  e x i s t i n g  format of t h e  musket t o  make a 
be t te r  r i f l e .  The  c u l m i n a t i o n  of t hese  l a b o r s  w a s  t h e  
i n a c c u r a t e l y  l a b e l e d  Minie " b a l l "  r i f l e .  The t e c h n o l o g i c a l  
breakthrough of Captain Claude Et ienne  Minie, of t h e  French 
Army, w a s  t h e  u s e  of  a p i l l a r  i n  t h e  breech of a muzzle 
load ing  r i f l e .  T h i s  device w a s  d r i v e n  by t h e  f o r c e  of t h e  
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d e t o n a t i o n  of t h e  pe rcuss ion  cap  i n t o  t h e  base  of t h e  b u l l e t  
so  t h a t  it would cause t h e  l a t te r  t o  expand i n t o  t h e  grooves 
of t h e  r i f l i n g .  I n  t u r n  a cup w a s  p laced  a t  t h e  base  of t h e  
b u l l e t  which t h e  p i l l a r  s t r u c k ;  it was t h i s  cup, i n  conjunc­
t i o n  w i t h  t h e  d i scha rge  of gas from t h e  powder exp los ion ,  
i n s t e a d  of t h e  earlier method of ramming, which fo rced  t h e  
p r o j e c t i l e  i n t o  t h e  r i f l e  g r o o v e s .  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  
Ordnance Bureau qu ick ly  devised a s u p e r i o r  v e r s i o n  of t h e  
new Minie-bul le t .  The improved p r o j e c t i l e  used a steel  s t e m  
o r  l i g e ,  a t t a c h e d  t o  t h e  base of t h e  b u l l e t ,  which worked 
"as a wedge t o  spread  o u t  t h e  b a l l "  and t h e r e b y  caus ing  it 
t o  assume t h e  shape of t h e  r i f l i n g  when f i r ed .27  The key 
advantage w a s  a greater conformity of b u l l e t  t o  r i f l i n g  and 
a c o r r e s p o n d i n g  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  loss of p r o p e l l a n t  gas. 
The e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of  t hese  new weapons w a s  a s t o n i s h i n g .  
C l e a r l y ,  as  C a p t a i n  E m r i c  Szabad  p o i n t e d  o u t ,  " t h e  new-
f i r e a r m s  present . .  .a most formidable  a p p a r a t u s  of des t ruc ­
t i o n ,  b o t h  f r o m  t h e i r  p r e c i s i o n  a n d  wide  r a n g e . .  ..It 2 8 
E f f e c t i v e  range  mushroomed from s i x t y  o r  one hundred ya rds  
t o  e i g h t  hundred or more; reasonably  s k i l l e d  s h o o t e r s  w e r e  
a s s u r e d  good a c c u r a c y  w i t h  some models  up t o  t h i r t e e n  
hundred yards .  Furthermore,  t h e  use of pre-packaged paper  
c a r t r i d g e s  ( t o  be r e p l a c e d  i n  o n l y  f i f t e e n  y e a r s  by t h e  
modern p r o j e c t i l e - p r o p e l l a n t  e n c l o s e d  b u l l e t )  served t o  
i n c r e a s e  t h e  speed of r e l o a d i n g  t h e  weapon. There fo re ,  as 
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many as twelve rounds could  be f i r e d  a minute .  And it could  
be used under a lmost  a l l  weather cond i t ions .  29 
The b a s i c  t ac t ics  of b a t t l e ,  as p r a c t i c e d  by armies on 
both s i d e s  of t h e  A t l a n t i c ,  i n  t h e  y e a r s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  C i v i l  
War, a s  s u c c i n c t l y  d e s c r i b e d  by General Henry H a l l e c k  i n  
1 8 6 1  were based on t h e  t e c h n o l o g i c a l  l i m i t a t i o n s  of smooth­
bore  weaponry. 
The a t t a c k  i s  f i r s t  opened by a cannonade, 
l i g h t  t r o o p s  a r e  s e n t  f o r w a r d  t o  a n n o y  t h e  
i n f a n t r y ,  a n d  i f  p o s s i b l e ,  t o  p i c k  o f f  h i s  
a r t i l l e r i s t s .  The main body t h e n  advances i n t o  
l i n e s  ( ( i . e . ,  dep loymen t  f rom column t o  l i n e a r  
f o r m a t i o n ) ) ;  t h e  f i r s t  d i s p l a y s  i t s e l f  i n  l i n e  as 
it a r r i v e s  n e a r l y  w i t h i n  r a n g e  o f  g r a p e s h o t  
( ( a b o u t  2 0 0  y a r d s ) ) ;  t h e  second l i n e  remains i n  
columns of a t t a c k  formed i n  b a t t a l i o n s  by d i v i s i o n  
a t  a d i s t a n c e  f rom t h e  f i r s t  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  b e  
beyond t h e  r each  of t h e  enemy's musketry,  b u t  near  
enough t o  suppor t  t h e  f i r s t  l i n e  o r  cover  it i f  
d r i v e n  back .  The a r t i l l e r y ,  i n  t h e  meant ime,  
c o n c e n t r a t e s  i t s  f i r e  on some weak p o i n t  t o  open a 
way f o r  t h e  r e s e r v e  which rushes  i n t o  t h e  opening
and takes t h e  enemy i n  t h e  f l a n k s  and rear. The 
c a v a l r y  charges a t  t h e  o p p o r t u n e  moment on t h e  
f l a n k  o f  t h e  enemy's  columns o r  p e n e t r a t e s  a n  
o p e n i n g  i n  h i s  l i n e ,  and  c u t t i n g  t o  p i e c e s  h i s  
s t a g g e r e d  t r o o p s ,  f o r c e s  them i n t o  retreat ,  and 
completes t h e  v i c t o r y .  During t h i s  t i m e  t h e  whole 
l i n e  of  t h e  enemy should be kept  occupied as t o  
p r e v e n t  f r e s h  t r o o p s  from be ing  concen t r a t ed  on 
t h e  t h r e a t e n e d  p o i n t  .30 
The impact of t h e  Minie-bul le t  r i f l e  and i t s  progeny on 
c o n v e n t i o n a l ,  p o s t - N a p o l e o n i c  t a c t i c s  w a s  i n  t i m e  t o  be 
d e v a s t a t i n g  and even world s h a t t e r i n g .  Over a c e n t u r y  of 
c a r e f  u l l y  t h o u g h t - o u t  m i l i t a r y  t h e o r y  a n d  h a r d - e a r n e d  
e x p e r i e n c e  w a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e n d e r e d  o b s o l e t e .  Shock 
t a c t i c s ,  r e l y i n g  on  c o l d  s t ee l ,  no l o n g e r  made s e n s e .  
F o r m e r l y ,  i n f a n t r y  c o u l d  s a f e l y  a p p r o a c h  t o  w i t h i n  o n e  
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hundred  a n d  f i f t y  y a r d s  o f  an  enemy's l i n e  b e f o r e  coming 
unde r  e f f e c t i v e  f i r e  f rom t h e i r  a d v e r s a r i e s .  Smoothbore 
cannon, p a r t i c u l a r l y  of t h e  ho r se  a r t i l l e r y  v a r i e t y ,  could  
n o  l o n g e r  g a l l o p  u p  t o  w i t h i n  t h r e e  h u n d r e d  y a r d s  o f  
o p p o s i n g  i n f a n t r y  a n d  p r o v i d e  d i r ec t  f i r e  s u p p o r t  i n  
re la t ive s a f e t y .  Thei r  gunners now would be e a s i l y  picked 
o f f  by o r d i n a r y  s o l d i e r s  armed w i t h  t h e  new r i f l e s  long  
be fo re  t h e i r  p i e c e s  could be unlimbered, l e t  a l o n e  brought  
i n t o  a c t i o n .  Moreover ,  e v e n  medium and heavy smoothbore 
cannon, w i th  e f f e c t i v e  ranges  of no more t h a n  e i g h t  hundred 
y a r d s l  were w e l l  w i t h i n  t h e  range of t r a i n e d  s n i p e r s  armed 
w i t h  t h e  new r i f l e s .  C a v a l r y  charges  were rendered  v i r ­
t u a l l y  u s e l e s s .  I n f a n t r y  f i r e ,  f rom e n t r e n c h e d  f i e l d  
p o s i t i o n s ,  would a n n i h i l a t e  mounted u n i t s  long  b e f o r e  t h e y  
could s u c c e s s f u l l y  c l o s e  wi th  t h e i r  a d v e r s a r i e s .  While such 
d i f f i c u l t  and harrowing f a c t s  were t o  be stumbled upon i n  
t i m e  by t h e  m i l i t a r y  s e r v i c e s  o f  t h e  U n i t e d  S t a t e s  a n d  
Europe, t h e  awesome r e a l i t y  of j u s t  what t h e  new r i f l e  cou ld  
i n  fact ach ieve  w a s ,  i n  t h e  1850s, l a r g e l y  understood on ly  
by  a h a n d f u l  o f  o r d n a n c e  o f f i c e r s .  One s u c h  o f f i c e r ,  
C a p t a i n  Camdus Wilcox o f  t h e  United States Army, i n  1859 
desc r ibed  t h e  s t a r t l i n g  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of t h e  new r i f l e s :  
I n  service use  of t h e  improved r i f l e  it may
be c o n f i d e n t l y  a s s e r t e d  t h a t  ba t t les  w i l l  be more 
d e s t r u c t i v e  t h a n  f o r m e r l y ,  a g r e a t e r  number of 
bal ls  w i l l  take e f f e c t ,  it w i l l  be d i f f i c u l t  f o r  
t h e  s o l i d e r  t o  f i n d  himself i n  t h e  presence  of t h e  
enemy, and... [ r e s u l t i n g ]  f i r e  beyond t h e  r ange  of 
h i s  p r e s e n t  p i e c e  .3 1  
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Formerly, t h e  p o s i t i o n  of t h e  enemy could  be 
a p p r o a c h e d  t o  w i t h i n  3 0 0  y a r d s  w i t h o u t  expe r i ­
e n c i n g  much l o s s  from t h e  f i r e  of t h e  i n f a n t r y .  
Now t h i s  f i r e  i s  d e s t r u c t i v e  a t  1 0 0 0  o r  1 2 0 0  
y a r d s ,  a n d  w e l l  d i r e c t e d  a t  6 0 0  y a r d s  becomes 
i r r e s i s t i b l e .  The range  of t h e  r i f l e ,  p e r m i t t i n g
b a t t l e s  t o  commence a t  c o n s i d e r a b l e  d i s t a n c e s  
wi thout  great care on t h e  p a r t  of t h e  g e n e r a l ,  h i s  
w h o l e  l i n e  may become e x p o s e d  a t  o n c e  t o  a 
d e s t r u c t i v e  f i re ,  t h e  p o s i t i o n  a s s igned  t o  t r o o p s  
n o t  i m m e d i a t e l y  engaged  w i l l  r e  u i r e  as  much 
a t t e n t i o n  as t h o s e  t h a t  are engaged.3 2  
I n s o f a r  as t h e  c a v a l r y  was concerned, t h e  e f f e c t  would 
be t o  f o r e c l o s e  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  of shock tact ics :  
Formerly, c a v a l r y  could  take as i t s  p o s i t i o n
i n  c o l u m n s  o f  s q u a d r o n s  i n  f u l l  v iew of  t h e  
i n f a n t r y  t o  be charged,  a t  a d i s t a n c e  of 40  ya rds ,
a n d  c o u l d  a p p r o a c h  w i t h i n  3 0 0  y a r d s  w i t h o u t  
expe r i enc ing  much loss .  A t  t h i s  d i s t a n c e  it moved 
a g a i n s t  ( ( t h e ) )  i n f a n t r y ,  f i r s t  a t  a t r o t ,  t h e n  
g a l l o p ,  and f i n a l l y  a t  f u l l  speed.... Even wi th  
t h e  smoothbore musket, t h e  c a v a l r y  charge  a g a i n s t  
i n f a n t r y ,  t o  b e  made w i t h  a p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
s u c c e s s ,  had  t o  be  i n  g e n e r a l  proceeded by t h e  
f i r e  of a r t i l l e r y ;  o r  t h e  i n f a n t r y  must have been 
a l r e a d y  exhausted o r  demoral ized from i t s  c o n t e s t  
w i t h  o t h e r  arms.... Under t h e  e x i s t i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  
of  t h e  i n f a n t r y  armament, c a v a l r y  w i l l  be w i t h i n  
i t s  sphe re  of a c t i o n  a t  1 2 0 0  o r  more ya rds ,  and as 
it a p p r o a c h e s  n e a r e r ,  t h e  f i r e  w i l l  become more 
and more d e s t r u c t i v e .  33  
T h e  f o u n d a t i o n  of C a p t a i n  W i l c o x ' s  conc lus ion  w a s  a 
series of ordnance tests,  f irst  undertaken i n  Great B r i t a i n  
and la te r  d u p l i c a t e d  by every  l e a d i n g  power, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
U n i t e d  S t a t e s ,  w i t h  t h e  new i n f a n t r y  arms. The 1855 and 
1 8 5 6  H y t h e  t r i a l s  w e r e  c o n d u c t e d  w i t h  t h e  new E n g l i s h  
Enf i e l d  r i f l e d  muske t ,  w i t h  which ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Capta in  
Sazaband ,  "a t o l e r a b l y  good r i f l e m a n  w i l l  now f i r e  w i th  
e f f e c t  a t  600... ((to)) 800 yards."34 The 1855 tes t  p i t t e d  
twen ty - seven  i n f a n t r y m e n  a g a i n s t  a t h e o r e t i c a l  i n f a n t r y  
I 
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column, firing of the guns being carried out at five hundred 

and fifty yards (or the tail of the column) and at two 

hundred and twenty yards (the head). Within four minutes 

the infantrymen had succeeded in decimating their imaginary 

foes under fairly realistic battle conditions. And in 1856 

a similar test was conducted against a theoretical artillery 

battery at a distance of eight hundred and ten yards, 

resulting in complete destruction of the unit in only three 

minutes. These tests were clearly devastating in their 

results on the effectiveness of conventional tactics. They 

were also either ignored or even incomprehensible to most 

military leaders. Firing at targets was one thing; firing 

at real adversaries, capable of returning fire was another. 

Moreover, there were significant problems of perception as 

regards the meaning of the term "firepower". The criticism 

of the breechloader, regardless of whether it was capable of 

being fired ten or twenty times that of a musket, stated 

above, was characteristic of most military thinking of this 

period. The comprehension of officers as to the effect of 

concentrated fire was expressed usually as the weight of the 

volley or the number of projectiles discharged. What was 

absent was any real understanding of the effect of multiply­

ing the rate of discharge and thus creating zones of fire. 

Precisely the same lack of comprehension blocked the later 

adoption of the machine gun, in large numbers, prior to 

World War 1-35 
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The great master of the French-Austrian school of War, 

Baron de Jomini, initially examined the weaponry with 

trepidation, as to the potentially grave consequences on the 

process of military science in civilizing warfare: 

The means of destruction are approaching the 

perfection with frightful rapidity. The Congreve

rockets...the shrapnel howitzers, which can throw 

a stream of canister as far as the range of a 

bullet, will multiply the chances of destruction, 
as though the hecatombs of Eylau, Borodino,
Leipzig, and Waterloo were not sufficient to 
decimate the European races.36 
In its first, limited employment in the Crimean War of 

1856, the Minie-bullet rifle's impact was largely negligi­

ble. And in the 1859 War of Italian Unification, the French 

trounced the Austrians with the bayonet, instead of exploit­

ing the capabilities of their new rifles. Jomini, along 

with most other officers, concluded that there would in fact 

be no telling affect on battle as a result of the new 

weapons: 
The improvements in firearms will not 
introduce any important change in the manner of 
taking troops into battle, but that it would be 
useful to introduce into tactics of infantry the 
formation of columns by companies, and to have a 
numerous body of good riflemen or skirmishers, and 
to exercise the troops considerably in firing.37 
Thus there would be little direct affect on tactics by 
the Minie-bullet rifle, save fox a slight increase in the 
importance of sniper fire. The formal response of the 

United States Army to the Minie-bullet rifle was the 

issuance of a new manual of infantry tactics. Major William 

Hardee, at the direction of Secretary or War Davis, under-
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took a limited revision of General Scott's translation of 

the official 1836 French manual of infantry tactics. The 

changes introduced by Hardee were relatively minor. Of note 

were the introduction of two new commands for the movement 

of infantry; the double quick time (ninety steps per minute) 

and the run (120 steps per minute). The greater exertions 

required for these evolutions earned Hardee's tactics the 

sarcastic label of a "Shanghai fire drill" from both 
officers and soldiers.38 In part, the lack of substantial 
change in infantry tactics was due to the problem of 
controlling troops in battle. In the heat of combat and the 
general din of war, auditory signal devices such a5 drums 
and bugles were largely useless. Alternative methods such 
as runners, flags or heliographs were equally unsuccess­
fu1.39 Thus, prior to the development of the radio, small 
unit tactics as practiced today were highly impractical; 
troops command was still premised on the Frederickian 
concept of soldiers as mercenary robots. Loss of control 
over individual units, it was thus feared, would result in 
wholesale desertion while under fire.40 
On a deeper level than the mere technical aspects of 
infantry tactics, were the powerful restraints of tradition 
and experience of aristocratically oriented armies. Thus 
Jomini, with complete confidence, could conclude that in the 
end, regardless of the greater lethality of the Minie-
I 
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bullet rifle, orthodoxy would prevail, as before, on the 

battlefield: 
In spite of the improvements of firearms, two 
armies in battle will not pass the day in firing 
at each other from a distance; it will always be 
necessary for one of them to advance to the attack 
of the other. 
That victory may with much certainty be 
expected by the party taking the offense when the 
general in command possesses the talent of taking
his troops into action in good order and of boldly
attacking the enemy, adopting the spirit and 
quality of troops. .to his own character.41 
Fundamentally, therefore, understanding of just how 

potent the impact of the new rifle could be on orthodox 

tactics was lacking among most officers of this period. 

Simply put, it meant comprehending the fact that the new 

weapon had more than twice the rate of fire of the old one, 

with at least six times the effective range, which could be 

used in all weather conditions and was machine built, at 

very little expense and in vastly greater numbers than its 

predecessor. Granted that the actual range at which most 
soldiers could be reasonably expected to aim and hit a 
target was about two to four hundred yards, yet the very 
fact that a common infantryman could now actually pinpoint 
his fire at such a range was still a great change from the 
old smoothbore musket.42 An even greater problem of 
perception for traditional military leaders involved the 
concept of firepower, of the effect of the rapid discharge 
of many weapons in a confined space. Thus, for example, the 
quite typical assessment of Dutch cavalry officer J. Roemer, 
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a traditionalist in the field of mounted warfare doctrine, 

of the general lack of impact of the new rifles on battle 

tactics: 

Infantry must...depend wholly on its fire, it 
has time to deliver only two volleys and these 
with largely the power to cripple every sixth 
horse. Experience shows that the effect of 
musketry is very trifling at more than three 
hundred yards and within this distance it is not 
prudent to try more than two discharges ((i.e.,
before the cavalry descended upon the infantry's
position. 4 3  
As late as 1868, after making a thorough study of the 

American Civil War, Lieutenant-Colonel George T. Denison, of 

the Canadian Army and one of the most progressive and 

reform-minded cavalry officers of h i s  day, could just as 
easily misgauge the impact of the rifled musket on mounted 

tactics: 

From 800 to 400 yards cavalry can advance at 
the trot in about one minute and a quarter. In 
that time some six or seven shots may be fired,
but practically with no effect, the rapidly
changing distances, the difficulties of guessing
the proper elevation to strike a moving body, the 
necessity of having the sights accurate, will do 
away with much danger from these shots. From 400 
to 100 yards--300 yards at a gallop will take half 
a minute, two shots can be fired in this time,
leaving one for the last hundred yards, which can 
be run over in ten seconds.44 
The problem with these calculations is that they lacked 

understanding of the impact of volume of fire. A single 

rank formation of a cavalry company covered some three 

hundred yards. For two minutes or so it could be expected 
to be under concentrated infantry fire, from say an infantry 

company. Assuming a reasonable rate of fire of six rounds 
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per minute, a total as high as twelve hundred projectiles 
would be placed into those three hundred yards occupied by 
two hundred men and an equal number of horses. In turn, a 
bullet, when fired, travels at a speed of between eight 
hundred and five thousand feet per second, far faster than 
any horse. The resulting zone of fire would be such as to 
destroy the cavalry company or at least render it -­hors du 

combat. Moreover, the infantry would be deployed in the 

protective square formation or, as was increasingly the 

fashion, entrenched or positioned between defensive cover, 

further reducing the cavalry's potential effectiveness. 

Aside from the lack of understanding of the effect of 
tremendously increased firepower, there were other intellec­
tual problems associated with the adaptation by Nineteenth 
Century armies to these new weapons. Take fox example the 
deceptively simple problem of how to train a soldier to 
"aim" his weapon. The basic pattern of using small arms of 
military purposes had been by volley. With an attached 
bayonet it was simply not possible to line the barrel of the 
piece with a desired target. Secondly, the very limited 
range of the smoothbore musket ruled out the use of long 
range fire. Finally, the paramount emphasis in infantry 
tactics on shock and the use of cold steel, reduced engage­
ment of foot soldiers to short range, hand-to-hand engage­
ments. Targeting a firearm was a matter left to the 
sportsmen and the hunter; many European light infantry 
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u n i t s ,  i n  f a c t ,  were, as i n  t h e  case o f  German jaeqers, 
f o r m e r  woodsmen r e c r u i t e d  f o r  t h e i r  s u p e r i o r  marksmanship. 
S o l d i e r s  were almost  never g iven  any i n s t r u c t i o n  i n  how t o  
d i r e c t  t h e i r  f i r e  a c c u r a t e l y .  S ince  t h e  i n f a n t r y  f i r e  had 
b e e n ,  f o r  s e v e r a l  c e n t u r i e s  ( a t  l eas t  as f a r  back as t h e  
F i f t e e n t h  Century and t h e  d e c l i n e  of t h e  crossbow) equiva­
l e n t  t o  t h e  scatterl ike f i r e  of a shotgun,  there were t h u s  
no immediate h i s t o r i c a l  examples of mass aiming of weapons 
t o  be  drawn upon. N o t i c e  t h e  r e p e a t e d  a s s e r t i o n s  of t h e  
a u t h o r s  above  t h a t  t h e  g r e a t e r  s p e e d  of  f i r e  would b e  
negated by t h e  i n a b i l i t y  of t h e  s o l d i e r  q u i c k l y  t o  a i m  h i s  
weapon. P u t t i n g  a s i d e  t h e  i s s u e  of volume of f i r e ,  it is  
i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  how a weapon w a s  aimed i n  t h i s  
per iod .  Targe t  weapons f e a t u r e d  e l a b o r a t e  s i g h t i n g  systems 
w h i l e  h u n t i n g  f i r e a r m s  r e l i e d  upon t h e  expe r i ence  of t h e  
shoo te r .  B a s i c a l l y ,  one s e l e c t e d  a t a r g e t ,  determined range  
and  s p e e d  o f  movement, i f  a p p l i c a b l e ,  and t h e n  c a r e f u l l y  
s i g h t e d  and  f i r e d .  Such methods  were n e c e s s a r i l y  t o o  
complex and  t o  slow f o r  u s e  i n  combat ,  s a v e  by h i g h l y  
s p e c i a l i z e d  s o l d i e r s ,  Only g r a d u a l l y  would armies begin t o  
master t h e  t e c h n i q u e s  by w h i c h  g r o u p s  of  s o l d i e r s  could  
s p e e d i l y  i d e n t i f y  and  h i t  t a r g e t s .  The modern system of 
combat a iming  began t o  be experimented w i t h  i n  t h e  1860s. 
E s s e n t i a l l y  t h e  r i f l e  i s  t r e a t e d  as  a n  e x t e n s i o n  of t h e  
p e r s o n ,  it i s  t h u s  p o i n t e d  a t  t h e  c e n t e r  of t h e  d e s i r e d  
t a r g e t s  a n d  t h e  weapon l e v e l e d  so t h e  b u l l e t  w i l l  s t r ike  
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about six feet above ground. In effect, therefore, the 

soldier shoots as if he were making a bayonet thrust. 

Though some difficulties as directed-firing by troops in 

battle seemed insurmountable, rendering the superior range 

of the new rifles useless, a few ballistic experts were 

already attempting to solve the problem. According to 

Captain Wilcox, the future promised a revolution in how a 

common soldier would manipulate his weapon in combat--the 

shift from volley and bayonet to firepower and controlled 

shooting: 

He will be inspired with more confidence 
knowing the range and accuracy of his arms. At 
great distances he will no longer fire by hazard,
but will use his elevating ((i..e., aiming)), at 
short distances, knowing the power of his rifle,
he will fire with the utmost coolness, and with a 
certainty the smoothbore and round ball could 
never inspire.45 
The Industrial Revolution was, in addition to profound 
changes in technology, causing as well, considerable 
alterations in the composition and orientation of civil 
society that was to affect greatly the conduct of war. The 
Minie-bullet rifle was not simply a matter of improved 
hardware. As the question of aiming shows quite clearly, an 
intellectual as well as a social revolution in military 
science and organization was needed to exploit fully the 
possibilities of the new arms technology. Guilbert, in the 
1760s pioneered the column as the solution of the complexi­
ties and failings of Eighteenth Century linear tactics. The 
intellectual breakthrough and in unison as opposed to the 
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earlier method of starting each movement from a fixed point 
and defining it as an end-to-itself . It was only until the 
French Revolution and the immediate need to convert un­
trained citizens into soldiers that Guilbert's concepts 
could finally be exploited to the fullest and in turn, under 
Napoleon, destroying the fundamental Eighteenth Century 
maxim that one army could not destroy another. 
Similarly, the basic revision in the science of war 
made possible by the Minie-bullet rifle was one which 
required a massive redefinition of military theory and 
organization, which transcended such relatively mundane 
matters as increased range or firepower. Rather it offered 
the immediate end to the Frederickian tradition of soldiers 
as mere robots. The weapon required the use of loose­
skirmish-order tactics in place of tight, disciplined 
formations. Neither exposed linear or column formations, 
designed to accommodate traditional volley fire and the 
bayonet charge, were practical against the fire of the 
Minie-bullet rifle. Even with such modifications as those 
developed by Hardee to conventional infantry tactics, of 
increasing the speed of movement, there was simply no way to 
close with an adversary without suffering massive casualties 
from his fire. To disperse men on the battlefield, however, 
demanded considerably more than simple tinkering with the 
infantry manuals. A s  shown by the French Revolution, 
effective soldiers could be trained in Guilbertian tactics 
I 
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in about eight weeks; the Minie-bullet rifle, in turn, 

further speeded up training time. 

The emergence of large middle class, urban populations 

and the development of national political culture on both 

sides of the Atlantic was as well rendering the principles 

of limited warfare anachronistic. The idea of war fought 

for limited gain by competitive princes, with small pro­

fessional mercenary forces was increasingly out of line with 

mid-Nineteenth Century society; the Crimean War, for 

example, with popular involvement in the war effort by 

ordinary citizens and coverage in the newspapers was a 

portent of still greater change. The new style of tactics 

would require a willingness to trust the initiative of 

individual soldiers. Men would thus have to be led, not 

driven into battle, and non-commissioned officers would have 

to be redefined from brutal task masters to team leaders. 

The armies of the trans-Atlantic military community, save 

for Prussia, however, continued to plan and wage war as it 

had been done for the previous one hundred and fifty 

years.46 

Part I11 

The 1850s were in the United States, as well as in 

Europe, an era in which change in the military arts was 

beginning to be officially analyzed. Two major technologi­

cal advancements, steam powered ships and the new rifled 

naval artillery threatened at once to sweep aside the twin 
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I p i l l a r s  o f  t h e  C a l h o u n - n a t i o n a l  war p o l i c y .  F o r  t h e  
p r e v i o u s  f o r t y  y e a r s  t h e  b a s i c  war-planning assumption of 
t h e  Army h a d  b e e n  t h a t  a minimum of  th ree  months  w a s  
n e c e s s a r y  f o r  a European power t o  t r a n s p o r t  and deploy an 
i n i t i a l  i n v a s i o n  f o r c e ;  t h a t  i n  t u r n ,  s a i l  powered s h i p s  
c o u l d  n o t  suppor t  a f o r c e  much l a r g e r  t h a n  f i f t y  thousand 
men f o r  any extended p e r i o d  of t i m e ;  and t h a t  t h e  n a t i o n ' s  
masonry s e a c o a s t  f o r t r e s s e s  could wi ths t and  naval  bombard­
ment l o n g  enough f o r  r e in fo rcemen t s  t o  a r r i v e .  Thus, t h e  
army would have s u f f i c i e n t  t i m e  t o  e n l a r g e  i t s  f o r c e s  and i n  
t u r n  be  r e a d y  t o  m e e t  a European invader .  By t h e  1850s' 
none of these assumptions were v a l i d .  Steam powered s h i p s  
could c a r r y  t e n s  of thousands of men i n  a matter of weeks t o  
America's sho res  and i n  t u r n ,  e f f e c t i v e l y  supply them. The 
n a v a l  r i f  l e d  cannon rendered  America's c o a s t a l  f o r t r e s s e s  
u s e l e s s ;  t h e y  could now be demolished i n  a matter of hours ,  
as  opposed  t o  weeks i n  t h e  p a s t .  And t h e  army w a s  now 
saddled  w i t h  a v a s t l y  g r e a t e r  coun t ry  t o  defend,  i n  r e g a r d s  
t o  t o t a l  area, i n c l u d i n g  t h e  two sea c o a s t s .  
I n  o r d e r  t o  b r i n g  American m i l i t a r y  d o c t r i n e  a n d  
p r a c t i c e s  i n  l i n e  w i t h  t h e  l a t e s t  b r e a k t h r o u g h s  i n  t h e  
s c i e n c e  of w a r ,  S e c r e t a r y  of War Davis, i n  1856,  a r r anged  
f o r  a m i l i t a r y  commission t o  under take  a grand i n s p e c t i o n  of 
t h e  l e a d i n g  armies of t h e  day. Moreover, t h e  t h e n  on-going 
C r i m e a n  War o f f e r e d  a s p l e n d i d  c h a n c e  t o  v i ew t h e  new 
hardware and  d o c t r i n e s  of  w a r  i n  o p e r a t i o n  and i n  t u r n ,  
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allow the army to gather invaluable field data on the 
fighting capabilities of potential enemies. The officers 
selected for this Commission were Majors Richard Delafield 
and Albert Mordecai and Captain George Brinton McClellan. 47 
The first two officers were noted experts in their respected 
areas of military science (Delafield, fortifications; 

Mordecai, artillery), both were senior West Point professors 

and in their fifties. The third member of the Commission, 

Captain McClellan, was the representative of the mounted 

arm, a line officer with the First Cavalry (although his 

corps affiliation was with the Engineers) and barely thirty. 

McClellan was by no means an elder and accomplished officer 

in his supposed area of specialization; in fact, he had been 

in the saddle, as it were, for less than a year. Rather 

this plum was awarded to him as recognition that he was one 

of the most promising and gifted young officers in the 

Army.48 The composition of the Commission reflected the War 

Department's concern that rifled artillery had rendered the 

nation's seacoast defense system ineffective. Delafield and 

Mordecai had strong engineering backgrounds, equipping them 

to understand collateral military advances such as steam-

powered ships. The assignment of a would-be cavalry officer 

to the Commission reflected Davis's personal bias toward the 

cavalry. The absence of any representative of the King of 

Battle, the infantry, was characteristic of the general lack 
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of interest  o r  unders tanding  of t h e  Minnie b u l l e t ' s  consid­
e r a b l e  impact on orthodox tactics.49 
T h e  Commission t o u r e d  t h e  p r i n c i p a l  Crimean b a t t l e ­
f i e l d s ,  a l though most of t h e  f i g h t i n g  w a s  over by t h e  t i m e  
t h e y  l a n d e d  i n  R u s s i a .  The Crimean War had been l a r g e l y  
t r a d i t i o n a l  i n  t h e  m i l i t a r y  technology used by both s i d e s  
and even more so  i n  t h e  tact ics .  Most i nnova t ions  t h a t  were 
t r i e d  o u t  i n  t h i s  w a r - - r i f l e d  n a v a l  a r t i l l e r y  and steam 
powered s h i p s  ( t h e  M i n i e - b u l l e t  r i f l e  w a s  i n  l i m i t e d  use  
w i t h  French and B r i t i s h  t r o o p s ,  who, however, cont inued  t o  
employ t r a d i t i o n a l  tact ics)  among others--had l i t t l e  d i r e c t  
b e a r i n g  on t h e  b a t t l e f i e l d  a s  s u c h .  Y e t  t h e  c r i p p l i n g  
f a i l u r e s  of l o g i s t i c s  of t h e  B r i t i s h  Army demonstrated t h e  
need  f o r  g r e a t e r  improvements i n  m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  and 
l o g i s t i c s . 5 o  The m i l i t a r y  t h e o r i s t s  of  t h e  d a y ,  w h i l e  
n o t i n g  t h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  new developments i n  t h e  t o o l s  of w a r ,  
g e n e r a l l y  d e f i n e d  t h e  Crimean War as u n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  of 
f u t u r e  wars. J o m i n i  e x p r e s s e d  t h i s  p o s i t i o n  q u i t e  a p t l y  
when he wrote:  
T h i s  ... c o n t e s t  be tween two v a s t  en t renched  
camps, o c c u p i e d  by e n t i r e  armies. . is  an  even t  
wi thout  precedent ,  which w i l l  have no e q u a l  i n  t h e  
f u t u r e ,  f o r  t h e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  which produced it 
cannot  occur aga in .  Moreover, t h i s  c o n t e s t  cannot  
i n f l u e n c e  i n  any r e s p e c t  t h e  g r e a t  combinat ions of 
w a r ,  o r  even t h e  tact ics  of b a t t l e . 5 1  
Y e t  t h e  Crimean War d i d ,  as one of t h e  l a s t ,  t r a d i ­
t i o n a l  e x a m p l e s  of  E i g h t e e n t h  C e n t u r y  w a r ,  h e r a l d  t h e  
beginnings of a s i g n i f i c a n t  a l t e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  n a t u r e  of w a r  
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occasioned by the first arms race in history and by the 

effects of social and political change on the conduct of 

war.52 

Cooperation with the French and Russian military 

services was difficult, but the British amicably welcomed 

the Americans. The return to the United States was routed 

through the leading European states. Thus the trio of 

American officers was able to scrutinize the military 

establishments of France, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and 

Prussia, centering much of their attention on depots and 

fortresses. The reports that were subsequently published of 

their observations were of mixed quality. Delafield's 

Report on the Art of War in Europe and Mordecai's Military 

Commission to Europe were objective and professional in 

nature.53 Delafield concentrated on his area of specialty, 

fortifications, while Mordecai emphasized the latest 

advances in artillery and other aspects of military hard­

ware; both authors, as well, provided illuminating intelli­

gence on virtually every other important aspect of military 

science and the capabilities of the leading European armies. 

In striking contrast to the reports of the two senior 

members of the Commission, McClellan's European Cavalry and 

The Armies of Europe (both of which were privately published 

and distributed far more widely than either of the two 

government-produced reports1 were flaccid and exceedingly 
undiscriminating. What was clearly absent from McClellan's 
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official reports were practical and comprehensive assess­

ments of the military effectiveness of the various cavalry 

services of Europe. Moreover, McClellan made little effort 

to evaluate the combat worth of cavalry in the Crimean War; 

certainly the infamous charge of the British Light Brigade 

merited considerable inquiry as to the future prospects of 

horse soldiers in battle. One can learn from McClellan all 

kinds of quaint but largely useless trivia such as the types 

of drums used in the Prussian Army or even the relative 

merits of Sardinian wooden water caskets. Yet nowhere did 

the young Captain attempt to evaluate or analyze his data; 

rather McClellan was apparently content simply to report, 

without investigation or inquiry. The British Cavalry, for 

example, widely rated as the worst of any major power by the 

leading cavalry theorists of the day, was cheerfully 

presented in terms of its formal order of battle without a 

whiff of criticism by McClellan. One of the positive gains 

for the United States Cavalry service was the adoption of 

the Hungarian saddle (albeit that the original horsehair 

cover, due to the extreme discomfort it caused, was replaced 

by one of tanned leather); McClellan, in describing this key 

piece of cavalry equipment, however, did not lay out a 

process of evaluation from which the reader could trace out 

and comprehend how he arrived at the merits of his conclu­

sions. The reason for McClellan's lack of analysis stemmed 

from the fact that, unlike either Delafield or Mordecai, he 

210 
was not an experienced student of his assigned area of the 
art of war. In fact, McClellan's understanding of cavalry 
theory was superficial at best. Analyzing European cavalry 
theory and practice on the basis of official tables of 
organization and elite demonstration units was for 
McClellan, the representative of a second rate power, akin 
to letting loose a very studious child in a marvelous store 
of infinite wonders, all very pretty and overwhelming in 
their splendor.5 4  
As an official observer of the major European cavalry 
services, McClellan was to exert considerable influence on 
the development of the American cavalry in the late Antebel­
lum years. Yet McClellan, despite the adoption of a new 
saddle and helping to pave the way for the formal adoption 
of the new single-rank mounted tactics, was thoroughly 
traditional in his analysis of cavalry. The image of a 
young, overly enthusiastic junior cavalry officer, in effect 
a novice journeying as part of a distinguished United States 
Military Commission to study at the feet of the masters as 
it were, is well supported by McClellan's fanciful and 
utterly impractical notion of transforming Plains Indians 
into Cossacks: 
It is impossible to repress the conviction 

that in many of the tribes of our frontier 

Indians, such as the Delaware, Kickapoos ti c., we 

possess the material for the formation of partisan 

troops fully equal to the Cossacks, in the event 

of a serious war on this continent, their employ­

ment, under the regulations and restrictions 

necessary to restrain their tendency to un-
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necessary cruelty, would be productive of most 
important advantage.55 
Far more biting was McClellan's assessment of the types 

of mounted units then in Army service and in turn, what 

improvements were necessary. Echoing Davis's argument for 

general-purpose cavalry, McClellan listed all the conceiv­
able and probable types of wars in which American mounted 
units would be needed. The classifications of armed 
conflict which McClellan entertained in his report were the 
same essential types which had been the focus of national 
war policy since Calhoun's tenure as Secretary of War. What 
was not at all likely, McClellan concluded, was a full-
scale, unrestrained and nationalistic struggle, of the 
Napoleonic variety, which of course had, as a consequence of 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the emergence of scienti­
fic concepts of war, been exercised from the lexicon of 
armed hostilities. Thus three possible uses of cavalry for 
three types of potential wars were enumerated by McClellan: 
a. use against the Indians; 

b. to repel foreign invaders [which due to 

the limited capacity of mid-19th Century ships,

would be woefully short of cavalry; 

c. an offensive war involving limited use of 

cavalry [as in Mexico]-56 

Thus: 
It could therefore, seem that heavy cavalry
would be worse than useless for our purposes, and 
that we need only light cavalry, in the true and 
strict sense of the term. 
Since the primary purpose of such cavalry would be 

frontier security (the East, as per traditional doctrine, 
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w a s  s u p p o s e d l y  u n f i t  f o r  c o n v e n t i o n a l  mounted u n i t s ) ,  
McClellan argued t h a t :  
The t a c t i c a l  u n i t  should be s m a l l ,  t h a t  it 
may be handled wi th  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p o s s i b l e  ease and 
c e l e r i t y ,  and t h a t  it may never be broken up. The 
r e g i m e n t ,  a l s o ,  s h o u l d  b e  s m a l l ,  f o r  t h e  same 
reasons  . 
It fo l lowed t h e r e f o r e ,  t h a t :  
The  n a t u r e  of c a v a l r y  s e r v i c e  i n  t h e  United 
S t a t e s  be ing  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  from t h a t  performed 
by any i n  Europe, w e  ought no t  t o  f o l l o w  b l i n d l y  
any one system, bu t  should endeavor t o  select t h e  
good f e a t u r e s ,  and e n g r a f t  them upon a system of 
our  own.57 
S u p e r f i c i a l l y ,  M c C l e l l a n  a p p e a r e d  t o  have addressed  
many of t h e  concerns of f r o n t i e r  o f f i c e r s  as t o  t h e  need t o  
m a i n t a i n  u n i t  i n t e g r i t y  as  w e l l  a s  a u t h o r i n g  a uniquely  
American form of mounted warfare .  McClellan, however, most 
c e r t a i n l y  d i d  n o t  d e s i r e  t o  c u t  l o o s e  American c a v a l r y  
p r a c t i c e s  f rom i t s  t h e o r e t i c a l  u m b i l i c a l  co rd  t o  European 
t r a d i t i o n s  and d o c t r i n e s  of mounted warfare .  Thus, as i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  c lass ical  c a v a l r y  t h e o r y ,  McClellan wrote:  
" t h e  firearms ...'I, of a mounted format ion ,  I'...used solely 
on guard,  v e d e t t e ,  ti c., t o  g i v e  t h e  alarm, it being  t a k e n  
as a maxim t o  t r u s t  t h e  saber . "  Furthermore,  " a g a i n s t  t h e  
Ind ians  of our  p l a i n s ,  who have no sabers, t h e  f a r  r each ing  
l a n c e  would be  no d o u b t  an e f f e c t i v e  weapon; y e t  a l i g h t  
s abe r  would be about  as much so,  and fa r  less i n  t h e  w a r . " 5 8  
T h u s ,  i n  t h e  g r a n d  t r a d i t i o n  of  mounted warfare ,  t h e  
s t r e n g t h  o f  t h e  c a v a l r y  i s  a l w a y s  i n  i t s  " s p u r s  and  
sabers ."59 What McClellan, who had no expe r i ence  a t  a l l  i n  
I 
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Indian fighting, intended was not the creation of a unique 

American style of cavalry adapted to the requirements of the 

Great Plains. Rather he was clearly in the long tradition 

of professional officers, dating back to the efforts to turn 

the First Dragoons into a proper European-like mounted unit, 

who were dedicated to the classical tradition of horse 

soldiering. Thus the desire to prepare the cavalry to fight 

a "real" war with a European adversary. The adoption of 

such useless European practices as the lance or saber, as 

argued for by McClellan, demonstrated his lack of comprehen­

sion of the practical requirements of Indian fighting. 

The professional American Army approached the irksome 

task of Indian control as a non-military activity, of little 

honor, as the price for its dedications to the European-

style of war. None of the official Army manuals, cavalry or 

otherwise, up to the 1850s, had made the slightest reference 

to the unique tactical problems of Indian fighting. Rather 

the Army chose to leave such problems to the discretion of 

individual field commanders. For example, General Dabney 

Maury, recalled in the 1890s, that in the late 1850s, as a 

consequence of frontier fighting and McClellan's examination 

of contemporary cavalry doctrine, a new system of tactics 

was introduced which: 

...would enable men to dismount quickly and 
use their rifles [Sharps carbines] on foot and 
demanded also single rank formations. By this new 
system of tactics, a troops.. could be moving at 
the gallop, and when the trumpet sounded, 'Dis­
mount to fight', could halt, link their horses, 
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and be handl ing  t h e i r  r i f l e s  i n  l i n e  of b a t t l e , .  
[ w i t h i n ]  seconds 60 
W h i l e  s t a r t l i n g l y  similar t o  la ter ,  i n n o v a t i v e  Union 
c a v a l r y  p r a c t i c e ,  Maury's s t a t emen t  is  unsupported by any 
c a v a l r y  manual i n  use  i n  t h e  United S t a t e s  b e f o r e  o r  d u r i n g  
t h e  C i v i l  War. Moreover, i n  i t s  use  of d e c i d e d l y  nonstan­
dard  c a v a l r y  tact ics ,  it r e p r e s e n t e d  a clear d e p a r t u r e  from 
M c C l e l l a n ' s  e m p h a s i s  upon o r t h o d o x y  i n  mounted w a r f a r e  
p r a c t i c e .  E i t h e r  Maury w a s  r ead ing  la ter  e v e n t s  back i n t o  
h i s  h i s t o r y  ( h e  w a s  a Southern c a v a l r y  commander) o r  (more 
l i k e l y  w a s  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  growing emphasis on musketry i n  
t h i s  p e r i o d - - c o n f u s i n g  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  mounted w a r f a r e  
manuals w i th  t h e  sea t -of - the-pants ,  ad hoc c a v a l r y  p r a c t i c e  
of f r o n t i e r  commandexs.61 Only Major-General P h i l i p  Cooke, 
one of America's pre-eminent c a v a l r y  e x p e r t s  made a s p e c i f i c  
r e f e r e n c e  t o  W e s t e r n  m i l i t a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  h i s  own, 
o f f i c i a l  manual of c a v a l r y  t ac t i c s .  Y e t  Cooke wrote  no th ing  
more t h a n  such common sense  adv ice  as  t h e  need f o r  g r e a t e r  
camp s e c u r i t y ;  t h e r e  i s  no m e n t i o n  o r  e v e n  h i n t  of a 
d e t a i l e d  a n d  u n i q u e  b o d y  o f  f r o n t i e r  mounted w a r f a r e  
p r i n c i p l e s .  6 2  McClellan c l e a r l y  sugges ted  i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  
recommendations t h a t  most American f r o n t i e r  cavalrymen d i d  
not  d e f i n e  themselves  as t r u e  ho r se  s o l d i e r s  o r  cons ide red  
t h a t  t h e i r  g r u b b y  work c o n s t i t u t e d  t r u e  mounted warfare, 
Fundamentally t h e y  were l i t t l e  more t h a n  mounted gendarmes 
f o r c e d  t o  do t h e  d i r t y  work of I n d i a n  c o n t r o l .  The p r o f e s s ­
i o n a l  Army, t h e  one  d e d i c a t e d  t o  f i g h t i n g  a n  i n v a d i n g  
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European army in the classical manner of the French-Austrian 

school of war, paid scant attention to the unique require­

ments of frontier security duty. Only one American officer, 

an anonymous Captain of infantry, actually formulated a 

unique system of war to deal with the elusive and extraordi­

narily mobile Plains Indians in the Antebellum era. 

Unerringly, this author rejected the use of classical 

European tactics as being inappropriate as well as ineffec­

tual: 
It [the Army] was...warfare in a country of 

resources and of comparatively contracted space,

and for operations against forts, fieldwork, lines 

of men, communication or supply, or something that 

was accessible [which] could be found and seen.63 

The formal tradition of post-Napoleonic warfare was 

unsuited to the demands of the frontier security according 

to the Captain: 

This condition is changed; and so the system.
The change consists in the field of operations,

its extent, resources and people. It is almost 

the entire country, washed by the waters of the 

Rocky Mountains...destitute of resources, its 

people...without permanent habitation, independent

of agriculture, good hunters and horsemen and,

with few exceptions, hostile.64 

The failure of the Army to undertake a complete 

reorientation of its tactics to meet the unique problems of 

the far West, lay in the military's unshakable commitment to 

European style warfare, according to this Captain: 

Those having the power are looking across the 

Atlantic to France, waiting to adapt her practice

in similar exigencies, while our officers are at 

least the equals of the French officers, and our 

men superior. Our line officers, have no voice, 
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they bear these evils and exercise the same quiet
stoicism under: existing deficiencies which they
tolerate, the incubus, the man who shuns his duty 
or throws it on his superior, and with which they
endure their life-long exile, and we have the 
material to make, as good light cavalry and 
infantry as any in the world. France felt a 
similar need in Algeria and she has her chasseurs 
d'Afrique and spahia....G5 
It is time we acted upon our necessities. 

Europe comes to us for pistols and rifles, and we 

take back the latter, altered but not improved.66 

The assessment offered by this Captain of the limita­

tions of the French-Austrian school of war carried no weight 

in official circles. Nonetheless, this officer brilliantly 

identified and criticized the futility of applying orthodox, 

European concepts of war to the American frontier. Unlike 

McClellan's romantic, and rather simplistic call for 

traditional light cavalry and for the conversion of the 

Plains Indians into Cossacks, this Captain's remarks were 

directly attuned to the actual difficulties of frontier 

security duty. Moreover, unlike the direct importation of 

French Algerian practice in unconventional warfare, as 

embodied in Davis's great desert Indian control plan, this 

Captain's concepts reflected, instead, the very originality 

of Marshal Bugeaud in developing unorthodox tactics uniquely 

suited to North African conditions. Thus, the development 

of Indian fighting tactics uniquely designed for the Far 

West. Specifically, therefore, "the inadequacy and unfit­

ness of present organization.. .such as the injustice to 

heavy cavalry [i.e., the Dragoons] and infantry of employing 
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them to subdue a nation of mounted spies who have no home 

and leave no trace."67 The correct, and pointedly unortho­

dox method of solving the prickly problem of dealing with an 

exceedingly mobile and fleeting adversary as the Plains 

Indians, was set forth by the Captain when he wrote: 

To control these people or making a step
towards doing so,  it is proposed to do what has 
often been done before with a people to be 
conquered: take a lesson from them. Assimilate 
and equalize the two by giving to the soldier the 
horse, arms and dress of a hunter, the wont of 
which prevents his efficiency, without giving up
the present organization for attacks and self 
support groups of fours [i.e., a kind of early
fire team system adopted by some Western comman­
ders]-68 
The tactics which were in turn devised by this Captain 

constituted what could be defined as the nucleus of modern 

counterinsurgency tactics. The emphasis was on the use of 

small units, not dissimilar from today's LRPs (long range 

reconnaissance patrols) teams combined with the speed and 

endurance of the Indian dog soldiers. Specifically, he 

advocated the creation of a special, commando-like corps 

combining light infantry and light cavalry (but distinctly 

not of the usual European variety)--the former to deal with 

the Indians in mountainous terrain, the latter for pursuit 

on the Plains. The proposed armament would be principally 

breechloading carbines and revolvers plus sabers if required 

for close-quarter work.6g The record, both before and after 

the Civil War, however, reveals no instance of such strik­

ingly original tactics being employed by the Army. Thus 
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I 
I 
I 
f r o n t i e r  commanders cont inued ,  as i n  t h e  p a s t ,  t o  make do 
w i t h  t h e  e x i s t i n g ,  v e r y  i l l - s u i t e d  r e s o u r c e s  a t  t h e i r  
d i s p o s a l  i n  handl ing  f r o n t i e r  s e c u r i t y  problems. 
I n  t h e  main, du r ing  t h e  y e a r s  immediately p r i o r  t o  t h e  
C i v i l  War, t h e  o f f i c i a l ,  p r o f e s s i o n a l  Army r e d e d i c a t e d  
i t s e l f  t o  i t s  e s s e n t i a l  miss ion ,  t h e  de fense  of t h e  United 
S t a t e s  a g a i n s t  f o r e i g n  ty ranny  w i t h  t h e  d o c t r i n e s ,  weapons 
and  equipment  of t h e  French-Austrian school  of w a r  and of 
contemporary France. The advent  of r a d i c a l  t e c h n o l o g i c a l ,  
economic and s o c i a l  change w a s  l i t t l e  understood and l i t t l e  
e x p l o i t e d  i n  t h e  f i n a l  y e a r s  of t h e  Antebellum era. I n  1861 
t h e  U n i t e d  States Army would f i n d  i t s e l f  f i g h t i n g  a mass, 
i n d u s t r i a l  and  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  war of  s u r v i v a l .  This  w a s  
c l e a r l y  no t  t h e  kind of w a r  p r e d i c t e d  by e i t h e r  t h e  strate­
g i s t s  of t h e  French-Austrian school  of war or by McClellan 
i n  h i s  o f f i c i a l  x e p o r t .  The U n i t e d  S t a t e s  had  g r e a t l y  
changed  s i n c e  Calhoun's t e n u r e  as S e c r e t a r y  of War. What 
had b e e n  a minor  power,  p e r i l o u s l y  pe rched  on t h e  o u t e r  
f r i n g e s  of European c i v i l i z a t i o n  w a s  now a c o n t i n e n t a l  s i z e  
n a t i o n ,  a g rowing  commercial power, i n c r e a s i n g l y  urban i n  
i t s  s o c i a l  make-up. 
The Calhoun w a r  p o l i c y  l a y  i n  r u i n s  by t h e  mid-1850s; 
casemate s e a c o a s t  f o r t r e s s e s  and t h e  concept  of t h e  s k e l e t o n  
army were r e n d e r e d  o b s o l e t e  by t h e  deve lopment  of steam 
powered s h i p s ,  by t h e  g r e a t  improvements i n  nava l  a r t i l l e r y  
and by t h e  c o n s i d e r a b l e  w e s t w a r d  expansion of t h e  count ry .  
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Y e t  t h e  v e r y  F r e n c h - A u s t r i a n  s c h o o l  of  war was a l r e a d y  
o b s o l e t e  b e f o r e  i t s  f i r s t  t h e o r i s t s  a t tempted  t o  set i t s  
i d e a s  down on paper.  Only P r u s s i a  and General  Clausewi tz  
had f u l l y  understood t h a t  t h e  Napoleonic Wars were t r u l y  t h e  
p o r t e n t  of f u t u r e  n a t i o n a l i s t i c  t u s s l e s  be tween  warr ing  
peoples ,  dominated by ideology and by i n d u s t r y  and t echno l ­
ogy. The G u i l b e r t i a n  t a c t i c a l  r e v o l u t i o n  demolished t h e  
c a r d i n a l  m i l i t a r y  t e n e t  of Eighteenth  Century l i m i t e d  w a r  
d o c t r i n e ,  namely t h a t  one army could not  move w i t h  s u f f i ­
c i e n t  d i s p a t c h  t o  e n c i r c l e  an d e s t r o y  ano the r .  I t  had as 
w e l l  made t h e  need f o r  a F r e d e r i c k i a n ,  r o b o t - l i k e  army of 
m e r c e n a r i e s  o b s o l e t e  as  w e l l .  I n  t u r n ,  t h e  Min ie -bu l l e t  
r i f l e ,  t h e  cu lmina t ion  of t h e  g radua l  s h i f t  toward f i repower  
as  d o m i n a t i n g  t h e  b a t t l e f i e l d  s i n c e  t h e  end of t h e  Seven­
t e e n t h  C e n t u r y ,  r e n d e r e d  n o t  o n l y  t h e  f o r m a l  t a c t i c a l  
s y s t e m s  o b s o l e t e  b u t  a l s o  t h e  p r i n c i p l e s  of  command and 
l e a d e r s h i p .  And it l a u n c h e d  t h e  armies of t h e  t r a n s -
A t l a n t i c  m i l i t a r y  community on t o  t h e  f i r s t  arms race;  
weapons would be r e d e f i n e d  and improved no t  e v e r y  couple  of 
hundred  of y e a r s  o r  more as  i n  t h e  p a s t ,  b u t  now e v e r y  
f i f t e e n  o r  less. However, t o  t h e  v a s t  m a j o r i t y  of m i l i t a r y  
o f f i c e r s  and t h e o r i s t s ,  u n t i l  World War I ,  t h e  f u l l  impact 
of s u c h  r a d i c a l  change w a s  a t  b e s t ,  i l l - u n d e r s t o o d  and i n  
t h e  main ignored.  
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The An tebe l lum f r o n t i e r  e x p e r i e n c e s  of t h e  American 
c a v a l r y  had no d i r e c t  e f f e c t  upon t h e  development of mounted 
warfare  p r a c t i c e  du r ing  t h e  C i v i l  War. Both Confedera te  and 
Union ho r se  s o l d i e r s  g r a d u a l l y  adapted t o  t h e  dense woodland 
t e r r a i n  of t h e  E a s t e r n  Uni ted  S t a t e s ,  th rough t h e  use  of 
d i s m o u n t e d  tact ics .  Y e t ,  t h e  charges  and t h e  arme blanche  
c o n t i n u e d  t o  dominate formal  Confederate  and Union c a v a l r y  
p r a c t i c e  u n t i l  1864.  The s o u t h e r n e r s  achieved  more s u c c e s s  
i n i t i a l l y  due t o  t h e  s imple f a c t  t h a t  Confederate  m i l i t a r y  
commanders had t o  use  t h e i r  mounted v o l u n t e e r s  due t o  t h e  
i n i t i a l  a b s e n c e  of any m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n .  The North,  
however, b l e s s e d  ( o r  more a p t l y ,  c u r s e d )  wi th  t h e  e x i s t i n g  
A n t e b e l l u m  a rmy  o r g a n i z a t i o n  d u t i f u l l y ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  
European  c a v a l r y  d o c t r i n e ,  blocked t h e  format ion  of s ta te  
h o r s e  u n i t s .  Only p o l i t i c a l  p r e s s u r e  and t h e  demands of 
f i e l d  commanders f o r  c a v a l r y  caused t h e  m i l i t a r y ’ s  s e n i o r  
l e a d e r s h i p  t o  begrudgingly accep t  such t r o o p s .  
T h e  i n i t i a l  Southern s u p e r i o r i t y  i n  t h e  l a r g e  scale use  
o f  c a v a l r y  s t e m m e d  d i r e c t l y  f rom s u p p o r t  f rom s e n i o r  
C o n f e d e r a t e  commanders f o r  t h e i r  h o r s e  s o l d i e r s .  Thus, 
C o n f e d e r a t e  c a v a l r y  pe r fo rmed  b e t t e r  i n  t h e  f i e l d  due t o  
2 2 1  

r e t a i n i n g  t h e i r  o r g a n i z a t i o n  i n t e g r i t y  (Union reg iments ,  i n  
c o n t r a s t ,  were broken up and s c a t t e r e d  among v a r i o u s  larger 
u n i t s )  and b e t t e r  l e a d e r s h i p ,  Confederate  Capta in  John N. 
Opie  e x p r e s s e d  v e r y  w e l l  t h e  i n i t i a l  low op in ion  he ld  by 
both sou the rn  and no r the rn  m i l i t a r y  men of ho r se  s o l d i e r s .  
It w a s  t h e  custom of t h e  i n f a n t r y  t o  t a u n t  
a n d  jeer  t h e  c a v a l r y  whenever  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  
a r o s e .  They c a l l e d  them,  t h e  ' B u t t e r m i l k  Ran­
g e r s ' ,  I f  t h e  c a v a l r y  w a s  going forward,  t h e y  a l l  
c r i e d  o u t ,  ' N o  f i g h t  t o d a y ,  t h e  ' B u t t e r m i l k  
R a n g e r s '  are going t o  t h e  F r o n t ' .  I f  t h e y  were 
g o i n g  t o  t h e  rear ,  t h e y  shouted 'The Bu t t e rmi lk  
R a n g e r s '  r u n n i n g  f rom t h e  y a n k s ,  lookout  f o r  a 
b a t t l e .  70 
I t  w a s  s u c h  s t u n t s  as Colonel J e b  S t u a r t ' s  1 8 6 2  r i d e  
a r o u n d  G e n e r a l  McClellan' s Army of t h e  Potomac du r ing  t h e  
P e n i n s u l a r  campaign which g r e a t l y  improved t h e  morale of 
C o n f e d e r a t e  c a v a l r y .  I n  t u r n ,  rebel  h o r s e  u n i t s  won a 
measure of suppor t  from s e n i o r  Confederate  g e n e r a l s .  Y e t ,  
t h e  South f a i l e d  t o  develop any advances i n  c a v a l r y  tact ics ;  
h o r s e  s o l d i e r s  were w a s t e d  on u n p r o d u c t i v e  r a i d s .  Such 
e x p e r i e n c e s - - h a r d  c h a r g i n g  u n i t s  s c o r i n g  a few q u i c k  
successes- - i s  bu t  of l i t t l e  s u b s t a n t i a l  m i l i t a r y  va lue .  Only 
t h e  C o n f e d e r a t e  g u e r i l l a  leader ,  Genera l  Bedford F o r r e s t  
d e v e l o p e d  a form of  h i g h l y  mobile mounted i n f a n t r y  as an  
a l t e r n a t i v e  t o  or thodox c a v a l r y  tact ics .  The t r a d i t i o n a l  
l ack  of  f i r e p o w e r  of h o r s e  s o l d i e r s  and  t h e  l o g i s t i c a l  
p r o b l e m s  o f  s u p p o r t i n g  a c a v a l r y  f i e l d  f o r c e  c r i p p l e d  
F o r r e s t ' s  e f f o r t s  a t  d e v i s i n g  a h i g h l y  mobile Confedera te  
s t r i ke  fo rce .71  
I 
I 
I 
I 
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In 1864, during the wilderness campaign, General 

Sheridan radically altered Union military practice. 

Essentially his thrust toward Richmond was not a raid, 

rather, his sole purpose was to draw out and destroy 

Confederate mounted units. The real break-through in Union 

cavalry, came with Brevet Major-General James Harrison 

Wilson. Incredibly, only twenty-three years old, in 

December, 1864, during the Battle of Nashville, Wilson's 

cavalry forces, fighting both mounted and dismounted and 

exploiting the enormous fire power of their seven-shot 

Spencer carbines, played the key role in annihilating 

General Hood's invading army. The culmination of Union 

innovative cavalry tactics was Wilson's 1865 Selma expedi­

tion. Combining firepower and mobility with the simple 

Napoleonic logistical solution of living off the land, 

Wilson's cavalry army destroyed the last major industrial 

center of the confederacy, crushed Forrest's army and 

captured Selma, protected by some of the most formidable 

defenses of the Civil War.7* While there was no direct link 

to the Antebellum army's frontier experience, the innova­

tions of Wilson were of the same sort as earlier army 

officers' ad hoc solutions to the difficulties of western 

and southeastern border control. Thus while the French-

Austrian school of war, overall failed during the course of 

the Civil War, professionalism allowed for the development 

of innovative and dedicated officers. 
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